Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies is a very welcome addition to the literature on political parties and party systems in developing countries. This volume's contribution is easy to identify simply by scanning the shelves of books on political parties. Much ink has been spilled on two areas of research that flank this book's emphasis on party regulation in deeply divided societies: the use of electoral rules to engineer institutional reforms and the role of the international community in building democracies. But the question of direct regulation of parties to craft more stable polities is relatively uncharted territory. The project takes as its starting point the importance of party regulation and engineering in order to reduce the likelihood of ethnic conflict, but virtually all the chapters approach the success of regulation with a critical eye and a healthy dose of skepticism. For this very reason, this book should end up on the reading list of any organization involved in some aspect of party regulation and engineering. Although the analytical thrust of this book is more in line with an academic readership, any thoughtful practitioner will have much to gain from this book. In this review, I want to focus on three overarching themes: (1) the consequences of reforms; (2) the tradeoffs that result from reforms; and (3) the issue of social structure.
A central premise of this book is that engineering and regulation of parties and party systems in conflict-prone societies may help reduce systemic violence. In general, such regulation has the intention of moving the polity in a more centripetal direction. This means that ethnic (or regional or linguistic) identities are either repressed or aggregated into multi-ethnic parties or coalitions so that they will not destabilize the polity. The abiding concern is that ethnic identities that become fully articulated through parties can spur social disorder in volatile societies.
Yet, the authors of this volume place this hypothesis under a high-powered microscope and examine all its implications. Vicky Randall's contribution is especially notable in this regard. While acknowledging that some regulations may be useful, such as basic party registration requirements and minimal thresholds for parliamentary seats, more heavy-handed ones may generate unintended or unanticipated consequences (“consequences not anticipated by some of the actors concerned, but intended by others” [253]) in terms of conflict alleviation. Even more fundamental than the unintended consequences of reforms is their actual effectiveness and enforcement. Many reforms may be on the books but their actual enforcement is extremely shallow due to the weakness of the monitoring agencies.
The case studies in this book also shed much empirical light on the relative effectiveness and unintended consequences of regulatory endeavors. In Southeast Asia, Allen Hicken concludes that attempts to create more aggregative and programmatic parties in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have all resulted in unintended consequences, with Thailand exemplifying the worst outcome—a military putsch against a party that used institutional reforms to dominate the polity. Jóhanna Kristín Birnir notes that in a number of Eastern European and Latin American countries, formation rules have helped institutionalize party systems, but they have not reduced conflict—even exacerbating ethnic tensions. And in southern and eastern Africa, Denis Kadima shows through a tight comparison of five countries that the countries that have followed a “light touch” approach in terms of regulations have sustained relatively harmonious ethnic relations, while those countries that have sought to contain ethnic articulation have had more mixed results.
Related to the issue of effectiveness in regulating parties and party systems lies the question of tradeoffs. Attempts to create more centripetal institutions may end up undermining democracy and human rights, diluting politics of its social content, or most ironically, hindering institutionalization—the very goal of most regulatory agendas. Reforms may thus stifle genuine interest for political participation among social groups, limit ethnic groups' ability to engage democratically and cut off the social base for a party built along ethnic lines. As Per Nordlund puts it in his concluding chapter, the critical question that has to be prioritized is whether the benefits that ensue from the repression of ethnic politics outweigh the costs.
Lurking beneath the problems of effectiveness and tradeoffs lies the question of social structure. A number of the chapters make the point that one cannot enforce a “one-size-fits-all” model, and that engineers and regulators should be especially cognizant of the nature of social cleavages and social interests. Nordlund concludes, “A thorough analysis of traditions, structures and relations of power in each society is essential to any work on party system design and support” (302). In other words, social structure has to be given greater analytical emphasis by both academics and practitioners.
This is particularly relevant in the context of the book's analytical questions and conclusions. While numerous authors conclude that efforts at institutional regulation and engineering have often not led to desired outcomes, the volume does not provide a broad theoretical explanation for why this has occurred. Yet, it is clear that social structure plays a central role in the way that rules play out in practice. For example, Birnir shows that exclusionary formation rules have led to increased ethnic conflict in countries like Ecuador and Moldova, while Hicken argues that the goal of creating nationally based parties in Indonesia has led to some weakening of party roots in society and therefore to less institutionalization. More generally, as Iain McMenamin puts it, “the effect of institutions will vary according to what type of society they are placed in” (225). Thus, if social structure has a strong causal impact on the effect of rules, it would make sense to give it greater theoretical weight. Too often, in studies of electoral rules and party systems, social forces come into the equation as “background noise” or as a residual variable. This volume does not skirt the importance of social structure but leaves much room open for more explicit theorization of the role of social structure in party development.
