For anyone who studies modern Chinese political thought, the revival of interest in federalism is one of the most striking features of the current scene. It has been particularly visible abroad in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, and its most conspicuous spokesman has been the former director of the Institute of Political Science of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Yan Jiaqi. In remarks delivered to the First Congress of Chinese Students and Scholars in the United States, held in Chicago in July 1989, Yan proposed a Chinese “federation” (lianbang guojia) having a democratic system as the best hope both for reforming China's internal politics and ultimately for resolving the problems of Hong Hong, Taiwan and Tibet. He made similar remarks in other speeches in America and at the founding meeting of the Federation for Chinese Democracy, of which he was elected president, held in Paris in September 1989. Some other mainland Chinese intellectuals, among them Ge Yang, former editor-in-chief of Xin guancha, have supported such views, as have members of the China Spring movement. A recent official denunciation of such views is testimony to their growing influence.

These are surprising developments. Federalist programmes for China have long been seen as little more than relics of an era which ended in the 1920s. As the Cihai entry for liansheng zizhi (one of the phrases for the idea in Chinese) puts it, while certain warlord politicians of the 1920s believed that federalism was the appropriate political system for China, “after the Guangdong revolutionary government launched the Northern Expedition in 1926, no one advocated federalism again.”

For a variety of reasons, still hotly debated by social anthropologists and social historians, both Guangdong and Fujian have been home to many large tightly-organized lineages since at least the 17th century. For a variety of reasons, overseas Chinese emigration in the pre-1949 period was also more prevalent in Guangdong and Fujian than in other Chinese provinces.

Heretofore, analysts have argued that one characteristic of mobilization in China is to provide uniformity in policy direction. This paper sets out to demonstrate that, in at least the public health area, a diverse set of public policies was pursued even in a period as apparently “radical” as the Great Leap Forward (1958–60). The reason for this policy diversity is that different segments of health policy were made in different political arenas, or institutional settings; the pressures, perceptions and resources which characterized one of these political arenas did not necessarily characterize another. The “failures” of the Leap did not simply arise from a ubiquitous “radical” assertion of power but, on the contrary, resulted from the inconsistencies in leadership and programme characteristic of diverse policy-making arenas. Because policy-making responsibility is divided among political arenas, political bargaining and conflict have characterized the allocation to them of different health issues; elaborate strategies have been devised by organizations in order to acquire and /or hold certain areas of policy and unburden themselves of others.

Internet service providers (ISPs) have played an important role in China's internet regulation regime. This article illustrates how ISPs are governed to serve the government's regulatory goals. This involves examining some of the most extraordinary and profound insights concerning internet governance: the theories of the layers principle, the end-to-end argument and the generative internet. Chinese ISPs have been dependent rather than neutral regulatory intermediaries of the government. Moreover, in addition to telecommunication carriers, the radio and television networks affiliated to the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) are to become a new type of ISP that is capable of choking the free spirit of the internet, as recently demonstrated by the far-reaching policy of “network convergence.” This article argues that the policy has the potential to drastically alter the structure and ecology of the internet in China.

The contributions to this Special Issue were first presented as discussion papers for a conference entitled “The Chinese Environment” convened by The China Quarterly and held in London at the School of Oriental and African Studies in January 1998. The papers benefited from the input of discussants and guests: Elisabeth Croll, Christopher Howe, and David Norse, and Fran Monks who served as rapporteur. James E. Nickum later wrote a general article on water issues which has enhanced and complemented the conference set. These combined efforts produced a volume which measures the state of the environment and pinpoints the environmental problems that China will face in the first decade of the 21st century.

Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin's heir apparent, has risen to the elite levels of Chinese politics through skill and a diverse network of political patrons. Hu's political career spans four decades, and he has been associated with China's top leaders, including Song Ping, Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Though marked early as a liberal by his ties to Hu Yaobang, Hu Jintao's conservative credentials were fashioned during the imposition of martial law in Tibet in 1989. Those actions endeared him to the Beijing leadership following the 4 June Tiananmen Square crackdown, and his career accelerated in the 1990s. Young, cautious and talented, Hu catapulted to the Politburo Standing Committee, the vice-presidency and the Central Military Commission. Despite recent media attention, Hu's positions on economic and foreign policy issues remain poorly defined. As the 16th Party Congress approaches, Hu is likely to be preparing to become General Secretary of the Communist Party and a force in world affairs.

In China, continuous rural–urban migration on a massive scale disrupts the traditional rural patriarchal society and makes the temporary non-patrilocal way of residence possible. This new residential pattern has brought profound changes to the lives of migrants. Based on participant observation and interviewing, this article intends to explore the exercise of agency and the representation of subjectivity of female migrant workers in intimate relations after migration. By emphasizing the intergenerational relationship and partner relationships of both unmarried and married women, I demonstrate a complicated picture regarding the changing status of rural migrant women and show how these women both conform and challenge the social norm of filial obligations, through which their agency is exerted and subjectivity is crafted.

The recent proliferation of China's railways has posed challenges to the dominance of the national-level railway authority on railway development. Since the 2000s, the planning of new railways has evolved into a politics of scale in which actors across multiple scales of government have bargained over railway alignment and station siting for their respective interests. This politics is shaped by the uneven bargaining powers of the contending state agents over railway planning. Interscalar division of regulatory oversight over strategic resources for railway development enables state agents at some scales to bargain more successfully, whereas variations in administrative and economic standing further differentiate the interscalar bargaining powers of municipal governments. Different results of bargaining across scales for each city have produced, as intercity railway planning in the Pearl River Delta illustrates, significant intercity variations in average travel times to the stations for the new railways that these cities share. Owing to the peculiar scalar distribution of the costs and benefits of the new railways, municipal governments with greater bargaining power have, contrary to traditional wisdom, bargained for less accessibility to intercity railway stations.

The purpose of this article is to examine the role of constitutions in Hong Kong, the principal concern being the implications of the Basic Law which comes into effect in July 1997 as the constitution of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). In order to show the purpose and method of the Basic Law, I also examine the role of colonial constitutions in the territory.

It is almost exactly a decade since the process of change in China initiated by Deng Xiaoping and his political and ideological supporters began to gather momentum. Formally speaking, the decisive break point was, of course, the holding of the Third Plenum in December 1978, but by the spring of that year the confrontation between the “Whateverists” and the supporters of the “practice criterion” had become open and acute.

The subject of this article is the development of the second united front in China between 1935 and 1938, and in particular the difference between the Comintern and the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on this question. In the first part of the period these differences revealed themselves in the Comintern's criticisms of the CCP's slow rate of progress towards rapprochement with the Kuomintang (KMT). As progress towards the united front gathered speed, they more and more came to centre on how far the alliance should go and the status of the communist areas and armies in relation to the central power of the KMT. Eventually the Maoist interpretation emerged successful from this contest between the two centres, and Wang Ming, chief Chinese spokesman for the Comintern, was elbowed away from the levers of power in the Party.

Fudan is one of China's few universities to survive the vicissitudes of this century's political upheavals, with a tradition of almost 80 years' standing. Many of the colleges which sprung up at the same time perished with the 1911 Revolution, and others of similar character disappeared in the reorganization of Chinese higher education in 1952. It may be significant, therefore, that Fudan was chosen by Chinese Communist leaders to become one of the main comprehensive universities for south China in 1952, which suggests that certain aspects of the tradition for which it was known were considered acceptable and worthy of continuation under the new people's government. Perhaps its development had demonstrated some small measure of success in the exacting task facing Chinese higher education in this century, that of creating a modern Chinese-style university on the ruins of the traditional education system whose values persisted in spite of the abolition of the Imperial examinations in 1905, the year in which Fudan was born.

Personnel changes in the party and government in communist systems are typically politicized and personalistic. Changes occur as the result of natural death, political error or consolidation of personal power from the top. Cadres able to manoeuver around the vagaries of politics enjoy de facto lifelong tenure. In 1978, the experience in the People's Republic of China (PRC) was no different in that regard: lifelong tenure, barring political error, had existed since the consolidation of power in the 1950s. Purge had been the dominant form of exit from office in the PRC. And because purge had not meant physical liquidation in the Chinese case, veteran revolutionaries had survived and reappeared to dominate the Party and government bureaucracies for decades.

In the last five years China has dramatically increased its presence in Africa. Despite its abundant natural resources, the notoriety of its political regime and its close relationship with Beijing, Equatorial Guinea is a glaring omission in the China–Africa literature. This article intends to fulfil that gap by analysing the bilateral relationship between Beijing and Malabo at both the official and the social levels to assess its impact on the development of Equatorial Guinea. As bad governance is the main obstacle for the development of Equatorial Guinea, the article compares the role played by Chinese companies and government in reinforcing Obiang's authoritarian regime with that played by their Western counterparts. It concludes that Chinese extractive firms play a marginal role in the financial extraversion that strongly links the Obiang regimen with US oil companies. Conversely, the Chinese government offers Obiang more extensive and stable support than Western governments to the extent that most of the undeniable developmental potential of Chinese co-operation is wasted through clientelist networks.

Through use of a unique, multi-year public opinion survey, this paper seeks to measure changes in self-reported governmental satisfaction among Chinese citizens between 2003 and 2016. Despite the persistence of vast socio-economic and regional inequalities, we find evidence that low-income citizens and residents living in China's less-developed inland provinces have actually reported comparatively greater increases in satisfaction since 2003. These results, which we term the “income effect” and “region effect” respectively, are more pronounced at the county and township levels of government, which are most responsible for public service provision. Our findings also show that the satisfaction gap between privileged and more marginalized populations in China is beginning to close, in large part owing to efforts by the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations to rebalance the gains of economic growth and shift resources towards the populations most overlooked during China's first few decades of reform.

This study provides an overview of the origin, importance and strength of the non-leading cadre system and argues that the system plays a key role in building resilience in China's bureaucracy. The non-leading cadre system is administratively and politically important because it makes the party-state bureaucracy more adaptable and fosters cohesion among the elite cadre workforce. Although the system may appear to have institutionalized redundancy, this study argues that this redundancy has the benefit of making movement between leading and non-leading cadre status possible. In other words, the non-leading cadre system provides the various levels of the party-state bureaucracy with the leverage to develop their own measures for resolving their own problems. Putting aside the deficiencies in implementation, the non-leading cadre system is likely to remain durable and will help to develop an agile and resilient personnel management system, at least in the short to medium term.

There is little reason for thinking that the anti-rightist campaign of 1957–58, which closed the Hundred Flowers interlude, was undertaken in order to overcome an organised opposition in the central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party rather than to deal with a political situation that was clearly getting out of hand. The victims were either bourgeois intellectuals and members of the so-called “democratic parties” or communist officials of the second rank, for the most part provincial administrators. Their fate presumably strengthened the hand of the doctrinaires in the Party and weakened the will of the moderates to oppose the extravagances of the subsequent “great leap forward”; and there are doubtless many in China as well as the West who believe that Mao's personal involvement in the fiasco of liberalisation may have constituted the first stage in a process which would lead eighteen months later to his withdrawal from the chairmanship of the republic. The political repercussions were, however, long-term; the immediate effect of the change of line may have been to cement rather than undermine the solidarity of the leaders.

The issue of equality has become the focus of increasing attention in both China and the west in the past several years. But the empirical basis for analyzing the extent and nature of equality in modern China remains weak, relying as it has on impressions and scattered statistics brought back by visitors. The most systematic summary of available data on one form of equality – income distribution – is Professor Martin Whyte's recent article in The China Quarterly (No. 64) entitled “Inequality and stratification in China.” Whyte's measure of inequality is the ratio of the income of the highest earner to that of the lowest. In his treatment of rural income, Whyte reports intra-team ratios for 18 communes visited by Keith Buchanan as around 3:1, a ratio of 14:1 for Liu-lin village visited by Jan Myrdal in 1962, and 3:1 or 4:1 for villages in his own interview research. On the basis of this kind of data, Whyte concludes that income inequality within China's production teams is relatively low but not outstandingly so in comparison with pre-1949 China or with other Asian countries. He suggests that the “modest” level of income inequality in rural China today may be as much the result of a relatively equal distribution before 1949 as of post-Liberation agricultural development and redistribution of the means of production.

Throughout its period of economic transition, the Chinese state has readjusted its relationship with industry and developed new regulatory schemes. China's first industry-specific independent regulatory agency, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), was created in 2003. Its operation does not follow Western practice which adopts the best institutional arrangement for autonomous regulators. This article will examine the failings and regulatory capture of SERC. I argue that because the process of creating a new regulator involves resource reallocation and power redistribution, SERC has suffered both endogenous and exogenous disadvantages since its inception. The compromised institutional design, along with insufficient resources and fragmented authority, has considerably weakened SERC's regulatory capacity. Moreover, SERC was not designed as part of the reform schedule, but rather emerged later as a response to institutional necessities, which also contributes to its vulnerability. As a result, the state has exposed SERC to potential capture by both government entities and regulated enterprises.

Although not commonly recognized as such, China is a sizeable oil exporter in the world. In 1985, for example, it exported 36.24 million tonnes of crude oil and oil products, accounting for 2.41 per cent of total oil exports in the world. Oil also satisfied 17 per cent of total domestic energy needs and generated 25.9 per cent of all export earnings of the country in 1985.