

SOME VARIETIES OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: REFLECTIONS  
ON FRICKER

ABSTRACT

Miranda Fricker's important study of epistemic injustice is focussed primarily on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. It explores how agents' capacities to make assertions and provide testimony can be impaired in ways that can involve forms of distinctively epistemic injustice. My paper identifies a wider range of forms of epistemic injustice that do not all involve the ability to make assertions or offer testimony. The paper considers some examples of some other ways in which injustice can prevent someone from participating in inquiry.

I.

Miranda Fricker's book *Epistemic Injustice* (2007) identifies some important forms of epistemic injustice, illustrating them through impressive close accounts of particular examples, mostly taken from films and novels. Her aim is to find distinctive forms of personal wrong that are both epistemological and forms of injustice. She is not simply applying conceptions of justice familiar from ethics and political philosophy to the particular case of our dealings with knowledge, perhaps by showing that knowledge or the resources we make use of in acquiring knowledge are unfairly distributed. Rather, Fricker claims to have identified forms of injustice that are somehow intrinsically epistemic, that can only be understood through studying their manifestations in cases that involve knowledge or other epistemic phenomena. In doing this she offers a framework for thinking about distinctively *epistemological* wrongs.

This provides an approach to a kind of virtue epistemology that is genuinely helpful in understanding concrete cases that are of moral and political importance. In doing this, she provides explanations of how stereotypes and prejudices can generate epistemic injustice. She also explains how such injustice can be damaging to its victim, especially when injustice results from stereotypes associated with features that determine the victim's identity, for example, race and gender. Her account of how epistemic injustice arises (and how it can be overcome) provides a framework for thinking about distinctively epistemic virtues and vices. It also provides illuminating explanations of how this can give rise to damaging prejudice.

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The passages in which she discusses the virtues that are required if we are to avoid or overcome these injustices might have a place in a defence of virtue epistemology, but it is not clear that a systematic defence of virtue epistemology is what she intends. She may instead be concerned with the ethics of practices that also provide a focus for epistemic evaluation; she need not see the epistemic evaluations and the ethical evaluations as intrinsically connected.

Fricker has provided compelling accounts of two kinds of epistemic injustice, ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutic injustice’. Someone is a victim of *hermeneutic injustice* when they lack the resources, usually conceptual resources, that are required for formulating important problems or for addressing them systematically. In Fricker’s example, someone who lacks the concept of *sexual harassment* may be incapacitated from being able to understand or describe what is happening to them when they are victims of such behaviour (150–2). *Testimonial injustice* need not involve any lack of conceptual resources. Rather, it arises when someone lacks credibility: their assertions are not accepted by those to whom they are directed, and they are treated as lacking what is required to be a reliable informant. Moreover, someone may be treated as lacking credibility, not because they have been observed to be unreliable in representative cases in the past, but rather because this is the result of the application of stereotypes, for example, gender or racial stereotypes.

Why are these forms of injustice described as *epistemic*? The epistemic character of testimonial injustice is grounded in the fact that when we offer testimony, we present ourselves as possessing knowledge of the propositions that we assert to be true. If we fail to recognize the force of someone’s testimony, we fail to recognize them as capable of obtaining and transmitting knowledge. It is thus natural to assume that an account of testimonial injustice provides the core of an account of phenomena that are characterized as potential impediments to knowledge and to our ability to make claims to knowledge. Something similar holds for hermeneutic injustice: if we lack the conceptual resources required for understanding propositions with a particular subject matter, for example, propositions about sexual harassment, then we are not in a position to obtain and transmit knowledge that has this subject matter.

In the case of hermeneutic injustice, someone lacks the conceptual resources for understanding and using certain propositions; and in the case of testimonial injustice, they are treated as lacking the ability to make reliable assertions using those propositions. Are these the only important kinds of epistemic injustice that we need to recognize? In this paper, I shall argue that there are other kinds of epistemic injustice. We can be victims of epistemic injustice without making assertions and claims to knowledge, and without suffering from conceptual impoverishment. Moreover, taking account of these cases draws attention to some important ranges of phenomena in which people are victims of discrimination. A further advantage of exploring this wider range of epistemic injustices is that it enables us to formulate a general understanding of epistemic injustice that explains

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what is common to the cases described by Fricker and the others that I will consider.

For Fricker, then, testimonial injustice is an important kind of epistemic injustice, and the victim of testimonial injustice suffers from a deficit of credibility (17). In testimonial exchanges, ‘the hearer must make some attribution of credibility regarding the speaker’ and normally, when the hearer makes a low estimate of the speaker’s credibility, this will be ‘disadvantageous’ to the speaker (18). Such injustice has as its primary effect the fact that someone is prevented from being recognized as, or prevented from being, a knower, as someone who can possess knowledge that they can pass on to other people: the victim is ‘*wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower*’ (18; italics original). And by page 28, she is able to identify the ‘systematic’ central case of testimonial injustice: ‘The speaker sustains such a testimonial injustice if and only if she received a credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice in the hearer; so the central case of testimonial injustice is *identity-prejudicial credibility deficit*.’ This is illustrated through the example of the film *The Talented Mr Ripley*, where the victim of epistemic injustice, Marge Sherwood, is not taken seriously when she offers information, when she tries to be a source of testimony. It is evident that such cases are important—perhaps they are the most important cases. It is also clear that when someone has the experience of not being taken seriously as a source of information, they can lose their confidence in their ability to obtain and transmit knowledge. It is easy to see how such injustice is intrinsically epistemic: we offer testimony by making assertions; assertions are understood as expressing knowledge; and the victim of epistemic injustice is not recognized as able to express (and perhaps possess) knowledge.

My concern is that the resources we make use of in exercising our epistemic agency are richer and more varied than is often supposed. The assertions that we make and the concepts we deploy are among the things that contribute to the epistemic value of our contributions, but they are not the only actions and capacities that do so. Someone may not be credited as sufficiently trustworthy as an ‘epistemic agent’, and this judgement may reflect identity prejudices, even if their evaluation as unreliable is not made in the context of a straightforward testimonial exchange. Taking account of this should lead to a more sophisticated account of the sorts of virtues a hearer should possess if injustice is to be kept at bay. But it also helps to draw attention to kinds of prejudice and roles for stereotypes that will welcome further investigation. In the following section, we describe some cases that might support Fricker’s approach: although the injustice they involve is not straightforwardly testimonial, it is best understood by reference to the testimonial case. Indeed, we may feel that such cases are not a really ‘intrinsically epistemic’ kind of injustice. The remainder of the paper explores some cases that appear to be genuinely ‘intrinsically epistemic’ forms of injustice but that do not involve testimonial exchanges and, thus, cannot be understood in terms of testimonial injustice or hermeneutic injustice.

We can describe cases where wrongs result from identity prejudices and where the manifestations of those wrongs include the impairment of the victim's epistemic achievements, but which are not explained in terms of a lack of conceptual resources or a direct obstacle to making claims to knowledge that will be taken seriously. Consider, for example, a research scientist whose ability to complete her projects is impeded by a shortage of child care, or an inability to obtain research grants, or, perhaps, a reluctance or slowness in making grant applications. It is easy to see how, even in this case, the impediments could be the result of prejudicial stereotypes; and it is also easy to see that they can result in the agent being prevented from being in a position to be recognized as (or to recognize herself as) a knower. She is prevented from coming to know things that otherwise she might discover. Moreover, such experiences may damage the agent's own self-conception: if she expects that her research plans will be thwarted by such impediments, she may not be able to see herself as someone whose fundamental projects involve pushing back the frontiers of knowledge.

Fricker is concerned with the possibility that there is 'a distinctively epistemic kind of injustice' (1), which indicates that her topic concerns kinds of injustice that can only arise in epistemic contexts. If we did not share information and engage in discussions, these sorts of injustice would not arise. The example I described does not have this character. An unfair lack of child care can have harmful effects upon someone's projects, whatever those projects may be. The fact that the person I described was engaged in scientific research, rather than some other project, was not relevant to the fact that she suffered injustice. In such cases, the agent is prevented from achieving her goals effectively; and if the case I described can be described as 'epistemic injustice', this is merely because the goals in question happen to be epistemic.

Wholly parallel phenomena could arise in cases where the goal in question is not epistemic at all. It might be argued that it is a contingent matter that a lack of child care facilities provides an obstacle to the pursuit of one's epistemic goals, while the lack of the concepts needed to understand the issues we want to address is somehow constitutive of our being in an impoverished epistemic position. In a similar way, someone who lacks the capacity to make assertions that will be taken seriously already lacks capacities that are required for them to be active members of an epistemic community at all. When asked why we might think that the lack of child care facilities leads to wrongs that have an epistemic dimension, we would have to appeal to the fact that the injustices in question stand in the way of our subject being able to perform epistemic acts such as making assertions or making claims to knowledge. The injustice interferes with the possession of *means* for achieving goals that happen to be epistemic. But the wrong is not intrinsically epistemic because it could interfere with the pursuit of other goals too and because it does not consist in something that is *constitutive* of being engaged in epistemic activities.

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However, this example is valuable because it reminds us that much of the time our engagement with the epistemic involves participation in goal directed activities, not just in making assertions, communicating information, or using our conceptual resources to formulate problems and propositions. If we want to find a focus for other forms of genuinely epistemic injustice, we need to see how injustice can be manifested in obstacles to someone's ability to engage in practices that are constitutive of activities that are distinctively epistemic. I shall now explore some examples that fit this description.

### 3.

The first example involves a poor teacher whose behaviour in dealing with a student can be seen to manifest a kind of epistemic injustice, shaped by a prejudicial use of a stereotype of a student. The teacher is engaging in discussion with her pupil, perhaps discussing a philosophical issue. When the student asks for information, the teacher happily provides that information. Moreover, when the student announces that she does not understand some argument or that she has trouble reading a difficult text, her testimony is readily accepted and her request for information is met. However, when the student raises a question which is not a request for information, and is apparently intended as a contribution to continuing debate or discussion, then the teacher makes a presumption of irrelevance and ignores the question or takes things over and construes the question as a request for information that is loosely related to the question asked. In this case, the student is not treated as a potential participant in discussion but just as someone who can ask for and provide information. And this is based upon a stereotypical view of the value of student contributions to debate. It is assumed that it is not possible to make progress by sensitively identifying what the student is trying to say, helping her to get her ideas into focus, and generally helping the student to improve her mastery of skills that will help her to participate in collaborative inquiry or discussion. Due to prejudice, the teacher fails to respect the student as a potential contributor to discussion (or participant in discussion). The student, who wished to be recognized as a member of a community of people collaborating in the attempt to improve understanding or advance knowledge, cannot be recognized in that way. The result is that the student can no longer think of herself as a participant in inquiry and discussion. What is important in this case is that the leader *fails to take the student's questions seriously*. Asking a question is not an assertion; it is not intended as an expression of knowledge, and it need not even be a request for information. It can also be a move undertaken as a contribution to a collaborative activity, albeit one whose character is epistemic; it is the sort of activity that has to be regulated in accord with *epistemic* norms.

Reflecting on this example enables us to identify two different perspectives, two ways of thinking about epistemic agents.<sup>1</sup> The first, which I shall call the 'participant perspective', is involved when we think of the student as trying to participate in activities such as discussion, inquiry, deliberation, and so on.

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The student may suffer an injustice because, under the influence of damaging stereotypes, the teacher fails to recognize the student as a possible participant. Participating is not just a matter of exchanging information: it involves asking questions, floating ideas, considering alternative possibilities, and so on. The second way of thinking about epistemic agents, which I shall call the ‘informational perspective’, involves seeing the student as a potential recipient or source of information. When we take this perspective, we encounter people making assertions, recognizing (or failing to recognize) other people’s authority to make assertions, and so on. In the case I have described, the student is wronged, not because the teacher refuses to give credence to his testimony, but rather because the teacher refuses to recognize him as a participant in debate or discussion.

We can consider another, albeit related, kind of example. Consider a student who is reluctant to ask questions in class, perhaps due to shyness. The initial manifestation of this will be simply that the student does not ask questions of clarification or ask questions intended to elicit information from the teacher. Once the teacher ceases to expect (or even hope for) questions from this student, then the habit of silence may become more entrenched with time. And if the teacher associates such silence with students of a particular gender, or with students with other distinctive, highly visible characteristics, the expectation of such silence may lead (not necessarily with the aid of shyness) to the acquisition of a habit of not asking questions. Injustice may be involved in the acquisition of such habits. And the injustice acquires an epistemic flavour when the resulting habits prevent the agent from contributing to inquiry and deliberation. It is a product of injustice that the student will not be able to ask the questions that are required if one is to contribute to the success of collaborative deliberation and inquiry.

The reader of Fricker’s book could easily come away with the impression that when we study epistemic injustice, we only need to take account of its impact upon people’s abilities to transmit knowledge to other people or receive information from them. In doing this, we take up what I have called the informational perspective: epistemic interactions are all concerned with the possession and transmission of information or knowledge from one person to another. Fricker’s concern with testimonial injustice focuses primarily upon this perspective. And I want to raise the possibility that adopting a wider conception of what can count as participating in epistemic activities may be (perhaps more) illuminating. Much of our participation in epistemic activities does not involve claims to knowledge; and much of it does not even serve as a precursor to the offering of testimony. Often, little in the way of claims to knowledge may be involved at all.

4.

We should clarify these two perspectives and their relevance to these issues of epistemic injustice.<sup>2</sup>

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### *Informational perspective:*

When we adopt this perspective in describing and evaluating someone, the questions we ask are along these lines:

- a) Is A a reliable or trustworthy source of information concerning whether it is the case that  $p$  (or concerning propositions with a particular kind of subject matter)?
- b) When A asserted that  $p$ , was she/he providing reliable or trustworthy testimony concerning whether  $p$ ?

The result of testimonial injustice of the kind discussed by Fricker is that A is not treated as a reliable source of information on the matter in question. It can also have the effect of making it impossible for A to offer testimony concerning this matter.

### *Participant perspective:*

When we adopt this perspective in describing and evaluating someone, the questions we ask are along these lines:

- a) Is A competent or trustworthy in carrying out activity X, for example, inquiring into the solution to some problem concerning what is the case?
- b) Is A competent to carry out some particular activity that has a fundamental role in carrying out inquiries into the solution of some problem, for example, asking pertinent questions, recognizing relevant information, etc.?

The result of epistemic injustice that is identified from a participant perspective is that A *cannot* carry out that activity competently. Thus when someone is the victim of epistemic injustice when evaluated from one or other of these perspectives, the result is a kind of epistemic silencing that leads to a negative answer to some or all of the appropriate questions.

If we give assertion and testimony a fundamental role in our explanation of what makes something a case of *epistemic* injustice, then we shall be mostly concerned with evaluations made from the informational perspective. The examples I introduced and will explore in more detail below involve evaluations of a different kind. They are made from what I called the participant perspective. However, we should note that testimony can be viewed from either of these perspectives. We can view testimony as the expression of the result of an investigation, as having the role of transmitting information to some external recipient. Reliability of testimony is then a matter of the testimony being made because it is true or known to be the case.

Testimony also has a role that is internal to inquiry or deliberation: someone may offer their testimony to remind us of pertinent evidence that will then be

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used as the inquiry develops. In that case, from a participant perspective, the testimony is reliable only if it is true or known to be the case and also *relevant* to the needs of those engaged in the inquiry. There could be a form of injustice related to assertion and testimony that consisted, not in a silencing refusal to take the testimony to be true or expressing knowledge, but in a refusal to take seriously the ability of the agent to provide information that is relevant in the current context. When we make assertions, there will often be an implicature about how and why this was a relevant contribution to make in the current context of inquiry and deliberation. This would be a kind of injustice that could only be detected from the participant perspective. Someone may be recognized as a possessor and transmitter of knowledge, but not as someone who purveys information that is useful or relevant in the current context. Indeed, if all testimony has to be evaluated in terms of its importance and relevant for the recipient, then we should treat evaluations made from that perspective as more significant than those made from the informational perspective. And we shall now return to studying some kinds of epistemic injustice that can only be identified from that perspective.

5.

At risk of repetition, I want to emphasise two examples of epistemic activities that can be affected by the kinds of silence I have just described.<sup>3</sup>

- a) In the course of discussion, someone can raise questions, putting them forward as relevant contributions to debate or deliberation. Such questions raise issues to be addressed or anxieties to be settled if we are to make progress. They are often highly hypothetical and are not simply requests for information – they suggest routes that deliberation and discussion might follow. We may do someone an epistemic injustice by treating them as if they do not have the capacities to ask interesting or relevant questions – they lack capacities that are relevant to the activities they are participating in. When this is influenced by stereotype or prejudice or when there is no reason for treating them in this way, they are treated as lacking a sense of relevance. In that case, we treat the person as a non-participant, not just as a non-knower.

Sharp distinctions are not easy to draw here. Assertions always occur in a context, and usually carry important implicatures. I may offer you information with the implicature that it is relevant to the next stage in our deliberations. So when I suffer testimonial injustice, this may undermine my ability to point out the relevance of pertinent evidence. I lose the ability to participate in the ways I want to. This is one reason for treating participant injustice as a broad category of epistemic harm of which testimonial injustice is a particular case.

- b) Consider a philosophical discussion, the sort where participants try to construct counterexamples to proposals, expecting to learn from seeing



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how each counterexample fails, using what they have learned to provide better counterexamples, and so on. Such discussion can be assertive and insistent, and these features can contribute to its success in eliminating error and arriving at a stronger position. The shy and retiring can find it hard to contribute to such discussion; as can those belonging to groups that are associated with stereotypes that lead hearers who doubt that their contributions can be trusted. Their perceived failure to make a contribution can lead to the widely held expectation that they have nothing to offer. If success in participating in such activities is perceived as a mark of success as a philosopher, and if someone is perceived, perhaps due to stereotypes of shy (or female) behaviour in such debates, then prejudice can lead to someone being perceived as a poor performer at the activities that are supposed to be definitive of her identity. Once again, we encounter epistemic injustice that does not involve testimonial injustice; the result is not that someone is not recognized as a knower and as a source of information; it is, rather, that someone is recognized as unable to participate in activities whose content is intrinsically epistemic. The shy student is not invited to contribute to discussion or her contributions are not used as a starting point for further discussion, and this means she is perceived as someone with little say, which makes it all the more intelligible that she will not be invited to make further contributions.

Studies by the Sadkers and others of classroom behaviour illustrate the kinds of phenomena I am concerned with, by showing that teachers will 'coach male students to develop their thoughts by giving them more extended and more specific feedback on the quality of their ideas', are more likely to ask male students questions that call for 'higher order' critical thinking as opposed to the recounting of facts, and give male students more eye contact following questions (Sadker and Sadker 1986, 513). Female students, it appears, are often 'less likely to receive feedback, whether praise, help or criticism.' (Little 2004, 10) It is also observed that female students often 'ask questions rather than give statements, even if they know an answer.' (see, for example, Tannen 1994) It is conjectured that this 'may stem from a preference for collaborative discussion', since these styles of speech have the effect of 'leaving room for other opinions and ideas'. It is suggested that a concern with collaborative discussion 'may contradict our assumptions about effective or authoritative speech.' (Little, 11) Perhaps, but it is important that questions can be issued in an 'authoritative' or insistent manner—perhaps we talk about questioning being 'assertive' as readily as assertions properly so-called. One result of using questions rather than assertions is to be sceptical, reluctant to accept others' assertions; most likely in this case, it reflects a tendency to be tentative and hesitant in both assertions and questions. And both kinds of hesitancy can be obstacles to effective participation.

6.

I am suggesting that we need to pay serious attention to the kinds of epistemic injustice that arise from the participant perspective. Participating in discussion, deliberation, and other forms of inquiry involves making evaluations or judgements about, for example, the relevance of questions or the importance of issues. Such judgements have the feature that Fricker ascribes to judgements more generally. They have a particularist character, and often display a sort of immediacy. In relying upon such judgements, we depend upon our own immediate reactions – a form of confident self-trust in our ability to escape irrelevant or distorting factors. Thus they have the following features:

- i. They are ‘perceptual’ and non-inferential.
- ii. They are uncodifiable.
- iii. They are intrinsically motivating.
- iv. They are intrinsically reason giving.
- v. They have an emotional character. (Fricker, 72–85)

It is evident that unless we are confident of our ability to make such judgements, we simply cannot participate properly in discussion, deliberation, and inquiry. If prejudice and injustice prompts anxiety or uncertainty about our possession of this kind of legitimate self-trust, if we are anxious about the idea that we possess the capacities required for making such judgements, this attacks directly not just our ability to be recognized as knowers or as potential informants, but also our ability to properly participate in epistemic activities at all. The injustice cuts deep. So my thought here is that testimonial injustice threatens people’s ability to give testimony, and this may serve as a *cause* of a deeper sort of loss of confidence. But epistemic injustice that is directed at someone’s functioning as a *participant* in discussion, deliberation, and inquiry does not simply *cause* the victim to lose epistemic confidence more generally. Rather it questions the possession of capacities that are necessary for participation in these kinds of epistemic activities.

7.

When I raise a question, make a suggestion, or offer a counterexample, I don’t appear to make an assertion. I am making a contribution, but not by offering or seeking testimony. Successful participation presumably requires that I am trustworthy or reliable or useful in asking pertinent or illuminating questions or offering counterexamples, and injustice may arise when for bad reasons, I am treated as unable to participate successfully. If I make no assertion, what sort of speech act do I perform when I make a suggestion, offer a counterexample, or propose a question or a route for discussion? Presumably, there is a suggestion (something like, but of course not, an implicature) that my question is worth paying attention to or exploring, that my counterexample is relevant to our cognitive goals.

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To function well, I need to be confident that my contributions will be helpful and relevant. And it is this confidence that is shaken by lack of recognition.

One of Fricker's own examples is worth noting here. She discusses Lieutenant Columbo from the 1970s crime television programme, remarking that his 'bumbling and shambolic style lures those he is investigating into a false sense of security and enables him to quiz them off-guard' (19). He suffers a 'credibility deficit', and she remarks that in this case, as in some others, this can have its advantages. It may be a minor verbal matter that we would not normally talk of the *credibility* of his quizzing, in contrast to the credibility of his mumbling assertions. But it is significant that the relevance of the questioning is the key to his success, as is his suspects' readiness to doubt that his questions are epistemically relevant. He is trying to find something out, and the appropriateness of his questioning is just as important as the relevance and reliability of his assertions.

### 8.

In her discussion of testimonial injustice, Fricker describes the virtues that hearers must possess if they are to be just in their dealings with their informants. Possession of this virtue requires 'critical awareness of the likely presence of prejudice', and also an ability to 'correct' for such prejudice. The hearer must be able to 'identify the impact of identity power in their credibility judgement', and this requires them to 'be alert to the impact of their own social identity on their credibility judgement.' (91) The virtue is all concerned with how the hearer can improve their credibility judgements. Once we adopt the participant perspective, we are no longer simply concerned with the threats to our credibility judgements. We must also be critically aware of the way in which our judgements of the intended *relevance* of contributions can be influenced by stereotypes and prejudices. But this also requires capacities that enable us to respond sensitively in identifying the intended relevance of what is said to our shared project. There is a requirement that we be charitable in our understandings, willing to explore the possible uses of the contributions that have been made. Thus we must be aware of the obstacles to our willingness to go the extra mile in looking for value in the contributions that have been made. This is much more difficult and is not just a matter of worrying about the reliability of our judgements of credibility.

We participate in a wide range of activities that can be described as epistemic. We make assertions, we ask appropriate questions, we treat arguments as valid or invalid, we trust our instinctive judgements of plausibility and reasonableness, we formulate new concepts, revising and developing them in response to experience. We can do many of these things in the course of solitary processes of reasoning and investigation. But there are other things we do that possess their epistemic importance because they make a contribution to processes of inquiry and deliberation that are collaborative. Our ability to contribute to collaborative inquiry depends upon our possession of a whole range of such abilities. And we can

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suffer epistemic injustice when we are not taken seriously in our exercise of any of these capacities. We can suffer injustice when we are not taken seriously in our performance of any of these things. And this injustice can, in appropriate circumstances, threaten our continuing possession of the capacities upon which our participation in collaborative inquiry depends.

Among the capacities that we bring to inquiry is the ability to offer credible testimony, and once we lose that capacity, our ability to collaborate with other investigators is impaired. Others include the ability to ask pertinent questions, our mastery of concepts, and our inferential and mathematical capacities. It is easy to see that identity-based injustice can fasten onto any of the resources that we hope to bring to our shared inquiry. And it has a similar structure in all of these cases. Testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice threaten particular kinds of epistemic resource – our assertions and our possessions of a relevant repertoire of concepts. Miranda Fricker has shown that concentrating on these cases can be very illuminating in understanding these phenomena. However, there are other kinds of epistemic resource too, and thus other kinds of epistemic injustice, and it is illuminating to explore these other kinds of epistemic injustice as well.<sup>4</sup>

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#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Although this distinction is helpful for my purpose of emphasising that a wider range of kinds of epistemic injustice should be investigated than Fricker takes account of, it is potentially misleading. It should be clear from the final paragraph that the forms of injustice that I associate with the informational perspective can also be identified from the wider participant perspective.
- <sup>2</sup> In line with footnote 1 above, it may be best to interpret informational injustice as a kind of participant injustice. In that case, the aim of the paper is to recognize that there are more kinds of epistemic participant injustice than might be initially supposed.
- <sup>3</sup> These examples both involve roles for questioning. A survey of the importance of questioning for our epistemic lives is offered in Hookway (2008).

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