The paper argues that the point of a business ethics course is to improve behavior in business, and that an essential ingredient in that improved behavior is knowing what's right or wrong. To make that claim, the paper attempts to dispose of three arguments which support the contrary claim, that business ethics courses are useless. First, it is argued that morals can't be taught, since they only result from training. Second, it is argued that such courses are unnecessary because business executives already know right from wrong. Third, it is argued that ethical knowledge is impossible, so there is nothing to teach. The first two arguments are dealt with briefly, and the third is addressed extensively. The paper argues that the scepticism about ethical knowledge is part of a pervasive “relativism” in our society, but shows that such a relativism/scepticism is untenable and indicates how ethical knowledge is possible. If, then, knowledge of right and wrong is an essential ingredient for improving business behavior, and such knowledge can be imparted in an ethics course, there is some point to teaching business ethics.

In this comment I challenge two of the arguments made in the paper, “Toward the Feminine Firm.” First I challenge the claim that Gilligan's work on gender differences in moral orientation provides a logically and empirically sound foundation for an alternative theory of the firm. I cite recent work that discredits any concise notion of a feminine ethic. Second I challenge the claim that, if such a firm were to exist, it would flourish in a competitive market economy. I suggest that, far from flourishing, such a firm will rapidly perish.

This article investigates how religion-based social norms and values shape women’s access to employment in Muslim-majority countries. It develops a religiously sensitive conceptualization of the differential valence of genders based on respect, which serves to (re)produce inequality. Drawing on an ethnographic study of work practice in Berber communities in Morocco, aspects of respect are analyzed through an honor–shame continuum that serves to moralize and mediate gender relations. The findings show that respect and shame function as key inequality-(re)producing mechanisms. The dynamic interrelationship between respect and shame has implications for how we understand the ways in which gender inequality is institutionalized and (re)produced across different levels. Through these processes, gender-differentiated forms of respect become inscribed in organizational structures and practices, engendering persistent inequality.

I evaluate the adequacy of the three models of international business ethics that have been recently proposed by Thomas Donaldson, Gerard Elfstrom and Richard De George. Using the example of the conduct of the aluminum companies in Jamaica, I argue that these three models fail to address the most important of the ethical issues encountered by multinationals because they focus too narrowly on human rights issues and on utilitarian considerations. In addition I argue that these models also evidence an inadequate understanding of microeconomic theory. I end by proposing that these defects can be remedied by a model of ethics that incorporates a theory of moral rights, a utilitarian-based theory of the market, and a theory of justice.

Concern for one’s “reputation” has been introduced in recent game theory enabling theorists to demonstrate the rationality of cooperative behavior in certain contexts. And these impressive results have been generalized to a variety of situations studied by students of business and business ethicists. But it is not clear that the notion of reputation employed has much explanatory power once one sees what is meant. I also suggest that there may be some larger lessons about the notion of rationality used by decision theorists.

This article argues for the compatibility of casuistry and the business case method. It describes the salient features of casuistry and the case method, shows how the two methods are similar yet different, and suggests how elements of casuistry might benefit the use of the case method in management education. Toward these ends, it shows how casuistry and the case method are both inductive and practical methods of reasoning focussed on single settings and real-life situations and how both methods stress that real-life decision making is not the exclusive domain of experts. It also shows how casuistry and the case method are not identical processes but have different purposes and emphasize order and problem-resolution differently. In the end, Casuistry and the Business Case Method suggests that, despite their differences, casuistry and the case method might be brought together to benefit business management and the field of business ethics.

The discussion of the global economy and worldwide expansion of the capitalist and market economic system barely deals with the topic of public goods, although they are of paramount importance precisely in this international setting. Fortunately, the theory of public economics systematically developed the central concept of the public good with its far-reaching implications so that this knowledge can be applied also to global issues. In order to treat these often vaguely discussed issues, a typology of international relations is proposed. These and other considerations prepare the way to ask the question about the implied ethos. Because a common and sustainable ethos for public goods in the global economy is of great relevance and high urgency, both religious and non-religious ethical traditions are called for making their necessary contributions to this foundation.

This article explains how the private equity-leveraged buyout type of financial institution (PE-LBO) operates as a form of finance capitalism. PE-LBO capitalism is described and compared with other types of capitalism such as family business capitalism, managerial capitalism, and other forms of finance capitalism such as shareholder value capitalism. Ethical and social issues structurally related to the PE-LBO form are analyzed. Potential reforms and/or solutions are considered.

Sandberg documents with admirable precision nine rather diverging renderings of Freeman’s call for the rejection of the separation thesis (ST). A more careful consideration of the propriety of importing phrases such as “the rejection of ST” from more established academic disciplines so as to serve in the field of normative business ethics would seem to make that precision premature and maybe even superfluous. This may well be generalized to an observation concerning current working methods in normative business ethics.

Pragmatists believe that philosophical inquiry must engage closely with practice to be useful and that practice serves as a source of social norms. As a growing alternative to the analytic and continental philosophical traditions, pragmatism is well suited for research in business ethics, but its role remains underappreciated. This article focuses on Richard Rorty, a key figure in the pragmatist tradition. We read Rorty as a source of insight about the ethical and political nature of business practice in contemporary global markets, focusing specifically on his views about moral sentiments, agency, and democratic deliberation. Importantly for business ethicists, Rorty’s approach sets in stark relief our moral responsibility as useful, practical thinkers in addressing the societal challenges of our time. We use “modern slavery” as an empirical context to highlight the relevance of Rorty’s approach to business ethics.

Business ethics in China is highly politicized, both within China as well as on the global scene. Over the past years many issues of business ethics have arisen. It turns out that the Chinese often have a different set of ethical priorities with respect to the economy than do their Western counterparts. China possesses rich and well-developed ethical traditions that provide a meaningful basis for evaluating its own problems. This article reviews China’s ethical heritage and, at the same time, takes note of Western ethical concerns of human rights, property and so forth that have been injected into the debate. The article further reviews the principal issues of ethical analysis and, within the context of China/U. S. inter-relations, suggests ethical paths to pursue on four levels: government to government, multinational corporations, interest groups and international fora, and individual initiatives and commitment.

The current literature in business ethics is tending toward an unacknowledged moral pluralism, with all the problems this position entails. An adequate moral pluralism cannot be achieved by a synthesis of existing theoretical alternatives for moral action. Rather, what is needed is a radical reconstruction of the understanding of the moral situation that undercuts some of the traditional dichotomies, provides a solid philosophical grounding which is inherently pluralistic, and offers a new understanding of what it is to think morally. The philosophical position of American pragmatism, as briefly sketched in this paper, offers one such possible reconstruction.

In this article, I want to draw attention to one strand of the complex web of processes that are involved when people group others, including themselves, into social categories. I will focus on the tendency to treat members of one’s own group more favorably than nonmembers, a tendency that has been called ingroup favoritism. The structure of the article has three parts. First I will offer an evolutionary argument as to why ingroup favoritism, or something very much like it, is required by theories of the evolution of altruism. I will then review some of the basic social psychological research findings dealing with social categorization generally, and ingroup favoritism specifically. Finally, I will examine two problems in business ethics from the point of view of ingroup favoritism to suggest ways in which social psychological principles and findings may be mobilized to help solve problems of racial or gender discrimination in business contexts.

According to the market failures approach to business ethics, beyond-compliance duties can be derived by employing the same rationale and arguments that justify state regulation of economic conduct. Very roughly, the idea is that managers have a duty to behave as if they were complying with an ideal regulatory regime ensuring Pareto-optimal market outcomes. Proponents of the approach argue that managers have a professional duty not to undermine the institutional setting that defines their role, namely the competitive market. This answer is inadequate, however, for it is the hierarchical firm, rather than the competitive market, that defines the role of corporate managers and shapes their professional obligations. Thus, if the obligations that the market failures approach generates are to apply to managers, they must do so in an indirect way. I suggest that the obligations the market failures approach generates directly apply to shareholders. Managers, in turn, inherit these obligations as part of their duties as loyal agents.

This paper explains and defends three basic propositions: (1) that our attitudes (particularly American attitudes) toward organizational ethics are conflicted at a fairly deep level; (2) that in response to this conflict in our attitudes, we often default to various counterfeits of conscience (non-moral systems that serve as surrogates for the role of conscience in organizational settings); and (3) that a better response (than relying on counterfeits) would be for leaders to foster a culture of ethical awareness in their organizations. Some practical suggestions are made about fostering such a culture, and a comparison is made between this late-20th-century response to the problem of counterfeits and the classic “naturalistic fallacy” identified in early-20th-century ethics by G. E. Moore.

It is argued that virtuous peers in work organizations have two elements of character no matter what the nature of the goods the organization produces: loyalty to common projects for their own sake and trustworthiness. Each of these is shown to be a uniquely human attribute, an element of character that contributes to a life well lived, and a trait that leads to the flourishing of an entire work community.

Contemporary society faces a wide range of environmental problems. In what ways might business be part of the solution, rather than the problem? The Moralist Model is one general response. It tends to focus on particular corporations which it treats as moral agents operating within our common moral system. As a consequence, it claims that, with various (usually modest) changes, corporations may become environmentally responsible.

This paper contends, on the contrary, that business has its own special “ethics,” which relates not simply to the internal nature of the corporation but also to the corporate (free market) system. Given this special ethics, business cannot in general be environmentally responsible in the manner that the Moralists demand. Instead, more far-reaching changes are needed within corporations and the economic system to promote environmental responsibility. Though the requisite changes are significant, there are forces pushing in the direction which the paper identifies.

Are there any advantages to thinking and speaking about ethical business in the language of citizenship? We will address this question in part by looking at the possible relevance of a vast literature on individual citizenship that has been produced by political philosophers over the last fifteen years. Some of the central elements of citizenship do not seem to apply straightforwardly to corporations. E.g., “citizenship” typically implies membership in a state and an identity akin to national identity; but this connotation of citizenship is obviously problematic for multinational corporations. However, the language of citizenship does help to focus our attention on various legal and political virtues (or vices) for corporations—topics that have been largely neglected by discussions under other rubrics, such as CSR or sustainability. We finish with an evaluation of the potential benefits and costs of conceptualizing and talking about ethical business practices in the language of citizenship.