Canadian provinces have long been considered as “small worlds,” each with its own cultural distinctiveness and province-building dynamics (Anderson, Reference Anderson2010; Elkins and Simeon, Reference Elkins and Simeon1980; Henderson, Reference Henderson2010a, Reference Henderson2010b). The ten Canadian provinces have different orientations to political life, different levels of attachments and loyalties to the federal and provincial governments and distinct policy preferences. At the time of David Elkins and Richard Simeon's study of regional cleavages, immigration and racial diversity were not perceived as critical issues in Canadian and provincial politics as they are today.Footnote 1 Things have changed. Immigration and racial diversity are now at the forefront of the policy agenda.Footnote 2 Policy makers debate their potential contribution to the strengthening of the country's economy and the challenges associated with an aging population. But immigration and racial diversity are not only discussed in such “instrumental” terms. Their “symbolic” dimensions are also important, as shown by debates about multiculturalism policy. Most of the time, however, immigration and racial diversity are portrayed as a “national” matter. Provincial public opinion has been neglected in the study of immigration and racial diversity. Accordingly, a number of questions are worth asking: Are there important differences in views toward immigration and racial minorities across Canadian provinces within the native-born white Canadian population?Footnote 3 Has public opinion on these issues evolved over the years? And do provincial-specific economic, demographic and cultural realities shape provincial public opinion on these matters?
There are many reasons why the provincial scale is important with regards to immigration and racial diversity and why provincial public opinion over those matters ought to be investigated. First, over the last two decades, as immigration became more central to demographic planning and economic development, provinces have gradually become important actors in the immigration policy sector after close to a century of almost uninterrupted federal leadership. Since 1991, the Quebec government has had sole responsibility for the selection of economic immigrants in the province. In 1996, the federal government developed a Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) that allows a province or territory “to identify a limited number of economic immigrants to meet specific regional needs and/or to receive priority attention for immigration processing” (quoted in Seidle, Reference Seidle2010: 3). Since then, all provinces have signed agreements, except Quebec. Second, many provinces have adopted programs to facilitate the integration of immigrants, such as language training programs or measures to facilitate the recognition of foreign credentials (Paquet, Reference Paquet2011). Third, all provinces except Newfoundland and Labrador have adopted multicultural (or intercultural in the case of Quebec) policies to promote better interracial relations (Garcea, Reference Garcea2006). In Quebec, for example, debates about the province's intercultural policy have been prominent in the last few years in the wake of the Bouchard–Taylor commission on reasonable accommodation. Thus, even though immigration intakes and the number of visible minorities vary greatly across Canadian provinces (see Table 1), these issues matter for all provinces and not just for those provinces that receive large immigration intakes.
Table 1 Immigrant and Visible Minority Populations in Canadian Provinces
Source: Statistics Canada, 2006 Census of Population.
As demonstrated by a Nanos poll, provincial variations in attitudes toward immigration seem significant with the highest proportion of the population asking for a decrease in immigration in Ontario and the lowest in the Atlantic region (Nanos, Reference Nanos2010: 8). As mentioned previously, however, with a few exceptions (Berry et al., Reference Berry, Kalin and Taylor1976), studies of public opinion on immigration in Canada have rarely explored variations across provinces, with most studies using aggregate national data (Johnston et al., Reference Johnston, Banting, Kymlicka and Soroka2010; Kalin and Berry, Reference Kalin, Berry, Kalin and Laponce1994; Palmer, Reference Palmer1996; Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, Reference Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown2011; Wilkes et al., Reference Wilkes, Guppy and Farris2008).Footnote 4 Moreover, most studies looked at national level demographic and economic indicators to explain how Canadians react to immigration and racial minorities. In light of the increasing role and salience of provincial governments in the management of immigration, we sought to investigate whether the public opinion of Canadians on immigration and racial minorities relates to the specific realities (economic, demographic and cultural) of their province.
In short, there has been no research into whether there are differences in public opinion toward immigration and racial minorities among native-born white Canadian in all ten provinces, how these differences have evolved over time and whether provincial public opinion on these issues varies according to the specific realities of the provinces. This paper aims at addressing these three gaps. Our analysis relies on the Canadian Election Studies (CES) data from 1988 to 2008 to assess the views of native-born white Canadians toward immigrations and racial minorities.
Understanding Views toward Immigration and Racial Minorities in Provinces
Why would there be differences in public opinion on immigration and racial minorities across the provinces? Our argument is that the public in each province is likely to react to the specific economic, demographic and cultural realities of their province of residence. In this line of reasoning, the economic and identity perspectives on group conflict theory provide important insights to understand public opinion regarding immigration and racial minorities in the provinces.
First, the economic perspective on group conflict theory claims that in more difficult economic contexts, members of the majority are more likely to feel threatened by immigrants and racial minorities as they view them as competitors for scarce jobs or as exercising downward pressure on wages. As a result, they are likely to favour a reduction in levels of immigration and express greater hostility toward minority groups (Blumer, Reference Blumer1958; Bobo and Hutchings, Reference Bobo and Hutchings1996; Semyonov et al., Reference Semyonov, Raijman, Tov and Schmidt2004; Semyonov et al., Reference Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky2006). Second, this perspective also claims that a feeling of threat is likely to arise in communities in which there are large proportions of immigrants and racial minorities. Regardless of the economic context, politics is seen as a struggle for power over resources and recognition where any gain by racial minorities or immigrants is seen as a loss for the rest of the population (Glaser, Reference Glaser1994; Quillian, Reference Quillian1995). Provinces differ greatly from each other in terms of past and current economic vitality and in terms of immigration intakes and racial diversity. Accordingly, this leads us to present a first set of two hypotheses:
H1: Populations in provinces where the economy is weaker (lower GDP growth or higher unemployment) hold more negative views toward immigration and racial minorities.
H2: Populations in provinces with a large intake of immigrants and a larger presence of racial minorities hold more negative views toward immigration and racial minorities.
In Canada, a few studies have provided evidence supporting the effect of the economic context (Palmer, Reference Palmer1996; Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, Reference Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown2011; Wilkes et al., Reference Wilkes, Guppy and Farris2008). However, there is no consensus in the literature on the impact of the presence of immigrant and racial minorities on attitudes towards immigration and racial minorities (compare Blake, Reference Blake2003; Kalin, Reference Kalin1996). All of these Canadian studies, however, examined how views toward immigration and racial minorities relate to either national (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, Reference Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown2011; Wilkes et al., Reference Wilkes, Guppy and Farris2008) or local economic and demographic indicators (Blake, Reference Blake2003; Kalin, Reference Kalin1996). Our objective is to explore whether views toward immigration and racial minorities also relate to provincial indicators.
There is no doubt that immigration brings, today more than ever, a rich diversity of cultural practices, languages and religions. Not all provincial populations or subgroups of the provincial population, however, are necessarily confident that their community can absorb or integrate such diversity while maintaining its own identity. Explaining this phenomenon, the social identity perspective of group conflict theory (Brown, Reference Brown1995; Capozza and Brown, Reference Capozza and Brown2000) claims that the group to which an individual belongs is central to the individuals' sense of who they are. As a result, immigration and racial diversity can be seen as a threat to the culture of the host community. As argued by Sniderman and colleagues (Reference Sniderman, Hafendoorn and Prior2004), in order to evaluate their own group positively, members of that community are often motivated to evaluate other groups negatively and are less accepting of them. Consistent with this line of reasoning, it could be argued that immigration and racial minorities will be perceived more negatively by communities that are more likely to feel culturally at risk. Escandell and Ceobanu (Reference Escandell and Ceobanu2010) found support for such expectations. They observed that strong regional identity was associated with strong anti-immigrant sentiments among the Basques, Catalans and Galicians, the main national minorities in Spain, but not in other segments of the Spanish population.
In Canada, the case of Quebec tends to support this hypothesis. In the past decades, a few studies provided evidence showing that French-speaking Quebecers were less favourable to immigration and less enthusiastic toward racial diversity than English-speaking Canadians (Berry et al., Reference Berry, Kalin and Taylor1976; Berry and Kalin, Reference Berry and Kalin1995; Lambert and Curtis, Reference Lambert and Curtis1983). As mentioned in a few of these studies, Quebec's more limited enthusiasm for immigration and racial minorities could be understood through the lens of the social identity perspective. Of all of the provinces, Quebec, with its more distinct cultural background and fragile linguistic situation, might be the most hesitant to embrace immigration and racial diversity. The recent debate over reasonable accommodation in Quebec seems to support this hypothesis of ambivalence toward immigration and racial diversity. Other sub-provincial communities might similarly suffer from cultural insecurities. This is certainly the case of French-Canadians outside of Quebec who also struggle to maintain the vitality of their community. The above considerations lead us to another hypothesis. Some provinces might present lower enthusiasm toward immigration and racial minorities because they host larger French-speaking populations who feel more culturally threatened. Accordingly, our third hypothesis is:
H3: French-speaking Canadians are less positive about immigration and racial minorities than English-speaking Canadians of their respective province.
Finally, it is not clear whether opinions toward immigration vary with opinions toward racial minorities and are driven by similar considerations. Ford (Reference Ford2011), for instance, indicates that the levels of support for immigration in the UK vary greatly depending on the origin of immigrants. Palmer (Reference Palmer1996) reaches similar conclusions and demonstrates that the predictors among Canadians of views toward immigration and views toward “non-white” immigration differ. A key objective of this paper is to explore whether provinces that are open to immigration are also open to racial minorities (and vice versa), whether both types of attitudes have followed similar trends in all provinces over time and whether the same predictors hold for both opinions toward immigration and racial minorities.
Data and Method
The analyses rely on a pooled data set of the Canadian Election Studies of 1988, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2008 (the appendix includes detailed information on variables that we used in our analyses in the paper).Footnote 5 The analyses focus on two indicators. The first one indicates whether respondents thought Canada should admit more, fewer or about the same number of immigrants as now.Footnote 6 We treat this variable as a multinomial one. We presume that the considerations leading one to expressing the desire to have “more” immigrants admitted are not exactly the opposite ones to those leading to expressing the desire to have “fewer” immigrants admitted.Footnote 7 The second indicator measures respondents' feeling toward racial minorities using a scale ranging from 0 to 100 where 100 corresponds to strong positive feelings and 0 strong negative feelings.
Our analyses focus on respondents born in Canada and who are not of a visible minority background.Footnote 8 Two considerations motivate this decision. First, provinces vary greatly in the levels of immigrants and racial diversity (see Table 1). Accordingly, when comparing a province with a large immigrant (or visible minority) population like British Columbia with a province with a small immigrant population like Prince Edward Island (PEI), we are comparing public opinion of two provinces that are substantially different in their immigration and ethnic background. This becomes potentially a problem when immigrant and visible minority populations systematically differ from the rest of the population in their views on immigration and racial minorities. And indeed, it has been documented that immigrants and subsequent generations of immigrants are more open to ethno-cultural diversity and immigration than the rest of the population (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, Reference Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown2011). Therefore, analyses that would include Canadians born outside of the country and of a visible minority background could minimize our assessment of differences across provinces. In short, in the aggregate, provinces could appear to have similar or distinct views on immigration and racial minorities because their population composition is different. Second, one of the objectives of this article is to test the validity of group conflict theory, which states explicitly that the attitudes of the majority population toward immigration and racial minorities are influenced by economic and demographic factors. To test this theory, we need to limit our sample to native-born white Canadians. Our decision to limit our study to native-born white Canadians is consistent with other studies of public opinion towards immigration and/or diversity done in Canada and elsewhere (see, for example, Blake Reference Blake2003; Johnston et al., Reference Johnston, Banting, Kymlicka and Soroka2010; Meuleman et al., Reference Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet2009). Accordingly, when for the sake of simplicity we refer to views in “Canadian provinces,” we actually refer to views of white native-born Canadians.
Views toward Immigration and Racial Minorities in Canadian Provinces
We start by investigating differences in views toward immigration and racial minorities across provinces for the overall period of 1988 to 2008. As Table 2 indicates, there are significant differences across all ten provinces on views toward immigration. Provinces in which the native-born white population is the least favourable to immigration are clearly Alberta, Ontario and British Columbia, where the preferred option for the 1988 to 2008 period was to lower immigration intakes. This was also the preferred option in New Brunswick. Interestingly, support for increasing immigration intakes was also quite strong in that province (17.5%) in comparison to other provinces. In effect, New Brunswick is the province where the population is least happy with the status quo in immigration intakes and hence where the population was most polarized between those who wanted both “more” and “fewer” immigrants admitted. The provinces most favourable to immigration are Nova Scotia and Manitoba. Quebec stands out as the province with the largest proportion of people happy with the status quo in immigration intake (49.6%).Footnote 9
Table 2 Views toward Immigration and Racial Minorities in Provinces (1988–2008)
* Difference with Ontario is statistically significant at .05-level (t-test).
Table 2 also indicates that provincial public opinion on immigration is not the same as public opinion on racial minorities. Here, Quebec clearly stands out as the province with the lowest score on the 0–100 thermometer question on attitudes toward racial minorities. During the 20-year period, it presented the lowest mean score (61.7). Alberta (64.8) and Saskatchewan (64.3) also stand as more negative toward racial minorities in comparison to other provinces. Nova Scotia (72.8) and PEI (72.2) are the two provinces most positively inclined toward racial minorities.Footnote 10
Overall, two striking findings emerged from these first investigations. The first finding is that there are differences among the native-born white population across provinces in views toward immigration and racial minorities. During the 1988 to 2008 period, the status quo in immigration intakes was overall the preferred option in six provinces. Moreover, the majority of respondents in all provinces felt positive toward racial minorities. Nevertheless, there were significant variations across Canada's “small worlds.” Taking together attitudes toward immigration and those toward racial minorities, Nova Scotia was the province in which respondents had the most positive views and Alberta the one in which they had the most negative views. The second finding is that views toward immigration intakes are not necessarily the same as views toward racial minorities. Native-born white Canadians' views toward immigration intakes and racial minorities are correlated but less strongly than we might have expected (Pearson correlation = .28).Footnote 11 As a result, Ontario and BC tend to be more critical of the level of immigration intake but have positive feelings about racial minorities, and the Quebec population is least positive toward racial minorities but is among the provinces that are the most satisfied with the number of immigrants admitted to Canada.
Cross-Time Changes on Views toward Immigration and Racial Minorities
We now look at the evolution in views toward immigration intakes and racial minorities between 1988 and 2008 in all ten Canadian provinces. In this section, caution is required in interpreting unique provincial trends across time as margins of errors are quite large for a few provinces due to the small samples in these provinces at each time point. We are thus primarily interested in assessing whether change took place and whether the direction of this change was uniform across provinces. The net change between 1988 and 2008 for each province is presented in the legend in the figures that follow.
Figure 1 indicates what could be qualified as the “melting” of opposition to immigration during the 20-year period. In all ten provinces, the proportions of respondents asking for “fewer” immigrants to be admitted have dropped substantially. Keeping in mind margins of errors, the magnitude of the decrease appears to vary somewhat across provinces. For instance, the decrease appears most substantial in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador, with drops of about 50 points and the decrease is least substantial in Ontario (28%), Quebec (36%) and Alberta (36%). The general trend, however, is the same in all ten provinces, namely, that people are less likely than they were to ask for a reduction in immigration intakes.
Figure 1 Proportion of Population in Each Province Asking for “Fewer” Immigrants to be Admitted to Canada (1988–2008)
Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies
Note: Δ values represent change over time for each province (1988\N2008); * statistically significant at .05-level (t-test)
In parallel, however, there was no systematic and significant increase in the proportion of Canadians asking for more immigrants. Between 1988 and 2008, while there were ups and downs, as indicated in Figure 2 below, the proportion asking for “more” immigrants appears to have slightly decreased in most provinces, most notably in Ontario and PEI (−13) and Quebec (−10). The exceptions to this downward trend are British Columbia and Manitoba, where support for more immigration seems to have remained stable and Nova Scotia (+9) where, if anything, it seems to have rather increased.
Figure 2 Proportion of Population in Each Province Asking for “More” Immigrants to be Admitted to Canada (1988–2008)
Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies
Note: Δ values represent change over time for each province (1988\N2008); * statistically significant at .05-level (t-test)
Interestingly, in 2008, native-born white Canadians of all provinces were thus less likely than 20 years before to ask for a reduction of immigration levels and, in at least three provinces, less likely to ask for an increase in immigration. Not surprisingly, then, Figure 3 indicates that from 1988 and 2008, Canadians of all provinces have become increasingly and overwhelmingly comfortable with the status quo—between 55 per cent and 70 per cent—and this despite the fact that the annual intake of immigrants admitted to Canada increased significantly during that period from around 150,000 to about 250,000 people. In effect, it seems a “quasi consensus” emerged for the status quo in immigration intakes.
Figure 3 Proportion of Population in Each Province Asking for “Same Number of Immigrants as Now” to be Admitted to Canada (1988–2008)
Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies
Note: Δ values represent change over time for each province (1988\N2008); * statistically significant at .05-level (t-test)
At the same time that native-born white Canadians of all provinces were becoming more comfortable with the level of immigration, they were becoming more positive toward racial minorities. Figure 4 indicates that between 1988 and 2008 the mean score on the 0–100 thermometer question on racial minorities increased by about 7 to 12 points in seven provinces; in Newfoundland and Labrador, it even increased by 21 points. The main exceptions to this trend are Quebec and Saskatchewan where we observe no significant net change between 1988 and 2008 despite some movement from year to year. As a result, the gap between Quebec and the rest of the country grew significantly wider during the 20-year period, from lagging by about three points in 1988 to lagging by about 12 points in 2008. Similarly, Saskatchewan lagged by seven points in 2008 while it was marginally ahead of the rest of the country by one point in 1988.
Figure 4 Mean Scores for Views Toward Racial Minorities Across Provinces (1988–2008)
Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies (2000 data not available).
Note: Δ values represent change over time for each province (1988\N2008); * statistically significant at .05-level (t-test)
The data presented in Table 2, above, show significant differences across all ten provinces on views toward immigration and racial diversity. Interestingly, cross-time data also indicate that despite the presence of unique provincial realities, all ten Canadian provinces have followed a common pan-Canadian movement of greater acceptance of immigration and racial diversity. While provinces may share common trends, however, a common movement does not necessarily imply convergence. There are persistent, and sometimes even increasing, differences among the provinces.
Provincial Economy, Demography and Views toward Immigration and Racial Minorities
In this section we investigate the impact of some provincial economic and demographic indicators on attitudes toward immigration and racial minorities. We expect that populations in provinces where the economy is weaker and/or with a large intake of immigrants and racial minorities hold more negative views toward immigration and racial minorities. To test the impact of the economy in each province, we rely on two measures: the level of unemployment and the GDP growth in the province for the year the interview was conducted. With regard to the impact of diversity's presence, we rely on distinct indicators for examining views toward immigration and views toward racial minorities. For views toward immigration, we rely on the size of immigration intakes in the province (in per cent of the population) during the 15-year period prior to the year the interview was conducted.Footnote 12 For views toward racial minorities, we rely on the percentage of the population in the province that is considered visible minorities according to the most recent census. To take into account the pan-Canadian cross-time transformation, we use the survey dummies, taking the 1988 survey as the base year.
In addition to provincial-level explanations, the analyses control for a number of individual-level characteristics: income and change in respondent's economic situation in the previous year, level of education, sex and age. First, in line with the economic perspective on group conflict, individuals with low household income and those who feel insecure about their personal economic situation are likely to hold more negative views toward immigration and racial minorities (Scheve and Slaughter, Reference Scheve and Slaughter2001). Second, higher education is often considered to be one of the key determinants of greater racial tolerance (Epenshade and Hempstead, Reference Epenshade and Hempstead1996; Hainmueller and Hiscox, Reference Hainmueller and Hiscox2007; Hood and Morris, Reference Hood and Morris1997). Finally, it is generally understood that older people hold less positive views toward immigration and racial minorities than younger ones (Binder et al., Reference Binder, Polinard and Wrinkle1997; O'Rourke and Sinnott, Reference O'Rourke and Sinnott2006).
The data structure is hierarchical, therefore multi-level analysis was conducted where level 1 is the individual level and level 2 the provincial level. Level 2 has 60 cases representing each province for each of the six time points.Footnote 13 This multi-level model allows us to simultaneously control for individual and contextual level variables. The design-effect score, a measure using cluster size and intraclass correlation, indicates that a hierarchical model is appropriate.Footnote 14 We have two different dependent variables. The first model for views toward immigration has a multinomial dependent variable while the model for views toward racial minorities has a continuous dependent variable. Accordingly, we use a hierarchical non-linear (multinomial) model for exploring views toward immigration and a hierarchical linear model for exploring views toward racial minorities.Footnote 15 In both models, as suggested by Hox (Reference Hox2002) we used grand-centring procedures to make the interpretation meaningful for our variables such as gender. No analysis is conducted for the year 2000 because the information for views toward racial minorities was not available. Results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3 Determinants of Views toward Immigration in Provinces
Note: “Same Number of Immigrants” is the comparison group.
N: 12563.
* p < .1,
** p < .05;
*** p < .01 (two-tailed).
Table 4 Determinants of Views toward Racial Minorities
Note: Entries are reduced maximum likelihood coefficients with standard errors.
N: 12563.
* p < .1,
** p < .05;
*** p < .01(two-tailed).
The multivariate findings indicate cross-time trends consistent with those presented in the descriptive section. Provincial populations have become far less opposed to immigration between 1988 and 2008. Once the effect of other factors is taken into account, however, the net change in weakening of opposition to immigration appears somewhat less radical than Figure 1 suggested. Predicted probabilities derived from the model in Table 3 indicate that the probability of asking for “fewer” immigrants decreased from 13.2 per cent to 2.5 per cent during the 20-year period, about a 10-point change.Footnote 16 The analyses also indicate that support for “more” immigration decreased during the same period, a drop of close to 28 points (from 41.4% to 13.7%). Overall, the analyses in Table 3 thus suggest a massive movement of public opinion—almost consensual—toward the status quo in immigration intakes (an increase of more than 38 points, from 45.4% to 83.8%).
Results presented in Table 3 also indicate that populations are sensitive to past immigration intakes in their province. The larger the immigrant population hosted by the province, the larger the proportion of the population asking for “fewer” immigrants (an 8 point difference between the province with smallest and largest immigrant intakes) and the smaller the proportion of those asking for “more” immigrants (a 10 point difference). The strength of the economy in the province also appears to matter somewhat. Native-born white populations living in provinces with higher unemployment rates are less favourable to immigration than those where the unemployment rate is lower. The effect is asymmetrical, primarily increasing the propensity of asking for “fewer” immigrants, a difference of more than 7 points between the province with the lowest and highest unemployment rates (from 10.9% to 18.4%). Views toward immigration also seem to correlate with economic growth in the province, but, intriguingly, in the opposite direction than what was expected. When economic growth is stronger, people seem somewhat more likely to ask for a reduction in immigration levels. Here as well the effect is asymmetrical, only affecting the likelihood of asking for a reduction in immigration.
Results for attitudes toward racial minorities are presented in Table 4. The results confirm the warming up of views toward racial minorities between 1988 and 2008, a net increase of more than 9 points. In contrast with views toward immigration, provinces with large visible minorities population are not more positive or negative toward racial minorities than provinces that do not host large visible minority populations. We observe some puzzling findings regarding the effect of economic considerations. Provinces that have high unemployment rates seem to be somewhat more favourable to racial minorities than other provinces where unemployment rate is lower; the effect is modest though (a difference of less than 5 points).
The multivariate analyses grant support for our first two hypotheses, but mostly for views toward immigration. While the economic situation of provinces as well as their past immigration intakes seem to play a key role in predicting levels of support for immigration, such considerations are less helpful explaining why native-born white populations in some provinces are more positive than others toward racial minorities. This suggests that the roots of views toward immigration and racial minorities are not the same.
Results for the individual-level analysis are consistent with findings from previous studies. Moreover, for most individual-level predictors, the effect is similar for both views toward immigration and racial minorities. Hence, more educated people and those with a higher income are more favourable to immigration and more positive toward racial minorities than people with a lower level of education or income. The results are somewhat unclear for respondents' views on past changes in their personal economic situation. Both people who saw their personal economic situation improve or deteriorate are more likely to ask for a reduction in immigration intakes in comparison to those who experienced no change in their personal economic situation over the past year. The differences are statistically significant but marginal.Footnote 17
The effect differs for views toward immigration and racial diversity, however, both for age and sex. Older people tend to be marginally more favourable to immigration than younger ones but less positive toward racial minorities. As for women, they tend to be less favourable than men to immigration but more positive toward racial minorities. These findings for age and sex are also consistent with those observed by Palmer in the Canadian context. His proposed explanation is that both women and younger people are typically more vulnerable in terms of employment and hence are more likely to see immigration as a threat (Reference Palmer1996: 185). As for the more positive views toward racial minorities among young people and women, the explanation is less clear. Arguably, for young people, racial diversity is more likely to be the norm. Younger generations grew up with diversity; they shared schooling experiences with members of racial minorities. Accordingly, these younger generations might have better internalized racial diversity as being part of their social identity and hence they might be more comfortable with it (Ford, Reference Ford2008). In sharp contrast, current older generations, for the most part, encountered racial diversity at a relatively later stage of their life. For them, the current demographic makeup of Canada or their province is different from the one they grew up in. For these older generations, their sense of identity might therefore be structured around a more homogeneous image that hardly fits with the growing racial diversity. This proposed explanation is consistent with political socialization research that emphasizes the importance of political learning during late adolescence and early adulthood (see Niemi and Hepburn, Reference Niemi and Hepburn1995) for the development of political orientations, especially for those attitudes that are symbolically loaded such as partisan and group identification (Sears, Reference Sears, Iyengar and McGuire1993).
Cultural Insecurity and Views Toward Immigration and Racial Minorities
As mentioned, previous studies have shown that Quebec tends to be less enthusiastic toward immigration and racial minorities; this study supports those findings with regards to views toward racial minorities. The purpose of the present section is to examine whether cultural insecurity plays a role in explaining Quebec's lower enthusiasm for racial minorities. In order to do this, we examine whether such lower enthusiasm is also observed among French-speaking communities in other provinces. We thus investigate differences between French- and English-speaking communities in the three provinces (Quebec, New Brunswick and Ontario) where our data provided large enough samples to conduct reliable analyses.Footnote 18 We expect French-speaking individuals to be less favourable to both immigration and racial minorities than their English provincial counterparts because of greater cultural (and linguistic) insecurities. Multivariate analyses are conducted for each of the three provinces where we distinguish between French-speaking and English-speaking individuals. We also control for socio-economic characteristics (age, sex, education and household income). Multinomial analysis is used for views toward immigration and OLS regression is used for views toward racial minorities on a 0–100 scale.
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that views toward immigration differ between French- and English-speaking individuals in Quebec but not in New Brunswick and Ontario. In Quebec, the French-speaking community is less likely to ask for “more” immigrants than the English-speaking community (13% vs. 21%, descriptive findings). This being said, French-speaking individuals in Quebec are not more likely than English-speaking individuals to ask for fewer immigrants (36% vs. 37%, descriptive findings). The hypothesis is thus only weakly supported for views toward immigration. With regards to views toward racial minorities, however, differences are significant between French- and English-speaking communities in two of the three provinces. While there are no significant differences in the 0–100 mean scores between French- and English-speaking communities in Ontario (68.8 vs. 66.8), descriptive findings indicate significant differences for the other two provinces. In Quebec, the mean scores on the racial minorities thermometer are 73.3 and 60.1 respectively for English- and French-speaking Quebecers, and in New Brunswick, the mean scores for the two linguistic communities are 70.3 and 63.7. The results presented in Table 6 indicate that these linguistic differences in Quebec and New Brunswick are not explained by differences in the socio-economic situation between the two communities. Everything being equal, French-speaking individuals are less positive toward racial minorities than English-speaking ones by 12.7 points in Quebec and 5.6 points in New Brunswick.
Table 5 The Role of Cultural Insecurity in Views toward Immigration
Entries report multinomial logit B coefficients. Note: Base outcome is “about the same.”
Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies.
Table 6 The Role of Cultural Insecurity in Views toward Racial Minorities
Entries report unstandardized B coefficients from OLS regressions.
Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies (no data for 2000).
*** p < .01;
** p < .05;
* p < .1.
These findings lend partial support to our social identity hypothesis. French-speaking communities in New Brunswick and Quebec tend to be less positive toward racial minorities and to some extent to immigration, in the case of Quebec, than the English-speaking communities of those provinces. In effect, French-speaking communities in Quebec and New Brunswick have the least positive views toward racial minorities in Canada when compared to the English-speaking communities of all other provinces. These findings indicate that the presence of large French-speaking communities in New Brunswick and Quebec accounts in part for these two provinces' lower standing on views toward racial minorities in comparison to other provinces.
Conclusion
Views of native-born white Canadians toward immigration in all ten provinces are largely favourable both to the current level of immigration intake and racial minorities; in no province are views negative. Most importantly, views have become increasingly positive in all provinces during the 20 year period examined in this study. We observed the emergence of a “quasi” consensus toward the status quo on immigration levels even though annual intakes during that period increased from about 150,000 to 250,000 people. We also observed that the native-born white population in eight provinces has become significantly more positive toward racial minorities. While the populations of many European countries have become increasingly hostile toward immigration and racial minorities over the last two decades (Semyonov et al. Reference Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky2006), we observed no backlash in any of the Canadian provinces. The Canadian and European publics are clearly on opposite trajectories regarding issues of immigration and racial diversity.Footnote 19 It is not clear why Canadians have become more open to both immigration and racial minorities over the 20-year period examined.Footnote 20 Quite importantly, however, our investigations indicate that it is not one or a few provinces that are driving the increasing positive views toward immigration and racial minorities; there is a pan-Canadian movement including almost all provinces toward greater acceptance of diversity.
There are nevertheless significant differences in views toward immigration intakes and racial minorities across provinces. The most favourable on both dimensions appears to be Nova Scotia, while the least favourable, again considering both dimensions, appears to be Alberta. But one need not confuse views toward immigration intakes with views toward racial minorities. They are not the same thing and the placement across provinces is not the same on both dimensions. On the one hand, people in Ontario and British Columbia are quite comfortable with racial minorities but seem more likely than other Canadians to think their province might need to reduce somewhat the number of immigrants they receive each year. On the other hand, Quebecers are quite content with maintaining a steady flow of immigrants but are clearly not as comfortable with racial minorities as other Canadians might be. These findings, like others before (Ford, Reference Ford2011; Palmer, Reference Palmer1996), indicate that the dynamics of support for immigration and for racial minorities are partly distinct. Hence, when support for immigration declines, it does not necessarily mean that racism is on the rise and, conversely, when support for immigration increases, it does not mean that the day-to-day integration of minorities is easier.
The different dynamics of support for immigration and for racial minorities is made even more evident when taking into account our findings on the roots of such attitudes. First, support for immigration intakes seems to go somewhat hand in hand with the unemployment rate in provinces. Second, populations of provinces that received a large number of immigrants are more likely to think Canada received enough immigrants, and those in provinces that did not receive a lot of immigrants are more likely to want more. These findings are quite in line with current discourse relating to immigration. In provinces that do not receive a lot of immigrants (in the Atlantic provinces and in Saskatchewan and Manitoba), immigration might be perceived as a rare “commodity” essential for the future of the community while in provinces that receive a lot (Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta), the need for more immigrants might be perceived as being less critical and desirable. This finding is also consistent with recent policy developments. Provincial nominee programs are very much grounded in an instrumental discourse emphasizing the need to select immigrants in line with the province's specific economic needs.
Contrary to views toward immigration intakes, however, views toward racial minorities do not seem to correlate as strongly to provincial economic and demographic considerations. There is thus a first distinction in the views toward immigration and racial minorities. While the former seem to respond to some instrumental provincial considerations and lend support to the economic perspective on group conflict, the latter does not. Second, views toward racial minorities seem to correlate with the presence of French-communities in the province. French-speaking communities in Quebec and New Brunswick appear somewhat less positive than their English-speaking counterpart. Arguably, the social identity perspective provides a partial explanation for this finding. It thus appears that the standing of these two provinces' views toward racial minorities is partly the result of the presence of large French-speaking communities.
Findings presented in this paper are reassuring in many ways. First, public opinion in all provinces is positive and increasingly so. Second, we can clearly differentiate between Canadians' concern for a policy (whether or not they think Canada should admit more immigrants) and their more fundamental orientations toward racial diversity (how they feel toward racial minorities). There is a correlation between the two but our investigation of public opinion in the provinces indicates that they do not seem to be fully rooted in similar considerations. Moreover, and maybe most importantly, if views toward immigration intakes are likely to vary across time with the ups and downs of the economy and the concentration of immigration in certain regions, views toward racial minorities seem to be less sensitive to short-term variations in macro-economic indicators. This is a strong protection Canada and Canadians might have to preserving a healthy level of social cohesion.
Our account of varying reactions to immigration and racial diversity across Canadian provinces is incomplete. Limitations with our data did not allow us to investigate the impact of other potential key factors associated with the social identity perspective, such as dominant provincial social and economic ideologies, the sense and strength of provincial identity and cosmopolitan outlooks. Nevertheless, this study provides a significant account for variation in attitudes of the native-born white majority population toward immigration and racial minorities within the Canadian federation. Hence, although there is an important level of cohesion in the way Canadians of all provinces appear to react to immigration and racial minorities, provinces do appear to some extent to be “small worlds” where attitudes toward diversity are driven in part by provincial issues, such as the level of unemployment and the size of the provincial immigration intakes, and by cultural insecurities of some fragile linguistic groups in some provinces. To understand how Canadians feel toward diversity we must understand what is happening in their own part of the country. Despite a major pan-Canadian movement in views on immigration and diversity, provincial and regional dynamics are thus not fading legacies of the past but still salient forces shaping the public's views toward an increasingly significant component of Canadian political life and Canadian identity.
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