Small Worlds of Diversity: Views toward Immigration and Racial Minorities in Canadian Provinces

ANTOINE BILODEAU *Concordia University*
LUC TURGEON *Université d'Ottawa*
EKREM KARAKOÇ *Binghamton University, SUNY*

Canadian provinces have long been considered as "small worlds," each with its own cultural distinctiveness and province-building dynamics (Anderson, 2010; Elkins and Simeon, 1980; Henderson, 2010a, 2010b). The ten Canadian provinces have different orientations to political life, different levels of attachments and loyalties to the federal and provincial governments and distinct policy preferences. At the time of David Elkins and Richard Simeon's study of regional cleavages, immigration and racial diversity were not perceived as critical issues in Canadian and provincial politics as they are today.[1] Things have changed. Immigration and racial diversity are now at the forefront of the policy agenda.[2] Policy makers debate their potential contribution to the strengthening of the country's economy and the challenges associated with an aging population. But immigration and racial diversity are not only discussed in such "instru-

Antoine Bilodeau, Department of Political Science, Concordia University, 1455 boulevard de Maisonneuve Ouest, Montréal, Québec H3G 1M8, antoine.bilodeau@concordia.ca.
Luc Turgeon, École d'études politiques, Université d'Ottawa, 120 Université, pièce 7005, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5, luc.turgeon@uottawa.ca.
Ekrem Karakoç, Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, SUNY, Binghamton, NY, ekrem.karakoc@gmail.com.

mental" terms. Their "symbolic" dimensions are also important, as shown by debates about multiculturalism policy. Most of the time, however, immigration and racial diversity are portrayed as a "national" matter. Provincial public opinion has been neglected in the study of immigration and racial diversity. Accordingly, a number of questions are worth asking: Are there important differences in views toward immigration and racial minorities across Canadian provinces within the native-born white Canadian population?[3] Has public opinion on these issues evolved over the years? And do provincial-specific economic, demographic and cultural realities shape provincial public opinion on these matters?

There are many reasons why the provincial scale is important with regards to immigration and racial diversity and why provincial public opinion over those matters ought to be investigated. First, over the last two decades, as immigration became more central to demographic planning and economic development, provinces have gradually become important actors in the immigration policy sector after close to a century of almost uninterrupted federal leadership. Since 1991, the Quebec government has had sole responsibility for the selection of economic immigrants in the province. In 1996, the federal government developed a Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) that allows a province or territory "to identify a limited number of economic immigrants to meet specific regional needs and/or to receive priority attention for immigration processing" (quoted in Seidle, 2010: 3). Since then, all provinces have signed agreements, except Quebec. Second, many provinces have adopted programs to facilitate the integration of immigrants, such as language training programs or measures to facilitate the recognition of foreign credentials (Paquet, 2011). Third, all provinces except Newfoundland and Labrador have adopted multicultural (or intercultural in the case of Quebec) policies to promote better interracial relations (Garcea, 2006). In Quebec, for example, debates about the province's intercultural policy have been prominent in the last few years in the wake of the Bouchard–Taylor commission on reasonable accommodation. Thus, even though immigration intakes and the number of visible minorities vary greatly across Canadian provinces (see Table 1), these issues matter for all provinces and not just for those provinces that receive large immigration intakes.

As demonstrated by a Nanos poll, provincial variations in attitudes toward immigration seem significant with the highest proportion of the population asking for a decrease in immigration in Ontario and the lowest in the Atlantic region (Nanos, 2010: 8). As mentioned previously, however, with a few exceptions (Berry et al., 1976), studies of public opinion on immigration in Canada have rarely explored variations across provinces, with most studies using aggregate national data (Johnston et al., 2010; Kalin and Berry, 1994; Palmer, 1996; Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Wilkes et al., 2008).[4] Moreover, most studies looked at national

Abstract. Canadian provinces have long been considered as "small worlds," each with its own cultural distinctiveness and province-building dynamics. This article examines whether these same provincial specificities are observed in terms of attitudes toward immigration intakes and racial diversity. Three questions are asked. First, are there important variations in views toward immigration and racial minorities across Canadian provinces within the native-born white Canadian population? Second, have the differences and similarities changed between 1988 and 2008? And third, do specific provincial economic, demographic, and cultural realities shape provincial public opinion on these matters? The findings indicate that there are significant differences and commonalities in how all provinces react to immigration and racial diversity, that native-born white Canadians have grown increasingly accepting of immigration and racial diversity over time and that views toward immigration and racial diversity are distinct from each other and each responds to a specific set of provincial realities.

Résumé. Les provinces canadiennes constituent de "petits univers," chacune possédant sa propre culture et sa propre dynamique politique. Cet article explore si de telles spécificités provinciales peuvent être également observées en ce qui a trait aux attitudes par rapport à l'immigration et à la diversité raciale. Nous posons trois questions. Premièrement, y a-t-il des différences d'opinions quant à l'immigration et aux minorités raciales entre provinces canadiennes au sein de la population blanche née au Canada? Deuxièmement, est-ce que les similarités et les différences entre les provinces ont changé entre 1988 et 2008? Et troisièmement, est-ce que les réalités économiques, démographiques et culturelles provinciales influencent l'opinion publique provinciale sur ces questions? Les résultats de l'étude indiquent qu'il y a à la fois des similarités et des différences quant aux attitudes des différentes provinces sur l'immigration et la diversité raciale, que la population blanche née au Canada s'est montrée de plus en plus ouverte à l'immigration et à la diversité raciale au cours de la période à l'étude, et que les attitudes par rapport à l'immigration et la diversité raciale ne sont pas identiques et qu'elles répondent chacune à leur façon à un certain nombre de réalités provinciales.

level demographic and economic indicators to explain how Canadians react to immigration and racial minorities. In light of the increasing role and salience of provincial governments in the management of immigration, we sought to investigate whether the public opinion of Canadians on immigration and racial minorities relates to the specific realities (economic, demographic and cultural) of their province.

In short, there has been no research into whether there are differences in public opinion toward immigration and racial minorities among native-born white Canadian in all ten provinces, how these differences have evolved over time and whether provincial public opinion on these issues varies according to the specific realities of the provinces. This paper aims at addressing these three gaps. Our analysis relies on the *Canadian Election Studies* (CES) data from 1988 to 2008 to assess the views of native-born white Canadians toward immigrations and racial minorities.

Understanding Views toward Immigration and Racial Minorities in Provinces

Why would there be differences in public opinion on immigration and racial minorities across the provinces? Our argument is that the public in

TABLE 1

Immigrant and Visible Minority Populations in
Canadian Provinces

	% of Immigrants in Province	% of Visible Minorities in Province
Newfoundland and Labrador	1.67	1.14
Prince Edward Island	3.57	1.36
Nova Scotia	5.00	4.14
New Brunswick	3.67	1.85
Quebec	11.45	8.80
Ontario	28.25	22.82
Manitoba	13.34	9.62
Saskatchewan	5.05	3.55
Alberta	16.18	13.95
British Columbia	27.47	24.76
Canada	19.80	16.22

Source: Statistics Canada, 2006 Census of Population.

each province is likely to react to the specific economic, demographic and cultural realities of their province of residence. In this line of reasoning, the economic and identity perspectives on group conflict theory provide important insights to understand public opinion regarding immigration and racial minorities in the provinces.

First, the economic perspective on group conflict theory claims that in more difficult economic contexts, members of the majority are more likely to feel threatened by immigrants and racial minorities as they view them as competitors for scarce jobs or as exercising downward pressure on wages. As a result, they are likely to favour a reduction in levels of immigration and express greater hostility toward minority groups (Blumer, 1958; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Semyonov et al., 2004; Semyonov et al., 2006). Second, this perspective also claims that a feeling of threat is likely to arise in communities in which there are large proportions of immigrants and racial minorities. Regardless of the economic context, politics is seen as a struggle for power over resources and recognition where any gain by racial minorities or immigrants is seen as a loss for the rest of the population (Glaser, 1994; Quillian, 1995). Provinces differ greatly from each other in terms of past and current economic vitality and in terms of immigration intakes and racial diversity. Accordingly, this leads us to present a first set of two hypotheses:

H₁: Populations in provinces where the economy is weaker (lower GDP growth or higher unemployment) hold more negative views toward immigration and racial minorities.

H_2: *Populations in provinces with a large intake of immigrants and a larger presence of racial minorities hold more negative views toward immigration and racial minorities.*

In Canada, a few studies have provided evidence supporting the effect of the economic context (Palmer, 1996; Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Wilkes et al., 2008). However, there is no consensus in the literature on the impact of the presence of immigrant and racial minorities on attitudes towards immigration and racial minorities (compare Blake, 2003; Kalin, 1996). All of these Canadian studies, however, examined how views toward immigration and racial minorities relate to either national (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Wilkes et al., 2008) or local economic and demographic indicators (Blake, 2003; Kalin, 1996). Our objective is to explore whether views toward immigration and racial minorities also relate to provincial indicators.

There is no doubt that immigration brings, today more than ever, a rich diversity of cultural practices, languages and religions. Not all provincial populations or subgroups of the provincial population, however, are necessarily confident that their community can absorb or integrate such diversity while maintaining its own identity. Explaining this phenomenon, the social identity perspective of group conflict theory (Brown, 1995; Capozza and Brown, 2000) claims that the group to which an individual belongs is central to the individuals' sense of who they are. As a result, immigration and racial diversity can be seen as a threat to the culture of the host community. As argued by Sniderman and colleagues (2004), in order to evaluate their own group positively, members of that community are often motivated to evaluate other groups negatively and are less accepting of them. Consistent with this line of reasoning, it could be argued that immigration and racial minorities will be perceived more negatively by communities that are more likely to feel culturally at risk. Escandell and Ceobanu (2010) found support for such expectations. They observed that strong regional identity was associated with strong anti-immigrant sentiments among the Basques, Catalans and Galicians, the main national minorities in Spain, but not in other segments of the Spanish population.

In Canada, the case of Quebec tends to support this hypothesis. In the past decades, a few studies provided evidence showing that French-speaking Quebecers were less favourable to immigration and less enthusiastic toward racial diversity than English-speaking Canadians (Berry et al., 1976; Berry and Kalin, 1995; Lambert and Curtis, 1983). As mentioned in a few of these studies, Quebec's more limited enthusiasm for immigration and racial minorities could be understood through the lens of the social identity perspective. Of all of the provinces, Quebec, with its more distinct cultural background and fragile linguistic sit-

uation, might be the most hesitant to embrace immigration and racial diversity. The recent debate over reasonable accommodation in Quebec seems to support this hypothesis of ambivalence toward immigration and racial diversity. Other sub-provincial communities might similarly suffer from cultural insecurities. This is certainly the case of French-Canadians outside of Quebec who also struggle to maintain the vitality of their community. The above considerations lead us to another hypothesis. Some provinces might present lower enthusiasm toward immigration and racial minorities because they host larger French-speaking populations who feel more culturally threatened. Accordingly, our third hypothesis is:

H_3: French-speaking Canadians are less positive about immigration and racial minorities than English-speaking Canadians of their respective province.

Finally, it is not clear whether opinions toward immigration vary with opinions toward racial minorities and are driven by similar considerations. Ford (2011), for instance, indicates that the levels of support for immigration in the UK vary greatly depending on the origin of immigrants. Palmer (1996) reaches similar conclusions and demonstrates that the predictors among Canadians of views toward immigration and views toward "non-white" immigration differ. A key objective of this paper is to explore whether provinces that are open to immigration are also open to racial minorities (and vice versa), whether both types of attitudes have followed similar trends in all provinces over time and whether the same predictors hold for both opinions toward immigration and racial minorities.

Data and Method

The analyses rely on a pooled data set of the *Canadian Election Studies* of 1988, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2008 (the appendix includes detailed information on variables that we used in our analyses in the paper).[5] The analyses focus on two indicators. The first one indicates whether respondents thought Canada should admit more, fewer or about the same number of immigrants as now.[6] We treat this variable as a multinomial one. We presume that the considerations leading one to expressing the desire to have "more" immigrants admitted are not exactly the opposite ones to those leading to expressing the desire to have "fewer" immigrants admitted.[7] The second indicator measures respondents' feeling toward racial minorities using a scale ranging from 0 to 100 where 100 corresponds to strong positive feelings and 0 strong negative feelings.

Our analyses focus on respondents born in Canada and who are not of a visible minority background.[8] Two considerations motivate this deci-

sion. First, provinces vary greatly in the levels of immigrants and racial diversity (see Table 1). Accordingly, when comparing a province with a large immigrant (or visible minority) population like British Columbia with a province with a small immigrant population like Prince Edward Island (PEI), we are comparing public opinion of two provinces that are substantially different in their immigration and ethnic background. This becomes potentially a problem when immigrant and visible minority populations systematically differ from the rest of the population in their views on immigration and racial minorities. And indeed, it has been documented that immigrants and subsequent generations of immigrants are more open to ethno-cultural diversity and immigration than the rest of the population (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, 2011). Therefore, analyses that would include Canadians born outside of the country and of a visible minority background could minimize our assessment of differences across provinces. In short, in the aggregate, provinces could appear to have similar or distinct views on immigration and racial minorities because their population composition is different. Second, one of the objectives of this article is to test the validity of group conflict theory, which states explicitly that the attitudes of the *majority population* toward immigration and racial minorities are influenced by economic and demographic factors. To test this theory, we need to limit our sample to native-born white Canadians. Our decision to limit our study to native-born white Canadians is consistent with other studies of public opinion towards immigration and/or diversity done in Canada and elsewhere (see, for example, Blake 2003; Johnston et al., 2010; Meuleman et al., 2009). Accordingly, when for the sake of simplicity we refer to views in "Canadian provinces," we actually refer to views of white native-born Canadians.

Views toward Immigration and Racial Minorities in Canadian Provinces

We start by investigating differences in views toward immigration and racial minorities across provinces for the overall period of 1988 to 2008. As Table 2 indicates, there are significant differences across all ten provinces on views toward immigration. Provinces in which the native-born white population is the least favourable to immigration are clearly Alberta, Ontario and British Columbia, where the preferred option for the 1988 to 2008 period was to lower immigration intakes. This was also the preferred option in New Brunswick. Interestingly, support for increasing immigration intakes was also quite strong in that province (17.5%) in comparison to other provinces. In effect, New Brunswick is the province where the population is least happy with the status quo in immigration intakes and hence where the population was most polarized between those who wanted both "more" and "fewer" immigrants admitted. The prov-

TABLE 2

Views toward Immigration and Racial Minorities in Provinces (1988–2008)

Province (n)	Canada Should Admit More, Fewer or about the Same Number of Immigrations as Now?			How Do You Feel about Racial Minorities?
	% Fewer	% Same	% More	Mean Scores on 0–100 Scale
Newfoundland and Labrador (620)	40.1*	46.9*	13.0	68.2
Prince Edward Island (571)	38.9*	43.3*	15.8*	72.2*
Nova Scotia (616)	34.4*	45.0*	20.8*	72.8*
New Brunswick (726)	44.7	37.7	17.5*	67.9
Quebec (5231)	36.3*	49.6*	14.1*	61.7*
Ontario (5063)	47.8	39.8	12.5	68.8
Manitoba (917)	35.6*	44.1*	20.3*	68.4
Saskatchewan (1064)	42.2*	42.3	15.5*	64.3*
Alberta (2024)	48.8	38.3	12.9	64.8*
British Columbia (2327)	43.6*	43.3*	13.1	69.9

*Difference with Ontario is statistically significant at .05-level (t-test).

inces most favourable to immigration are Nova Scotia and Manitoba. Quebec stands out as the province with the largest proportion of people happy with the status quo in immigration intake (49.6%).[9]

Table 2 also indicates that provincial public opinion on immigration is not the same as public opinion on racial minorities. Here, Quebec clearly stands out as the province with the lowest score on the 0–100 thermometer question on attitudes toward racial minorities. During the 20-year period, it presented the lowest mean score (61.7). Alberta (64.8) and Saskatchewan (64.3) also stand as more negative toward racial minorities in comparison to other provinces. Nova Scotia (72.8) and PEI (72.2) are the two provinces most positively inclined toward racial minorities.[10]

Overall, two striking findings emerged from these first investigations. The first finding is that there are differences among the native-born white population across provinces in views toward immigration and racial minorities. During the 1988 to 2008 period, the status quo in immigration intakes was overall the preferred option in six provinces. Moreover, the majority of respondents in all provinces felt positive toward racial minorities. Nevertheless, there were significant variations across Canada's "small worlds." Taking together attitudes toward immigration and those toward racial minorities, Nova Scotia was the province in which respondents had the most positive views and Alberta the one in which they had the most negative views. The second finding is that views toward immi-

gration intakes are not necessarily the same as views toward racial minorities. Native-born white Canadians' views toward immigration intakes and racial minorities are correlated but less strongly than we might have expected (Pearson correlation = .28).[11] As a result, Ontario and BC tend to be more critical of the level of immigration intake but have positive feelings about racial minorities, and the Quebec population is least positive toward racial minorities but is among the provinces that are the most satisfied with the number of immigrants admitted to Canada.

Cross-Time Changes on Views toward Immigration and Racial Minorities

We now look at the evolution in views toward immigration intakes and racial minorities between 1988 and 2008 in all ten Canadian provinces. In this section, caution is required in interpreting unique provincial trends across time as margins of errors are quite large for a few provinces due to the small samples in these provinces at each time point. We are thus primarily interested in assessing whether change took place and whether the direction of this change was uniform across provinces. The net change between 1988 and 2008 for each province is presented in the legend in the figures that follow.

Figure 1 indicates what could be qualified as the "melting" of opposition to immigration during the 20-year period. In all ten provinces, the proportions of respondents asking for "fewer" immigrants to be admitted have dropped substantially. Keeping in mind margins of errors, the magnitude of the decrease appears to vary somewhat across provinces. For instance, the decrease appears most substantial in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador, with drops of about 50 points and the decrease is least substantial in Ontario (28%), Quebec (36%) and Alberta (36%). The general trend, however, is the same in all ten provinces, namely, that people are less likely than they were to ask for a reduction in immigration intakes.

In parallel, however, there was no systematic and significant increase in the proportion of Canadians asking for more immigrants. Between 1988 and 2008, while there were ups and downs, as indicated in Figure 2 below, the proportion asking for "more" immigrants appears to have slightly decreased in most provinces, most notably in Ontario and PEI (−13) and Quebec (−10). The exceptions to this downward trend are British Columbia and Manitoba, where support for more immigration seems to have remained stable and Nova Scotia (+9) where, if anything, it seems to have rather increased.

Interestingly, in 2008, native-born white Canadians of all provinces were thus less likely than 20 years before to ask for a reduction of immi-

FIGURE 1

Proportion of Population in Each Province Asking for "Fewer"
Immigrants to be Admitted to Canada (1988–2008)

Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies

Note: Δ values represent change over time for each province (1988–2008); *
statistically significant at .05-level (t-test)

gration levels and, in at least three provinces, less likely to ask for
an increase in immigration. Not surprisingly, then, Figure 3 indicates that
from 1988 and 2008, Canadians of all provinces have become increas-
ingly and overwhelmingly comfortable with the status quo—between
55 per cent and 70 per cent—and this despite the fact that the annual
intake of immigrants admitted to Canada increased significantly during
that period from around 150,000 to about 250,000 people. In effect, it
seems a "quasi consensus" emerged for the status quo in immigration
intakes.

At the same time that native-born white Canadians of all provinces
were becoming more comfortable with the level of immigration, they were
becoming more positive toward racial minorities. Figure 4 indicates that
between 1988 and 2008 the mean score on the 0–100 thermometer ques-
tion on racial minorities increased by about 7 to 12 points in seven prov-
inces; in Newfoundland and Labrador, it even increased by 21 points.
The main exceptions to this trend are Quebec and Saskatchewan where
we observe no significant net change between 1988 and 2008 despite
some movement from year to year. As a result, the gap between Quebec
and the rest of the country grew significantly wider during the 20-year
period, from lagging by about three points in 1988 to lagging by about

FIGURE 2

Proportion of Population in Each Province Asking for "More"
Immigrants to be Admitted to Canada (1988–2008)

Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies

Note: Δ values represent change over time for each province (1988–2008); *
statistically significant at .05-level (t-test)

12 points in 2008. Similarly, Saskatchewan lagged by seven points in
2008 while it was marginally ahead of the rest of the country by one
point in 1988.

The data presented in Table 2, above, show significant differences
across all ten provinces on views toward immigration and racial diver-
sity. Interestingly, cross-time data also indicate that despite the presence
of unique provincial realities, all ten Canadian provinces have followed a
common pan-Canadian movement of greater acceptance of immigration
and racial diversity. While provinces may share common trends, how-
ever, a common movement does not necessarily imply convergence. There
are persistent, and sometimes even increasing, differences among the
provinces.

**Provincial Economy, Demography and Views toward Immigration
and Racial Minorities**

In this section we investigate the impact of some provincial economic
and demographic indicators on attitudes toward immigration and racial
minorities. We expect that populations in provinces where the economy

FIGURE 3

Proportion of Population in Each Province Asking for "Same Number of Immigrants as Now" to be Admitted to Canada (1988–2008)


Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies

Note: Δ values represent change over time for each province (1988–2008); * statistically significant at .05-level (t-test)

is weaker and/or with a large intake of immigrants and racial minorities hold more negative views toward immigration and racial minorities. To test the impact of the economy in each province, we rely on two measures: the level of unemployment and the GDP growth in the province for the year the interview was conducted. With regard to the impact of diversity's presence, we rely on distinct indicators for examining views toward immigration and views toward racial minorities. For views toward immigration, we rely on the size of immigration intakes in the province (in per cent of the population) during the 15-year period prior to the year the interview was conducted.[12] For views toward racial minorities, we rely on the percentage of the population in the province that is considered visible minorities according to the most recent census. To take into account the pan-Canadian cross-time transformation, we use the survey dummies, taking the 1988 survey as the base year.

In addition to provincial-level explanations, the analyses control for a number of individual-level characteristics: income and change in respondent's economic situation in the previous year, level of education, sex and age. First, in line with the economic perspective on group conflict, individuals with low household income and those who feel inse-

FIGURE 4

Mean Scores for Views Toward Racial Minorities Across Provinces
(1988–2008)

Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies (2000 data not available).

Note: Δ values represent change over time for each province (1988–2008); *
statistically significant at .05-level (t-test)

cure about their personal economic situation are likely to hold more neg-
ative views toward immigration and racial minorities (Scheve and
Slaughter, 2001). Second, higher education is often considered to be
one of the key determinants of greater racial tolerance (Epenshade and
Hempstead, 1996; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hood and Morris,
1997). Finally, it is generally understood that older people hold less pos-
itive views toward immigration and racial minorities than younger ones
(Binder et al., 1997; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006).

The data structure is hierarchical, therefore multi-level analysis was
conducted where level 1 is the individual level and level 2 the provin-
cial level. Level 2 has 60 cases representing each province for each of
the six time points.[13] This multi-level model allows us to simulta-
neously control for individual and contextual level variables. The design-
effect score, a measure using cluster size and intraclass correlation,
indicates that a hierarchical model is appropriate.[14] We have two dif-
ferent dependent variables. The first model for views toward immi-
gration has a multinomial dependent variable while the model for
views toward racial minorities has a continuous dependent variable.
Accordingly, we use a hierarchical non-linear (multinomial) model for

exploring views toward immigration and a hierarchical linear model for exploring views toward racial minorities.[15] In both models, as suggested by Hox (2002) we used grand-centring procedures to make the interpretation meaningful for our variables such as gender. No analysis is conducted for the year 2000 because the information for views toward racial minorities was not available. Results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.

The multivariate findings indicate cross-time trends consistent with those presented in the descriptive section. Provincial populations have become far less opposed to immigration between 1988 and 2008. Once

TABLE 3

Determinants of Views toward Immigration in Provinces

	Fewer Immigrants		More Immigrants	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Intercept	−0.076	0.041*	−0.788	0.045***
Age	−0.004	0.002**	0.007	0.002***
Education	−0.633	0.044***	0.269	0.079***
Female	0.228	0.057***	−0.290	0.051***
Income	−0.054	0.015***	0.039	0.018**
Personal Economy Deteriorated	0.358	0.064***	0.173	0.063***
Personal Economy Improved	0.182	0.048***	0.217	0.066***
Province-Level Variables				
Size of Immigration	0.036	0.009***	−0.024	0.009***
Unemployment	0.026	0.014*	−0.021	0.016
GDP Growth	0.036	0.015**	−0.018	0.026
Survey 1993	0.021	0.145	−0.363	0.140**
Survey 1997	−1.313	0.091***	−2.049	0.120***
Survey 2004	−2.012	0.107***	−1.454	0.094***
Survey 2006	−2.252	0.127***	−1.666	0.137***
Survey 2008	−2.291	0.132***	−1.719	0.123***
Random Effects				
Intercept	0.0517***			
Level-1	0.0382***			

Predicted Probabilities for Minimum and Maximum Values (Selected Variables)

	Fewer Immigrants			More Immigrants			Same		
	Min	Max	Δ%	Min	Max	Δ%	Min	Max	Δ%
Age	0.154	0.107	−30.71	0.364	0.478	31.31	0.482	0.415	−13.84
Education	0.325	0.047	−85.59	0.254	0.548	115.59	0.421	0.406	−3.70
Female	0.112	0.154	37.50	0.455	0.373	−18.02	0.433	0.473	9.24
Income	0.150	0.117	−22.24	0.388	0.438	12.86	0.462	0.445	−3.57
Personal Economy Deteriorated	0.124	0.157	26.60	0.408	0.429	5.20	0.469	0.414	−11.55
Personal Economy Improved	0.130	0.138	6.71	0.403	0.445	10.42	0.467	0.417	−10.85
Province-Level Variables									
Size of Immigration	0.109	0.189	73.13	0.448	0.343	−23.52	0.443	0.468	5.74
Unemployment	0.109	0.184	68.80	—	—	—	—	—	—
Economic growth	0.101	0.170	68.32	—	—	—	—	—	—
1988–2008 change	0.132	0.025	−81.06	0.414	0.137	−66.92	0.454	0.838	84.62

Note: "Same Number of Immigrants" is the comparison group.
N: 12563. *p < .1, **p < .05; ***p < .01 (two-tailed).

TABLE 4

Determinants of Views toward Racial Minorities

	Views Toward Racial Minorities (0–100)	
	B	S.E.
Intercept	68.687	0.519***
Age	−0.109	0.021***
Education	6.499	0.470***
Female	2.591	0.549***
Income	0.625	0.164***
Personal Economy Deteriorated	−1.658	0.377***
Personal Economy Improved	0.525	0.455
Province-Level Variables		
% of Visible Minorities	0.043	0.064
Unemployment	0.283	0.146*
GDP Growth	−0.043	0.232
Survey 1993	2.483	1.730
Survey 1997	−5.150	1.708**
Survey 2004	2.579	1.628
Survey 2006	6.829	1.912***
Survey 2008	9.757	1.979***
Random Effect		
Level 2	13.880	
Level 1	474.770	
2-Log Likelihood	−5.66E+04	

Note: Entries are reduced maximum likelihood coefficients with standard errors.

N: 12563. *p < .1, **p < .05; ***p < .01 (two-tailed).

the effect of other factors is taken into account, however, the net change in weakening of opposition to immigration appears somewhat less radical than Figure 1 suggested. Predicted probabilities derived from the model in Table 3 indicate that the probability of asking for "fewer" immigrants decreased from 13.2 per cent to 2.5 per cent during the 20-year period, about a 10-point change.[16] The analyses also indicate that support for "more" immigration decreased during the same period, a drop of close to 28 points (from 41.4% to 13.7%). Overall, the analyses in Table 3 thus suggest a massive movement of public opinion—almost consensual— toward the status quo in immigration intakes (an increase of more than 38 points, from 45.4% to 83.8%).

Results presented in Table 3 also indicate that populations are sensitive to past immigration intakes in their province. The larger the immigrant population hosted by the province, the larger the proportion of the population asking for "fewer" immigrants (an 8 point difference between

the province with smallest and largest immigrant intakes) and the smaller the proportion of those asking for "more" immigrants (a 10 point difference). The strength of the economy in the province also appears to matter somewhat. Native-born white populations living in provinces with higher unemployment rates are less favourable to immigration than those where the unemployment rate is lower. The effect is asymmetrical, primarily increasing the propensity of asking for "fewer" immigrants, a difference of more than 7 points between the province with the lowest and highest unemployment rates (from 10.9% to 18.4%). Views toward immigration also seem to correlate with economic growth in the province, but, intriguingly, in the opposite direction than what was expected. When economic growth is stronger, people seem somewhat more likely to ask for a reduction in immigration levels. Here as well the effect is asymmetrical, only affecting the likelihood of asking for a reduction in immigration.

Results for attitudes toward racial minorities are presented in Table 4. The results confirm the warming up of views toward racial minorities between 1988 and 2008, a net increase of more than 9 points. In contrast with views toward immigration, provinces with large visible minorities population are not more positive or negative toward racial minorities than provinces that do not host large visible minority populations. We observe some puzzling findings regarding the effect of economic considerations. Provinces that have high unemployment rates seem to be somewhat more favourable to racial minorities than other provinces where unemployment rate is lower; the effect is modest though (a difference of less than 5 points).

The multivariate analyses grant support for our first two hypotheses, but mostly for views toward immigration. While the economic situation of provinces as well as their past immigration intakes seem to play a key role in predicting levels of support for immigration, such considerations are less helpful explaining why native-born white populations in some provinces are more positive than others toward racial minorities. This suggests that the roots of views toward immigration and racial minorities are not the same.

Results for the individual-level analysis are consistent with findings from previous studies. Moreover, for most individual-level predictors, the effect is similar for both views toward immigration and racial minorities. Hence, more educated people and those with a higher income are more favourable to immigration and more positive toward racial minorities than people with a lower level of education or income. The results are somewhat unclear for respondents' views on past changes in their personal economic situation. Both people who saw their personal economic situation improve or deteriorate are more likely to ask for a reduction in immigration intakes in comparison to those who experienced no change

in their personal economic situation over the past year. The differences are statistically significant but marginal.[17]

The effect differs for views toward immigration and racial diversity, however, both for age and sex. Older people tend to be marginally more favourable to immigration than younger ones but less positive toward racial minorities. As for women, they tend to be less favourable than men to immigration but more positive toward racial minorities. These findings for age and sex are also consistent with those observed by Palmer in the Canadian context. His proposed explanation is that both women and younger people are typically more vulnerable in terms of employment and hence are more likely to see immigration as a threat (1996: 185). As for the more positive views toward racial minorities among young people and women, the explanation is less clear. Arguably, for young people, racial diversity is more likely to be the norm. Younger generations grew up with diversity; they shared schooling experiences with members of racial minorities. Accordingly, these younger generations might have better internalized racial diversity as being part of their social identity and hence they might be more comfortable with it (Ford, 2008). In sharp contrast, current older generations, for the most part, encountered racial diversity at a relatively later stage of their life. For them, the current demographic makeup of Canada or their province is different from the one they grew up in. For these older generations, their sense of identity might therefore be structured around a more homogeneous image that hardly fits with the growing racial diversity. This proposed explanation is consistent with political socialization research that emphasizes the importance of political learning during late adolescence and early adulthood (see Niemi and Hepburn, 1995) for the development of political orientations, especially for those attitudes that are symbolically loaded such as partisan and group identification (Sears, 1993).

Cultural Insecurity and Views Toward Immigration and Racial Minorities

As mentioned, previous studies have shown that Quebec tends to be less enthusiastic toward immigration and racial minorities; this study supports those findings with regards to views toward racial minorities. The purpose of the present section is to examine whether cultural insecurity plays a role in explaining Quebec's lower enthusiasm for racial minorities. In order to do this, we examine whether such lower enthusiasm is also observed among French-speaking communities in other provinces. We thus investigate differences between French- and English-speaking communities in the three provinces (Quebec, New Brunswick and Ontario)

where our data provided large enough samples to conduct reliable analyses.[18] We expect French-speaking individuals to be less favourable to both immigration and racial minorities than their English provincial counterparts because of greater cultural (and linguistic) insecurities. Multivariate analyses are conducted for each of the three provinces where we distinguish between French-speaking and English-speaking individuals. We also control for socio-economic characteristics (age, sex, education and household income). Multinomial analysis is used for views toward immigration and OLS regression is used for views toward racial minorities on a 0–100 scale.

The results presented in Table 5 indicate that views toward immigration differ between French- and English-speaking individuals in Quebec but not in New Brunswick and Ontario. In Quebec, the French-speaking community is less likely to ask for "more" immigrants than the English-speaking community (13% vs. 21%, descriptive findings). This being said, French-speaking individuals in Quebec are not more likely than English-speaking individuals to ask for fewer immigrants (36% vs. 37%, descriptive findings). The hypothesis is thus only weakly supported for views toward immigration. With regards to views toward racial minorities, however, differences are significant between French- and English-speaking communities in two of the three provinces. While there are no significant differences in the 0–100 mean scores between French- and English-speaking communities in Ontario (68.8 vs. 66.8), descriptive findings indicate significant differences for the other two provinces. In Quebec, the mean scores on the racial minorities thermometer are 73.3 and 60.1 respectively for English- and French-speaking Quebecers, and in New Brunswick, the mean scores for the two linguistic communities are 70.3 and 63.7. The results presented in Table 6 indicate that these linguistic differences in Quebec and New Brunswick are not explained by differences in the socio-economic situation between the two communities. Everything being equal, French-speaking individuals are less positive toward racial minorities than English-speaking ones by 12.7 points in Quebec and 5.6 points in New Brunswick.

These findings lend partial support to our social identity hypothesis. French-speaking communities in New Brunswick and Quebec tend to be less positive toward racial minorities and to some extent to immigration, in the case of Quebec, than the English-speaking communities of those provinces. In effect, French-speaking communities in Quebec and New Brunswick have the least positive views toward racial minorities in Canada when compared to the English-speaking communities of all other provinces. These findings indicate that the presence of large French-speaking communities in New Brunswick and Quebec accounts in part for these two provinces' lower standing on views toward racial minorities in comparison to other provinces.

TABLE 5
The Role of Cultural Insecurity in Views toward Immigration

| | Quebec | | | | New Brunswick | | | | Ontario | | | |
| | Fewer | | More | | Fewer | | More | | Fewer | | More | |
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
French- vs. English-speaking	−.19	.13	−.48	.15***	−.20	.23	−.27	.28	−.34	.15	.03	.21
Age	−.01	.00***	.02	.00***	−.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
Education	−.61	.07***	.47	.10***	−.54	.19***	.19	.24	−.52	.07***	.25	.11**
Female	.19	.08**	−.45	.10***	.06	.22	−.49	.26*	.25	.07***	−.16	.11
Household income	−.16	.03***	−.02	.04	.00	.09	.17	.10*	−.05	.28*	.06	.04
Year of interview												
1993	−.24	.19	−.34	.26	−.66	.58	−1.02	.68	.05	.19	−.77	.24***
1997	−1.32	.14***	−2.12	.20***	−.238	.45	−2.99	.61***	−1.19	.16***	−2.33	.23***
2000	−1.55	.14***	−1.80	.19***	−2.54	.44***	−2.30	.50***	−1.70	.16***	−1.92	.20***
2004	−1.84	.15***	−1.52	.17***	−3.19	.46***	−2.31	.51***	−1.83	.15***	−2.22	.19***
2006	−2.26	.16***	−1.90	.18***	−3.46	.49***	−2.61	.53***	−1.79	.15***	−2.11	.19***
2008	−1.85	.18***	−1.94	.23***	−3.26	.52***	−2.43	.55***	−2.07	.18***	−2.40	.24***
	N = 4068		Pseudo R² = .10		N = 569		Pseudo R² = .15		N = 3901		Pseudo R² = .09	

Entries report multinomial logit B coefficients. Note: Base outcome is "about the same."
Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies.

TABLE 6
The Role of Cultural Insecurity in Views toward Racial Minorities

	Quebec		New Brunswick		Ontario	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
French- vs. English-speaking	−12.78	1.44***	−5.60	2.52**	−1.66	1.66
Age	−.16	.03***	−.05	.08	−.16	.03***
Education	7.06	.82***	4.19	2.10**	5.68	.83***
Female	1.60	.87*	4.76	2.34**	4.33	.85***
Household income	.70	.34**	1.41	.90	.39	.32
Year of interview						
1993	2.90	1.78	3.63	4.19	3.34	1.55**
1997	−8.77	1.40***	−.99	3.65	−2.50	1.43*
2004	−1.67	1.50	4.71	3.85	4.57	1.36***
2006	1.01	1.45	11.67	9.99***	9.25	1.43***
2008	3.19	1.66*	9.60	4.11**	11.89	1.59***
	N = 2572 Adj. R² = .12		N = 379 Adj. R² = .09		N = 2765 Adj. R² = .09	

Entries report unstandardized B coefficients from OLS regressions.
Source: 1988–2008 Canadian Election Studies (no data for 2000).
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.

Conclusion

Views of native-born white Canadians toward immigration in all ten provinces are largely favourable both to the current level of immigration intake and racial minorities; in no province are views negative. Most importantly, views have become increasingly positive in all provinces during the 20 year period examined in this study. We observed the emergence of a "quasi" consensus toward the status quo on immigration levels even though annual intakes during that period increased from about 150,000 to 250,000 people. We also observed that the native-born white population in eight provinces has become significantly more positive toward racial minorities. While the populations of many European countries have become increasingly hostile toward immigration and racial minorities over the last two decades (Semyonov et al. 2006), we observed no backlash in any of the Canadian provinces. The Canadian and European publics are clearly on opposite trajectories regarding issues of immigration and racial diversity.[19] It is not clear why Canadians have become more open to both immigration and racial minorities over the 20-year period examined.[20] Quite importantly, however, our investigations indicate that it is not one or a few provinces that are driving the increasing positive views toward immigration and racial minorities; there is a pan-Canadian movement including almost all provinces toward greater acceptance of diversity.

There are nevertheless significant differences in views toward immigration intakes and racial minorities across provinces. The most favourable on both dimensions appears to be Nova Scotia, while the least favourable, again considering both dimensions, appears to be Alberta. But one need not confuse views toward immigration intakes with views toward racial minorities. They are not the same thing and the placement across provinces is not the same on both dimensions. On the one hand, people in Ontario and British Columbia are quite comfortable with racial minorities but seem more likely than other Canadians to think their province might need to reduce somewhat the number of immigrants they receive each year. On the other hand, Quebecers are quite content with maintaining a steady flow of immigrants but are clearly not as comfortable with racial minorities as other Canadians might be. These findings, like others before (Ford, 2011; Palmer, 1996), indicate that the dynamics of support for immigration and for racial minorities are partly distinct. Hence, when support for immigration declines, it does not necessarily mean that racism is on the rise and, conversely, when support for immigration increases, it does not mean that the day-to-day integration of minorities is easier.

The different dynamics of support for immigration and for racial minorities is made even more evident when taking into account our find-

ings on the roots of such attitudes. First, support for immigration intakes seems to go somewhat hand in hand with the unemployment rate in provinces. Second, populations of provinces that received a large number of immigrants are more likely to think Canada received enough immigrants, and those in provinces that did not receive a lot of immigrants are more likely to want more. These findings are quite in line with current discourse relating to immigration. In provinces that do not receive a lot of immigrants (in the Atlantic provinces and in Saskatchewan and Manitoba), immigration might be perceived as a rare "commodity" essential for the future of the community while in provinces that receive a lot (Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta), the need for more immigrants might be perceived as being less critical and desirable. This finding is also consistent with recent policy developments. Provincial nominee programs are very much grounded in an instrumental discourse emphasizing the need to select immigrants in line with the province's specific economic needs.

Contrary to views toward immigration intakes, however, views toward racial minorities do not seem to correlate as strongly to provincial economic and demographic considerations. There is thus a first distinction in the views toward immigration and racial minorities. While the former seem to respond to some instrumental provincial considerations and lend support to the economic perspective on group conflict, the latter does not. Second, views toward racial minorities seem to correlate with the presence of French-communities in the province. French-speaking communities in Quebec and New Brunswick appear somewhat less positive than their English-speaking counterpart. Arguably, the social identity perspective provides a partial explanation for this finding. It thus appears that the standing of these two provinces' views toward racial minorities is partly the result of the presence of large French-speaking communities.

Findings presented in this paper are reassuring in many ways. First, public opinion in all provinces is positive and increasingly so. Second, we can clearly differentiate between Canadians' concern for a policy (whether or not they think Canada should admit more immigrants) and their more fundamental orientations toward racial diversity (how they feel toward racial minorities). There is a correlation between the two but our investigation of public opinion in the provinces indicates that they do not seem to be fully rooted in similar considerations. Moreover, and maybe most importantly, if views toward immigration intakes are likely to vary across time with the ups and downs of the economy and the concentration of immigration in certain regions, views toward racial minorities seem to be less sensitive to short-term variations in macro-economic indicators. This is a strong protection Canada and Canadians might have to preserving a healthy level of social cohesion.

Our account of varying reactions to immigration and racial diversity across Canadian provinces is incomplete. Limitations with our data did not allow us to investigate the impact of other potential key factors associated with the social identity perspective, such as dominant provincial social and economic ideologies, the sense and strength of provincial identity and cosmopolitan outlooks. Nevertheless, this study provides a significant account for variation in attitudes of the native-born white majority population toward immigration and racial minorities within the Canadian federation. Hence, although there is an important level of cohesion in the way Canadians of all provinces appear to react to immigration and racial minorities, provinces do appear to some extent to be "small worlds" where attitudes toward diversity are driven in part by provincial issues, such as the level of unemployment and the size of the provincial immigration intakes, and by cultural insecurities of some fragile linguistic groups in some provinces. To understand how Canadians feel toward diversity we must understand what is happening in their own part of the country. Despite a major pan-Canadian movement in views on immigration and diversity, provincial and regional dynamics are thus not fading legacies of the past but still salient forces shaping the public's views toward an increasingly significant component of Canadian political life and Canadian identity.

Notes

1 They did briefly investigate views on immigration policies but the variation across provinces was among the most modest (1980: 86) and the issue seemed at the time of little importance in comparison to others such as federal-provincial relations, French-English relations, and the role of government in moral issues and economic matters.

2 The term "ethnic diversity" is usually used in the literature and in the media in Canada rather than "racial diversity." However, the *Canadian Electoral Study* data, on which this article is based, asks Canadians questions about racial diversity. As such, for the sake of consistency, we use "racial diversity" throughout this article.

3 See the justification for the focus on native-born white Canadians in the methodology section.

4 A few studies examined differences in views toward immigration and racial minorities between Quebecers and other Canadians (Gidengil et al., 2002; Lambert and Curtis, 1983). Other studies have looked at the attitudes of Canadians towards immigrants and immigration in different Canadian cities (see Berry and Kalin, 1995; Mulder and Krahn, 2005).

5 Visit the *Canadian Election Study* website for more information on these studies: http://ces-eec.org/

6 Since we are interested in provincial variations in attitudes toward immigration, it would be better to investigate opinions on whether the respondent's *province* should admit more or fewer immigrants. Unfortunately such data are not available.

7 Wilkes et al. (2008) in Canada provide findings consistent with our assumption.

8 We use Statistics Canada's definition of visible minority, which is a "person other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour. The

visible minority population consists mainly of the following groups: Chinese, South Asian, Black, Arab, West Asian, Filipino, Southeast Asian, Latin American, Japanese and Korean."

9   When respondents of all ethnic origins and place of birth are included in the analyses, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia all appear more favourable to immigration intakes than what Table 2 suggests because the samples for these provinces are composed of large segments of immigrants and visible minority Canadians who are more favourable toward immigration than the rest of the population. Including all respondents does not have much of an impact on the distribution of responses for other provinces because the immigrants and visible minorities represent a smaller percentage of the samples. Results not presented.

10   Interestingly, the pattern of differences is not altered when we include in the analyses Canadians born outside of Canada and those of visible minority background. Results not presented.

11   The strength of the correlation is relatively the same within all provinces (ranging from .24 to .31). Only in PEI is it significantly weaker with a Pearson coefficient = .14.

12   We selected the 15-year period to capture long-term trends in immigration rather than the ups and downs in yearly immigration intakes.

13   Initially, we considered using growth model where the 'year' is level 1 and 'provinces' is level 2. However, the survey years are not sufficient to conduct such analysis. Therefore, we took the 'province-year' as level 2.

14   The design-effect score was above 2, which suggests that the clustering in the data has to be taken into consideration (Muthen and Satorra, 1995).

15   We use HLM 6.00 for these analyses.

16   To calculate the predicted probability, we held all control variables values constant at their mean (and with 1988 as the time point of reference) and varied a variable of interest from its minimum to its maximum.

17   It could have been a better indicator to rely on views about future changes in respondents' personal economic situation. Unfortunately, however, this indicator is not available for the 2008 *Canadian Election Study* and we did not want to leave out this time-point from our analyses.

18   The samples of French and English speakers (as measured by the language spoken at home) are respectively 4666 and 480 for Quebec, 264 and 458 for New Brunswick, and 329 and 4594 for Ontario. Those who speak another language at home are not included in the analyses.

19   A number of hypotheses can be advanced to explain such variation between Canada and Europe. First, as argued by Kymlicka (2008), the fact that, contrary to Europe, Canada does not face the threat of a large-scale influx of unwanted migrants from poor countries might explain in part the more positive attitudes of the native-born population in Canada. Second, Canadians are much more likely to believe that immigration is good for the economy of the country than it is the case in European countries (Banting, 2010: 804). This might be explained by the fact that Canada's immigration policy has given priority to economic migrants who can move quickly into employment and self-sufficiency. Finally, contrary to the case in some European countries, those with the strongest sense of Canadian identity tend to be more, not less, supportive of immigration and immigrants than those who are less nationalist (Johnston et al., 2010). Such findings suggest that cultural diversity has become a key component of the Canadian identity for many Canadians.

20   We examined whether some specific sub-group of the population was primarily responsible for these increasing positive views. These additional investigations suggest that most subgroups of the population have become more positive over the years (young and old, poor and rich, financially secure and financially insecure, more and less educated). Results not presented.

References

Anderson, Cameron. 2010. "Regional Heterogeneity and Policy Preferences in Canada: 1979–2006." *Regional and Federal Studies* 20(4–5): 447–68.

Banting, Keith G. 2010. "Is There a Progressive's Dilemma in Canada? Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 43(4): 797–820.

Berry, John W. and Rudolf Kalin. 1995. "Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada: An Overview of the 1991 Survey." *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* 27: 301–20.

Berry, John W., Rudolf Kalin and Donald M. Taylor. 1976. *Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.

Binder, Norman E., J. L. Polinard and Robert D. Wrinkle. 1997. "Mexican American and Anglo Attitudes toward Immigration Reform: A View from the Border." *Social Science Quarterly* 78(2): 324–37.

Blake, Donald E. 2003. "Environmental Determinants of Racial Attitudes among White Canadians." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 36(3): 491–503.

Blumer, Herbert. 1958. "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position." *The Pacific Sociological Review* 1(1): 3–7.

Bobo, Lawrence and Vincent L. Hutchings. 1996. "Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context." *American Sociological Review* 61(6): 951–72.

Brown, Rupert. 1995. *Prejudice: Its Social Psychology*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Capozza, D. and Rupert Brown. 2000. *Social Identity Processes: Trends in Theory and Research*. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications.

Elkins, David J. and Richard Simeon. 1980. *Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life*. Toronto: Methuen.

Epenshade, Thomas J. and Katherine Hempstead. 1996. "Contemporary American Attitudes toward US Immigration." *International Migration Review* 30(2): 535–70.

Escandell, Xavier and Alin M. Ceobanu. 2010. "Nationalisms and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Spain." *South European Society and Politics* 15(2): 157–79.

Ford, Robert. 2008. "Is Racial Prejudice Declining in Britain?" *British Journal of Sociology* 59(4): 609–36.

Ford, Robert. 2011. "Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to Immigration in Britain is Affected by Migrants' Region of Origin." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37(7): 1017–37.

Garcea, Joseph. 2006. "Provincial Multiculturalism Policies in Canada, 1974–2004: A Content Analysis." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 38(3): 1–20.

Gidengil, Elisabeth, André Blais, Richard Nadeau and Neil Nevitte. 2002. "Language and Cultural Insecurity." In *Quebec: State and Society*, ed. Alain G. Gagnon. 3rd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Glaser, James M. 1994. "Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South." *The Journal of Politics* 56(1): 21–41.

Hainmueller, Jans and Michael J. Hiscox. 2007. "Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe." *International Organization* 61(2): 399–442.

Henderson, Ailsa. 2010a. "Why Regions Matter: Sub-state Polities in Comparative Perspective." *Regional and Federal Studies* 20(4–5): 439–45.

Henderson, Ailsa. 2010b. "'Small Worlds' as Predictors of General Political Attitudes." *Regional and Federal Studies* 20(4–5): 469–85.

Hood, M. V. and Irwin L. Morris. 1997. "¿Amigo o Enemigo?: Context, Attitudes, and Anglo Public Opinion toward Immigration." *Social Science Quarterly* 78(2): 309–23.

Hox, J. J. 2002. *Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications*. Mahwah NJ: Erlbaum.

Johnston, Richard, Keith Banting, Will Kymlicka and Stuart Soroka. 2010. "National Identity and Support for the Welfare State." *Canadian Journal Political Science* 43: 349–77.

Kalin, Rudolf. 1996. "Ethnic Attitudes as a Function of Ethnic Presence." *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* 28: 171–90.

Kalin, Rudolf. and J.W. Berry. 1994. "Ethnic and Multicultural Attitudes." In *Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape*, ed. Rudy Kalin and Jean Laponce. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Kymlicka, Will. 2008. "Marketing Canadian Pluralism in the International Arena." In *The Comparative Turn in Canadian Politics*, ed. Linda White, Richard Simeon, Robert Vipond and Jennifer Wallner. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Lambert, Ronald D. and James E. Curtis. 1983. "Opposition to Multiculturalism among Québécois and English-Canadians." *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 20(2): 193–206.

Meuleman, Bart, Eldad Davidov and Jaak Billiet. 2009. "Changing Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe, 2002–2007: A Dynamic Group Conflict Theory Approach." *Social Science Research* 38(2): 352–65.

Mulder, Marlene and Harvey Krahn. 2005. "Individual and Community-level Determinants of Support for Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Canada." *Canadian Review of Sociology* 42(4): 421–44.

Muthen, Bengt O, and Albert Satorra. 1995. "Complex Data in Structural Equation Modeling." *Sociological Methodology* 25: 267–316.

Nanos, Nik. 2010. "Canadians Strongly Support Immigration, but Don't Want Current Levels Increased." *Policy Options*: 10–14.

Niemi, R.G. and M.A. Hepburn. 1995. "The Rebirth of Political Socialization." *Perspectives on Political Science* 24: 7–16.

O'Rourke, Kevin H. and Richard Sinnott. 2006. "The Determinants of Individual Attitudes toward Immigration." *European Journal of Political Economy* 22(4): 838–61.

Palmer, Douglas L. 1996. "Determinants of Canadian Attitudes toward Immigration: More than Just Racism?" *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* 28: 180–92.

Paquet, Mireille. 2011. "The Canadian Mosaic of Reception: Provincial Integration Regimes." Paper presented at the 13th National Metropolis Conference, Vancouver.

Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe." *American Sociological Review* 60(4): 586–611.

Scheve, K., and M. Slaughter. 2001. "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1): 133–45.

Sears, D. O. 1993. "Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory." In *Explorations in Political Psychology*, ed. S. Iyengar and W. J. McGuire. Durham NC: Duke University Press.

Seidle, F. Leslie. 2010. *The Canada–Ontario Immigration Agreement: Assessment and Options for Renewal*. Toronto: Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation.

Semyonov, Moshe, Rebeca Raijman, A.Y. Tov and Peter Schmidt. 2004. "Population Size, Perceived Threat, and Exclusion: A Multiple-Indicators Analysis of Attitudes toward Foreigners in Germany." *Social Science Research* 33(4): 681–701.

Semyonov, Moshe, Rebeca Raijman and Anastasia Gorodzeisky. 2006. "The Rise of Anti-foreigner Sentiment in European Societies, 1988–2000." *American Sociological Review* 71(3): 426–49.

Sniderman, Paul M., Louk Hafendoorn and Markus Prior. 2004. "Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities." *American Political Science Review* 98: 35–49.

Wilkes, Rima and Catherine Corrigall-Brown. 2011. "Explaining time trends in public opinion: Attitudes towards immigration and immigrants." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 51(1–2): 79–99.

Wilkes, Rima, Neil Guppy and Lily Farris. 2008. "'No Thanks, We're Full': Individual Characteristics, National Context, and Changing Attitudes Towards Immigration." *International Migration Review* 42(2): 302–29.

Appendix

Views toward immigration	Do you think Canada should admit "more", "fewer" or "about the same" number of immigrants as now? 3-category variable where 1 means "more," 0 "about the same" and −1 means "fewer."
Views toward racial minorities	How do you feel about racial minorities on a 0–100 scale where 0 means you really dislike them and 100 means you really like them? 0–100-scale variable.

Province-level variables

Size of immigrant intakes	Size of total immigrant intake received in the province in the fifteen years prior to the year of the interview. Measured in percentage of the population. Range: 1.22–14.77%
Size of visible minority population	Size of visible minority population in the province based on closest census data to the year of interview. We use Statistics Canada's definition of visible minority, which is a "person other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour. The visible minority population consists mainly of the following groups: Chinese, South Asian, Black, Arab, West Asian, Filipino, Southeast Asian, Latin American, Japanese and Korean." Measured in percentage of the population. Range: .24–24.76%
Unemployment rate	Unemployment rate in the province for the year of interview. Range: 3.4–20.10%
GDP growth	GDP growth in the province for the year of interview. Range: −4.60–9.10%

Individual-level variables

Age	Respondent's age in years
Income	Household income in quintiles (1–5)
Female	Respondent's sex. Female = 1; Male = 0
Education	0 = Primary education completed; 1 = High school education completed; 2 = Post-secondary education completed
Personal economic situation in the previous year	Respondent's personal economic situation in the previous year. 3 Dichotomic variables indicating whether respondents' economic situation: improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated.