Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) present a compelling distinction between different cognitive systems for dealing with temporal information. It is commonly assumed that the evolution of temporal reasoning, as H&M describe it, must have been driven by the benefits representing different times brings for planning and decision-making (Boyer Reference Boyer2008; Schacter & Addis Reference Schacter and Addis2007; Suddendorf & Corballis Reference Suddendorf and Corballis2007a). Similarly, H&M discuss the benefits of temporal reasoning mainly in regard to its effects for temporal discounting in decision-making. Focusing on the purely future-directed benefits of temporal reasoning does not by itself, however, explain why we should expect this capacity to be human specific. Arguably, other animals would equally benefit from improvements to planning and decision-making through temporal reasoning.
By contrast, as H&M also point out, for other animals, “opportunities to benefit from knowing that a situation of a particular kind obtained at a unique time in the past are relatively rare, because that time itself will never come around again” (sect. 6, para. 2). For humans, however, the past seems to have a special status independent from what it tells us about the future. This fact becomes particularly apparent in conversational behavior where people have been found to display a “retrospective bias” by talking two to three times more often about the past than the future (Demiray et al. Reference Demiray, Mehl and Martin2018). Some consequences of the ability to represent time should have generated evolutionary pressure for the ability to represent the past in its own right, independently from its benefits for future-directed cognition.
Most prominently, those benefits exist in the domain of causal thinking, specifically in the ability to represent token cause-and-effect relationships (“Mark died because he was shot”) as opposed to type causal relationships (“Being shot kills people”) (Campbell Reference Campbell, Pastor and Artieda1996). We can distinguish physical, psychological, and social cause-and-effect relations.
Regarding the physical domain, being able to represent the history of environmental states to draw inferences about token cause-effect relationships benefits primarily inductive learning. Inferring the cause of a physical state allows one to build causal maps of type causal relations, which are in turn important for future-directed decision-making. As such, here, particular past events are important primarily insofar as they inform inferences to type causal relations.
Therefore, in the physical domain, the ability to represent token past events can indeed be expected to be beneficial, insofar as it supports future-directed cognition. As H&M point out, however, inductive learning arguably functions more effectively not by recourse to retrospective representation of particulars, but through use of “a general learning system geared toward encoding and retaining information about regular, stable, or recurring features of the environment” (sect. 6, para. 2). By contrast, in the psychological and social domains, representing particular past events has benefits in which the particularity and pastness of events matter for their own sake.
First, the ability to represent particular past events allows one to represent the causal history of mental states. In essence, representing the token cause of a mental state is to represent the source of this state. The benefits of the ability to represent source information are particularly apparent in the case of beliefs (Cosmides & Tooby Reference Cosmides, Tooby and Sperber2000; Mahr & Csibra Reference Mahr and Csibra2018). Representing the causes of one's own and others’ beliefs allows one to gauge their reliability and the conditions under which they should be revised (Király et al. Reference Király, Oláh, Csibra and Kovács2018). Moreover, this ability facilitates the transmission of beliefs because the causal history of a belief can be given as a reason for why it should be accepted (as, e.g., in the case of beliefs acquired through firsthand experience).
Second, in contrast to physical cause-effect relationships, knowing the cause of a specific token effect in the social domain has benefits not (primarily) because it allows one to draw inductive inferences about type causal relations but because it can serve to establish the existence of this social effect in the first place (Mahr & Csibra, Reference Mahr and Csibrain press). If Bob takes money out of my wallet while I am distracted, it follows that he stole from me. While many other things can be inferred from this event, too (that there was money in my wallet, that Bob has quick fingers, etc.), knowing what occurred in this specific circumstance primarily has importance insofar as it establishes specific obligations and entitlements. As such, token events have significance in the social domain in virtue of their particularity.
In fact, in many circumstances, events have lasting social consequences without also leaving physical traces behind, which could prove the occurrence of the event in the first place. If I promise to meet you at 5 p.m. tomorrow at the train station, nothing but your memory of the fact that I indeed made such a promise will serve to hold me accountable after the fact. In such cases, mental representations of particular past events are crucial to establish the existence of the social effects of these events. After all, usually such effects (e.g., my commitment of meeting you tomorrow at 5 p.m.) only exist insofar as they are mentally represented by the parties involved. To a large extent, the fact that our lives are heavily determined by social norms governing the social cause-and-effect relationships of events unfolding around us explains why we seem to care so much about what occurred in the past.
In sum, for humans there are distinctive benefits of representing the past not connected to future-directed cognition and decision-making. As such, we should expect the operation of selection pressures on the ability to represent past times, which might not have operated over the ability to represent the future. While, if H&M are right, the development of the temporal reasoning system should result in the ability to think about both the past and the future, it is by no means obvious that the evolution of this system was solely, or even primarily, driven by its benefits for future-directed cognition.
Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) present a compelling distinction between different cognitive systems for dealing with temporal information. It is commonly assumed that the evolution of temporal reasoning, as H&M describe it, must have been driven by the benefits representing different times brings for planning and decision-making (Boyer Reference Boyer2008; Schacter & Addis Reference Schacter and Addis2007; Suddendorf & Corballis Reference Suddendorf and Corballis2007a). Similarly, H&M discuss the benefits of temporal reasoning mainly in regard to its effects for temporal discounting in decision-making. Focusing on the purely future-directed benefits of temporal reasoning does not by itself, however, explain why we should expect this capacity to be human specific. Arguably, other animals would equally benefit from improvements to planning and decision-making through temporal reasoning.
By contrast, as H&M also point out, for other animals, “opportunities to benefit from knowing that a situation of a particular kind obtained at a unique time in the past are relatively rare, because that time itself will never come around again” (sect. 6, para. 2). For humans, however, the past seems to have a special status independent from what it tells us about the future. This fact becomes particularly apparent in conversational behavior where people have been found to display a “retrospective bias” by talking two to three times more often about the past than the future (Demiray et al. Reference Demiray, Mehl and Martin2018). Some consequences of the ability to represent time should have generated evolutionary pressure for the ability to represent the past in its own right, independently from its benefits for future-directed cognition.
Most prominently, those benefits exist in the domain of causal thinking, specifically in the ability to represent token cause-and-effect relationships (“Mark died because he was shot”) as opposed to type causal relationships (“Being shot kills people”) (Campbell Reference Campbell, Pastor and Artieda1996). We can distinguish physical, psychological, and social cause-and-effect relations.
Regarding the physical domain, being able to represent the history of environmental states to draw inferences about token cause-effect relationships benefits primarily inductive learning. Inferring the cause of a physical state allows one to build causal maps of type causal relations, which are in turn important for future-directed decision-making. As such, here, particular past events are important primarily insofar as they inform inferences to type causal relations.
Therefore, in the physical domain, the ability to represent token past events can indeed be expected to be beneficial, insofar as it supports future-directed cognition. As H&M point out, however, inductive learning arguably functions more effectively not by recourse to retrospective representation of particulars, but through use of “a general learning system geared toward encoding and retaining information about regular, stable, or recurring features of the environment” (sect. 6, para. 2). By contrast, in the psychological and social domains, representing particular past events has benefits in which the particularity and pastness of events matter for their own sake.
First, the ability to represent particular past events allows one to represent the causal history of mental states. In essence, representing the token cause of a mental state is to represent the source of this state. The benefits of the ability to represent source information are particularly apparent in the case of beliefs (Cosmides & Tooby Reference Cosmides, Tooby and Sperber2000; Mahr & Csibra Reference Mahr and Csibra2018). Representing the causes of one's own and others’ beliefs allows one to gauge their reliability and the conditions under which they should be revised (Király et al. Reference Király, Oláh, Csibra and Kovács2018). Moreover, this ability facilitates the transmission of beliefs because the causal history of a belief can be given as a reason for why it should be accepted (as, e.g., in the case of beliefs acquired through firsthand experience).
Second, in contrast to physical cause-effect relationships, knowing the cause of a specific token effect in the social domain has benefits not (primarily) because it allows one to draw inductive inferences about type causal relations but because it can serve to establish the existence of this social effect in the first place (Mahr & Csibra, Reference Mahr and Csibrain press). If Bob takes money out of my wallet while I am distracted, it follows that he stole from me. While many other things can be inferred from this event, too (that there was money in my wallet, that Bob has quick fingers, etc.), knowing what occurred in this specific circumstance primarily has importance insofar as it establishes specific obligations and entitlements. As such, token events have significance in the social domain in virtue of their particularity.
In fact, in many circumstances, events have lasting social consequences without also leaving physical traces behind, which could prove the occurrence of the event in the first place. If I promise to meet you at 5 p.m. tomorrow at the train station, nothing but your memory of the fact that I indeed made such a promise will serve to hold me accountable after the fact. In such cases, mental representations of particular past events are crucial to establish the existence of the social effects of these events. After all, usually such effects (e.g., my commitment of meeting you tomorrow at 5 p.m.) only exist insofar as they are mentally represented by the parties involved. To a large extent, the fact that our lives are heavily determined by social norms governing the social cause-and-effect relationships of events unfolding around us explains why we seem to care so much about what occurred in the past.
In sum, for humans there are distinctive benefits of representing the past not connected to future-directed cognition and decision-making. As such, we should expect the operation of selection pressures on the ability to represent past times, which might not have operated over the ability to represent the future. While, if H&M are right, the development of the temporal reasoning system should result in the ability to think about both the past and the future, it is by no means obvious that the evolution of this system was solely, or even primarily, driven by its benefits for future-directed cognition.