One can only wish that Canadian politicians, their advisors and public servants would some day borrow a page from their British counterparts and write about their years in office. There is a long tradition in Britain that sees leading politicians and public servants mine their experience in office, thus contributing significantly to the political science and public administration literature. Perhaps the most celebrated is Richard Crossman's Diary of a Cabinet Minister, which not only had a profound impact on relations between politicians and public servants but also gave rise to the highly popular “Yes, Minister” television series. British prime ministers and senior ministers have consistently produced first-rate memoirs, which have become required reading for students of political science and public administration. In Canada, leaving aside Gordon Robertson's excellent Memoirs of a Very Civil Servant, the pickings are few, for the most part, limited to self-serving, vapid and very often ghost-written fluff that have a shelf life of a few months.
The Chancellors' Tales adds to the British tradition. It offers fresh insights into public policy and public administration from those who had a hand in shaping both. The book will be of strong interest to practitioners, aspiring politicians and public servants as well as students of politics, public administration, public policy and history.
Howard Davies does a masterful job in setting the scene, establishing the themes and putting probing questions to five former chancellors of the Exchequer. Davies opens the book with a well-crafted introduction that outlines the book's purpose and the issues to be addressed. The five former chancellors who reflect on their work are Denis Healy, Geoffrey Howe, Nigel Lawson, Norman Lamont, and Kenneth Clarke. The five cover the period from the Callaghan government to John Major's government and provide important insights into economic policy making in Britain between 1974 and 1997. They also present a valuable historical perspective on how the most powerful minister in the British cabinet, apart from the prime minister, dealt with the country's economic challenges.
To be sure, the years 1974 to 1997 were turbulent years in Britain. It will be recalled that Britain had to turn to the IMF in 1976 for help, which forced the government to take tough decisions. Then, when Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, a public policy revolution was unleashed that was felt in all Anglo-American democracies. It continues to be felt in Britain today. Denis Healy, for one, maintains that Tony Blair “really became very much like Maggie.” Britain abolished exchange control in October 1979. North Sea oil revenues were intended to provide an important source of revenues, starting in the 1980s, but it came at a cost. They pushed the country's exchange rate up which, in turn, made it extremely difficult for traditional manufacturing industries to compete. There is an important lesson here for Canada, given the recent rise of its currency resulting from high energy prices and consequent negative impact on its manufacturing sector.
There are remarkable similarities not only in how the five chancellors saw their role, but also in the policy prescriptions they promoted. All five maintain that formal economics has little to contribute to policy making, that the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer is the loneliest job in government and that the Treasury operates from an institutional motto—a single word, NO. All express a certain reservation about the work of economists, but all have at least some kind words about the contributions of public servants.
All also see important limitations to economic forecasting. But there are also sharp differences. Geoffrey Howe sees merit in the work of Milton Friedman, but Denis Healy does not. Similarly, the work of John Maynard Keynes is reviewed, with varying verdicts.
All five chancellors were asked about their relationship with the Prime Minister's Office. While Clarke had little difficulty, if only because the prime minister's economic advisor of the day hardly intervened, others report a most difficult relationship. Nigel Lawson resigned from the Thatcher cabinet over the role Allan Walters, her economic advisor, played. Lawson now explains that “when a personal advisor starts going public, so that it becomes unclear as to what the economic policy of the government is, then I think it is distinctly unhelpful.” The message for political advisors is, while you throw your weight around inside government, you need to stay out of the media, a world that belongs to politicians.
All five chancellors discuss how they dealt with the same issues: how to control inflation and public expenditures, how best to manage the national economy and how to align it with Europe and the global economy. All five lived through fascinating times. They witnessed the global economy coming of age. They saw the emergence of a new political consensus in Britain, one that to this day still bears the Thatcher trademark. The declining importance, if not the near collapse of labour unions, a profound belief in market forces, and a deliberate shift to a liberalization of financial markets have survived changes in government.
Howard Davis has done an important service to students of British politics, economics and history in soliciting the thoughts of these five chancellors on their experiences in office. This book should sit at the very top of briefing material for cabinet ministers, aspiring ministers, and public servants, particularly those working in the Treasury in Britain. Canadian policy makers would also learn a great deal from reading The Chancellors' Tales.
