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Meta-ethical pluralism: A cautionary tale about cohesive moral communities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 September 2015

Jennifer Cole Wright*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC 29412. wrightjj1@cofc.eduhttp://wrightjj1.people.cofc.edu

Abstract

Meta-ethical pluralism gives us additional insight into how moral communities become cohesive and why this can be problematic (even dangerous) – and in this way provides support for the worries raised by the target article. At the same time, it offers several reasons to be concerned about the proposed initiative, the most important of which is that it could seriously backfire.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

For decades, meta-ethicists have debated that status of people's ordinary moral discourse (e.g., Blackburn Reference Blackburn1984; Brink Reference Brink1989; Darwall Reference Darwall1998; Dreier Reference Dreier1999; Gibbard Reference Gibbard1990; Harman Reference Harman, Harman and Thomson1996; Mackie Reference Mackie1977; Shafter-Landau Reference Shafer-Landau2003; Smith Reference Smith1994; Wong Reference Wong1984). When people declare that “Racial discrimination is unacceptable!”, are they expressing negative feelings and/or other “con” attitudes towards discrimination, or an affective affiliation with community norms? Or are they conveying beliefs about objectively determined (i.e., non-relative and/or mind-independent) matters of moral fact?

Most involved in the debate (though not all – see Gill Reference Gill2008; Loeb Reference Loeb and Sinnott-Armstrong2008) assume the answer to be one or the other. But our research suggests that it is both. On some occasions, for some issues, people take an objectivist stance, believing non-relative/mind-independent facts to underpin their moral beliefs/judgments/values/practices (hereafter referred to as “beliefs”). Other times, for other issues, the same people take a non-objectivist stance, treating their moral beliefs as reflections of a personal moral code and/or the social community to which they belong (Wright, in press; Wright et al. Reference Wright, Grandjean and McWhite2013; Reference Wright, McWhite, Grandjean, Lombrozo, Knobe and Nichols2014; see also, Goodwin & Darley Reference Goodwin and Darley2008; Reference Goodwin and Darley2010; Reference Goodwin and Darley2012).

Under the former circumstances, people express strong certainty about their beliefs and intolerance for divergent beliefs. They show little interest in interacting with or helping those who hold divergent beliefs and find social censorship or punishment acceptable. Under the latter circumstances (i.e., the non-objectivist stance), people express less certainty and less intolerance for divergence. They show a greater interest in interacting with or helping those who hold divergent beliefs and are uncomfortable with social censorship/punishment, believing that people should make their own choices and that open dialogue and debate is important (Wright, in press; Wright et al. Reference Wright, Grandjean and McWhite2013; Reference Wright, McWhite, Grandjean, Lombrozo, Knobe and Nichols2014; see also Wright Reference Wright2012; Wright et al. Reference Wright, Cullum and Schwab2008). A paradigmatic example of this was provided by Jonathan Safran Foer, author of Eating Animals (Foer Reference Foer2010), during a lecture delivered in 2012 when he stated: Industrialized animal agriculture is the most serious moral crisis of our time, and yet each person must decide for himself/herself how to respond.Footnote 1

A strong predictor of people's meta-ethical stance on an issue is the degree of consensus expected from their relevant community. Where stronger consensus is expected, greater objectivity – and intolerance for divergent beliefs – is found (Goodwin & Darley Reference Goodwin and Darley2010; Reference Goodwin and Darley2012; Wright et al. Reference Wright, McWhite, Grandjean, Lombrozo, Knobe and Nichols2014). This relationship appears complex and bidirectional: Although we have found perceived consensus to fully mediate the relationship between meta-ethical stance and attitudes/behaviors towards divergence (Wright et al. Reference Wright, McWhite, Grandjean, Lombrozo, Knobe and Nichols2014), manipulations of perceived consensus have also resulted in shifts in meta-ethical stance (Goodwin & Darley Reference Goodwin and Darley2012). Regardless, the point is that people who belong to cohesive communities (i.e., those with strongly shared moral beliefs) are more likely to view those beliefs as objectively grounded and less likely to tolerate divergence. What in less cohesive communities may be viewed as reasonable (even celebrated) moral diversity, becomes deviance to be censured or prohibited – even punished.

The relevance of this to the topic at hand should be (hopefully) clear. The more unified/cohesive a community we perceive ourselves to be, the more likely we are to feel suspicious of and inclined to reject divergence – especially when it is of moral significance, as are many of the issues discussed in the target article. This suggests that creating a less cohesive community – one that openly acknowledges a wider range of beliefs/judgments/values/practices – could shift meta-ethical stances and reduce expectations of consensus, increasing tolerance for disagreement and appreciation for respectful dialogue/debate. And an initiative that advocates for a stronger conservative voice in social psychology (and academia more generally) may indeed be a legitimate way to decrease the cohesiveness that the authors worry is undermining our scholarly activities.

That said, let me express three concerns that might warrant further consideration before investing serious time and money into this initiative:

First, the divide between liberals and conservatives nationwide (if not globally) has become increasingly large and incendiary. According to a recent Pew Research Center report, there is greater ideological disagreement between, and uniformity within, liberal and conservative groups today than at any point in the previous two decades – generating stronger, more harmful, animosity (Pew Research Center 2014). They have become separate, and increasingly cohesive, communities. It is therefore unlikely that bringing conservatives and liberals together under the same academic umbrella will turn them into a “community” (cohesive or otherwise). Yet this is critical, because while perceived disagreement within communities can have the aforementioned positive effects (found also by others; e.g., Crano Reference Crano2012), disagreement between cohesive communities often has the opposite effect (examples of which are given in the target article). People disapprove – often strongly – of divergence in other communities (Wright Reference Wright2012; Wright et al. Reference Wright, Cullum and Schwab2008; but see Sarkissian et al. Reference Sarkissian, Parks, Tien, Wright and Knobe2011), which can create a polarized “us against them” situation. And if we aren't careful, this initiative could have a similar effect, resulting in the stagnation, bickering, and outright conflict often present when disagreeing cohesive communities come together to “work it out.” In other words, many of the problems identified in the target article could get worse, not better.

Second, this isn't our first encounter with the distorting influence of bias – indeed, many important mechanisms and strategies have been developed to help protect against it. If we have become lazy in their application, this should be fixed. But I'm not convinced that an initiative directed at one particular source of bias is warranted. And, if our objective is to be as “value-neutral” as possible, I'm not sure how bringing together such strongly divided groups accomplishes this – it's not as if, contrary to what Duarte et al. seem to think, liberal and conservative beliefs, if placed in close enough proximity to one another, will somehow cancel (or balance) each other out!

Third, cautionary tale aside, community cohesiveness is not always a bad thing – it provides a solid foundation for both continuity/tradition and social change. Plus, I think we can generally agree that certain moral issues are (or should be) “closed” to dialogue and debate. I'm not saying that liberals have everything right – or that they should discount, ignore, and/or shut down all conservative viewpoints. But we need to be clear on where the mandate for increased diversity begins and ends. Which divergent beliefs count as legitimate counterpoints? Whose divergent voices should be included? Unless we are simply seeking diversity for diversity's sake (which I hope we're not), these questions require serious thought.

Footnotes

1. Talk given by Jonathan Foer as part of the College Reads program at the College of Charleston, South Carolina, in 2012.

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