A central claim by Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) is that humans are endowed with a “temporal reasoning system” unique to them, whereas animals are guided only by a “temporal updating system,” which is “both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive” (introduction, paras. 2 and 3). This commitment informs their interpretation of influential findings on the cognitive capacities of scrub jays. Originally, these were considered as evidence that jays have the capacity for reasoning, or drawing inferences about time, including abilities for mental “time travel” (Clayton & Dickinson Reference Clayton and Dickinson1998). The authors reject this interpretation. Their dual-systems model proposes that all animals operate only on the basis of a temporal updating system, which effectively makes the temporal reasoning system a uniquely human capacity. But what exactly is uniquely human about the temporal reasoning system?
H&M's dual-systems perspective on temporal cognition provides a persuasive and comprehensive framework that is well supported by the empirical evidence. Their specific commitment to human uniqueness, however, may prove problematic. The options to support this claim are limited in light of the numerous and wide ranging findings that have gone a long way toward disproving the uniqueness of capacities long held to be uniquely human (most recently, de Waal Reference de Waal and Norton2016).
The authors explain their dual perspective in terms of Kahneman's (Reference Kahneman2011) systems 1 and 2, which distinguish two general modes of inferential reasoning, a fast and frugal one and a slow and effortful one. Independent argumentation is needed to demonstrate that these cannot be present in some animals. Moreover, Kahneman's two systems concern rational decision-making, rather than the representation of navigational magnitudes, such as time. Crucially, neither of these issues settles the controversy regarding human uniqueness with regard to the temporal reasoning system. Therefore, it seems that one needs a better reason than a general appeal to systems 1 and 2 to conclude that all animals are entirely incapable of representing time as such.
The temporal reasoning system affords, according to H&M, the ability to reason about and represent time itself. Given their reliance on Kahneman's work, they appear to assume that such reasoning is inferential. As they argue, the temporal updating system represents change, and is updated in the present moment through a maplike structure. Animals are “stuck in time” because they cannot think of other times at all – their minds cannot meander through time; only their present-bound map can be used to update temporal features. Yet maps certainly can be used to draw inferences. For example, my indexical location (I am here now) is updated not only with respect to the here but also with respect to the now. An animal with minimal temporal capacities will be able to infer that not everything happens simultaneously in the now, that some durations are longer than others, and that change is essentially related to time. So, it seems, animals would be capable of representing time as such by representing simultaneity, duration, and time order. Moreover, these representations support inferential reasoning, albeit of an implicit or Helmholtzian kind (e.g., if this lasts a bit longer, I shall switch to the shorter task). Therefore, perhaps the distinction between temporal reasoning and updating should not be drawn in terms of inferential capacities. In any case, a central issue to properly interpret their dual-systems model is whether an animal really can adjust its maps and representations of the world at any point in time without essentially relying on representations of time as such.
But let us grant that temporal reasoning is unique to humans. Why exactly is it uniquely human? There seem to be two plausible options here. One option is that the autonoetic function of episodic memory (Tulving Reference Tulving, Tulving and Donaldson1972) is what makes temporal reasoning uniquely human (for a dual-systems account of time cognition that endorses this type of agency approach without the commitment to human uniqueness, see Montemayor Reference Montemayor and Phillips2017). This interpretation of temporal reasoning, however, would deny animals a sense of agency that seems necessary for basic decision-making, which has been documented across species (for a more flexible approach that attributes “event memories” to animals without assigning episodic memories to them, see Keven Reference Keven2016). More precisely, H&M's approach would deny animals time-representation capacities based on an autonoetic and anthropocentric constraint that may not be necessary for the proper functioning of temporal reasoning.
An alternative option is language. This might be the best option because the justification for human uniqueness is not based on some type of introspective autonoesis imposed on temporal cognition. Rather, human uniqueness would be based on the representational format of the uniquely human temporal reasoning system. The authors seem to favor this view. They assert that the use of tense appears very early in infancy and that it is plausible that language is necessary for the development of the temporal reasoning system (introduction, para. 2; sect. 3.2, para. 7). If language is what makes temporal reasoning uniquely human, then we have a possible explanation of the gap between us and other species. But if this is the explanation, then much more needs to be said about the implications of language for the authors’ dual model. Perhaps the influence of language is to reformat all of temporal perception through syntactic tree-like patterns, which manifests in what Fitch (Reference Fitch2014) has called “dendrophilia.” This account would assume, however, the view that language is a uniquely human capacity, an approach that is not entirely uncontroversial.
It is also unclear what kind of influence language might have on time cognition in humans, or how the reasoning system affects the updating system through linguistic representations. Types of “time traveling” through inference in humans might be compatible with similar capacities in non-human species—a view in which time traveling is not determined by language. Issues concerning the scope of linguistic influences need to be addressed more explicitly. There might be other alternatives to justify the human uniqueness of temporal reasoning, but H&M must present and justify them explicitly as part of their model to provide a more complete understanding of their interesting proposal.
A central claim by Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) is that humans are endowed with a “temporal reasoning system” unique to them, whereas animals are guided only by a “temporal updating system,” which is “both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive” (introduction, paras. 2 and 3). This commitment informs their interpretation of influential findings on the cognitive capacities of scrub jays. Originally, these were considered as evidence that jays have the capacity for reasoning, or drawing inferences about time, including abilities for mental “time travel” (Clayton & Dickinson Reference Clayton and Dickinson1998). The authors reject this interpretation. Their dual-systems model proposes that all animals operate only on the basis of a temporal updating system, which effectively makes the temporal reasoning system a uniquely human capacity. But what exactly is uniquely human about the temporal reasoning system?
H&M's dual-systems perspective on temporal cognition provides a persuasive and comprehensive framework that is well supported by the empirical evidence. Their specific commitment to human uniqueness, however, may prove problematic. The options to support this claim are limited in light of the numerous and wide ranging findings that have gone a long way toward disproving the uniqueness of capacities long held to be uniquely human (most recently, de Waal Reference de Waal and Norton2016).
The authors explain their dual perspective in terms of Kahneman's (Reference Kahneman2011) systems 1 and 2, which distinguish two general modes of inferential reasoning, a fast and frugal one and a slow and effortful one. Independent argumentation is needed to demonstrate that these cannot be present in some animals. Moreover, Kahneman's two systems concern rational decision-making, rather than the representation of navigational magnitudes, such as time. Crucially, neither of these issues settles the controversy regarding human uniqueness with regard to the temporal reasoning system. Therefore, it seems that one needs a better reason than a general appeal to systems 1 and 2 to conclude that all animals are entirely incapable of representing time as such.
The temporal reasoning system affords, according to H&M, the ability to reason about and represent time itself. Given their reliance on Kahneman's work, they appear to assume that such reasoning is inferential. As they argue, the temporal updating system represents change, and is updated in the present moment through a maplike structure. Animals are “stuck in time” because they cannot think of other times at all – their minds cannot meander through time; only their present-bound map can be used to update temporal features. Yet maps certainly can be used to draw inferences. For example, my indexical location (I am here now) is updated not only with respect to the here but also with respect to the now. An animal with minimal temporal capacities will be able to infer that not everything happens simultaneously in the now, that some durations are longer than others, and that change is essentially related to time. So, it seems, animals would be capable of representing time as such by representing simultaneity, duration, and time order. Moreover, these representations support inferential reasoning, albeit of an implicit or Helmholtzian kind (e.g., if this lasts a bit longer, I shall switch to the shorter task). Therefore, perhaps the distinction between temporal reasoning and updating should not be drawn in terms of inferential capacities. In any case, a central issue to properly interpret their dual-systems model is whether an animal really can adjust its maps and representations of the world at any point in time without essentially relying on representations of time as such.
But let us grant that temporal reasoning is unique to humans. Why exactly is it uniquely human? There seem to be two plausible options here. One option is that the autonoetic function of episodic memory (Tulving Reference Tulving, Tulving and Donaldson1972) is what makes temporal reasoning uniquely human (for a dual-systems account of time cognition that endorses this type of agency approach without the commitment to human uniqueness, see Montemayor Reference Montemayor and Phillips2017). This interpretation of temporal reasoning, however, would deny animals a sense of agency that seems necessary for basic decision-making, which has been documented across species (for a more flexible approach that attributes “event memories” to animals without assigning episodic memories to them, see Keven Reference Keven2016). More precisely, H&M's approach would deny animals time-representation capacities based on an autonoetic and anthropocentric constraint that may not be necessary for the proper functioning of temporal reasoning.
An alternative option is language. This might be the best option because the justification for human uniqueness is not based on some type of introspective autonoesis imposed on temporal cognition. Rather, human uniqueness would be based on the representational format of the uniquely human temporal reasoning system. The authors seem to favor this view. They assert that the use of tense appears very early in infancy and that it is plausible that language is necessary for the development of the temporal reasoning system (introduction, para. 2; sect. 3.2, para. 7). If language is what makes temporal reasoning uniquely human, then we have a possible explanation of the gap between us and other species. But if this is the explanation, then much more needs to be said about the implications of language for the authors’ dual model. Perhaps the influence of language is to reformat all of temporal perception through syntactic tree-like patterns, which manifests in what Fitch (Reference Fitch2014) has called “dendrophilia.” This account would assume, however, the view that language is a uniquely human capacity, an approach that is not entirely uncontroversial.
It is also unclear what kind of influence language might have on time cognition in humans, or how the reasoning system affects the updating system through linguistic representations. Types of “time traveling” through inference in humans might be compatible with similar capacities in non-human species—a view in which time traveling is not determined by language. Issues concerning the scope of linguistic influences need to be addressed more explicitly. There might be other alternatives to justify the human uniqueness of temporal reasoning, but H&M must present and justify them explicitly as part of their model to provide a more complete understanding of their interesting proposal.