One of the most prevalent rationales for public healthcare policies is a human right to healthcare. Governments are the typical duty-bearers, but they differ vastly in their capacity to help those vulnerable to serious health problems and those with severe disabilities. A right to healthcare is out of the reach of many developing economies that struggle to provide the most basic services to their citizens. If human rights to provision of such goods exist, then governments would be violating rights without doing anything wrong. I argue that such variable ability to provide healthcare depends not only on financial resources, but on institutional capacity, and that the latter represents a more fundamental challenge to the existence of a human right to healthcare than previously recognized. This challenge does not imply that government has no obligations to protect and improve the health of their citizens, but that it is best to think of such obligations as generated by conventional rights, namely rights arising from local legal and social conventions, which require governments to pursue health-related moral goals such as reducing suffering, closing opportunity gaps for the disadvantaged, and preventing the spread of contagious diseases. We need not think of such moral goals in terms of human rights.

Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) argue that the extant literature on ambiguity aversion is not successful in accounting for Ellsberg choices as rational responses to ambiguity. We concur, and propose that rational choice under ambiguity aims at robustness rather than avoidance of ambiguity. A central argument explains why robust choice is intrinsically context-dependent and legitimately violates standard choice consistency conditions. If choice consistency is forced, however, ambiguity-aversion emerges as a semi-rational response to ambiguity.

This critical note concerns John Broome's book Rationality through Reasoning (2013). Broome claims that rationality amounts to satisfying rational requirements as opposed to responding correctly to reasons. My critique focuses on two issues. First, I try to show that Broome's account of rational requirements, in particular his answer to the so-called ‘symmetry-problem’, presupposes that responding correctly to reasons is part of rationality. Secondly, in discussing Broome's account of reasoning I criticize his claim that first-order reasoning involves no appeal to reasons and, hence, no normative thoughts on behalf of the reasoner.

When people must either save a greater number of people from a smaller harm or a smaller number from a greater harm, do their choices reflect a reasonable moral outlook? We pursue this question with the help of an experiment. In our experiment, two-fifths of subjects employ a similarity heuristic. When alternatives appear dissimilar in terms of the number saved but similar in terms of the magnitude of harm prevented, this heuristic mandates saving the greater number. In our experiment, this leads to choices that are inconsistent with all standard theories of justice. We argue that this demonstrates the untrustworthiness of distributive judgements in cases that elicit similarity-based choice.

Ronald Dworkin's (1981) theory of equality of resources draws heavily on conceptual tools developed in economic theory. His criterion for a just distribution of resources is closely connected with two economic ideas: first, the idea that a distribution of resources reflects a concern for equality if it is envy-free; second, the idea that such an envy-free distribution of resources is attainable as a competitive equilibrium from equal split. The objective of this paper is to show that the criterion of equality of resources has been misinterpreted by normative economics, largely due to Dworkin's own lack of precision, and that it needs to be reformulated in order to be intelligible. The dimensions along which the reformulation is needed concern (1) the nature of the preferences used in what Dworkin calls the ‘envy test’ and (2) the nature of the envy test itself.

John Broome's ground-breaking Weighing Lives makes precise, and supplies arguments previously lacking for, several views which for centuries have been central to the utilitarian tradition. In gratitude for his enlightening arguments, I shall repay him in this paper by showing how he could make things easier for himself by denying neutrality and accepting hedonism.

This paper argues that, inasmuch as exploitation is a form of injustice, exploitative acts need not be performed intentionally.

This paper addresses the issue of finite versus countable additivity in Bayesian probability and decision theory – in particular, Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility and personal probability. I show that Savage’s reason for not requiring countable additivity in his theory is inconclusive. The assessment leads to an analysis of various highly idealized assumptions commonly adopted in Bayesian theory, where I argue that a healthy dose of, what I call, conceptual realism is often helpful in understanding the interpretational value of sophisticated mathematical structures employed in applied sciences like decision theory. In the last part, I introduce countable additivity into Savage’s theory and explore some technical properties in relation to other axioms of the system.

The article considers a surprisingly resilient argument, going back to Adam Smith, for the fairness of proportionate taxation: that proportionate taxation represents the fair way to divide the surplus value produced by social cooperation among all of society's members. The article considers two recent variants on that argument, one by Richard Epstein in Takings and one by David Gauthier in Morals by Agreement. It concludes that the normative and empirical assumptions that underlie these, and all other variants, of the argument are so implausible as to suggest the argument cannot be taken seriously as a defense of proportionate taxation. The article concludes by considering other possible explanations for the enduring attraction of proportionate taxation for political philosophers, particularly those with libertarian and quasi-libertarian leanings.

Some writers have noted that valuation is often focused on foreseen changes. They say that we often don't value situations in terms of what we would have in them only but also in terms of the gains or losses that they offer us — that we then focus on departures from our status quo. They argue that such thinking conflicts with basic economic analysis, and also that it violates logic: they say that it is irrational. I agree that it seems to be common. But is such a way of setting one's values a challenge to economics? And does it conflict with being rational?

Rationing health care by ordeals is likely to have different effects on women and men, and on distinct groups of women. I show how such putative effects of ordeals are relevant to achieving gender justice. I explain why some ordeals may disproportionately set back women’s interest in discretionary time, health and access to health care, and may undermine equality of opportunity for positions of advantage. Some ordeals protect the interests of the worse-off women yet set back the interests of better-off women in equal opportunities. I suggest how we can use ordeal design to advance particular aims of gender justice.

Professor Arnold's reply to my reply seems not to have touched the substance of my argument. Perhaps I have been unclear. Arnold contends that any form of market socialism, if unchecked by central authorities, would revert to a system essentially undistinguishable from capitalism. Against this contention I have argued that a democratic, worker-controlled, market socialism that generates its investment fund by taxation exhibits no such tendency. Specifically, I argued that in such a society

1. there exists no tendency for socialized property to revert to private property (since workers have no incentive to sell off their firms to private individuals);

2. the ability of private individuals to accumulate vast wealth is sharply curtailed (since interest and stock income are absent);

3. the authority structures within enterprises are much more democratic than under capitalism;

4. intra-firm income differentials will be far more egalitarian than under capitalism.