This article, focusing on the “revive the northeast” programme, examines four questions: why was the northeast region selected as yet another macro-site for Beijing-endorsed scheme of regional development; how does it differ from the “develop the west” scheme; what does the “revive the northeast” scheme entail in concrete policy terms; and how can we assess the impact of this scheme on the region's economic development? While it offers a relatively positive assessment of the programme's impact in facilitating a faster growth during 2004–06, future challenges are also noted for a sustainable development of the northeast region as a whole.

Re-education through labour (laodong jiaoyang or laojiao for short) is an administrative punishment imposed by the police. Since its inception in 1955, it has become a convenient instrument for the government to use to deal with any crisis. Its development has largely followed the ebb and flow of the CCP's political behaviour. Created as a comparatively mild suppression of counterrevolutionary activities, laojiao served as a useful instrument of punishment for dissenting intellectuals in 1958, though it was then nearly phased out during the radical years of the Cultural Revolution. Laojiao expanded quickly as a result of the CCP's anti-crime strategy after 1983, and has grown steadily ever since. It now serves multiple functions, including crime control, drug rehabilitation, investigative detention and political control. It enjoys different degrees of legitimacy and justification. Any substantive discussion on the future of laojiao has to be offence and offender specific.

Think tanks in China simultaneously play advisory, academic and advocacy roles in the policy process. In this article, I recommend an analytical framework that evaluates think tanks by studying their specific activities in addition to their nature. Empirical data involving 301 think tanks in 25 provinces were collected through the China Think Tank Survey 2004. The 1998 regional Integrated Knowledge Development Index database was also used for the analysis. Based on these two independent sets of survey data, the article concludes that connections with the government and knowledge capacity in regions where think tanks are located are the two differing forces that drive China's think tanks to operate as either advisors or advocates. Moreover, these two determinants differentially influence the individual roles of the two types of think tanks.

Based on a 2001 survey, this study finds increased disparities in land distribution in rural Zhejiang. Regression analyses yield three main findings. First, increased disparities in land distribution are associated with growth of land markets. Second, rural households who acquired land through markets significantly increased their farm income. Land markets thus gave rise to a new venue of income generation and increased inequality in farm income. Widening disparities in land rights and farm income, however, did not constitute a further retreat from equality, but instead had compensatory effects on overall inequality, as land markets brought up families who would have fallen at the lower end of income distribution in the absence of such markets. Third, land markets increased efficiency in farming, as households who acquired land were using it more productively. In rural Zhejiang, growth of land markets broadened access to market opportunities and enhanced both efficiency and equity.

A survey of local government officials and enterprise managers in six Chinese cities demonstrates relatively high environmental awareness. However, this awareness remains primarily an abstraction and does not always shape specific policy preferences. This article shows that the development-driven model works well overall, indicating the reluctance of policy makers to implement environmental protection policies at the cost of sacrificing the rate of economic growth. The pollution-driven model applies only to more developed areas, in which elites in more polluted cities are more concerned about environmental protection than those in less polluted cities. A non-linear model that takes into account the interaction between pollution and development works the best in explaining elites' policy preferences. It suggests that pollution becomes a significant factor affecting policy preferences only when a certain development level is reached.

This article analyses Chinese local people's congresses' supervision of governments in order to see whether people's congresses have played a meaningful role in the reform era. The article will show that the main strategies of people's congresses have been to gain the support of the Chinese Communist Party and to co-operate with governments, rather than to use confrontation, in an effort to overcome their lower political status. But after primarily achieving these goals by the early 1990s, people's congresses have also started to employ the confrontation strategy towards governments. At the same time, people's congresses have actively pioneered new supervisory measures so that they overcome current problematic legal and legislative systems. As a result, legislative supervision began to influence governments and officials significantly in the early 1990s. So people's congresses, along with the Party and governments, have become important political actors in local politics, even though they are not as influential as the other two institutions.

In this paper, we examine how the Chinese state controls social media. While social media companies are responsible for censoring their platforms, they also selectively report certain users to the government. This article focuses on understanding the logic behind media platforms’ decisions to report users or content to the government. We find that content is less relevant than commonly thought. Information control efforts often focus on who is posting rather than on what they are posting. The state permits open discussion and debate on social media while controlling and managing influential social forces that may challenge the party-state's hegemonic position. We build on Schurmann's “ideology and organization,” emphasizing the Party's goals of embedding itself in all social structures and limiting the ability of non-Party individuals, networks or groups to carve out a separate space for leadership and social status. In the virtual public sphere, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to apply these principles to co-opt, repress and limit the reach of influential non-Party “thought leaders.” We find evidence to support this logic through qualitative and quantitative analysis of leaked censorship documents from a social media company and government documents on information control.

In recent years the concept of civil society has gained scholarly attention world-wide. It has found numerous advocates in the West, such as John Keane who suggested democratizing European socialism by defending the distinction between civil society and the state; Michael Walzer who proposed synthesizing socialist, capitalist and nationalist ideals under the rubric of civil society; and Daniel Bell, who called for a revival of civil society in the United States as a protection against the expanding state bureaucracies. In 1992 alone, at least three books on the subject appeared. In Eastern Europe, proponents of the civil society concept – like Vaclav Havel, George Konrad and Adam Michnik – have been credited with developing an extremely useful theoretical tool for overthrowing Stalinist authoritarianism. A volume consisting of case studies of seven former or present socialist countries found that the notion of civil society is generally applicable to the study of Communist systems, as long as the influence of different cultures and traditions of individual countries are fully acknowledged. The civil society paradigm, despite its basic European orientation, has also been recognized as applicable to the study of developing countries.

Influence in world affairs is not limited to military and economic power. A government can use ideas and values to build support at home and to recruit sympathizers among publics and policy-makers abroad. The struggle over beliefs and values may be as complex as the struggle over other forms of power. The history of the human rights issue in Chinese foreign policy exemplifies such a process.

The third Congress of China's Literary and Art Workers, the first since the Hundred Flowers Campaign, was held in Peking from July 22 to August 13 “to review and assess” the literary and artistic achievements in the years between 1953 and 1960, “summarise and exchange experience, further define the road of development of socialist art and literature, and consider the tasks to be faced in the coming years.” The presence of Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, and other political leaders and the large space which the People's Daily devoted to the meeting indicated its importance. Of the 2,300 delegates there were professionals and amateurs working in local governments and the services and from them a praesidium of over 180 members was elected before the long speeches on the opening day began. Kuo Mo-jo, as the President of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, first spoke a few words of welcome and then went on to outline the circumstances under which the Congress was convoked and the general political lines along which China's art and literature had been and would be developing. These lines were repeated once more, and elaborated, by Lu Ting-yi, Director of the Party's Propaganda Department and Deputy Premier, who represented the Party and the Government, and subsequently they were to be repeated many times over. The third speaker on the opening day to recite them was Chou Yang, Vice-President of the Federation and a Deputy Director of the Party's Propaganda Department, who also laid down six tasks for the Congress.

Huang zhong bing, the “yellow puffy disease” caused by parasitic hookworms living in the human small intestine, was common throughout pre-liberation China. Hookworms contributed significantly to the nation's reputation as the sick man of Asia. However, even today China has the world's greatest number of cases of human hookworm infection. From estimates based on diagnostic surveys obtained during the early 1990s on over one million patients, there are approximately 194 million Chinese infected with hookworm. Most of these infections occur among the rural poor in the south and south-west. Even more recent data obtained in 1997 and 1998 indicate that hookworm remains a major public health problem in Hainan, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. Populations of the elderly and middle-aged women are emerging as the groups now at greatest risk for acquiring hookworm. New evidence indicates that in addition to threatening health, hookworms also contribute significantly to economic under-development. Hookworms are a living reminder of China's often-forgotten rural southern poverty and a rapidly growing urban–rural inequality; they are an impediment to China's future economic growth.

Students of the local state in reform-era China behold a host of different forms. Scholarly research reports debate their defining characteristics, speculate about the political participatory and non-participatory possibilities each type seems to hold out for the future, scrutinize their implications for economic development or for income distribution, and ponder if the very plurality of local governance types now seen in play across the country will prove to be a durable or only a transitory state of affairs. In a recent, commendably lucid “state of the field” essay, Baum and Shevchenko grouped the many disparate observations and models to date into four main sorts: in their relationships to economic activity, local states have been found to be entrepreneurial, clientelist, predatory or developmental.In entrepreneurial states, state agents and bureaucrats, even whole government bureaus, may go into business independently or enter into partnerships for profit; in clientelist states, officials promote and participate in the benefits of profit-making activity through personalized and particularistic ties to entrepreneurs in their localities; in predatory states, officials do not engage in business either directly or indirectly but utilize their positions instead to extract unproductive rents from producers and entrepreneurs through exorbitant fees, levies and fines; while in developmental states, officials intervene indirectly in the economy, “helping to plan, finance, and co-ordinate local projects, investing in local infrastructure, and promoting co-operative economic relations with external agencies.” In developmental states, local officials create an environment conducive to growth while not, themselves, engaging in business for profit and while “avoiding the formation of particularistic ties to ‘preferred’ enterprises and clients.” See Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, “The state of the state,” in Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (eds.), The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 344–45. The entrepreneurial state model has had its fullest elaboration in Jane Duckett, The Entrepreneurial State in China (London: Routledge, 1998), but see also Yimin Lin and Zhanxin Zhang, “Backyard profit centers: the private assets of public agencies,” in Jean C. Oi and Andrew G. Walder (eds.), Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 203–225. Clientelist state forms have been very widely reported. For just two urban examples, see Margaret M. Pearson, China's New Business Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), and David L. Wank, “Bureaucratic patronage and private business: changing networks of power in urban China,” in Andrew G. Walder (ed.), The Waning of the Communist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 153–183; and for a rural example, see Gregory A. Ruf, “Collective enterprise and property rights in a Sichuan village: the rise and decline of managerial corporatism,” in Oi and Walder, Property Rights, pp. 27–48. Predatory state forms have also been widely reported in the growing literature on corruption in China. They are often associated with poverty, the heavy tax and fee burden placed upon the peasantry and with peasant protest, as in Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, “Taxation without representation: peasants, the central and the local states in reform China,” The China Quarterly, No. 163 (September 2000), pp. 742–763. But predatory abuses are found also in more prosperous localities, as reported in Nan Lin and Chih-Jou Jay Chen, “Local elites as officials and owners: shareholding and property rights in Daqiuzhuang,” in Oi and Walder, Property Rights, pp. 145–170. As for the developmental state model, note that Baum and Shevchenko correctly classify Jean Oi's concept of “local state corporatism” as a variant within the category of “developmental” states (p. 350). See Jean C. Oi, “The role of the local state in China's transitional economy,” The China Quarterly, No. 144 (December 1995), pp. 1132–49; Jean C. Oi, “The evolution of local state corporatism,” in Andrew G. Walder(ed.), Zouping in Transition: The Process of Reform in Rural North China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); and Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). For a recent critique and reassessment of the “local state corporatist” conception, see Sally Sargeson and Jian Zhang, “Reassessing the role of the local state: a case study of local government interventions in property rights reform in a Hangzhou district,” China Journal, No. 42 (July 1999), pp. 77–99. But new examples of developmental state forms also continue to be found, as reported in Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, “Inheritors of the boom: private enterprise and the role of local government in a rural South China township,” China Journal, No. 42 (July 1999), pp. 45–74. Unger and Chan deal specifically, as we do here, with the relationship between local developmental states and the growing private sector.

Bands of young men took to the streets of Shanghai in late 1978, shouting slogans, vandalizing stores, putting up wall posters, imprisoning municipal officials in their offices and disrupting rail traffic. To many Shanghainese, it was déjà vu, a replay of Red Guard activities during the Cultural Revolution (CR), and small wonder, as the participants were those same youths who had rampaged through the city and then foresworn the urban security of Shanghai to go up to the mountains and down to the countryside to build socialism. Now, a decade later, disillusioned, alienated, in dire economic straits, unmarried and abandoned, they had ridden a “back to the city wind” and were determined to stay.

The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help those still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist duty. Mao Zedong

In the middle of October 1975, a dusty column of South African troops, equipped with armoured cars and helicopters, rumbled north into Angola, further internationalizing the already complex civil war there. The South African attack not only broadened the war, prompting an even greater Cuban intervention, it also posed a dilemma for China, which supported the same Angolan parties as did South Africa: should China follow its policy of tit-for-tat opposition to Soviet expansion world-wide, even if it meant allying with the racist government of South Africa? Or should it follow the opinions of its fellow Third World nations in Africa, even if it led to a Soviet bloc advance? The difficulty China's leaders faced in the autumn of 1975 was one which had hidden origins in the different ways in which China viewed conflicts around the world, a difficulty that had lain dormant for years but which erupted in 1975 into full view, and with disastrous consequences for Chinese foreign policy in Africa. It is, moreover, a discrepancy which continues to exist in China's views of the world today.

How does China view conflicts and revolutions in the Third World? How do the Chinese organize their relations with Third World revolutionary organizations and their post-independence governments? This article examines the tensions and shifts of Chinese policy towards two essentially simultaneous revolutionary struggles and their post-independence governments: Angola and Mozambique.

The military is a key actor in the political life of many nations. Across the developing and socialist worlds, the armed forces have served as far more than guarantors of national security as they sustain civilian elites in power or often seize it themselves. In China there has been a long tradition of military rule during much of the modern era–one need think only of Li Hongzhang and the Beiyang Army, the Republic's first president General Yuan Shikai, the warlords of the 1920s, or Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Guominjun (the twin sibling of the ruling Guomindang). In post-1949 China former and active-duty military officers (as well as the military as an institution) have been central actors in the political life of the nation, effectively administering the country from 1949–52 and 1967–73. However, this article is not so much about the militarization of politics in China as about the politicization of the military.

This article examines the potency and persistence of myth and language in the context of the dispute, now over 80 years old, about the officially-sanctioned wording of regulations in the municipal parks of foreign-administered Shanghai. Specifically, it examines the potent symbol of the sign placed in Shanghai's Huangpu Park that allegedly read: “Chinese and Dogs Not Admitted.” This symbol has secured a totemic position in the historiography of the Western presence in China before 1949 and is deeply embedded in contemporary Chinese and Western perceptions and representations of that era, and of the whole question of Western imperialism in China. It is the subject both of popular discourse and official fiat in China today. Drawing on a series of revisionist writings and new archival research this article shows that the true facts of the case are both beyond dispute and irrelevant, but that the legend survives undiminished.

For over 60 years before June 1928 most Chinese certainly were barred from the parks administered by the foreign-controlled Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) of the International Settlement in Shanghai. As shown below, the enforcement of the ban varied over time but for the first three decades of the 20th century it was rigidly administered. Dogs, ball games, cycling and picking of the flowers were also forbidden, but the alleged juxtaposition of the bans on dogs and Chinese became notorious. The potency of “dog” as an insulting and dehumanizing epithet in China undoubtedly exacerbated the insult, and also made the story of the sign's outrageous wording seem all the more plausible.

In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, a dramatic surge of rural industrialization occurred in China. Thousands of small-scale enterprises using intermediate technologies were set up in the rural hsien and communes.

This article focuses on three distinctive features of the revival of Catholicism in China: its relatively slow rate of increase, compared with other forms of Chinese religiosity; its relatively intense internal and external conflicts; and its peculiar mix of antagonism and co-operation with the government. These are explained in terms of three interpenetrating layers of the Chinese Catholic community: its priestly, sacramental religious vision, its social embodiment in rural society, and the legacy of political conflict between the Vatican and the PRC government. Though intimately interconnected, these layers of the Catholic Church have each developed at different paces and in somewhat different directions. The effects of this are seen most clearly in the problems faced by Chinese priests.

As urbanization continues to fuel land and property conflicts in rural China, shareholding has been promoted as a reform in property rights that would enhance bottom-up control in the governance of collective assets. The recent proliferation of community-based shareholding companies has been credited for giving villagers new identities as shareholders, which entitle them to vote, receive their share of collective profits, and elect the managers of their wealth. This paper critically appraises these reforms and offers a contrarian perspective to singular narratives of villager empowerment. While shareholding clarifies villagers’ rights of control, income and transfer in collective property, the effective exercise of such powers is often forestalled on the ground by the concentration of power in elite hands. To the extent that formal and informal constraints on cadre power remain tenuous, shareholding could function as a vehicle for the powerful to appropriate collective wealth rather than as a weapon of the weak.

Traditionally, marriage is a near universality in China. However, in the coming decades, owing to the growing sex imbalance, millions of men will be unable to marry. As a consequence, bachelorhood is becoming a new demographic concern, particularly affecting men from the most disadvantaged socio-economic groups. In China's cultural context today, heterosexual marriage remains a prerequisite for family formation and, in rural society particularly, the legitimate setting for sexual activity. Under such circumstances, bachelorhood is likely to produce privations on various fronts, the consequences of which for both the individual and the community are still largely unknown. This article focuses on the opinions and sexual behaviour of bachelors, and highlights significant variations from those of married men. It is based on the findings of an exploratory survey conducted in 2008 in selected villages in a rural county in Anhui province, referred to here as JC county. The survey provides insights into the more general situation of rural men unable to marry in a context of female shortage, and indicates the conditions a growing number of Chinese men will face in the near future.