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IAMBLICHUS APVD SIMPL. COROLLARIVM DE TEMPORE 794.21–7 DIELS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2021

Jeffrey M. Johns
Jeffrey M. Johns*
Affiliation:
Geneva, Illinois
*
nilexnihilo@gmail.com
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Abstract

In his commentary on the Timaeus, the Neoplatonist Iamblichus argues that time is logically antecedent to change inasmuch as time is no mere aspect of change. Naturally, scholars appraise this thesis in light of Neoplatonic metaphysics. Nevertheless, they neglect the philological framing of this thesis, and thence the philosophical implications thereof. Only J.M. Dillon acknowledges this framing, though even Dillon does not acknowledge the philosophical implications thereof. This article illustrates the logic of said thesis vis-à-vis the Iamblichean exegesis of Ti. 38b7–c1 (Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.21–7 Diels, Iambl. in Ti. fr. 67 Dillon). Beginning from the intuition that time is no mere aspect of change, Iamblichus argues that time can persist apart from change, and thereupon, given the Platonic notion that time is the everlasting image of Eternity qua paradigm, Iamblichus intuits that time is no mere image but everlasting in its own right, being itself a paradigm. Yet this thesis rests upon the indeterminateness of the Platonic title τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως (‘the paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature’) at Ti. 38b8 and, still more so, upon the reflexiveness of the ambiguous ΑΥΤΩΙ (that is, αὐτῷ ‘to it [the paradigm]’, if not αὑτῷ ‘to itself [as paradigm]’) at Ti. 38c1. Inasmuch as the subject of the Platonic title is indeterminate between Eternity and Eternal Being qua intelligible everlastingness, Iamblichus construes ΑΥΤΩΙ not as a mere reflexive but as self-reflexive, with αὑτῷ referring to Time qua intelligible paradigm. In this light, the Platonic lemma grounds the Iamblichean thesis.

Keywords

PlatoTimaeusNeoplatonismphilologyIamblichuseternitytimecosmogony
Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 71 , Issue 2 , December 2021 , pp. 849 - 855
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association

In illuminating the Timaeus and its genetic myth, the Neoplatonist Iamblichus argues that time is something logically antecedent to change, given his intuition that time is not, in and of itself, merely some aspect of change.Footnote 1 Naturally, scholars appraise this thesis in light of Neoplatonic metaphysics, as Iamblichus is the first of the Platonists to situate time among things intelligible and intellectual.Footnote 2 Nevertheless, scholars at the same time neglect the philological framing of this thesis, and thence the philosophical implications thereof.Footnote 3 So indeed, the only scholar to acknowledge this framing is J.M. Dillon. Yet even Dillon does not acknowledge the philosophical implications thereof.

In his edition of Iamblichean commentaria, Dillon appraises the Iamblichean reading of Ti. 38b7–c1 which Simplicius has furnished in his Corollarium de tempore.Footnote 4 In referring to this testimonium, Simplicius aims to elucidate the Iamblichean distinction between time in and of itself and the time of the cosmos, its phenomenal apparition. In contradistinction to his predecessors Plotinus and Porphyry, to whom time is the successiveness of Soul in its life fallen from Being, Iamblichus insists that time is not such a life but a genuine hypostasis—namely metaphysical, Ideal time.Footnote 5 Standing above Soul, his Time is the first image in the hierarchy of hypostases originating in the One, Time being the everlasting image of Eternity-abiding-in-the-One (μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνί).Footnote 6 Still, this is not to say that Time is not, qua participable, the life of Soul, a measure of movement or itself subject to measurement. Time guarantees the τάξις—the ‘order’—of all things, not as a thing subject to prior and posterior ordering but as a thing responsible for all such ordering. Time is then a function of Demiurgic διακόσμησις, precisely because it is Time which grounds all modes of cosmogenesis in its framing of events as prior and posterior. Thus the Iamblichean reading of the well-known lemma at Ti. 37d5–7 (τὸν γὰρ διάκοσμον ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ δηλοῖ τοῦτο, ὅτι συντέτακται τῇ διακοσμήσει τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ προελθούσῃ καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου ὑπόστασις).Footnote 7

On the other hand, in illuminating Ti. 37d5–7, Iamblichus distinguishes Time in terms of genesis, qua participable (ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν χρόνος, viz. ὁ μεθεκτὸς χρόνος), not Time as Ideal Monad, qua imparticipable (ὁ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν χρόνος, viz. ὁ ἀμέθεκτος χρόνος).Footnote 8 Though Time participable is generable and generate through its participants, Time imparticipable is ungenerate, standing still in its everlasting being.Footnote 9 Thence Iamblichus distinguishes Time relative to the cosmogony of the Timaeus, not Time relative to Eternity. Only in light of the lemma at Ti. 38b7–c1 does Iamblichus implicate Eternity in his metaphysical scheme:

ἅμα δὲ περὶ τούτου καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐνδιδομένου τῷ κόσμῳ ἐν τῷ ι´ κεφαλαίῳ τάδε γέγραφε· διὰ δὴ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ κατὰ δύναμίν ἐστι καὶ ὁ χρόνος. καὶ προσέοικε τῷ αἰῶνι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν διὰ τὴν ἀμερῆ φύσιν, διὰ μιᾶς τε ἐνεργείας ἐνίσταται καὶ πρόεισι κατ᾽ αὐτὴν καὶ ὁρίζει πάντα τὰ γινόμενα ὡσαύτως, κἂν ᾖ διαφέροντα.

22 ἀπ᾽ om. Simpl. Eἐκδιδομένου Simpl. a23 διὰ δὴ om. Simpl. Eδιαιωνίας Pl. A C F V Stob. Procl. Philop. Simpl. F a : αἰωνίας Pl. P g Stob. (alio loco) et δι punct. not. Pl. A2 C2 : δι᾽ αἰῶνος Simpl. E24 αὐτὸς αὑτῷ Simpl. F2 a : αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Simpl. E F1 Procl. (bis) : αὐτῷ Pl. Stob. Philop. (ter) Simpl. (alio loco)25 ὁμοιότητός Simpl. Eδιὰ τὴν ἀμερῆ Simpl. E : κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιομερῆ (sed κατὰ punct. not. et διὰ s. v. κατὰ) Simpl. F : κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιομερῆ Simpl. aFootnote 10

Moreover, in the tenth chapter of his commentaria, Iamblichus has written these things regarding Time in and of itself and Time as it is bestowed upon the cosmos therefrom: ‘in light of these things one reads “and according to the paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature, this is itself as similar to itself as possible”, viz. Time itself. Thereupon, Time [qua imparticipable, participable and participant] resembles Eternity and is, so far as possible, most similar to itself [participant to participable] as a result of its partless nature [that of Time imparticipable], and it [Time] persists through a single activity, and it itself [Time] proceeds through this same activity, distinguishing all things generate despite their differences.’Footnote 11

Instead of reading καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς (δι)αιωνίας φύσεως [sc. γέγονεν], ἵν᾽ ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ᾖ, which is the text of the earliest primary manuscripts (A, C) and of nearly all the testimonia, Iamblichus and Iamblichus alone reads καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ κατὰ δύναμίν ἐστι. Notwithstanding the absence of ἵν᾽ ὡς, and thence the shift from ᾖ to ἐστι, we need to explain the reflexiveness of αὐτὸς αὑτῷ, viz. ‘Time itself to itself’. That this is the reading of Iamblichus himself is not in doubt. Just consider the gloss thereafter, viz. καὶ προσέοικε τῷ αἰῶνι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν διὰ τὴν ἀμερῆ φύσιν. Such a gloss is sufficient proof that Iamblichus wrote πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατός in light of αὐτὸς αὑτῷ, as Dillon himself affirms.Footnote 12 Nevertheless, Dillon considers the reflexiveness of αὐτὸς αὑτῷ and its gloss in πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατός insignificant from a philosophical perspective—‘this fragment is a straight exposition of the lemma, and not of much philosophical importance’.Footnote 13 Why not? Dillon does not explain why ‘a straight exposition of the lemma’ signifies its insignificance. Nor does such a stance explain the classification of the testimonium itself, as Simplicius affirms that this testimonium is a ‘proof’—ἀπόδειξις—of the Iamblichean thesis.Footnote 14

So what is the origin of this proof, given the text upon which it rests? Observe that αὐτὸς—sc. οὐρανὸς—αὐτῷ, a reading to which Proclus alone attests, might well have arisen before the time of Proclus, if not of Iamblichus himself, as αὐτός can stand for χρόνος if not for οὐρανός.Footnote 15 On the other hand, if the reflexiveness of αὐτὸς αὑτῷ signals insights about the everlastingness of time, this might then signal its Iamblichean provenance. Yet αὐτὸς αὑτῷ might originate elsewhere. Dillon assumes that αὐτὸς αὑτῷ is the text which Iamblichus will have read in his exemplar, whatever the origin thereof.Footnote 16 Yet then again, does this reading not conform to the insights of Iamblichus himself, whose whole thesis of time apart from change draws upon the reflexiveness of αὐτὸς αὑτῷ? In so far as Proclus and Proclus alone attests to the reading αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, it is not unreasonable to surmise, ex hypothesi, that this was his own emendation of αὐτὸς αὑτῷ, whilst this αὐτὸς αὑτῷ was the novel reading of Iamblichus himself. Observe too that αὐτὸς αὑτῷ is not the reading to which Simplicius subscribes in propria persona. Simplicius acknowledges the traditional reading, with αὐτῷ—sc. τῷ παραδείγματι—alone, despite being the sole witness to the Iamblichean reading.Footnote 17 On these grounds, one may argue, pace Dillon, that Iamblichus will have read αὐτὸς αὑτῷ not because this was the reading in his exemplar, whatever its origin, but because αὐτὸς αὑτῷ validates his professed intuition that time is no mere aspect of change.

Still, one needs to explain how Iamblichus might justify this move. Of course, one could argue that the reading αὐτὸς αὑτῷ entails philological finesse, if not an objectionable sleight of hand. In this light, Iamblichus draws upon linguistic techniques some thought scandalous, rendering ΑΥΤΩΙ as αὑτῷ in the same manner as other exegetes finesse ambiguous terms to suit their exegeses. Thus Plutarch thought Xenocrates, Crantor and other Platonists unwilling to abide a temporalizing exegesis of the Timaeus quite willing to finesse its ipsissima uerba to their sempiternalizing ends.Footnote 18 Similarly, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Philoponus after him, thought the ideas of Calvenus Taurus quite shameless in this respect, given his reading of the programmatic text at Ti. 27c5 with the second ἦτα as εἰ, not ἤ (that is, εἰ γέγονεν εἰ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν, viz. ‘if it [sc. the All] has come into being, even if this [All] is ungenerate’).Footnote 19 Such ideas persist among the late Neoplatonists, given how Aeneas of Gaza complains that Platonists were still finessing Platonic texts to suit their preferred exegeses.Footnote 20 One has good reason to suspect that the Iamblichean reading of Ti. 38b7–c1 is reflective of these phenomena.

On the other hand, one could argue that the reading αὐτὸς αὑτῷ entails philosophical finesse vis-à-vis the Platonic title τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως, viz. ‘the paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature’, referent of αὐτῷ upon the traditional reading, where the subject of παράδειγμα appears indeterminate. Is this Eternity? Is this Eternal Being and the everlastingness thereof? If the former, Eternity is the paradigm of all things temporal no less than Time qua intelligible. If the latter, then Time qua intelligible can likewise lay claim to everlastingness in perfection. Such an idea would then explain the Iamblichean reading of a self-reflexive αὑτῷ in lieu of the traditional αὐτῷ. Though in this case, one must confess that Iamblichus imposes upon the text, as the thought that ΑΥΤΩΙ refers to something other than Eternity, to something other than Eternal Being and the everlastingness thereof, is not in the least convincing, unless one contends that time itself is something intelligible. Yet this is what Iamblichus argues, showing that his reading of αὐτὸς αὑτῷ is nothing if not a proof of its philosophical significance. In this light, Iamblichus considers τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως a title for ‘everlastingness’, though ‘everlastingness’ as such is indeterminate between Eternity and Eternal Being, as Eternal Being is thought of as everlasting owing to Eternity.Footnote 21 In so far as Iamblichus argues for the thesis of time apart from change, he himself draws upon the indeterminateness of this title as a means of grounding his ingenious classification of time. Naturally, inasmuch as time imitates Eternity in its everlastingness, it follows that the cosmos imitates Eternal Being, the cosmos being, through becoming, the everlasting image thereof.Footnote 22 Yet as a matter of intuition time can persist apart from change. Thence Iamblichus intuits that time is no mere image of Eternity but everlasting in its own right, being itself a paradigm.Footnote 23 Thereupon, the indeterminateness of the Platonic title τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως allows Iamblichus to confirm his intuition and infer his thesis from the text, this title thus referring to Eternity and Time alike, the everlastingness of Time being a state of perfection akin to Eternity.Footnote 24 In other words, the Iamblichean reading ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ arose through an astute reflection upon the title τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως, whereas ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, the reading Proclus attests, allows for a similar exegesis of the text, albeit with οὐρανός as the subject of αὐτός.Footnote 25

Such is the framing according to which Iamblichus distinguishes Time qua participable from Time qua imparticipable in illuminating the lemma at Ti. 38c1–3 (τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον γέγονεν, ὥστε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος).Footnote 26 Time is a paradigm in its own right (ὃ [sc. ὁ αἰών and ὁ χρόνος] τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὡς παράδειγμα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, τοῦτο ὡς εἰκών ἐστιν ἐν τῷ γενητῷ), though Time as a whole, from the imparticipable to the participable to all participants, is still the image of Eternity (καὶ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ κατ᾽ αἰῶνα, τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα κατὰ χρόνον).Footnote 27 Thence Time resembles its paradigm, Eternity rendering Time a paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature (καὶ νῦν δὴ τοῦ χρόνου γέγονε κατάδηλος ἡ μέση διπλῆ φύσις, μέση μὲν αἰῶνός τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ, διπλῆ δὲ καθόσον συνυφίσταται μὲν πρὸς τὸν κόσμον, συντάττεται δὲ πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡγεῖται, τῷ δὲ ἀφομοιοῦται).Footnote 28 Nor should such an approach to the text appear all that strange, given the logic of scholastic Platonism and its modes of exegesis. For if Plato is a fount of truth (just as Platonists argue), and the intuition of Iamblichus true, then the thesis of time apart from change is a thesis Plato himself should have professed.Footnote 29 Nor should one acquiesce in philological polemics owing to the absence of ἵν᾽ ὡς and ᾖ from the Iamblichean reading of the lemma at Ti. 38b7–c1. Said reading recalls ‘the art of misquotation’ common since the time of the Middle Platonists, to whom ‘misquotation’ is not necessarily a means of finessing a text. More often than not ‘misquotation’ is exegesis through paraphrasis, often for aesthetic reasons, even if there is still scope for finessing a text.Footnote 30 On the one hand, Iamblichus appears to finesse the text at Ti. 38b7–c1, as the absence of ἵν᾽ ὡς and ᾖ—and thence of the implicit γέγονεν—allows him to highlight his preferred reading. Yet if one construes καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ κατὰ δύναμίν ἐστι with χρόνος as the subject of ἐστι (sc. χρόνος γεγονώς), the absence of ἵν᾽ ὡς and ᾖ is negligible. One can still conceive of Time being brought into being with the cosmos, qua image, and this through the mediation of Time in itself, qua paradigm, so long as χρόνος has a double meaning, referring to Time in and of itself no less than to Time in its genesis.Footnote 31 On the other hand, this double meaning rests upon the reflexiveness of αὐτὸς αὑτῷ. Yet, even if Iamblichus finesses the lemma in this sense so as to infer his thesis, the shift from αὐτῷ to αὑτῷ could well rest upon a conjecture about its accentuation, as the reflexive ΑΥΤΩΙ allows of a rough breathing (αὑτῷ) if not a smooth one (αὐτῷ). In this light, illumination lies in emendation.Footnote 32

Footnotes

I am grateful to the editors and the reader at CQ for their insights.

References

1 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.702.19–24 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 62 Dillon) (ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τῷ †ὀγδόῳ [NB: ὀγδόῳ Simpl. MSS E F a, sed τρίτῳ emendauit Dillon] τῶν εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν δόξαν ἐπήγαγεν· εἰ πᾶσα κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ, κινήσεις πολλαὶ ὁμοῦ συνίστανται. τὰ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου μόρια ἄλλα ἄλλοτε. ἡ κίνησις περί τι μένον φέρεται, χρόνῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἠρεμίας δεῖ. κινήσει κίνησις ἢ ἠρεμία ἐναντιοῦται τῇ μὲν ἐν γένει ἡ ἐν γένει, τῇ δὲ ἐν εἴδει ἡ ἐν εἴδει, χρόνῳ δὲ οὐδέν). In so far as time is not commensurate with motion or rest, time is no mere aspect of change. On the logic of this fragment and its situation in the third—not eighth—volume of the Iamblichean τὰ εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνήματα, see J.M. Dillon (ed.), Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta (Leiden, 1973), 60–3, 343–5.

2 Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl; Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. frr. 63–4 Dillon); Dillon (n. 1), 345–9.

3 Thus the situation in H. Meyer, Das Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios und die Aporien des Aristoteles zur Zeit (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969), 42–7; S. Sambursky and S. Pines (edd.), The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism: Texts with Translation, Introduction and Notes (Jerusalem, 1971), 12–17, 43, 108 nn. 6–7; B. Dalsgaard Larsen (ed.), Jamblique de Chalcis. Exégète et philosophe, tomes I–II (Aarhus, 1972), 1.416–18; Hoffmann, P., ‘Jamblique exégète du Pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalités d'une doctrine du temps’, EPh 3 (1980), 307–23Google Scholar; E. Sonderegger (ed.), Simplikios. Über die Zeit: Ein Kommentar zum Corollarium de Tempore (Göttingen, 1982), 125–6; R.R.K. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (London, 1983), 33–45; D.P. Taormina, Jamblique critique de Plotin et de Porphyre. Quatre études (Paris, 1999), 68–75, 86–92; Wear, S.K., ‘Syrianus the Platonist on eternity and time’, CQ 58 (2008), 648–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.21–7 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 67 Dillon); Dillon (n. 1), 180–1, 351–3.

5 Plotinus, Enn. 3.7; Porph. Sent. 44; Porph. apud Cyril. Adv. Iul. 1.45.9–26 Riedweg (Porph. 223F Smith); Porph. apud Procl. Plat. theol. 1.51.4–11 Saffrey–Westerink (Porph. 232F Smith); Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl; Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. frr. 63–4 Dillon). On Plotinus and Porphyry, see P. Hadot, ‘La métaphysique de Porphyre’, in H. Dörrie (ed.), Porphyre. Huit exposés suivis de discussions (Geneva, 1966), 125–63; W. Beierwaltes (ed.), Plotin. Über Ewigkeit und Zeit (Enneade III 7) (Frankfurt am Main, 1967); Aubenque, P., ‘Plotin philosophe de la temporalité’, Diotima 4 (1976), 78–86Google Scholar; Graeser, A., ‘Zeitlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit: Bemerkungen zu Plotins Unterscheidung zweier “immer” (III, 7)’, PhJ 94 (1987), 142–8Google Scholar; A. Smith, ‘Soul and time in Plotinus’, in J. Holzhausen (ed.), Psychê—Seele—Anima. Festschrift für Karin Alt (Stuttgart, 1998), 335–44; L. Brisson (ed.), Porphyre. Sentences, tomes I–II (Paris, 2005), 2.756–86; S.K. Strange, ‘Porphyry and Plotinus’ metaphysics’, in G.E. Karamanolis and A. Sheppard (edd.), Studies on Porphyry (London, 2007), 17–34.

6 Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.14.16–19, 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. frr. 61, 64 Dillon). Cf. Plotinus, Enn. 3.7.6.1–12 on Ti. 37d6.

7 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 63 Dillon). Cf. Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.792.20–793.23 Diels (Iambl. in Cat. fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen); Procl. in Ti. 3.21.6–24.30 Diehl.

8 On this terminology, see Dillon (n. 1), 39–40, 335–6, 345, 353 on Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 2.240.2–28 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 54 Dillon) (πάσης γὰρ τάξεως ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ἡγεῖται μονὰς πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων). Cf. also Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.792.21–3 Diels (Iambl. in Cat. fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen) (λέγει οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ἀμεθέκτου χρόνου ἐν τῷ εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας ὑπομνήματι τὴν Ἀρχύτου λέξιν ἐξηγούμενος); Procl. in Ti. 3.26.30–27.3 Diehl (ἔστιν οὖν αἰώνιος μὲν καὶ μονὰς καὶ κέντρον κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ὁ χρόνος καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ μείνασαν ἐνέργειαν, συνεχὴς δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸς καὶ κύκλος κατὰ τὸ προϊὸν καὶ τὸ μετεχόμενον); Procl. Inst. theol. prop. 21–4, 53.

9 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.792.20–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in Cat. fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen, in Ti. fr. 63 Dillon). Cf. Procl. in Ti. 3.17.17–19.32, 3.24.30–32.6 Diehl; Procl. Plat. theol. 5.99.15–100.17 Saffrey–Westerink.

10 On the manuscript tradition, see L. Tarán, ‘The text of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle's Physics’, in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie (Berlin, 1987), 246–66. As Tarán warns that Diels is liable to report mistaken readings, I have myself inspected Marcianus graecus 229 (MS E, fol. 422r), Marcianus graecus 227 (MS F, fol. 290v) and the Aldina (MS a, fols. 188r–v), noting no errors. As for the text of the Timaeus, I have likewise inspected the two earliest primary witnesses, Parisinus graecus 1807 (MS A, ninth century, the ‘codex praestantissimus’) and Tubingensis Mb 14 (MS C, eleventh century). On these manuscripts and on all other primary witnesses to the Timaeus, see further G. Jonkers, The Textual Tradition of Plato's Timaeus and Critias (Leiden, 2017), 45–201, especially 74 on MS C vis-à-vis the other primary witnesses: ‘C is an independent source for the Timaeus. In age, C is only surpassed by A and perhaps by P, which has only excerpts from the text. C goes back to a MS which also served indirectly as a source for g (namely, the common ancestor of YΘΨ). Cg share many readings with F which are supported by ancient testimonia against the readings of AV.’

11 Inasmuch as Iamblichus distinguishes between Time imparticipable, Time participable and Time in its participants, I distinguish the three in parentheses. On the framing of this lemma, see Ti. 38b6–c3 (χρόνος δ᾽ οὖν μετ᾽ οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεν[ν]ηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γίγνηται, καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς [δι]αιωνίας φύσεως [sc. γέγονεν], ἵν᾽ ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ᾖ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν ὄν, ὁ δ᾽ αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον [sc. ἐστιν] γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος). Observe that the implicit subject of ᾖ (if not that of the implicit γέγονεν), and thence that of ὁ (and the implicit ἐστιν), is perhaps χρόνος or οὐρανός, if not οὐρανός qua αἰώνιος εἰκών (Ti. 37d5–7), where οὐρανός could refer to the cosmos, viz. ‘the All’ τὸ πᾶν (cf. Ti. 27c4–d1, 28b2–7, 37d1–4), just as well as to celestial phenomena (cf. Ti. 37e1–3, 38c3–6, 39d7–e2). On these semantic distinctions, see further F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato (London, 1937), 99 n. 1; Festugière, A.-J., ‘Le sens philosophique du mot αἰών. À propos d'Aristote, De Caelo I, 9’, PP 4 (1949), 172–89Google Scholar, at 186 n. 1; Cherniss, H.F., ‘Timaeus 38a8–b5’, JHS 77 (1957), 18–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 23; R. Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote. Quatre études (Paris, 1982), 43–55.

12 Dillon (n. 1), 180–1, 352.

13 Dillon (n. 1), 352.

14 Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.27–8 Diels (ἄλλην ἀπόδειξιν τοιαύτην).

15 Procl. in Ti. 3.49.20–6, 3.50.21–31 Diehl.

16 Dillon (n. 1), 352 (‘We may observe … a difference in the MSS readings available to Proclus and Iamblichus’, which implies that they abide by the readings of their exemplars, not that these are their readings).

17 Simpl. in Cael. 105.6–25 Heiberg. Simplicius construes οὐρανός as the subject of ᾖ at Ti. 38c1, as shown at lines 9 and 23–5 vis-à-vis κόσμος, viz. τὸ πᾶν ‘the All’. In similar fashion, Proclus construes οὐρανός as the subject of this same ᾖ in his gloss at in Ti. 3.50.21–31 Diehl.

18 Plut. De an. proc. in Ti. 1013D–E, noting Whittaker, J., ‘Textual comments on Timaeus 27c–d’, Phoenix 27 (1973), 387–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On emendation as a matter of finesse, if not that of ‘finessing’ a given text, see Dillon, J.M., ‘Tampering with the Timaeus: ideological emendations in Plato, with special reference to the Timaeus’, AJPh 110 (1989), 50–72Google Scholar; Gioè, A., ‘Aspetti dell'esegesi medioplatonica: la manipolazione e l'adattamento delle citazioni’, RAL 7 (1996), 287–309Google Scholar; Ferrari, F., ‘Struttura e funzione dell'esegesi testuale nel medioplatonismo: il caso del Timeo’, Athenaeum 89 (2001), 525–74Google Scholar. That Plutarch himself finesses Platonic texts in light of his own exegesis has been shown by H.F. Cherniss (ed.), Plutarch, Moralia. Volume XIII, Part I. Platonic Essays (Cambridge, MA, 1976), 137–49.

19 Taur. and Alex. Aphr. apud Philop. De aetern. mund. c. Procl. 191.15–193.9, 214.10–20 Rabe (Taur. 30–1 T Gioè, 28–9 T Petrucci; Alex. Aphr. in Cael. fr. 97a Rescigno), noting Whittaker (n. 18), 388–9. On the methodology of Taurus and its reception, see M. Baltes, Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, Teile I–II. Proklos (Leiden, 1976–8), 1.105–21; Verrycken, K., ‘Philoponus’ interpretation of Plato's cosmogony’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 8 (1997), 269–318Google Scholar; A. Gioè (ed.), Filosofi medioplatonici del II secolo d. C.: testimonianze e frammenti. Gaio, Albino, Lucio, Nicostrato, Tauro, Severo, Arpocrazione (Naples, 2002), 346–75; A. Rescigno (ed.), Alessandro di Aphrodisia: Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele. Frammenti del primo libro (Amsterdam, 2004), 563–8; F. Ferrari, ‘Lucio Calveno Tauro e l'interpretazione didascalica della cosmogenesi del Timeo’, in R.L. Cardullo and D. Iozzia (edd.), Κάλλος καὶ ἀρετή. Bellezza e virtù. Studi in onore di Maria Barbanti (Rome, 2014), 321–33; F.M. Petrucci, Taurus of Beirut: The Other Side of Middle Platonism (London, 2018), especially 26–197.

20 Aen. Gaz. Theophr. 8.11–17 Colonna, noting Whittaker (n. 18), 389. On this critique, see M.W. Champion, Explaining the Cosmos: Creation and Cultural Interaction in Late-Antique Gaza (Oxford, 2014), especially 52–3.

21 Cf. Plotinus, Enn. 3.7.5; Porph. apud Procl. Plat. theol. 1.51.4–11 Saffrey–Westerink (Porph. 232F Smith); Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 64 Dillon); Procl. in Ti. 3.10.2–16.11 Diehl (Syrian. in Ti. fr. 17 Wear); Procl. in Prm. 3.1118.6–1121.16 Steel–Van Campe (Syrian. in Prm. fr. 5 Wear); Procl. Inst. theol. prop. 52–4, 84–94, 104; Procl. Plat. theol. 3.54.22–62.10 Saffrey–Westerink.

22 Cf. Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.27–795.3 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 68 Dillon); Procl. in Ti. 3.50.21–31 Diehl; Procl. apud Philop. De aetern. mund. c. Procl. 103.25–104.3 Rabe; Simpl. in Phys. 2.1155.8–14 Diels on Pl. Ti. 37c6–40d5.

23 Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl; Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. frr. 63–4 Dillon). NB: Iamblichus distinguishes Eternity as ‘everlastingness’ no less than ‘oneness’ (Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.33.2 Diehl τὸ ἓν καὶ ἄπειρον τοῦ αἰῶνος). Its everlastingness follows from its infinite potency (ἄπειρος δύναμις), its oneness from the sameness of its perfect ‘Now’, which obtains simultaneously and always (ἅμα καὶ ἀεί). Cf. Plotinus, Enn. 3.7.2–6; Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 1.230.5–8, 2.72.20–3 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. frr. 29, 49 Dillon); Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.793.11–22 Diels (Iambl. in Cat. fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen).

24 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.24–6 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 67 Dillon) (καὶ προσέοικε τῷ αἰῶνι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν διὰ τὴν ἀμερῆ φύσιν), pace Dillon (n. 1), 353. Instead of ἀμερῆ in MS E, Dillon reads ὁμοιομερῆ in MSS F and a, noting e.g. the presence of ὁμοιομερῆς at Procl. in Ti. 2.225.31–226.3 Diehl. Yet Iamblichus attests to the partlessness of Time imparticipable apud Simpl. in Cat. 353.19–354.9 Kalbfleisch, in Phys. 1.792.20–793.23 Diels (Iambl. in Cat. frr. 108, 110 Dalsgaard Larsen). Cf. also Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.1–2 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 63 Dillon); Procl. in Ti. 3.23.11–22 Diehl.

25 Procl. in Ti. 3.50.21–31 Diehl, with τὸ πᾶν (‘the All’) as subject of ὁμοιότατον at line 23. Cf. Pl. Ti. 39d7–e2 (κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα ἐγεννήθη τῶν ἄστρων ὅσα δι᾽ οὐρανοῦ πορευόμενα ἔσχεν τροπάς, ἵνα τόδε [sc. τὸ πᾶν] ὡς ὁμοιότατον ᾖ τῷ τελέῳ καὶ νοητῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως); Cornford (n. 11), 99 n. 1.

26 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.27–795.3 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 68 Dillon). Instead of the γεγονώς τε of our Plato manuscripts, Iamblichus has γέγονεν, ὥστε, whilst the implicit ἐστιν is made explicit in the gloss thereafter, viz. ὃ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὡς παράδειγμα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, τοῦτο ὡς εἰκών ἐστιν ἐν τῷ γενητῷ.

27 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.28–32 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 68 Dillon). Cf. Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.33.7–14 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 64 Dillon).

28 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.35–795.1 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 68 Dillon). Cf. Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.33.14–30 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 64 Dillon).

29 On Plato as fount of truth, see Boys-Stones, G.R., Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen (Oxford, 2001)Google Scholar; Karamanolis, G.E., Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 On ‘misquotation’ as a means of Platonist exegesis, see J. Whittaker, ‘The value of indirect tradition in the establishment of Greek philosophical texts, or the art of misquotation’, in J.N. Grant (ed.), Editing Greek and Latin Texts (New York, 1989), 63–95. According to Whittaker, ‘misquotation’ may or may not entail a faithful gloss, faithfulness being relative (71).

31 Cf. Procl. in Ti. 3.55.2–7 Diehl on Ti. 38c3–6. Inasmuch as Iamblichus ‘misquotes’ Ti. 38b7–c1, one could construe his reading of Ti. 38c1–3 as another ‘misquotation’.

32 Cf. Porph. and Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 1.219.20–7, 1.275.20–276.3 Diehl (Porph. in Ti. frr. 30, 33 Sodano; Iambl. in Ti. frr. 28, 31 Dillon) on the accentuation of η … η … at Ti. 27c5 and the scope of παντός at Ti. 28b2–7. At Ti. 27c5, exegetes thought to read ἦτα as ἢ or ᾗ, if not εἰ, viz. η (ἢ, ᾗ, εἰ) γέγονεν η (ἢ, ᾗ, εἰ) καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν. Porphyry and Iamblichus construe η … η … as ἢ … ἢ … , if not as εἰ … ἢ … , ‘whether/if … or …’. Thereupon, at Ti. 28b2–7, Porphyry and Iamblichus argue that the παντός at 28b5 is referring to ‘everything of the All’, not just ‘everything’, as one should distinguish, first of all, whether the All is ungenerate or generate, viz. πότερον ἦν ἀεί, γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος. Thence Ti. 27c5 is a programmatic disjunction—ἢ (if not εἰ) γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν. On Porphyry and Iamblichus vis-à-vis Ti. 27c5, see Whittaker (n. 18), 388–91, with Ferroni, L. and Van Riel, G., ‘Editing lemmas in the second book of Proclus’ in Timaeum’, in Boodts, S., Leemans, P. De and Schorn, S. (edd.), Sicut dicit. Editing Ancient and Medieval Commentaries on Authoritative Texts (Leuven, 2020), 185–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 200–4 (contra Whittaker).