We question whether altruistic motivation mediates the link between identity fusion and extreme self-sacrifice. Whitehouse argues that “altruistic motivation is a necessary condition” (sect. 2, para. 4) for acts such as suicidal terrorism and offers identity fusion as a catalyst, because, unlike other forms of self-group alignment (e.g., tribal instincts, social identification [Richerson & Henrick Reference Richerson and Henrich2012; Tafel & Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1979]), it is a “powerful social glue to overcome selfish drives and impulses” (sect. 6, para. 4). In contrast, we review two lines of research indicating that identity fusion does not quell personal self-interest and propose, instead, that egoism is the motivational link.
One line of research examines the motivational significance of three forms of identity: the personal self, which reflects a person's subjective uniqueness; the relational self, which reflects attachments to close others; and the collective self, which reflects memberships in valued groups. Primary experiments (Gaertner et al. Reference Gaertner, Sedikides and Graetz1999; Nehrlich et al. Reference Nehrlich, Gebauer, Sedikides and Abele2018), meta-analysis (Gaertner et al. Reference Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea and Iuzzini2002), and cross-cultural comparisons (Gaertner et al. Reference Gaertner, Sedikides, Luke, O'Mara, Iuzzini, Jackson, Cai and Wu2012) constitute evidence of a motivational hierarchy topped by the personal self, followed by the relational self, and tailed by the collective self (Sedikides et al. Reference Sedikides, Gaertner, Luke, O'Mara and Gebauer2013). Relative to their other selves, for example, people respond more intensely to threat and enhancement of their personal self, attribute more of who they are to their personal self, associate more future goals with their personal self, and accredit greater worth to their personal self. But, does fusion moderate this hierarchy?
Given that fusion entails a union of the personal and collective selves and a strong sense of relational ties to in-group members (Swann et al. Reference Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse and Bastian2012; Reference Swann, Buhrmester, Gómez, Jetten, Bastian, Vázquez, Ariyanto, Besta, Christ, Cui, Finchilescu, González, Goto, Homsey, Sharma, Susianto and Zhang2014a), it is possible that the hierarchy disintegrates, and all three selves are equally valued when the collective self is derived from a fused group. Two experiments, however, suggest that this is not the case (Heger & Gaertner Reference Heger and Gaertner2018a). Participants in both experiments were randomly assigned to describe an in-group to which they are fused or not fused and were continuously primed with that in-group while performing a subsequent task. One experiment used a pronoun preference task in which participants (N = 155) rated how well a personal pronoun (I, me, my) and a collective pronoun (we, us, our) fit each of 20 sentences (e.g., “The sun went in just when [I, we] decided to go outside” [Wegner & Guiliano Reference Wegner and Giuliano1980]). The other experiment used a self-description task in which participants (N = 126) wrote 20 descriptions to the question “who are you?” and then rated how much each description represented their personal self, relational self, and collective self. Although the fusion manipulation was successful in both experiments (confirmed by the verbal identity fusion scale [Gómez et al. Reference Gómez, Brooks, Buhrmester, Vázquez, Jetten and Swann2011a]), fusion did not alter the motivational hierarchy. When thinking of either a fused or not fused in-group, participants preferred the fit of personal over collective pronouns and considered their self-descriptions to be more representative of their personal self than of either their relational or collective selves.
The other line of research examines identity fusion and reported willingness to sacrifice the in-group for the benefit of the personal self (Heger & Gaertner Reference Heger and Gaertner2018b). As Whitehouse reviews, fusion positively predicts reported willingness to sacrifice the self for the in-group. Based on the identity synergy principle of fusion theory (i.e., activation of the collective self activates, in turn, the personal self and vice versa [Swann et al. Reference Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse and Bastian2012]), we reasoned that fusion would similarly promote willingness to sacrifice the in-group for the self. To test this possibility, we revised the scale typically used to assess self-sacrifice (i.e., fight-and-die scale [Swann et al. Reference Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales and Huici2009]) to measure group sacrifice. A pilot study (N = 120) and two primary studies (N = 190 and 189) replicated the typical finding that fusion positively predicts reported willingness to sacrifice the self for the in-group and additionally found, in those same participants, that identity fusion positively predicts reported willingness to sacrifice the in-group for the personal self.
The reviewed lines of research suggest that if fusion promotes suicidal self-sacrifice, it does so by increasing personal self-interest, rather than diminishing it. Egoism, not altruism, is the motivational link. Given that persons and in-groups are positively interdependent and share a common fate, actions that benefit the in-group can be driven by self-interest (Gaertner & Insko Reference Gaertner and Insko2000; Gramzow & Gaertner Reference Gramzow and Gaertner2005). Empirical efforts to distinguish altruistic from egoistic motivation often dissect the emotional precursors of behavior with (1) an empathic emotional state of feeling for others, leading to altruistic motivation, and (2) emotional states of personal distress and feeling as others feel, leading to egoistic motivation (Batson Reference Batson2011). The assertion that with identity fusion “when the group is felt to be threatened, it feels personal” (sect. 3, para. 3) implies personal distress or feeling as others feel and points to the possibility of egoism (O'Mara et al. Reference O'Mara, Jackson, Batson and Gaertner2011). Whitehouse's theory emphasizes the moderating role of out-group threat. Perhaps in such a context, where the loss of one's way of life and/or the death of valued others is imminent, the anticipated psychological pain of living without having tried at all costs to preserve and protect (i.e., an egoistic, not altruistic, concern) overpowers survival and culminates in the ultimate sacrifice.
We question whether altruistic motivation mediates the link between identity fusion and extreme self-sacrifice. Whitehouse argues that “altruistic motivation is a necessary condition” (sect. 2, para. 4) for acts such as suicidal terrorism and offers identity fusion as a catalyst, because, unlike other forms of self-group alignment (e.g., tribal instincts, social identification [Richerson & Henrick Reference Richerson and Henrich2012; Tafel & Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1979]), it is a “powerful social glue to overcome selfish drives and impulses” (sect. 6, para. 4). In contrast, we review two lines of research indicating that identity fusion does not quell personal self-interest and propose, instead, that egoism is the motivational link.
One line of research examines the motivational significance of three forms of identity: the personal self, which reflects a person's subjective uniqueness; the relational self, which reflects attachments to close others; and the collective self, which reflects memberships in valued groups. Primary experiments (Gaertner et al. Reference Gaertner, Sedikides and Graetz1999; Nehrlich et al. Reference Nehrlich, Gebauer, Sedikides and Abele2018), meta-analysis (Gaertner et al. Reference Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea and Iuzzini2002), and cross-cultural comparisons (Gaertner et al. Reference Gaertner, Sedikides, Luke, O'Mara, Iuzzini, Jackson, Cai and Wu2012) constitute evidence of a motivational hierarchy topped by the personal self, followed by the relational self, and tailed by the collective self (Sedikides et al. Reference Sedikides, Gaertner, Luke, O'Mara and Gebauer2013). Relative to their other selves, for example, people respond more intensely to threat and enhancement of their personal self, attribute more of who they are to their personal self, associate more future goals with their personal self, and accredit greater worth to their personal self. But, does fusion moderate this hierarchy?
Given that fusion entails a union of the personal and collective selves and a strong sense of relational ties to in-group members (Swann et al. Reference Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse and Bastian2012; Reference Swann, Buhrmester, Gómez, Jetten, Bastian, Vázquez, Ariyanto, Besta, Christ, Cui, Finchilescu, González, Goto, Homsey, Sharma, Susianto and Zhang2014a), it is possible that the hierarchy disintegrates, and all three selves are equally valued when the collective self is derived from a fused group. Two experiments, however, suggest that this is not the case (Heger & Gaertner Reference Heger and Gaertner2018a). Participants in both experiments were randomly assigned to describe an in-group to which they are fused or not fused and were continuously primed with that in-group while performing a subsequent task. One experiment used a pronoun preference task in which participants (N = 155) rated how well a personal pronoun (I, me, my) and a collective pronoun (we, us, our) fit each of 20 sentences (e.g., “The sun went in just when [I, we] decided to go outside” [Wegner & Guiliano Reference Wegner and Giuliano1980]). The other experiment used a self-description task in which participants (N = 126) wrote 20 descriptions to the question “who are you?” and then rated how much each description represented their personal self, relational self, and collective self. Although the fusion manipulation was successful in both experiments (confirmed by the verbal identity fusion scale [Gómez et al. Reference Gómez, Brooks, Buhrmester, Vázquez, Jetten and Swann2011a]), fusion did not alter the motivational hierarchy. When thinking of either a fused or not fused in-group, participants preferred the fit of personal over collective pronouns and considered their self-descriptions to be more representative of their personal self than of either their relational or collective selves.
The other line of research examines identity fusion and reported willingness to sacrifice the in-group for the benefit of the personal self (Heger & Gaertner Reference Heger and Gaertner2018b). As Whitehouse reviews, fusion positively predicts reported willingness to sacrifice the self for the in-group. Based on the identity synergy principle of fusion theory (i.e., activation of the collective self activates, in turn, the personal self and vice versa [Swann et al. Reference Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse and Bastian2012]), we reasoned that fusion would similarly promote willingness to sacrifice the in-group for the self. To test this possibility, we revised the scale typically used to assess self-sacrifice (i.e., fight-and-die scale [Swann et al. Reference Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales and Huici2009]) to measure group sacrifice. A pilot study (N = 120) and two primary studies (N = 190 and 189) replicated the typical finding that fusion positively predicts reported willingness to sacrifice the self for the in-group and additionally found, in those same participants, that identity fusion positively predicts reported willingness to sacrifice the in-group for the personal self.
The reviewed lines of research suggest that if fusion promotes suicidal self-sacrifice, it does so by increasing personal self-interest, rather than diminishing it. Egoism, not altruism, is the motivational link. Given that persons and in-groups are positively interdependent and share a common fate, actions that benefit the in-group can be driven by self-interest (Gaertner & Insko Reference Gaertner and Insko2000; Gramzow & Gaertner Reference Gramzow and Gaertner2005). Empirical efforts to distinguish altruistic from egoistic motivation often dissect the emotional precursors of behavior with (1) an empathic emotional state of feeling for others, leading to altruistic motivation, and (2) emotional states of personal distress and feeling as others feel, leading to egoistic motivation (Batson Reference Batson2011). The assertion that with identity fusion “when the group is felt to be threatened, it feels personal” (sect. 3, para. 3) implies personal distress or feeling as others feel and points to the possibility of egoism (O'Mara et al. Reference O'Mara, Jackson, Batson and Gaertner2011). Whitehouse's theory emphasizes the moderating role of out-group threat. Perhaps in such a context, where the loss of one's way of life and/or the death of valued others is imminent, the anticipated psychological pain of living without having tried at all costs to preserve and protect (i.e., an egoistic, not altruistic, concern) overpowers survival and culminates in the ultimate sacrifice.