

IAMBlichus APVD SIMPL. COROLLARIUM DE TEMPORE 794.21–7 DIELS*

ABSTRACT

In his commentary on the *Timaeus*, the Neoplatonist Iamblichus argues that time is logically antecedent to change inasmuch as time is no mere aspect of change. Naturally, scholars appraise this thesis in light of Neoplatonic metaphysics. Nevertheless, they neglect the philological framing of this thesis, and thence the philosophical implications thereof. Only J.M. Dillon acknowledges this framing, though even Dillon does not acknowledge the philosophical implications thereof. This article illustrates the logic of said thesis vis-à-vis the Iamblichean exegesis of *Ti.* 38b7–c1 (*Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys.* 1.794.21–7 Diels, *Iambl. in Ti. fr.* 67 Dillon). Beginning from the intuition that time is no mere aspect of change, Iamblichus argues that time can persist apart from change, and thereupon, given the Platonic notion that time is the everlasting image of Eternity qua paradigm, Iamblichus intuits that time is no mere image but everlasting in its own right, being itself a paradigm. Yet this thesis rests upon the indeterminateness of the Platonic title τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαωνίας φύσεως ('the paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature') at *Ti.* 38b8 and, still more so, upon the reflexiveness of the ambiguous ΑΥΤΩΙ (that is, οὐτῶ 'to it [the paradigm]', if not οὐτῶ 'to itself [as paradigm]') at *Ti.* 38c1. Inasmuch as the subject of the Platonic title is indeterminate between Eternity and Eternal Being qua intelligible everlastingness, Iamblichus construes ΑΥΤΩΙ not as a mere reflexive but as self-reflexive, with οὐτῶ referring to Time qua intelligible paradigm. In this light, the Platonic lemma grounds the Iamblichean thesis.

Keywords: Plato; *Timaeus*; Neoplatonism; philology; Iamblichus; eternity; time; cosmogony

In illuminating the *Timaeus* and its genetic myth, the Neoplatonist Iamblichus argues that time is something logically antecedent to change, given his intuition that time is not, in and of itself, merely some aspect of change.¹ Naturally, scholars appraise this thesis in light of Neoplatonic metaphysics, as Iamblichus is the first of the Platonists to situate time among things intelligible and intellectual.² Nevertheless, scholars at the same time neglect the philological framing of this thesis, and thence the philosophical implications thereof.³ So indeed, the only scholar to acknowledge this framing is

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¹ *Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys.* 1.702.19–24 Diels (*Iambl. in Ti. fr.* 62 Dillon) (ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τῷ ἰσόδοῳ [NB: ὀγδόῳ *Simpl.* MSS E F a, sed τρίτῳ emendavit Dillon] τῶν εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν δόξαν ἐπίγαγεν· εἰ πᾶσα κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ, κινήσεις πολλαὶ ὁμοῦ συνίστανται. τὰ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου μόρια ἄλλα ἄλλοτε· ἡ κίνησις περὶ τι μένον φέρεται, χρόνῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἡρεμίας δεῖ. κινήσει κίνησις ἢ ἡρεμία ἐναντιοῦται τῇ μὲν ἐν γένει ἢ ἐν γένει, τῇ δὲ ἐν εἶδει ἢ ἐν εἶδει, χρόνῳ δὲ οὐδέν). In so far as time is not commensurate with motion or rest, time is no mere aspect of change. On the logic of this fragment and its situation in the third—not eighth—volume of the Iamblichean τὰ εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνήματα, see J.M. Dillon (ed.), *Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta* (Leiden, 1973), 60–3, 343–5.

² *Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti.* 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl; *Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys.* 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (*Iambl. in Ti. fr.* 63–4 Dillon); Dillon (n. 1), 345–9.

³ Thus the situation in H. Meyer, *Das Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios und die Aporien des*

J.M. Dillon. Yet even Dillon does not acknowledge the philosophical implications thereof.

In his edition of Iamblichean *commentaria*, Dillon appraises the Iamblichean reading of *Ti.* 38b7–c1 which Simplicius has furnished in his *Corollarium de tempore*.⁴ In referring to this testimonium, Simplicius aims to elucidate the Iamblichean distinction between time in and of itself and the time of the cosmos, its phenomenal apparition. In contradistinction to his predecessors Plotinus and Porphyry, to whom time is the successiveness of Soul in its life fallen from Being, Iamblichus insists that time is not such a life but a genuine hypostasis—namely *metaphysical, Ideal time*.⁵ Standing above Soul, his Time is the first image in the hierarchy of hypostases originating in the One, Time being the everlasting image of Eternity-abiding-in-the-One (μένοντος αἰώνος ἐν ἐνί).⁶ Still, this is not to say that Time is not, *qua* participable, the life of Soul, a measure of movement or itself subject to measurement. Time guarantees the τάξις—the ‘order’—of all things, not as a thing subject to prior and posterior ordering but as a thing responsible for all such ordering. Time is then a function of Demiurgic διακόσμησις, precisely because it is Time which grounds all modes of cosmogenesis in its framing of events as prior and posterior. Thus the Iamblichean reading of the well-known lemma at *Ti.* 37d5–7 (τὸν γὰρ διάκοσμον ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ δηλοῖ τοῦτο, ὅτι συντέτακται τῇ διακοσμήσει τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ προελθούση καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου ὑπόστασις).⁷

On the other hand, in illuminating *Ti.* 37d5–7, Iamblichus distinguishes Time in terms of genesis, *qua* participable (ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν χρόνος, viz. ὁ μεθεκτός χρόνος), not Time as Ideal Monad, *qua* imparticipable (ὁ κατ’ οὐσίαν χρόνος, viz. ὁ ἀμέθεκτος χρόνος).⁸ Though Time participable is generable and generate through its

Aristoteles zur Zeit (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969), 42–7; S. Sambursky and S. Pines (edd.), *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism: Texts with Translation, Introduction and Notes* (Jerusalem, 1971), 12–17, 43, 108 nn. 6–7; B. Dalsgaard Larsen (ed.), *Jamblique de Chalcis. Exégète et philosophe, tomes I–II* (Aarhus, 1972), 1.416–18; P. Hoffmann, ‘Jamblique exégète du Pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalités d’une doctrine du temps’, *Eph* 3 (1980), 307–23; E. Sonderegger (ed.), *Simplikios. Über die Zeit: Ein Kommentar zum Corollarium de Tempore* (Göttingen, 1982), 125–6; R.R.K. Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum* (London, 1983), 33–45; D.P. Taormina, *Jamblique critique de Plotin et de Porphyre. Quatre études* (Paris, 1999), 68–75, 86–92; S.K. Wear, ‘Syrianus the Platonist on eternity and time’, *CQ* 58 (2008), 648–60.

⁴ Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.794.21–7 Diels (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 67 Dillon); Dillon (n. 1), 180–1, 351–3.

⁵ Plotinus, *Enn.* 3.7; Porph. *Sent.* 44; Porph. *apud* Cyril. *Adv. Iul.* 1.45.9–26 Riedweg (Porph. 223F Smith); Porph. *apud* Procl. *Plat. theol.* 1.51.4–11 Saffrey–Westerink (Porph. 232F Smith); Iambl. *apud* Procl. in *Ti.* 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl; Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 63–4 Dillon). On Plotinus and Porphyry, see P. Hadot, ‘La métaphysique de Porphyre’, in H. Dörrie (ed.), *Porphyre. Huit exposés suivis de discussions* (Geneva, 1966), 125–63; W. Beierwaltes (ed.), *Plotin. Über Ewigkeit und Zeit (Enneade III 7)* (Frankfurt am Main, 1967); P. Aubenque, ‘Plotin philosophe de la temporalité’, *Diotima* 4 (1976), 78–86; A. Graeser, ‘Zeitlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit: Bemerkungen zu Plotins Unterscheidung zweier “immer” (III, 7)’, *PhJ* 94 (1987), 142–8; A. Smith, ‘Soul and time in Plotinus’, in J. Holzhausen (ed.), *Psyché—Seele—Anima. Festschrift für Karin Alt* (Stuttgart, 1998), 335–44; L. Brisson (ed.), *Porphyre. Sentences, tomes I–II* (Paris, 2005), 2.756–86; S.K. Strange, ‘Porphyry and Plotinus’ metaphysics’, in G.E. Karamanolis and A. Sheppard (edd.), *Studies on Porphyry* (London, 2007), 17–34.

⁶ Iambl. *apud* Procl. in *Ti.* 3.14.16–19, 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 61, 64 Dillon). Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* 3.7.6.1–12 on *Ti.* 37d6.

⁷ Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 63 Dillon). Cf. Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.792.20–793.23 Diels (Iambl. in *Cat.* fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen); Procl. in *Ti.* 3.21.6–24.30 Diehl.

⁸ On this terminology, see Dillon (n. 1), 39–40, 335–6, 345, 353 on Iambl. *apud* Procl. in *Ti.* 2.240.2–28 Diehl (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 54 Dillon) (πάσης γὰρ τάξεως ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ἡγεῖται μόνως πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων). Cf. also Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.792.21–3 Diels (Iambl. in *Cat.* fr. 108

participants, Time imparticipable is ungenerate, standing still in its everlasting being.⁹ Thence Iamblichus distinguishes Time relative to the cosmogony of the *Timaeus*, not Time relative to Eternity. Only in light of the lemma at *Ti.* 38b7–c1 does Iamblichus implicate Eternity in his metaphysical scheme:

ἅμα δὲ περὶ τούτου καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐνδιδομένου τῷ κόσμῳ ἐν τῷ ἰ' κεφαλαίῳ τάδε γέγραφε· διὰ δὴ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαωνίας φύσεως ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ἔστι καὶ ὁ χρόνος, καὶ προσέεικε τῷ αἰῶνι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατος ἔστι κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν διὰ τὴν ἡμερῆ φύσιν, διὰ μίας τε ἐνεργείας ἐνίσταται καὶ πρόεισι κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ὀρίζει πάντα τὰ γινόμενα ὡσαύτως, κἂν ἢ διαφέροντα.

22 ἀπ' om. Simpl. **E** ἐκδιδομένου Simpl. **a** 23 διὰ δὴ om. Simpl. **E** διαωνίας Pl. **A C F V** Stob. Procl. Philop. Simpl. **F a** : αἰωνίας Pl. **P g** Stob. (alio loco) et δι punct. not. Pl. **A² C²** : δι' αἰῶνος Simpl. **E** 24 αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Simpl. **F² a** : αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Simpl. **E F¹** Procl. (bis) : αὐτῷ Pl. Stob. Philop. (ter) Simpl. (alio loco) 25 ὁμοιότητος Simpl. **E** διὰ τὴν ἡμερῆ Simpl. **E** : κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιομερῆ (sed κατὰ punct. not. et διὰ s. v. κατὰ) Simpl. **F** : κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιομερῆ Simpl. **a**¹⁰

Moreover, in the tenth chapter of his *commentaria*, Iamblichus has written these things regarding Time in and of itself and Time as it is bestowed upon the cosmos therefrom: ‘in light of these things one reads “and according to the paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature, this is *itself* as similar to *itself* as possible”, viz. *Time itself*. Thereupon, Time [*qua* imparticipable, participable and participant] resembles Eternity and is, so far as possible, most similar to *itself* [participant to participable] as a result of its partless nature [that of Time imparticipable], and it [Time] persists through a single activity, and it itself [Time] proceeds through this same activity, distinguishing all things generate despite their differences.’¹¹

Dalsgaard Larsen) (λέγει οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ἀμεθέκτου χρόνου ἐν τῷ εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας ὑπονόηματι τὴν Ἀρχότου λέξιν ἐξηγούμενος); Procl. in *Ti.* 3.26.30–27.3 Diehl (ἔστιν οὖν αἰώνιος μὲν καὶ μονὰς καὶ κέντρον κατ' οὐσίαν ὁ χρόνος καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ μείνασαν ἐνεργείαν, συνεχῆς δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸς καὶ κύκλος κατὰ τὸ προῖον καὶ τὸ μετεχόμενον); Procl. *Inst. theol. prop.* 21–4, 53.

⁹ Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.792.20–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in *Cat.* fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen, in *Ti.* fr. 63 Dillon). Cf. Procl. in *Ti.* 3.17.17–19.32, 3.24.30–32.6 Diehl; Procl. *Plat. theol.* 5.99.15–100.17 Saffrey–Westerink.

¹⁰ On the manuscript tradition, see L. Tarán, ‘The text of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics*’, in I. Hadot (ed.), *Simplicius, sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie* (Berlin, 1987), 246–66. As Tarán warns that Diels is liable to report mistaken readings, I have myself inspected Marcianus graecus 229 (MS **E**, fol. 422r), Marcianus graecus 227 (MS **F**, fol. 290v) and the Aldina (MS **a**, fols. 188r–v), noting no errors. As for the text of the *Timaeus*, I have likewise inspected the two earliest primary witnesses, Parisinus graecus 1807 (MS **A**, ninth century, the ‘codex praestantissimus’) and Tubingensis Mb 14 (MS **C**, eleventh century). On these manuscripts and on all other primary witnesses to the *Timaeus*, see further G. Jonkers, *The Textual Tradition of Plato’s Timaeus and Critias* (Leiden, 2017), 45–201, especially 74 on MS **C** vis-à-vis the other primary witnesses: ‘**C** is an independent source for the *Timaeus*. In age, **C** is only surpassed by **A** and perhaps by **P**, which has only excerpts from the text. **C** goes back to a MS which also served indirectly as a source for **g** (namely, the common ancestor of **YΘΨ**). **Cg** share many readings with **F** which are supported by ancient testimonia against the readings of **AV**.’

¹¹ Inasmuch as Iamblichus distinguishes between Time imparticipable, Time participable and Time in its participants, I distinguish the three in parentheses. On the framing of this lemma, see *Ti.* 38b6–c3 (χρόνος δ' οὖν μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεν[ν]ηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἂν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γίγνηται, καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς [δι]αωνίας φύσεως [*sc.* γέγονεν], ἵν' ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν ὄν, ὁ δ' αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον [*sc.* ἐστίν] γεγονώς τε καὶ ὄν καὶ ἐσόμενος). Observe that the implicit subject of ἢ (if not that of the implicit γέγονεν), and thence that of ὁ (and the implicit ἐστίν), is perhaps χρόνος or οὐρανός, if not οὐρανός *qua* αἰώνιος εἰκόν (*Ti.* 37d5–7), where οὐρανός could refer to the cosmos, viz. ‘the All’ τὸ πᾶν (cf. *Ti.* 27c4–d1, 28b2–7, 37d1–4), just as well as to celestial phenomena (cf. *Ti.* 37e1–3, 38c3–6, 39d7–e2). On these semantic distinctions, see further F.M. Cornford, *Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato* (London, 1937), 99 n. 1; A.-J. Festugière, ‘Le sens philosophique du mot αἰών. À propos d’Aristote, *De Caelo* I, 9’, *PP* 4 (1949), 172–89, at

Instead of reading καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς (δι)αιωνίας φύσεως [*sc.* γέγονεν], ἴν' ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύνάμιν ἦ, which is the text of the earliest primary manuscripts (A, C) and of nearly all the testimonia, Iamblichus and Iamblichus alone reads καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ κατὰ δύνάμιν ἐστὶ. Notwithstanding the absence of ἴν' ὡς, and thence the shift from ἦ to ἐστὶ, we need to explain the reflexiveness of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, viz. 'Time itself to itself'. That this is the reading of Iamblichus himself is not in doubt. Just consider the gloss thereafter, viz. καὶ προσέειπε τῷ αἰῶνι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατος ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν διὰ τὴν ἡμερῆ φύσιν. Such a gloss is sufficient proof that Iamblichus wrote πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατος in light of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, as Dillon himself affirms.¹² Nevertheless, Dillon considers the reflexiveness of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ and its gloss in πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατος insignificant *from a philosophical perspective*—'this fragment is a straight exposition of the lemma, and not of much philosophical importance'.¹³ Why not? Dillon does not explain why 'a straight exposition of the lemma' signifies its insignificance. Nor does such a stance explain the classification of the testimonium itself, as Simplicius affirms that this testimonium is a 'proof—ἀπόδειξις—of the Iamblichean thesis'.¹⁴

So what is the origin of this proof, given the text upon which it rests? Observe that αὐτὸς—*sc.* οὐρανός—αὐτῷ, a reading to which Proclus alone attests, might well have arisen *before* the time of Proclus, if not of Iamblichus himself, as αὐτός can stand for χρόνος if not for οὐρανός.¹⁵ On the other hand, if the reflexiveness of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ signals insights about the everlastingness of *time*, this might then signal its Iamblichean provenance. Yet αὐτὸς αὐτῷ might originate elsewhere. Dillon assumes that αὐτὸς αὐτῷ is the text which Iamblichus will have read in his exemplar, whatever the origin thereof.¹⁶ Yet then again, does this reading not conform to the insights of Iamblichus himself, whose whole thesis of time apart from change draws upon the reflexiveness of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ? In so far as Proclus and Proclus alone attests to the reading αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, it is not unreasonable to surmise, *ex hypothesi*, that this was his own emendation of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, whilst this αὐτὸς αὐτῷ was the novel reading of Iamblichus himself. Observe too that αὐτὸς αὐτῷ is not the reading to which Simplicius subscribes *in propria persona*. Simplicius acknowledges the traditional reading, with αὐτῷ—*sc.* τῷ παραδείγματι—alone, despite being the sole witness to the Iamblichean reading.¹⁷ On these grounds, one may argue, *pace* Dillon, that Iamblichus will have read αὐτὸς αὐτῷ not because this was the reading in his exemplar, whatever its origin, but because αὐτὸς αὐτῷ validates his professed intuition that time is no mere aspect of change.

Still, one needs to explain how Iamblichus might justify this move. Of course, one could argue that the reading αὐτὸς αὐτῷ entails *philological* finesse, if not an objectionable sleight of hand. In this light, Iamblichus draws upon linguistic techniques some thought

186 n. 1; H.F. Cherniss, 'Timaeus 38a8–b5', *JHS* 77 (1957), 18–23, at 23; R. Brague, *Du temps chez Platon et Aristote. Quatre études* (Paris, 1982), 43–55.

¹² Dillon (n. 1), 180–1, 352.

¹³ Dillon (n. 1), 352.

¹⁴ Simpl. *in Phys.* 1.794.27–8 Diels (ἄλλην ἀπόδειξιν τοιαύτην).

¹⁵ Procl. *in Ti.* 3.49.20–6, 3.50.21–31 Diehl.

¹⁶ Dillon (n. 1), 352 ('We may observe ... a difference in the MSS readings available to Proclus and Iamblichus', which implies that they abide by the readings of their *exemplars*, not that these are *their* readings).

¹⁷ Simpl. *in Cael.* 105.6–25 Heiberg. Simplicius construes οὐρανός as the subject of ἦ at *Ti.* 38c1, as shown at lines 9 and 23–5 *vis-à-vis* κόσμος, viz. τὸ πᾶν 'the All'. In similar fashion, Proclus construes οὐρανός as the subject of this same ἦ in his gloss at *in Ti.* 3.50.21–31 Diehl.

scandalous, rendering ΑΥΤΩΙ as αὐτῶ in the same manner as other exegetes finesse ambiguous terms to suit their exegeses. Thus Plutarch thought Xenocrates, Crantor and other Platonists unwilling to abide a temporalizing exegesis of the *Timaeus* quite willing to finesse its *ipsissima uerba* to their sempiternalizing ends.¹⁸ Similarly, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Philoponus after him, thought the ideas of Calvenus Taurus quite shameless in this respect, given his reading of the programmatic text at *Ti.* 27c5 with the second ἦτα as εἰ, not ἦ (that is, εἰ γέγονεν εἰ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστίν, viz. ‘if it [sc. the All] has come into being, even if this [All] is ungenerate’).¹⁹ Such ideas persist among the late Neoplatonists, given how Aeneas of Gaza complains that Platonists were *still* finessing Platonic texts to suit their preferred exegeses.²⁰ One has good reason to suspect that the Iamblican reading of *Ti.* 38b7–c1 is reflective of these phenomena.

On the other hand, one could argue that the reading αὐτὸς αὐτῶ entails *philosophical* finesse vis-à-vis the Platonic title τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαωνίας φύσεως, viz. ‘the paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature’, referent of αὐτῶ upon the traditional reading, where the subject of παράδειγμα appears indeterminate. Is this Eternity? Is this Eternal Being and the everlastingness thereof? If the former, Eternity is the paradigm of all things temporal no less than Time *qua* intelligible. If the latter, then Time *qua* intelligible can likewise lay claim to everlastingness in perfection. Such an idea would then explain the Iamblican reading of a self-reflexive αὐτῶ in lieu of the traditional αὐτῶ. Though in this case, one must confess that Iamblichus imposes upon the text, as the thought that ΑΥΤΩΙ refers to something other than Eternity, to something other than Eternal Being and the everlastingness thereof, is not in the least convincing, unless one contends that time itself is something intelligible. Yet this is what Iamblichus argues, showing that his reading of αὐτὸς αὐτῶ is nothing if not a proof of its philosophical significance. In this light, Iamblichus considers τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαωνίας φύσεως a title for ‘everlastingness’, though ‘everlastingness’ as such is indeterminate between Eternity and Eternal Being, as Eternal Being is thought

¹⁸ Plut. *De an. proc. in Ti.* 1013D–E, noting J. Whittaker, ‘Textual comments on *Timaeus* 27c–d’, *Phoenix* 27 (1973), 387–91. On emendation as a matter of finesse, if not that of ‘finessing’ a given text, see J.M. Dillon, ‘Tampering with the *Timaeus*: ideological emendations in Plato, with special reference to the *Timaeus*’, *AJPh* 110 (1989), 50–72; A. Gioè, ‘Aspetti dell’esegesi medioplatonica: la manipolazione e l’adattamento delle citazioni’, *RAL* 7 (1996), 287–309; F. Ferrari, ‘Struttura e funzione dell’esegesi testuale nel medioplatonismo: il caso del *Timeo*’, *Athenaeum* 89 (2001), 525–74. That Plutarch himself finesses Platonic texts *in light of his own exegesis* has been shown by H.F. Cherniss (ed.), *Plutarch, Moralia. Volume XIII, Part I. Platonic Essays* (Cambridge, MA, 1976), 137–49.

¹⁹ Taur. and Alex. *Aphr. apud Philop. De aetern. mund. c. Procl.* 191.15–193.9, 214.10–20 Rabe (Taur. 30–1 T Gioè, 28–9 T Petrucci; Alex. *Aphr. in Cael. fr.* 97a Rescigno), noting Whittaker (n. 18), 388–9. On the methodology of Taurus and its reception, see M. Baltes, *Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, Teile I–II. Proklos* (Leiden, 1976–8), 1.105–21; K. Verrycken, ‘Philoponus’ interpretation of Plato’s cosmogony’, *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 8 (1997), 269–318; A. Gioè (ed.), *Filosofi medioplatonici del II secolo d. C.: testimonianze e frammenti. Gaio, Albino, Lucio, Nicostrato, Tauro, Severo, Arpocrasione* (Naples, 2002), 346–75; A. Rescigno (ed.), *Alessandro di Aphrodisia: Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele. Frammenti del primo libro* (Amsterdam, 2004), 563–8; F. Ferrari, ‘Lucio Calveno Tauro e l’interpretazione didascalica della cosmogenesi del *Timeo*’, in R.L. Cardullo and D. Iozzia (edd.), *Κάλλος καὶ ἄρετή. Bellezza e virtù. Studi in onore di Maria Barbanti* (Rome, 2014), 321–33; F.M. Petrucci, *Taurus of Beirut: The Other Side of Middle Platonism* (London, 2018), especially 26–197.

²⁰ Aen. Gaz. *Theophr.* 8.11–17 Colonna, noting Whittaker (n. 18), 389. On this critique, see M.W. Champion, *Explaining the Cosmos: Creation and Cultural Interaction in Late-Antique Gaza* (Oxford, 2014), especially 52–3.

of as everlasting owing to Eternity.²¹ In so far as Iamblichus argues for the thesis of time apart from change, he himself draws upon the indeterminateness of this title as a means of grounding his ingenious classification of time. Naturally, inasmuch as time imitates Eternity in its everlastingness, it follows that the cosmos imitates Eternal Being, the cosmos being, through becoming, the everlasting image thereof.²² Yet as a matter of intuition time can persist apart from change. Thence Iamblichus intuits that time is no mere image of Eternity but everlasting in its own right, being itself a paradigm.²³ Thereupon, the indeterminateness of the Platonic title τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως allows Iamblichus to confirm his intuition and infer his thesis from the text, this title thus referring to Eternity and Time alike, the everlastingness of Time being a state of perfection akin to Eternity.²⁴ In other words, the Iamblichean reading ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ arose through an astute reflection upon the title τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως, whereas ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, the reading Proclus attests, allows for a similar exegesis of the text, albeit with οὐρανός as the subject of αὐτός.²⁵

Such is the framing according to which Iamblichus distinguishes Time *qua* participable from Time *qua* imparticipable in illuminating the lemma at *Ti.* 38c1–3 (τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον γέγονεν, ὥστε καὶ ὦν καὶ ἐσόμενος).²⁶ Time is a paradigm in its own right (ὁ [*sc.* ὁ αἰῶν and ὁ χρόνος] τοῖνυν ἐστὶν ὡς παράδειγμα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, τοῦτο ὡς εἰκὼν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ γενητῷ), though Time as a whole, from the imparticipable to the participable to all participants, is still the image of Eternity (καὶ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ κατ' αἰῶνα, τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα κατὰ χρόνον).²⁷ Thence Time resembles its paradigm, Eternity rendering

²¹ Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* 3.7.5; Porph. *apud* Procl. *Plat. theol.* 1.51.4–11 Saffrey–Westerink (Porph. 232F Smith); Iambl. *apud* Procl. in *Ti.* 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 64 Dillon); Procl. in *Ti.* 3.10.2–16.11 Diehl (Syrian. in *Ti.* fr. 17 Wear); Procl. in *Prm.* 3.1118.6–1121.16 Steel–Van Campe (Syrian. in *Prm.* fr. 5 Wear); Procl. *Inst. theol.* prop. 52–4, 84–94, 104; Procl. *Plat. theol.* 3.54.22–62.10 Saffrey–Westerink.

²² Cf. Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.794.27–795.3 Diels (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 68 Dillon); Procl. in *Ti.* 3.50.21–31 Diehl; Procl. *apud* Philop. *De aetern. mund. c.* Procl. 103.25–104.3 Rabe; Simpl. in *Phys.* 2.1155.8–14 Diels on Pl. *Ti.* 37c6–40d5.

²³ Iambl. *apud* Procl. in *Ti.* 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl; Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 63–4 Dillon). NB: Iamblichus distinguishes Eternity as ‘everlastingness’ no less than ‘oneness’ (Iambl. *apud* Procl. in *Ti.* 3.33.2 Diehl τὸ ἐν καὶ ἄπειρον τοῦ αἰῶνος). Its everlastingness follows from its infinite potency (ἄπειρος δύναμις), its oneness from the sameness of its perfect ‘Now’, which obtains simultaneously and always (ἄμα καὶ ἄει). Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* 3.7.2–6; Iambl. *apud* Procl. in *Ti.* 1.230.5–8, 2.72.20–3 Diehl (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 29, 49 Dillon); Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.793.11–22 Diels (Iambl. in *Cat.* fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen).

²⁴ Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.794.24–6 Diels (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 67 Dillon) (καὶ προσέειπε τῷ αἰῶνι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν διὰ τὴν ἀμερῆ φύσιν), *pace* Dillon (n. 1), 353. Instead of ἀμερῆ in MS E, Dillon reads ὁμοιομερῆ in MSS F and a, noting e.g. the presence of ὁμοιομερῆς at Procl. in *Ti.* 2.225.31–226.3 Diehl. Yet Iamblichus attests to the *partlessness* of Time imparticipable *apud* Simpl. in *Cat.* 353.19–354.9 Kalbfleisch, in *Phys.* 1.792.20–793.23 Diels (Iambl. in *Cat.* fr. 108, 110 Dalsgaard Larsen). Cf. also Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.794.1–2 Diels (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 63 Dillon); Procl. in *Ti.* 3.23.11–22 Diehl.

²⁵ Procl. in *Ti.* 3.50.21–31 Diehl, with τὸ πᾶν (‘the All’) as subject of ὁμοιότατον at line 23. Cf. Pl. *Ti.* 39d7–e2 (κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα ἐγεννήθη τῶν ἄστρον ὅσα δι’ οὐρανοῦ πορευόμενα ἐσχεν τροπᾶς, ἵνα τῶδε [*sc.* τὸ πᾶν] ὡς ὁμοιότατον ἦ τῷ τελέῳ καὶ νοητῷ ζῳῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως); Cornford (n. 11), 99 n. 1.

²⁶ Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.794.27–795.3 Diels (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 68 Dillon). Instead of the γεγονός τε of our Plato manuscripts, Iamblichus has γέγονεν, ὥστε, whilst the implicit ἐστὶν is made explicit in the gloss thereafter, viz. ὁ τοῖνυν ἐστὶν ὡς παράδειγμα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, τοῦτο ὡς εἰκὼν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ γενητῷ.

²⁷ Iambl. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.794.28–32 Diels (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 68 Dillon). Cf. Iambl. *apud* Procl. in *Ti.* 3.33.7–14 Diehl (Iambl. in *Ti.* fr. 64 Dillon).

Time a paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature (καὶ νῦν δὴ τοῦ χρόνου γέγονε κατάδηλος ἡ μέση διπλῆ φύσις, μέση μὲν αἰῶνός τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ, διπλῆ δὲ καθόσον συνυφίσταται μὲν πρὸς τὸν κόσμον, συντάττεται δὲ πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡγεῖται, τῷ δὲ ἀφομοιοῦται).²⁸ Nor should such an approach to the text appear all that strange, given the logic of scholastic Platonism and its modes of exegesis. For if Plato is a fount of truth (just as Platonists argue), and the intuition of Iamblichus true, then the thesis of time apart from change is a thesis *Plato himself* should have professed.²⁹ Nor should one acquiesce in philological polemics owing to the absence of ἴν' ὡς and ἦ from the Iamblican reading of the lemma at *Ti.* 38b7–c1. Said reading recalls 'the art of misquotation' common since the time of the Middle Platonists, to whom 'misquotation' is not necessarily a means of finessing a text. More often than not 'misquotation' is exegesis through paraphrase, often for aesthetic reasons, even if there is still scope for finessing a text.³⁰ On the one hand, Iamblichus appears to finesse the text at *Ti.* 38b7–c1, as the absence of ἴν' ὡς and ἦ—and thence of the implicit γέγονεν—allows him to highlight his preferred reading. Yet if one construes καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαωνίας φύσεως ὁμοιότατος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ κατὰ δυνάμιν ἐστὶ with χρόνος as the subject of ἐστὶ (*sc.* χρόνος γεγωνώς), the absence of ἴν' ὡς and ἦ is negligible. One can still conceive of Time being brought into being with the cosmos, *qua* image, and this through the mediation of Time in itself, *qua* paradigm, so long as χρόνος has a double meaning, referring to Time in and of itself no less than to Time in its genesis.³¹ On the other hand, this double meaning rests upon the reflexivity of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. Yet, even if Iamblichus finesses the lemma in *this* sense so as to *infer* his thesis, the shift from αὐτῷ to αὐτῷ could well rest upon a conjecture about its accentuation, as the reflexive ΑΥΤΩΙ allows of a rough breathing (αὐτῷ) if not a smooth one (αὐτῶ). In this light, illumination lies in emendation.³²

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²⁸ Iamb. *apud* Simpl. in *Phys.* 1.794.35–795.1 Diels (Iamb. in *Ti.* fr. 68 Dillon). Cf. Iamb. *apud* Procl. in *Ti.* 3.33.14–30 Diehl (Iamb. in *Ti.* fr. 64 Dillon).

²⁹ On Plato as fount of truth, see G.R. Boys-Stones, *Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen* (Oxford, 2001); G.E. Karamanolis, *Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry* (Oxford, 2006).

³⁰ On 'misquotation' as a means of Platonist exegesis, see J. Whittaker, 'The value of indirect tradition in the establishment of Greek philosophical texts, or the art of misquotation', in J.N. Grant (ed.), *Editing Greek and Latin Texts* (New York, 1989), 63–95. According to Whittaker, 'misquotation' may or may not entail a faithful gloss, faithfulness being relative (71).

³¹ Cf. Procl. in *Ti.* 3.55.2–7 Diehl on *Ti.* 38c3–6. Inasmuch as Iamblichus 'misquotes' *Ti.* 38b7–c1, one could construe his reading of *Ti.* 38c1–3 as another 'misquotation'.

³² Cf. Porph. and Iamb. *apud* Procl. in *Ti.* 1.219.20–7, 1.275.20–276.3 Diehl (Porph. in *Ti.* fr. 30, 33 Sodano; Iamb. in *Ti.* fr. 28, 31 Dillon) on the accentuation of η ... η ... at *Ti.* 27c5 and the scope of παντός at *Ti.* 28b2–7. At *Ti.* 27c5, exegetes thought to read ἦτα as ἦ or ἦ, if not εἰ, viz. η (ἦ, ἦ, εἰ) γέγονεν η (ἦ, ἦ, εἰ) καὶ ἀγενές ἐστίν. Porphyry and Iamblichus construe η ... η ... as ἦ ... ἦ ... , if not as εἰ ... ἦ ... , 'whether/if ... or ...'. Thereupon, at *Ti.* 28b2–7, Porphyry and Iamblichus argue that the παντός at 28b5 is referring to 'everything of the All', not just 'everything', as one should distinguish, first of all, whether the All is ungenerate or generate, viz. πότερον ἦν ἀεὶ, γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἦ γέγονεν, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος. Thence *Ti.* 27c5 is a programmatic *disjunction*—ἦ (if not εἰ) γέγονεν ἦ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστίν. On Porphyry and Iamblichus vis-à-vis *Ti.* 27c5, see Whittaker (n. 18), 388–91, with L. Ferroni and G. Van Riel, 'Editing lemmas in the second book of Proclus' in *Timaeum*', in S. Boodts, P. De Leemans and S. Schorn (edd.), *Sicut dicit. Editing Ancient and Medieval Commentaries on Authoritative Texts* (Leuven, 2020), 185–208, at 200–4 (*contra* Whittaker).