One of the most arresting aspects of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been the confrontation between Mao Tse-tung (or the Maoist group) and the Chinese Communist Party. There is, to be sure, an area of vagueness and uncertainty concerning this whole matter. Have the Maoists attacked the party as such? What indeed is the party as such? The party may be conceived of as the sum total of its actual members—of its human composition. It may be conceived of in terms of its organisational structure—its “constitution,” rules and established mechanisms. To any genuine Marxist-Leninist, it is, of course, more than its cells and anatomy. It is a metaphysical organism which is more than the sum of its parts. The “soul” of this collective entity incarnates all those intellectual and moral capacities which Marx had attributed to the industrial proletariat.

The Sino-Vietnam War of February–March 1979 marked the culmination of months of strained relations between the two neighbouring communist states. (This article explores Chinese foreign policy as it evolved before, during and after the conflict) My underlying thesis is that China's original goals were both political and military, relating to the definition and strengthening of China's role in regional (e.g. Indo-Chinese and South-east Asian) international politics, as well as China's perceived role in the global relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Because the conflict's military goals were not fully attained, the political goals were also not met, affecting not only the relationship between various Chinese leadership factions and their views about China's economic development plans, but also the importance of military modernization costs as part of the “four modernizations” and even China's alignment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the United States. I shall first describe the prelude to the war.

Popular satisfaction with current standards of living in reform-era China is explored in this article, using survey data from the 2004 China Inequality and Distributive Justice Project. Three major patterns are found: first, people of rural origin, with low levels of education and living in the west region, who are disadvantaged in the inequality hierarchy, report greater satisfaction with current standards of living than do privileged urbanites, the highly educated and residents in the coastal east. Second, inequality-related negative life experiences and social cognitive processes including temporal and social comparisons, material aspirations, and life goal orientations mediate the effects of socioeconomic characteristics. Third, the social sources of satisfaction with current standards of living vary across urban, rural and migrant residents. It is suggested that these patterns have largely stemmed from the unique political economic institutional arrangement and stratification system in China.

Law is a social institution designed to help society operate in a harmonious and efficient manner. It fosters orderly relations among individuals and groups by formulating and enforcing some basic rules of conduct, providing mechanisms for the resolution of some major disagreements, and defining the structure and mode of government. The precise shape, content and manner of operation of this institution are determined by the resources, needs, problems, historical development and general conditions of the society in which it functions. As these factors differ from society to society, so also differ the attitudes towards law, the forms of legal systems and the specific legal norms and rules.

China's increasing, and increasingly visible, engagement in Latin America has led to a variety of analyses, many based on either international relations notions of realism or international political economy precepts of trade. Rather than seeing China's rhetoric on its relations with Latin America as fluff that conceals a harder reality, this article takes rhetoric seriously as a device of “framing and claiming”: a way in which political elites in China interpret the fast-changing developing world and China's place in it. The article explores how political elites have understood the sources of China's own domestic development and then projected those notions on to other parts of the developing world, through earlier “fractal” logics of development whereby each state repeats one model of development in its own way and a currently dominant “division of labour” logic that posits one integrated model of development whereby complementarity and comparative advantage hold sway. The article concludes with a comparison of China's relations with Peru and Brazil, suggesting that China's bilateral relations with Brazil indicate a newer, emerging rhetoric of global partnership based on equality.

This article is a case study of state–society–capital conflicts over the preservation of the Central Police Station (CPS) compound in Hong Kong during 2003–08. The conflict was between two fundamentally different approaches to urban space: a cultural economy approach that took culture and space as a source of economic profit, and an opposition discourse of preservation that emphasized cultural, historical and humanistic values as an end. The struggle turned out to be a moderate success for anti-commercialism. Drawing on and extending the notions of collective memory and spatial politics, this article examines how the various civil society actors, in their struggle against commercialism, sought to define and enhance the cultural value of the site through a variety of discourses and practices relating to history and space. It addresses the specific question of why and how certain constructions of collective memory succeed (or fail) to work with certain places in particular instances. The study shows that memories of the CPS compound contained both state-associated and people-associated accounts, between which the former prevailed. The state-associated account was embedded in a familiar, hegemonic story about Hong Kong, which, via an abstract process of symbolization around the notion of the rule of law, successfully turned the compound into an iconic symbol of identification for the city. Beyond this, the civil society actors sought also to generate a sense of lived space associated with the people, and the outcome was mixed.

The People's Republic of China failed to win the hearts and minds of the Hong Kong Chinese people before its resumption of the city's sovereignty on 1 July 1997. This article attempts to account for this contradiction in China's pursuit of reunification. By shifting the focus to the alternative battle to control the lives and bodies of the local population, this article demonstrates how China exploited its water and food supplies to the colony in order to control Hong Kong before and after 1997. The study pinpoints the bio-political measures used by China to secure Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. It concludes with an analysis of the current situation in Hong Kong and the implications of China's control of water and food supplies for the relations between the ruling state and the people of Hong Kong.

It is standard practice, both within and outside China, to divide its population between rural and urban. However, this distinction is more complex than at first appears. China's State Statistical Bureau uses three distinct concepts when defining China's rural population. These have been translated into “rural,” “agricultural” and “countryside” definitions. A further complication is that the people included in each of these definitions has changed over time. As a result, data for China's rural population is ambiguous unless the user can determine which of the three definitions is being used and from which period.

In mid May 1983 the Wuhan Public Security Bureau posted a notice along the walls of Hankow on “temporary residence certificates” for non-native personnel coming into the city to work. Since a check of the State Council Bulletin and the People's Daily for the months surrounding this time (from 1 January through 31 July 1983) turned up no similar central-level document, one must conclude that the source for this circular was local. Also, in the period since (through the time of final preparation of the present manuscript, late March 1984), those sources have still not published any authoritative rulings on this matter, insofar as I have been able to verify. Moreover, recent press accounts pertaining to city household registration describe decisions about this work as if they were taken by the municipalities themselves. Thus, the regulations translated and analysed below may only represent the situation and its handling in one particular region. Nonetheless, their intrinsic interest, their broader implications and their import reach far beyond this one case.

This article presents the first quantitative analysis of gender disparities in self-employment in urban China. It documents the extent of gender income inequality in self-employment. By disaggregating self-employment into three occupational classes, it reveals the gender segregation within self-employment – women were concentrated in the financially least rewarding segment – and identifies it as a main source of gender income inequality. I examine a range of determinants of participation in self-employment, including family structure, family background and career history, and how their gender-specific effects contribute to gender segregation. Although using data from a 1996 national survey, this study captures two key processes that shaped the structure of self-employment in contemporary urban China: the restructuring of the state sector and the growth of financial returns and social status in the private sector, both of which contributed to the formation of gender segregation in self-employment.

The object of this article is to examine changing Chinese attitudes to their place in the world from a Chinese historical and intellectual perspective, in order to provide a basis for anticipating developments in the future attuned more to a Chinese than to a western point of view. The question immediately arises whether such a perspective is in any way relevant to the recent theory and practice of international relations in the People's Republic of China, and what insights, if any, such a perspective may provide for discussing the future. This is a controversial subject concerned with the nature of cultural change, and the extent to which " imprinting" from a long continuity of accepted social and cultural values can psychologically condition people even after a decisive break in that tradition appears to have occurred.

Charismatic forms of healing can be found both in Chinese medicine and spiritual practices. This article examines how qigong healing sects in contemporary China became subject to state regulation and medicalization. Such a move was intended to eradicate masters who were viewed as promoting superstition (mixin) or heterodox spiritual practices. Yet, the rise of masters who intertwined healing with spirituality was facilitated by market reforms that enabled entrepreneurial forms of medicine. When other popular forms of healing emerged in the late 1990s, the previous state response to qigong facilitated containment practices which continue into the 21st century. Recent state policy towards sectarian organizations based on the promotion of science are compared with the regulation of qigong a decade earlier.

The basic character of crime in contemporary China by the Ministry of Public Security Research Unit Number Five1 offers what must be the most comprehensive picture to date of crime in contemporary China. Written by the unit in charge of criminal investigation this authoritative article offers figures and analysis rarely seen outside the Ministry. Almost by definition it was never meant for open publication. It was designed for Chinese specialists within the Ministry to help them come to terms with, and to gain some understanding of, the nature of crime in the China of economic reform. The overall volume from which this article comes was one of three internally published by the Ministry between 1989 and 1993. The first two volumes are collections of articles from throughout the country, and the final volume (published in 1993) was a summary of major criminal trends and an update on the situation. The decision to publish these books followed a specialist conference convened by the Ministry in 1989 and held in Hebei for specialists in the area. The significance of the series is testified by the fact that the then Deputy Minister of Public Security, Yu Lie, was made editor-in-chief of the whole series.

The post-Cold War world is witnessing the reconfiguration of international relations with the emergence of new actors and relationships on the world stage. These new actors and patterns of relations are reshaping the familiarities of the post-war era. As the new millennium approaches, one has the sense that the world is in transition from one epoch to another. Among the new realities of our era is the emergence of “Greater China.”

Pressures for change are inherent in leadership succession under any political system. In China, because of his longevity and close involvement in major strategic initiatives, Mao Zedong's passing was bound to intensify such pressures. When he died in September 1976, Mao had held supreme power, largely unchallenged, for four decades. Since 1949, China's economic development had been uniquely, if not consistently, influenced by his personal prejudices and idiosyncratic view of how best to realize the country's development potential.

Western economists who are interested in the analysis of the contemporary Chinese economy are currently confronted with challenging analytical tasks arising from two remarkable events. The first is the new post-Mao government's attempt to reform the economic system of centralized, physical planning that characterized the Mao regime in the direction of a system of decentralized and market-orientated planning (referred to as “reform” policy). Side by side with this systemic reform, the previous development policy of high growth and high investment, which gave top priority to heavy industry, is being replaced by a new one which aims at securing a steady increase in personal consumption and in which investment allocation is weighted in favour of light industry and agriculture. Of these new strategies, the latter is already being rigorously put into force (and even accompanied by a drastic deflatory effect), starting with an interim measure to reduce the over-inflated production of heavy industry in favour of raising that of light industry and agriculture (referred to as “adjustment” policy). The former component for the systemic reform of the economy is still at an experimental stage, but Chinese planners and economists appear to be very busy in discussing and preparing even more comprehensive reforms.

China's de jure urbanization level more than doubled in the five years between 1982 and 1987, jumping from 20.8 per cent to 46 6 per cent (Table 1). The Chinese State Statistical Bureau (SSB) officials explained that this unprecedented increase was largely the result of an increase in the number of urban towns since the mid 1984 relaxation of criteria for urban town designation.1 This is, however, only a partial explanation. My own analysis shows that much of the gain in the town population was in fact due to the post-1984 governing system of“town administering village” (zhen guan cun). Many newly designated urban towns (and some existing towns as well) have enlarged their administrative territories to include a huge number of agricultural residents in their official urban population. Most of these rural persons, however, judged by strict occupational and residential criteria, should not have been counted as urban population. The inclusion of many agricultural persons in the urban sector since mid 1984 has thus greatly exaggerated the actual urbanization level.2

In light of widespread western condemnation of the Tiananmen Square event, it may seem somewhat capricious to raise the issue of the “rule of law” as it is understood in China; however, prior to 4 June the Chinese Communist Party sanctioned a provocative theoretical debate which featured the “rule of law” as opposed to the “rule of man.” Even though the Chinese rule of law derived self-consciously from Chinese ideology and history, it seemed to parallel loosely the substantive concern in the western theoretical notion of “government of laws, not men.”

The analytical approaches so far devoted to the contemporary People's Liberation Army (PLA) have been of three general types. First, biographical studies which explain events in terms of the individual military leaders and their inter-relationships. Second, some students of the PLA have devised analytical models of informal power structures. The behaviour of the PLA in the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” has been interpreted by some as determined by personal loyalties, latent regionalism, and cliques formed around common service in military units prior to 1949. Others have viewed the PLA as split between “professional” commanders and the political cadres in the armed forces – sometimes dubbed a “Red versus expert” analysis. These categories of studies have one thing in common; they treat PLA institutions as being manipulated by informal and extra-legal forces. The third type of study emphasizes organizational and institutional frameworks. This paper falls into the third category. It asks the question: to what extent were the military institutions the subject or object of developments in the Cultural Revolution? It concludes that the organizational structures of the PLA and the missions assigned them heavily influenced the political behaviour of military leaders in the provinces.

Regional economic relations in East Asia have experienced a period of profound change since the 1997/98 financial crisis. Two developments are particularly notable. The first relates to the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework, under which an increasingly coalescent regional economic grouping has emerged in East Asia. Thus far, APT member states (Japan, China, South Korea and the ASEAN group) have devoted much energy to creating new mechanisms of regional financial governance, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative and Asian Bond Market Initiative. The second development concerns the expansion of bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) projects in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. Many see this as a precursor to forging wider sub-regional or regional trade agreements. Both developments mark a potentially significant shift from regionalization to regionalism in East Asia, and thus “high politics” becomes de facto more important given regionalism is largely founded on inter-(nation-)state agreements. Beijing's continued ardent contestation of Taiwan's nation-statehood has hence limited Taiwan's ability to engage as it would like in East Asia's new regional political economy. This article considers the nature of regional political economy and applies it to the recent East Asian experience, which in turn provides an analytical framework for examining the significance of the APT framework and new FTA trend, and Taiwan's position in relation to them. Special attention is paid to Taiwan's prospects in East Asia's new regional political economy.