This paper discusses the internal dynamics of American trade policy making in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. The author describes the active role interest groups, the U.S. business community, and representatives on both sides of the political spectrum have played in the passing of Transatlantic Partnership Agreement (TPA), the TPP negotiations, and currently the TTIP debate. Lastly, the author lays out the challenges TTIP will continue to face in light of opposition to specific TPP provisions, trans-atlantic disagreement over ISDS and data flows, and the recent presidential elections.

Although the pluralist theory of politics predicts that the focus of organizational activity should shift to the judicial arena whenever the expectations of government as regulator and the demands of regulated interests fail to converge, there has been little systematic research focusing on the question of business litigation as a specific form of interest mobilization. This article develops an integrated organizational choice model of interest mobilization to explain corporate litigation against the United States government. I argue that a company's decision to proceed with litigation is predicated upon the company's (1) resource capacity, (2) constraints of the regulatory environment, and (3) perception of procedural unfairness of the government in the administrative process. The argument is tested with data from a survey of top U.S. business executives whose companies unsuccessfully petitioned the government for administered protection between 1990 and 1995. The argument receives strong empirical support, and suggests that U.S. corporations facing import competition consider litigation an important component of their overall political strategy for obtaining nonmarket benefits.

Analyses of transnational governance formation point to the destabilizing effects transnational standard setters have upon national institutional configurations. Isomorphic pressures, it is argued, lead to the standardization of procedures used and actors involved in standard setting processes. What is not clear, however, is to what extent this meta-standardization increases the chances for convergence of national with transnational standards. This article explores this question for the case of the international accounting standard for off-balance-sheet financing in the Netherlands, France and Germany. It argues that the reconfiguration of domestic governance architectures had a decisive impact on convergence processes. Counter-intuitively, copying goals, membership and procedures of the transnational, private International Accounting Standards Committee limited the chances of rule convergence, as it threatened to deinstitutionalize the standard-setting role of an important national champion of rule-convergence, the banking regulator. The institutional template developed at the transnational level created actor-mismatch at the national level between those formulating and those implementing the rules, thereby weakening the coalition for rule change. A strong coalition, however, is needed to overcome vested business interests that favor convergence with transnational templates for legitimacy gains at the same time that they oppose convergence to contentious rules that limit their business activities.

Why do different industrial democracies employ different processes in determining trade policy and different models of capitalism? Two variables account for the nature of the decision-making process for trade policy. First, the level of inter-industry factor mobility determines if class or sectoral coalitions predominate. Second, the size of policy coalitions depends on which branch of government dominates trade policy. Legislatures favor minimum winning coalitions, while executives favor maximal coalitions. These two variables condition different patterns of coalition making: partisan, pluralist, corporatist, and interventionist. I illustrate this theory analyzing the development of policymaking concerning trade in France and Sweden.

Exchange rates influence a country's trading capability, foreign reserves and competitiveness. Recently, the exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and the U.S. dollar has been a contentious issue in both the United States and China. In this paper, we conduct a historical review of how the United States deployed negotiation strategies with China on the exchange rate issue and consider the degree to which it follows theoretical expectations. We then analyze the changing nature of the factors which shape exchange rate negotiations between the two nations in projecting alternative scenarios for the future of conflict resolution between the U.S. and China on this issue. We predict that the U.S. is likely to continue alternating between competition and collaboration, a negotiation cycle influenced by U.S. domestic politics, and China is less likely to continue with accommodation and compromise. The sequencing and timing of each nation's negotiation strategy will lead to widely divergent consequences for the management of exchange rates and the world economy.

Since the enactment of economic liberalization in India in the early 1990s, variation in investment climate and labor market reforms across sub-national states has been linked to the increasing relevance of business in policy making. This article argues that the influence of business on policy is conditioned by wider political dynamics. We argue that the reform orientation of states correspond to the position of business classes and caste-based groups within the support base of political parties. We show that caste identification plays an important role on the position of political parties towards business liberalization policies. Thus, we conclude that the relative power of business across the states appears to vary due to the relation between business and government, which in turn is structured by the salience of business castes as an electorally relevant group.

One of the major political narratives in the build-up to the critical parliamentary election of 2010 in Hungary was related to the “government of bankers.” Pre-2010 governments earned this label by the opposition based on their supposed close relationship with banking interests and for purportedly formulating financial and tax policy according to the needs of major financial institutions. In this article, we examine the preference attainment of the Hungarian Banking Association, the pre-eminent interest group in banking, and that of OTP, the biggest bank in Hungary, in order to evaluate this popular claim. The article addresses this challenge by comparing the policy influence of Hungarian Banking Association and OTP in the government cycles ending and starting in 2010. We adopt a computer-assisted qualitative content analysis framework and juxtapose the policy positions of the interest group in their formal communications with actual legislation related to the same issues. Results show that the general preference attainment of the banking lobby on major policy issues decreased after 2010—nevertheless, seismic activity was already under way after 2006.

In 2021 the ruling party in Poland proposed a reform to reverse the regressivity of the Polish tax system. Although the number of potential beneficiaries significantly exceeded the number of sufferers, the media coverage of the reform was strongly negative. This pushed the government to introduce reform adjustments, all of which benefited the high-income self-employed, increasing the cost of the reform and reducing its redistributive effect. To explain this, we analyze articles on the reform published in the three most opinion-forming newspapers. We demonstrate that the negative media coverage stemmed from successful incorporation of business narratives in the public debate by the business lobbying associations. It was supported by the weakness of workers’ organizations and a low level of citizens’ trust in government.

Defense contractors play an essential role in US security operations. Among other responsibilities, contractors manufacture arms, manage logistics, analyze intelligence, and carry out cybersecurity operations. Historically, defense contractors were either publicly traded corporations or privately owned companies. The past two decades, however, have seen a major shift in the ownership structure of the US defense industry. Private equity firms—once niche actors in the US national security marketplace—have carried out over 1,500 deals involving defense contractors since 2000. This study employs a mixed-methods research design to assess the effects of private equity investment on the financial stability of the US defense industry. Using data on over 8,000 defense contractors, the inquiry finds that contractors with private equity backing experience bankruptcy at higher rates than contractors with no prior private equity investment. In addition, the study evaluates private equity activity in the military satellite services market—a field of growing importance in the strategically important domain of outer space. The inquiry’s findings have notable international security implications. Given the US’ role as a lynchpin in numerous alliances around the world, higher rates of bankruptcy among defense contractors have the potential to affect the security of the United States and its allies.

What determines whether or not firms lobby on the same policy issues? Scholars offer two broad answers to this question. Firms that are (1) similar or (2) connected through interorganizational ties target the same policy issues. In this article, I argue that the co-occurrence of these two conditions produces the opposite outcome, namely a tendency to lobby on different issues. This expectation draws on ideas from collective action theory and the literature on issue niches. From these, I derive the following assumptions: similar firms share political objectives and they should, when possible, act collectively by jointly delegating their lobbying activities. The reason for doing this is that it allows them to focus on their issue niches. However, the ability to delegate hinges on coordination and monitoring, which is facilitated by interorganizational relations. To test this proposition, I study the largest American corporations. The dependent variable is activity overlap, a measure of the extent to which firms lobby on the same issues. According to expectations, activity overlap is reduced when firms operate in the same industry and, simultaneously, enjoy favorable conditions for social interactions, such as a concentrated market structure. These results lend support to collective action theory.

The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored emerging vulnerabilities in the US research and development (R&D) ecosystem. While an open and collaborative environment has been essential for advancing R&D, this approach exposes university-based R&D to a variety of security threats including state-supported efforts, attacks by malicious actors, and insufficient internal mitigation. As the pandemic led to more remote work and online collaboration, the incidence of exploitation has expanded. Increased security measures are needed to insulate and protect the R&D ecosystem, and US innovation more broadly, while maintaining the fundamental qualities that have contributed to its historical success. In this article, we present the Research Integrity Security Certification (RISC) framework. This concept preserves the autonomy of the US higher education system while also suggesting a mechanism whose effect would be a general enhancement of the security of the US university R&D enterprise with minimal additional state involvement. Much of the work in the proposed model is done by market mechanisms and self-interested microeconomic calculations that generate beneficial aggregate effects. The RISC framework modernizes the university R&D enterprise while strengthening it to operate in this evolving security environment.

What determines the bargaining power of states in international trade negotiations? The literature focuses predominantly on economic strength as the determinant of bargaining power. However, this explanation neglects the reality of modern trade, which is characterized by the globalization of production and high levels of economic interdependence. I argue that this interdependence undermines the effect of economic strength on the bargaining power of states. Specifically, I hypothesize that the effect of economic strength declines when a country's companies rely on inputs for their production from a negotiation partner because they are integrated into global value chains. The more a country's firms are dependent on a partner country, the less that country is able to coerce concessions from the partner country by bringing to bear its economic strength. To test this hypothesis, I use a dataset covering concessions on liberalization of the services sector made by 54 countries in 61 preferential trade agreements. By calculating the relative concessions of each partner, I construct a quantitative indicator of the outcome of trade negotiations. This indicator should reflect the underlying bargaining power of each negotiating party. The results of a regression analysis of these negotiation outcomes mostly support my hypotheses.

The globalization of production and finance is responsible for much of the variation in political contestation over exchange rates since the end of Bretton Woods. On the one hand, globalization increases the salience of the policy decisions that affect exchange rates, as more firms and their workers engage more in international trade and compete more against imports. On the other hand, globalization offers firms a myriad of opportunities to manage their exchange rate risk, through operational and financial hedging. But hedging is available to only certain types of economic actors and in certain situations of exchange rate risk. In this way, globalization has redrawn traditional political cleavages on exchange rates. This argument is tested with an original survey of US firms, labor unions, and trade associations on their preferences and political activity on exchange rate policy.

Restrictive policies aimed at reducing the likelihood of bank failure during recessions tend to increase the probability of a credit crunch. In this paper we infer governments' policy responses to this dilemma by studying the cyclical behavior of bank capital in 1369 banks from 28 OECD countries during the period 1992–98. We find significant differences across countries. In the US and Japan, bank capital is counter-cyclical, that is, the typical bank strengthens its capital base during periods of weak economic activity. In the other countries, there is no relationship between the level of macroeconomic activity and bank capital. From these findings we infer that severe banking crises in the US and Japan may have made policymakers there more vigilant towards “unhealthy” banks, even when this implies an increase in the risk of a credit crunch. In countries without such crisis experience, policymakers seem to be less concerned about future banking crises. Our results suggest that the strong push by the US for the 1988 Basle Accord may have been a reflection of this increased sensitivity. They also suggest that, to the extent business cycles do not develop in synchronicity across countries and policymakers respond differently to the banking crisis-credit crunch dilemma, current reforms of the Basle Accord, which are designed to tighten regulatory requirements, may encounter difficulties.

Most of the existing studies of the welfare state have dealt with OECD countries. Moreover, these studies have focused on government partisanship (left versus right), or institutional features under democracy, as primary causal variables. By providing four primary causal mechanisms (the power of popularly based parties, labor strength, democracy, and political instability) that are different from those of OECD countries, I answer the question of whether and why the efficiency or compensation hypothesis holds for developing countries. I show that either the efficiency or compensation thesis can hold for developing countries depending on the type of globalization with which popularly based governments interact.

The problems of rent seeking and state captured by business associations have been prominent among the concerns of economic development theory. This paper argues that firms and the state can make possible the building of new institutions that foster improvements in economic performance through arrangements that emphasize goal setting, problem solving, and continual evaluation of progress toward defined goals. The paper reviews key ideas on the learning-centered approach and builds on them to analyze the kinds of government–business relations that contribute to economic development. It uses case study material based on Chile's agro-industry business association FEPACH. It illustrates how innovative state policy coupled with private firms' efforts led to the discovery of group-based coordination that fostered rapid diffusion of new technology and production organization among Chilean enterprises. This work discusses the institutional reshaping of the business association and business–state relations to encourage learning and advance a process of development.

Why do autocratic regimes contain bureaucratic corruption in some economic sectors but allow it in other areas? This paper examines variations in governance outcomes and perceptions across firms in Morocco based on a survey of 659 businesses. Three factors explain better public services and control of corruption: the magnitude of potential rents that firms can exchange with the administration, the collective action capacity of the sector vis-à-vis the executive, and the taxability of the industry. Firms in sectors with low rent potential are more likely to coordinate, claim, and obtain better governance in exchange for taxes, whereas high-rent companies find it difficult to sustain effective pro-governance collective action. The findings shed light on business–state relations in autocratic political regimes that have to balance revenue raising goals, policy commitments to selected sectors, and incentives for grand corruption.

An increasing number of public institutional investors are adopting sustainable and ethical investment policies. While financial tests of materiality and norm structures are often assumed to guide their implementation, this assumption is challenged by the increasing complexity in global financial markets. This article provides an analytical framework to explain these implementation problems by drawing attention to the ambiguity inherent in investment policies. Ambiguity means there is no ideal outcome. Agents must use their discretion to interpret investment policies, which is at odds with conventional theories of discretion that assume a unique policy goal. This article argues that ambiguity impacts institutional investors in two contrasting ways. Ambiguity acts as a built-in mechanism for adapting investment policies to increasing complexity in global financial markets. But the resources required to maintain legitimacy under ambiguity detract from the investor's capacity to actually implement its policy. This framework is used to analyze the evolution of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund (SWF)'s ethical investment policy. The article finds that agents use their discretion to interpret the Fund's investment policy in ways that align with its long-term mandate.

Taxation reform has dominated Australian politics over the past twenty-five years. Despite this prominence on the political agenda, until recently Australian governments have lacked the capacity to consolidate key elements of this tax reform agenda. While the problematic nature of Australian tax reform can be explained in part by macro-level variables, this protracted policy deadlock has also influenced historical patterns of business-government intermediation. The article argues that the evolution of the Australian tax policy network over the study period was prompted by both associational and state actors reassessing their strategies in the context of the political failure of tax reform proposals. These developments provide empirical insights into the ongoing debate relating to the factors which lead to the formation and evolution of sectoral level policy networks. The article concludes that while the increasing levels of business mobilization experienced over the study period enhanced the electoral viability of reform proposals, these new patterns of sectoral business politics should be regarded as a consequence of the policy deadlock relating to tax reform rather than primary cause of policy change.

Developing countries face the daunting challenge of stimulating innovation-intensive sectors to increase their participation in the knowledge economy. In this context, two pressing questions arise: What types of state-business relations foster the adoption of industrial upgrading policies? And, what are the mechanisms through which some state-business relations configurations shape the likelihood of policy adoption under more democratic and open conditions? Bridging developmental state and business politics literature, this paper presents a novel framework that posits that the levels of bureaucratic quality and business cohesion generate diverse industrial upgrading policymaking patterns, and thus outcomes. An in-depth case study of the software sector and a cross-case comparison of the aerospace sector in Mexico during the 2000s illustrate and refine the framework. This article makes three main contributions. First, it expands extant political economy theories of industrial upgrading in developing democracies. Second, it improves our understanding of the private sector by carefully analyzing sectoral business cohesion. And third, the paper specifies the mechanisms through which bureaucrats and firms in democratic developing countries collaborate to enact programs that spur high-tech industries in the twenty-first century.