By now one might hope that the robust body of theoretical work recently published on immigration ethics would have taken general political philosophy a long way from the prevailing Rawlsian-style insularity premise, according to which society is “a closed system isolated from other societies” into which persons “enter only by birth and exit only by death.” But there are still a great many political theorists whose focus is unreflectively endogenous and who assume away questions of states’ constitutive scope and boundaries. One of the signal merits of David Miller's new book, Strangers in Our Midst, is that it lucidly demonstrates why ignoring state boundary constitution is untenable for political theory. Miller shows that foundational debates in political philosophy are inescapably related, both as premise and entailment, to many normative immigration questions.

The future for people becoming displaced due to climate processes is still unknown. The effects of climate change are more apparent every day, and those most acutely impacted are still unable to access an appropriate legal remedy for their woes. Two new books evaluate the limits to international legal protections and the application of justice. Climate Change, Disasters, and the Refugee Convention, by Matthew Scott, investigates the assumptions underpinning the dichotomy between refugees and those facing adversity due to climate-induced disasters. Climate Change and People on the Move: International Law and Justice, by Fanny Thornton, goes further by examining how justice is used—and curtailed—by international instruments of protection. Thornton's legal analysis is thorough and thoughtful, but also demonstrative of the limitations of justice when confined by historical precedent and political indifference. With so little still being done to hold industries to account, is it any surprise that the legal system is not yet ready to protect those harmed by carbon pollution? Demanding justice for climate displacees is an indictment of modern Western economics and development; it implicates entire national lifestyles and the institutions and people that support them.

Human rights is one of three issues addressed by the Helsinki Accord, alongside security and trade matters. In the mid-seventies the accord was greeted with enthusiasm by the Soviet Union, which saw it as a means to reduce the U.S. presence in Europe. The United States, which played a limited role in drafting the accord, feared it might result in a betrayal of the various nationalities of Eastern Europe by its tacit acceptance of Soviet territorial arrangements. Over the next ten years the human rights section of the accord would become a central point of contention between the superpowers. Korey traces the evolution of the dispute and discusses Gorbachev's uneven attempts to improve the Soviet Union's recognition of human rights.

In Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine, Ned Dobos highlights several negative consequences the preparation for war has for individuals and states. But he misses what I consider perhaps the most significant consequence of military mobilization for states, especially democracies: how war and the preparation for it affect deliberative politics. While many argue that all states, including democracies, require strong militaries—and there is some evidence that long wars can build democracies and states—I focus on the other effects of militarization and war on democratic states. War and militarism are antipodal to democracy and undermine it. Their normative bases are conflicting—democracy takes force off the table, whereas force is legitimate in war. Thus, while militarism and militarization can sometimes yield liberalization and the expansion of civil rights, they are arguably more likely to undermine democratic norms and practices.

As part of the roundtable, “The Responsibility to Protect in a Changing World Order: Twenty Years since Its Inception,” this essay asks the reader to consider the role that trust, distrust, and ambivalence play in enabling and constraining the use of force under pillar three of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). Drawing on interdisciplinary studies on trust, it analyzes the 2011 military intervention in Libya for evidence on how trust, distrust, and ambivalence help explain the positions taken by member states on the United Nations Security Council. In so doing, it challenges the mainstream view that the fallout over Libya represents a shift from trust to distrust. We find this binary portrayal problematic for three reasons. First, it fails to take into account the space in between trust and distrust, which we categorize as ambivalence and use to make sense of the position of Russia and China. Second, it is important to recognize the role of bounded trust, as those that voted in favor of going into Libya did so on certain grounds. Third, it overemphasizes the political fallout, as six of the ten elected member states continued to support the intervention. Learning lessons from this case, we conclude that it is highly unlikely that the Security Council will authorize the use of force to fulfill the RtoP anytime soon, which may have detrimental implications for the RtoP as a whole.

This article presents a new understanding of the problem of cosmopolitan motivation in war, comparing it to the motivational critique of social justice cosmopolitanism. The problem of cosmopolitanism's “motivational gap” is best interpreted as a political one, not a meta-ethical or ethical one. That is, the salient issue is not whether an individual soldier is able to be motivated by cosmopolitan concerns, nor is it whether being motivated by cosmopolitanism would be too demanding. Rather, given considerations of legitimacy in the use of political power, a democratic army has to be able to motivate its soldiers to take on the necessary risks without relying on coercion alone. Patriotic identification offers a way to achieve this in wars of national defense, but less so in armed humanitarian interventions (AHIs). Two potential implications are that either AHIs should be privatized or that national armies should be transformed to become more cosmopolitan.

In its seventy-fifth year, the UN needs to reflect more seriously on its value in the current global scenario, the current flow of ideas, and the current flow of power that is prevalent in the world. It is important to recall that the UN was founded after World War II as a way of addressing conflict at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield. Negotiating peace, attempting to provide some form of justice, and affirmation of human rights seemed to be the aspiration. It is within this context that women engaged in affirming their own special location in society and economy. However, over the years the UN has revealed its inability to fulfill these goals. Perhaps in the midst of all these failures, the only category of people that has drawn strength from the UN, but now has to leave it behind, are women. Scattered as they were across a world of distances, women of different cultures and classes found strength in numbers and, through the UN system and the conferences they convened, became a power of their own. As part of the special issue on “The United Nations at Seventy-Five: Looking Back to Look Forward,” this essay argues that today, however, women do not need and cannot have their aspirations be facilitated by the UN, because in their engagement with one another they have also recognized their differences. Being of similar gender does not necessarily overcome other oppressive differences.

Human rights and conflict resolution have been traditionally perceived as two separate fields, with contradictory principles and conflicting approaches toward achieving peace. This essay aims to understand these two fields in a more integrative way, showing how a human rights perspective can enrich the theory and practice of conflict resolution. It clarifies the main characteristics of a human rights approach to conflict resolution and identifies a set of human rights standards guiding its implementation: a normative legal framework; structural conditions for peace; participation and inclusion; and accountability and redress. The essay also briefly applies a human rights approach to the Colombian peace process and to the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The conclusion addresses one of the main criticisms of this approach and its principal challenges.

“The PLO practice of hiding behind civilians has produced severe tests for the IDF [Israeli Defense Force].” Have Israeli soldiers abandoned their moral obligations in war during the time of Intifada? The moral code of the “purity” of arms (tohar haneshek) has served as an absolute standard for the Israeli Army since the creation of Israel. The author emphasizes that although televised beatings of Palestinian women and children have caused an outcry, it would be unrealistic to hold Israeli soldiers to the same moral standards given the political situation; hence the IDF cannot be criticized for having committed some immoral acts under the unique circumstances of the intifada. The Israeli Defense Force has not abandoned its tohar haneshek and has maintained its commitment to moral values in national and international behavior.

As the following papers demonstrate, Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars continues to provoke thought and debate two decades after its publication. The book remains widely taught in college courses and is cited whenever the morality of war is discussed. It is appropriate, then, to celebrate the book's twentieth anniversary by reconsidering its arguments in light of what we have learned in the intervening years

The papers were discussed at a symposium hosted by the Carnegie Council in May 1996 and have been revised to take account of the conversation that occurred there. David Hendrickson takes issue with the book's criticism of realism, pointing to realist elements in Walzer's own argument. Theodore Koontz provides a careful analysis of some problems in Walzer's treatment of the noncombatant immunity principle. Both papers deal with the tension in Walzer's book between a morality of rights and a morality of consequences, a tension that Joseph Boyle illuminates in his contribution. And in a paper inspired by the symposium debate, Michael Joseph Smith provides an appreciation that serves as a readable introduction to the issues considered by the other contributors. Finally, Michael Walzer responds in what, if past is prologue, won't be the last word on the argument of Just and Unjust Wars.

Is the revocation of citizenship—a policy increasingly adopted by democratic states—a violation of democratic principles? In an article published in the Spring 2016 issue of this journal, I argued that it is. A true commitment to the best understanding of democratic citizenship does not permit the revocation of some citizens’ status by others. David Miller and Ben Herzog are unconvinced. Elizabeth Cohen agrees that revocation is a violation of democratic principle, but argues that my defense of this claim leaves room for it nevertheless. These thoughtful critiques raise two questions to which I would like to respond: (1) What is the nature of citizenship in democratic states? (2) What can legitimately be done by democracies to protect themselves?

The Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative is the largest multilateral effort aimed at providing debt relief. In this essay, we address the question of whether this program is consistent with a view of justice commonly known as liberal egalitarianism. We argue that the HIPC initiative violates two basic liberal egalitarian principles. More generally, we show why the debate on debt relief must move beyond a discussion of whether or not countries should be held responsible for their sovereign debt. We urge a more careful and broader classification of which of the factors affecting a country's situation it should be held responsible for and which it should not. While there are good arguments for sometimes not holding poor countries responsible for their sovereign debt, it is hard to see why the same arguments should not also apply to many other factors that affect a country's net disposable income.

In soliciting these articles, the editors of Ethics & International Affairs asked authors to respond to several questions. First, preemptive and preventive uses of force are often justified by claiming either that there is substantial risk of a future attack or that it is difficult to ascertain how dangerous the target is. Under what conditions does the existence of risk and uncertainty about possible threats license the use of military force? Second, what consultative procedures should be required in order to legitimate the preventive or preemptive use of force? There exist both domestic and international institutions that constrain the use of military force, but which, if any, should be granted authority to block or authorize military actions of these kinds? Third, if preemptive or preventive military action is taken, what jus in bello criteria apply? Are there different and perhaps more stringent jus in bello criteria if states act preemptively?