This article examines the large interstate variation in levels of unconventional gas development in the U.S. states. The following hypotheses are advanced to predict whether a state will be predisposed toward development: (H1) the availability of unconventional gas reserves; (H2) the availability of infrastructure to support development; (H3) a recent history of conventional oil and gas development; (H4) Republican party control of the Governor's office and state legislature; (H5) relatively low sensitivity to environmental issues; (H6) regulatory systems that treat UGD as a variant of conventional gas development; (H7) a pressing need for economic benefits as indicated by state and local measures of household income, unemployment and poverty; (H8) and public opinion supportive of development. To various degrees, each of the hypotheses is supported but important exceptions and surprises are uncovered in the qualitative and semi-quantitative analyses. Future research should continue the effort to explain the variation of development by expanding the geographical scope of inquiry and enlarging the sample of jurisdictions.

Modern financial law historically emerged as a patchwork of regulatory reactions to a series of financial crises. It continued to develop in sync with the ebb and flow of regulatory cycles that oscillated between periods of calm, conducive to a deregulatory frenzy, and periods of crises followed by re-regulatory fervour. Reform initiatives spurring in reaction to crises also comprise procedural/institutional reforms (i.e. those relating to the “who” and “how” of regulation, as opposed to the “what”). The latest financial crisis is no exception to this rule. This article focuses on the EU institutional reforms, which arguably represent a more radical departure from the status quo (in comparison to domestic or international initiatives) in that they involve an instance of “proper” institution-building with implications across different levels of governance. This reform is examined first against the backdrop of the existing EU agencies' legal framework and is found to constitute an important milestone in the crystallization of this framework. A closer look is then taken at the new European Supervisory Authorities' role in EU rulemaking, and to their relationship with the European Commission. Subsequently, the paper takes a further step back and offers some thoughts about the continuously mutating relationship between law and new governance practices, as illustrated in the context of EU financial regulation.

Attempts at suitable identification of a generally accepted definition of a ‘nanomaterial’ have been going on in Europe and worldwide for some time. Definitions are important from a regulatory perspective as “they assist in establishing the subject matter and scope of what is to be regulated”. However, considering the complexities associated with nanoscience and also the differing opinions on various definitions, this has not been an easy task. Reaching an agreement on fundamental terms and definitions such as ‘nanotechnology’, ‘nanoparticle’, ‘nanoscale’, and a ‘nanomaterial’ is both complex and contested. To date, there is no internationally recognised and accepted definition of a ‘nanomaterial’ even though several definitions have been discussed and proposed by national authorities, scientific committees, international organisations, and other bodies.

Before the Treaty of Lisbon, EU agencies were unknown in the EU's primary law defined procedural law. Today, following (i) the Treaty's entry into force, (ii) the Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies and (iii) the European Court of Justice's ruling in Short–selling it is interesting to take a look at the peculiar position of EU agencies under the EU's primary and secondary law defined procedural law.

The free movement of goods is a fundamental principle under EU law: a product lawfully manufactured and/or marketed in one Member State is, in principle, entitled to be marketed in another EU Member State. Indeed, Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits any quantitative restrictions on imports between Member States and all measures having equivalent effect.

Over the past years, a series of milk crises in China — culminating in the melamine milk scandal in 2008 — have seriously undermined public confidence in food safety. Drawing on international experience to strengthen its regulatory system, China recently introduced elements of risk assessment in its two main Food Safety Laws, namely the Law on the Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products and the Food Safety Law, which represent its basic legislation and institutional framework in terms of food safety. The article explores this new Chinese risk assessment framework in an international context. Specifically, given the similarities between the melamine milk scandal in China and the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in Europe in the 1990s in terms of both severity and link to respective corresponding reforms, much of the article focuses on a comparison of the food risk assessment institutions of the two jurisdictions in the aftermath of the crises.

Recent calls for transparency targeted towards regulatory bodies such as the US Food and Drug Administration has prompted investigation into the indubitable adoption of such measures. Specifically, the FDA's quarterly postings of AERS (Adverse Event Reporting System) signals on its CDER (Center for Drug Evaluation and Research) website, stemming from FDAAA legislation introduced in September 2007, is analysed from a risk perception and communication perspective. This paper consists of two qualitative studies examining public perceptions and subsequent reported behaviour related to increased transparency. Interviews were conducted on two separate samples of seventy respondents in both Pittsburgh and New York City. The results found that signals postings may prove counter productive in terms of increased public alarm and early or inappropriate termination of a drug appearing on the list. We also found communication from the FDA perceived as inaccessible or confusing, particularly that the AERS signals are posted strictly on the web, while the majority of our respondents cited their primary and secondary media sources as broadcast television. We recommend that the FDA reconsider its communication strategy of AERS to the public as it may prove to be a ‘transparency step too far.’

GATT Article III:4 aims at equal treatment in respect of competitive opportunities of imports and competing domestic products by preventing protectionism. A key question is whether regulations with heavier burdens on imported products than on domestic products and a valid regulatory purpose are consistent with Article III:4. Inquiry into regulatory purpose under Article III:4 would allow by-passing Article XX whose list of regulatory objectives is a closed one and which puts the burden of proof on the defending WTO member. In EC-Seal Products, the Appellate Body has rejected any role for the regulatory purpose inquiry under Article III:4. This article shows why a purely empirical definition of likeness and less favourable treatment as disparate impact cannot logically lead to a finding of a violation of Article III:4. It then argues that regulatory purpose continues to play a role under Article III:4 because of the centrality of the notion of competition. It proposes to frame that competition as perfect competition. It shows that the adoption of perfect competition as the evaluative benchmark for all of Article III:4 makes better legal sense than starting from imperfect competition for the likeness analysis and perfect competition for the less favourable treatment standard, as is proposed in the literature. It also shows that even in case where imperfect competition is used as the sole benchmark for both parts of Article III:4, an assessment of how regulation interacts with competition continues to play some role.

This report addresses the legal concept of “self-evident” and “flagrantly misleading” advertising established in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers (hereinafter, the Food Information Regulation, FIR). Since 13 December 2014 (since the specific origin of vegetable oils must be declared), “palm oil-free” claims on, e.g., a product containing sunflower oil or any other vegetable oil (and mandatorily indicating it in the list of ingredients) are arguably obvious, unnecessary and irrelevant (and in legal terms “selfevident” and “flagrantlymisleading”). Compared to similar foods that possess the same characteristics, but do not claim to be “palm oil-free”, these products are in no way “special”.

Like some other crises and scandals that periodically occur in the business community, the Volkswagen (“VW”) scandal once again highlights the devastating consequences of corporate misconduct, once publicly disclosed, and the media storm that generally follows the discovery of such significant misbehaviour by a major corporation. Since the crisis broke in September 2015, the media have relayed endless details about the substantial negative impacts on VW, on various stakeholder groups such as employees, directors, investors, suppliers and consumers, and on the automobile industry as a whole.1 The multiple and negative repercussions at the economic, organizational and legal levels have quickly become apparent, in particular in the form of resignations, changes in VW's senior management, layoffs, a hiring freeze, the end to the marketing of diesel-engined vehicles, vehicle recalls, a decline in car sales, a drop in market capitalization, and the launching of internal investigations by VW and external investigations by the public authorities.

Case T-29/05, Deltafina SpA v. Commission and Alliance One International, Inc., formerly Standard Commercial Corp. and Others v. Commission

The General Court partially annuls the Commission's decision on Case COMP/C.38.238/B.2 and reduces the amount of the fine imposed by the Commission on Deltafina SpA from EUR 1 188 000 to EUR 6 120 000 (author's headnote).

Many European countries, including Switzerland, share deep suspicions about the broad commercial application of Genetically Modified Plants (GMP) in agriculture. Research in GMP, however, is mostly welcome. In Switzerland, nevertheless, an overprotective legal framework against risks of GMP results in regulatory spillovers for research. This article explores how such expanded legal protection in combination with the application of a strong precautionary principle hampers freedom of research in the field of green gene technology. The authors do not seek, on this occasion, to question the general risk assessment of Swiss legislators and their desire for a high level of protection. However, field trials with GMP will cease to take place if the procedural burdens for researchers are not reduced. In particular, it will be vital to establish research zones (“protected sites”) if research in GMP is to continue to take place in Switzerland.

On the face of it, ‘better regulation’ sounds like a concept that no one could object to. But in contrast to past attempts to cut red tape for business and thus reduce unnecessary bureaucracy, the objective of the Juncker Commission's Better Regulation Agenda is to reduce “regulatory burden”.

The package, adopted on May 9th 2015, foresees the establishment of an impressive apparatus and toolbox for implementing the Agenda. Existing structures and procedures, such as the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and the Impact Assessment Guidelines, are being modified, and new elements such as the two REFIT Platforms, one for stakeholders and one for Member States, and the new Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making, will be introduced.

The Agenda raises many questions and concerns From the perspective of a public interest organisation such as The European Consumer Organisation (BEUC). Several aspects of this new institutional and procedural architecture suggest that it is not designed to provide society–wide benefits by generating better regulation for all. Rhetoric about the need to reduce costs is the dominant theme throughout the entire package, framed by the ‘jobs and growth’ narrative.

Over a decade ago I was involved in a group project that focused on developing a regulatory model concerning the implementation of the precautionary principle in the EU. The project involved a number of workshops and in those workshops I used to joke about the fact that while there were many different frameworks being produced to represent risk regulation, these diagrams basically fell into two different categories. In the first category there were those diagrams that characterised risk regulation as a linear process involving usually a scientific process of risk assessment and then political processes of risk management and risk communication. In the second category there were those diagrams that had lots of looping arrows going all over the place that represented the fact that risk regulation was an iterative process that constantly involved many scientific, socio-political and other inputs.

Behind my joking was a sense of hope. The linear diagrams did have their minimalist appeal, but the messy diagrams captured much of the reality of this area of regulatory practice.

This section aims at updating readers on the latest developments of risk-related aspects of food law at EU level, giving information on legislation and case law on various matters, such as food safety, new diseases, animal health and welfare and food labelling.

Collection and provision of scientific information for policy and decision-making is particularly important during emergencies or when uncertainty and ambiguity creates situation of fear and anxiety. This article offers two suggestions for addressing natural or technology risks, leveraging research by the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) and project contributors. The first advice is that concepts and instruments for risk governance be recognised and used as intermediation between evidence and policy. The second is that the role of the Chief Scientific Adviser in public sector organisations includes those of the Chief Risk Officer. These suggestions could help address the challenge for policymakers to deal with uncertainty and emergency, when little or contradictory evidence is available.

This report discusses the main provisions of the recently adopted WHO Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. While recognizing the remarkable achievement of the global community in its efforts to curb illicit trade in tobacco products at the international level, the report also highlights those aspects of the Protocol that may undermine its effectiveness in the long–term perspective. In this context the enforcement capabilities of developing countries are cited as a main concern.

“The Court considers that the Commission should give due consideration to the principles of clarity of objectives, simplification, realism, transparency and accountability when designing new and revising existing interventions.”

Responding to public fears and the loss of confidence in the aftermath of several food safety crises in the 1990s and 2000s, more and more regulatory laws have increasingly been affected by the precautionary principle. To clarify how those developments can have adverse consequences, we discuss two very different cases. First, at the molecular level we discuss the problems the system encounters by strictly applying the linear no-threshold (LNT) at low doses model, which was adopted in response to fears about the effects of ionizing radiations. Second, at a global scale, we discuss the problems associated with the precautionary regulation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregistered Fisheries that came into effect January 1, 2010. The technical aspects of food safety testing and their impacts are perhaps unknown to policy makers but they do dominate safety decisions. Both examples show that strict application of the precautionary principle produce deleterious side effects, which go against the very policy values that the precautionary regulation should protect. We show, in particular, that overly precautionary food safety regulation may harm food security. We conclude in the EU and other Western nations, problems of food security are much more relevant to human health and life expectancy than food safety. We recommend that current food safety regulation based on the precautionary risk-regulation reflex should normatively be re-evaluated with a complete regard for the values of food security – both within and outside the EU.