The target article is a remarkably scholarly, comprehensive discussion of memory research (see the lengthy list of references) and its relation to rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. Llewellyn uses as an organizing principle the ancient art of memory (AAOM) – the way our ancestors supported memory before the age of print and the Internet. Significant memory was not just learning by rote but an active process requiring creative activity. Llewellyn likens the activity in REM sleep to AAOM. She accepts the idea that dreaming is mainly a phenomenon associated with REM sleep and proposes that dreams represent a vivid example of AAOM in action. She bases her arguments on her extensive review of “neurobiology and psychology” (sect. 1, para. 4), which has clearly supported the role of REM sleep in memory organization. The point of this commentary is to suggest that neurobiology and psychology are two long and strong legs of a three-legged stool, but that to fully understand the role of REM sleep and dreaming a third leg must be equally strong.
This third leg, I would contend, is the information that has been accumulated from our clinical and research work with human subjects' dreams. Although Llewellyn touches on research on human subjects dreams, this information as presented in the target article lacks the emphasis and depth of the other two legs. Early studies of REM sleep and memory proposed that REM sleep was involved in memory consolidation (Greenberg Reference Greenberg1970). This turned out to be accurate, to some degree, but it also eventually proved to be more complicated than just consolidation (Greenberg et al. Reference Greenberg, Pearlman, Fingar, Kantrowitz and Kawliche1970). Some types of memory seemed to be REM dependent while others didn't.
Llewellyn uses the semantic-versus-episodic distinction. Greenberg & Pearlman (Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1974) prefer Seligman's (Reference Seligman1970) prepared-versus-unprepared-learning formulation as an effort to explain why word-list or one-trial learning do not seem to require REM sleep whereas more complicated tasks for animals and emotionally adaptive requirements for humans are REM dependent (Greenberg & Pearlman Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1974). This formulation about differences in types of information that require REM sleep points to the idea that, as the author and many earlier writers (Breger et al. Reference Breger, Hunter and Lane1971; French & Fromm Reference French and Fromm1964; Greenberg & Pearlman Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1975) suggest, there is an “integration of recent memories with remote parts of associative memories or networks.” More important is the nature of such memories. Llewellyn refers to literature suggesting that the emotional dimension is important in the memories. Llewellyn does not really spell out the actual nature of this emotional dimension, however, and I would like to remind readers of some research that makes this clearer. Llewellyn points to Freud's statement that dreams have images from the previous day's experience. However, Freud (Reference Freud1900) talked about these images as indifferent. It would seem that this is one place where Freud did not really get it (Greenberg & Pearlman Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1978). French and Fromm (Reference French and Fromm1964) pointed to dreams and their manifest content as containing important images related to the patient's “focal conflict.” We (Greenberg & Pearlman Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1978) demonstrated how in Freud's own classical “Specimen dream,” where he again talks about indifferent day residue, he misses the very emotionally important day residue. That dream, in the manifest content, actually portrays an event – a failed operation on a patient – that was so very important to Freud's self-esteem. We also presented findings from the sleep lab for a patient in psychoanalysis (Greenberg & Pearlman Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1975). Again the manifest images relate to emotionally significant issues for the patient. The results of our studies (Greenberg et al. Reference Greenberg, Katz, Schwartz and Pearlman1992) suggest that what is in the dream is emotionally significant and that what is emotionally significant from waking life is what appears in the dream.
If one considers these findings meaningful, then the statement “‘frustrating dearth’ of evidence on dream construction and its possible functions” (sect. 1, para. 2) is missing the point. Only in the world of nonclinical research can one miss the connection (bridge) between the clearly demonstrated and pretty much accepted role of REM sleep in memory and the idea that the kind of memories integrated in human dreams are mainly connected with the organization of emotionally meaningful and active issues with which the dreamer has been struggling while awake and continues to try to resolve during dreaming. Dreams show clearly how the dreamer sometimes succeeds in integrating and resolving the waking issues or at other times fails to integrate and has nightmares or repetitive dreams that fail to show any resolution (Greenberg et al. Reference Greenberg, Katz, Schwartz and Pearlman1992). These ideas build on the early and much more cognitive proposals about REM sleep and memory consolidation. An example of how this might be approached can be considered in relation to the “Quicksand” dream in the target article. This is presented as an example of a way to think about dreams and the day residue rather than a considered demonstration of the emotional salience of the dream.
One should approach a dream within the context of its occurrence. In this case, Llewellyn has chosen to present the dream in the context of proposing an important, elaborate framework for understanding the operation of memory functions in dreams. Her effort is impressive both in the amount of literature she has mastered and in the quality of her ideas. I do not think it is any stretch to suggest that this effort has been a major preoccupation and concern of hers (only she can confirm this) and that one might wonder how this might show up in the dream. Because of space limitations, I can only suggest that one might think about her efforts to create a new bridge in our thinking about dreams and perhaps her fear, as she struggled with this enormous effort, that she might fail and be swallowed by the quicksand – or, put another way, will anyone buy her new theoretical house? The story in the dream and her associations certainly encompass great hopes and great fears.
This commentary is a very sketchy presentation of ideas about a fuller approach to the understanding of dreams, which might be added to Llewellyn's extremely thorough and well-presented discussion. I hope these ideas will make the third leg as substantial as those of neurobiology and cognitive psychology.
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The target article is a remarkably scholarly, comprehensive discussion of memory research (see the lengthy list of references) and its relation to rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. Llewellyn uses as an organizing principle the ancient art of memory (AAOM) – the way our ancestors supported memory before the age of print and the Internet. Significant memory was not just learning by rote but an active process requiring creative activity. Llewellyn likens the activity in REM sleep to AAOM. She accepts the idea that dreaming is mainly a phenomenon associated with REM sleep and proposes that dreams represent a vivid example of AAOM in action. She bases her arguments on her extensive review of “neurobiology and psychology” (sect. 1, para. 4), which has clearly supported the role of REM sleep in memory organization. The point of this commentary is to suggest that neurobiology and psychology are two long and strong legs of a three-legged stool, but that to fully understand the role of REM sleep and dreaming a third leg must be equally strong.
This third leg, I would contend, is the information that has been accumulated from our clinical and research work with human subjects' dreams. Although Llewellyn touches on research on human subjects dreams, this information as presented in the target article lacks the emphasis and depth of the other two legs. Early studies of REM sleep and memory proposed that REM sleep was involved in memory consolidation (Greenberg Reference Greenberg1970). This turned out to be accurate, to some degree, but it also eventually proved to be more complicated than just consolidation (Greenberg et al. Reference Greenberg, Pearlman, Fingar, Kantrowitz and Kawliche1970). Some types of memory seemed to be REM dependent while others didn't.
Llewellyn uses the semantic-versus-episodic distinction. Greenberg & Pearlman (Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1974) prefer Seligman's (Reference Seligman1970) prepared-versus-unprepared-learning formulation as an effort to explain why word-list or one-trial learning do not seem to require REM sleep whereas more complicated tasks for animals and emotionally adaptive requirements for humans are REM dependent (Greenberg & Pearlman Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1974). This formulation about differences in types of information that require REM sleep points to the idea that, as the author and many earlier writers (Breger et al. Reference Breger, Hunter and Lane1971; French & Fromm Reference French and Fromm1964; Greenberg & Pearlman Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1975) suggest, there is an “integration of recent memories with remote parts of associative memories or networks.” More important is the nature of such memories. Llewellyn refers to literature suggesting that the emotional dimension is important in the memories. Llewellyn does not really spell out the actual nature of this emotional dimension, however, and I would like to remind readers of some research that makes this clearer. Llewellyn points to Freud's statement that dreams have images from the previous day's experience. However, Freud (Reference Freud1900) talked about these images as indifferent. It would seem that this is one place where Freud did not really get it (Greenberg & Pearlman Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1978). French and Fromm (Reference French and Fromm1964) pointed to dreams and their manifest content as containing important images related to the patient's “focal conflict.” We (Greenberg & Pearlman Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1978) demonstrated how in Freud's own classical “Specimen dream,” where he again talks about indifferent day residue, he misses the very emotionally important day residue. That dream, in the manifest content, actually portrays an event – a failed operation on a patient – that was so very important to Freud's self-esteem. We also presented findings from the sleep lab for a patient in psychoanalysis (Greenberg & Pearlman Reference Greenberg and Pearlman1975). Again the manifest images relate to emotionally significant issues for the patient. The results of our studies (Greenberg et al. Reference Greenberg, Katz, Schwartz and Pearlman1992) suggest that what is in the dream is emotionally significant and that what is emotionally significant from waking life is what appears in the dream.
If one considers these findings meaningful, then the statement “‘frustrating dearth’ of evidence on dream construction and its possible functions” (sect. 1, para. 2) is missing the point. Only in the world of nonclinical research can one miss the connection (bridge) between the clearly demonstrated and pretty much accepted role of REM sleep in memory and the idea that the kind of memories integrated in human dreams are mainly connected with the organization of emotionally meaningful and active issues with which the dreamer has been struggling while awake and continues to try to resolve during dreaming. Dreams show clearly how the dreamer sometimes succeeds in integrating and resolving the waking issues or at other times fails to integrate and has nightmares or repetitive dreams that fail to show any resolution (Greenberg et al. Reference Greenberg, Katz, Schwartz and Pearlman1992). These ideas build on the early and much more cognitive proposals about REM sleep and memory consolidation. An example of how this might be approached can be considered in relation to the “Quicksand” dream in the target article. This is presented as an example of a way to think about dreams and the day residue rather than a considered demonstration of the emotional salience of the dream.
One should approach a dream within the context of its occurrence. In this case, Llewellyn has chosen to present the dream in the context of proposing an important, elaborate framework for understanding the operation of memory functions in dreams. Her effort is impressive both in the amount of literature she has mastered and in the quality of her ideas. I do not think it is any stretch to suggest that this effort has been a major preoccupation and concern of hers (only she can confirm this) and that one might wonder how this might show up in the dream. Because of space limitations, I can only suggest that one might think about her efforts to create a new bridge in our thinking about dreams and perhaps her fear, as she struggled with this enormous effort, that she might fail and be swallowed by the quicksand – or, put another way, will anyone buy her new theoretical house? The story in the dream and her associations certainly encompass great hopes and great fears.
This commentary is a very sketchy presentation of ideas about a fuller approach to the understanding of dreams, which might be added to Llewellyn's extremely thorough and well-presented discussion. I hope these ideas will make the third leg as substantial as those of neurobiology and cognitive psychology.