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Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Christopher Hookway
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Abstract

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Miranda Fricker's important study of epistemic injustice is focussed primarily on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. It explores how agents' capacities to make assertions and provide testimony can be impaired in ways that can involve forms of distinctively epistemic injustice. My paper identifies a wider range of forms of epistemic injustice that do not all involve the ability to make assertions or offer testimony. The paper considers some examples of some other ways in which injustice can prevent someone from participating in inquiry.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , June 2010 , pp. 151 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

References

REFERENCES

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