In the target article, Boyer & Petersen (B&P) provide an intriguing account of how intuitive systems that are evolutionarily adapted to facilitate cooperation in social exchange can be explanatory of our lay or folk beliefs about economic policies (FEBs). What is inevitably true (and seems to be underemphasized in the article) is that the essential outputs of these intuitive inference systems are a certain group of social emotions – more specifically in this context, emotions such as disgust and anger. The greater efficacy of using emotions to explain the FEBs is demonstrable using the phenomenon of emporiophobia, or fear of market economy. The authors mention that the “impersonal” nature of markets makes it difficult for us to know the reputation of the partner of our social exchange, and therefore serves as “threat cue” for such transactions. However, it can be argued that economic markets don't necessarily prohibit us from knowing the reputation of our exchange partners (we can know a seller's or a company's reputation), but that a strict market-economy functions on policies which deem such sources of reputation irrelevant. In this case, it is not the absence of social information and emotions that makes market-based transactions of goods repulsive, but that the policies of a market-economy stipulate that these emotions be disregarded – in spite of the good's socio-emotional significance.
Second, the authors say impersonal exchange, such as in markets, “goes against [our intuitive] motivations to generate bonds of cooperation” (sect. 5.4, para. 3) with others. The term “goes against” again needs clarification as to whether it implies that markets force people to not form cooperative bonds or that a strict market economy requires that cooperative bonds should not be taken into consideration in economic markets. The former possibility seems rather odd, as one would suppose that intuitive cooperative bonds (good or bad), by definition occur intuitively (without deliberation or control) with any form of social exchange – regardless of whether market economy allows it.
A market economy that is indifferent to cooperative bonds for specific issues which we are adapted to value differently (e.g., moral norms) (Stanford Reference Stanford2018) is, however, emotionally repulsive. Indeed, we are more adapted to cheater-detection in social domains than in other domains (Cosmides & Tooby Reference Cosmides, Tooby and Buss2005). It is likely that we are repulsed by economic markets in the same way that we find individuals of consequentialist decisions less trustworthy (Everett et al. Reference Everett, Pizarro and Crockett2016) or atheists less moral (Gervais et al. Reference Gervais, Xygalatas, McKay, van Elk, Buchtel, Aveyard, Schiavone, Dar-Nimrod, Svedholm-Häkkinen, Riekki, Kundtová Klocová, Ramsay and Bulbulia2017) – insofar as they violate certain social contracts.
In light of these considerations, we propose that the fear of markets is not general and that it is specific to items for which markets tend to assault certain social values. Emporiophobia may be better explained by the intuitive moral emotion of disgust – an emotion elicited not only in response to physically revolting stimuli, but also by social and moral norm violations (Pizarro et al. Reference Pizarro, Inbar and Helion2011). For example, the supposedly impersonal market interactions (which differ from the types of social exchanges we evolved to value and process) occur primarily through the transfer of monetary assets from the buyer to the seller in return for some goods or services. But, as the authors themselves note in the target article, attempts to acquire certain goods of communal sharing through other means (such as money) would elicit shock. A similar idea, termed the sacred value protection model (Tetlock Reference Tetlock2003), asserts that certain items in society have sacred value, and when these values are threatened or diminished by secular consideration, people respond with moral outrage (i.e., emotions such as moral disgust and anger).
These emotional reactions are not necessarily due to economic markets not allowing us to track the reputation of social exchangers or because market-based transactions are emotionally unsatisfying (and therefore do not satisfy the necessary inputs for our intuitive inference system), but because the very nature of some of these transactions may undermine social values. Obvious examples include leaving a tip on the pillow of a romantic partner for a job well done, or paying your grandchildren to visit you on your deathbed. Brennan and Jaworski (Reference Brennan and Jaworski2015) discuss how disgust can act as a deterrent to market economy – essentially by saying that some people get automatic disgust reactions when considering the market-based transactions (that almost everything can be sold or bought from the market) of certain goods which have intrinsic dignity or social value. What indeed has such intrinsic value is culturally defined, and so are FEBs.
Market economics continues to spread into almost every sector of our life – medicine, education, government, law, art, sports, even family life and personal relations – and there are lesser things which money cannot buy (Sandel Reference Sandel2012). The marketization of sacred social items (i.e., they may be purchased with money), and that the resulting transactions of these items are competitive in nature (i.e., driven by notions of profit), may even strongly evoke our disgust response to such phenomena. There is also evidence to suggest that sensitivity to disgust explains significant variation in political ideology – political conservatives are more easily disgusted than liberals, especially regarding policies pertaining to the moral dimension of purity (Inbar et al. Reference Inbar, Pizarro and Bloom2009). We argue that in considering FEBs about market economy as well as other socio-economic policies, the role of intuitive emotional evocation in response to the interaction between economic transaction and social value must be emphasized.
You have
Access
In the target article, Boyer & Petersen (B&P) provide an intriguing account of how intuitive systems that are evolutionarily adapted to facilitate cooperation in social exchange can be explanatory of our lay or folk beliefs about economic policies (FEBs). What is inevitably true (and seems to be underemphasized in the article) is that the essential outputs of these intuitive inference systems are a certain group of social emotions – more specifically in this context, emotions such as disgust and anger. The greater efficacy of using emotions to explain the FEBs is demonstrable using the phenomenon of emporiophobia, or fear of market economy. The authors mention that the “impersonal” nature of markets makes it difficult for us to know the reputation of the partner of our social exchange, and therefore serves as “threat cue” for such transactions. However, it can be argued that economic markets don't necessarily prohibit us from knowing the reputation of our exchange partners (we can know a seller's or a company's reputation), but that a strict market-economy functions on policies which deem such sources of reputation irrelevant. In this case, it is not the absence of social information and emotions that makes market-based transactions of goods repulsive, but that the policies of a market-economy stipulate that these emotions be disregarded – in spite of the good's socio-emotional significance.
Second, the authors say impersonal exchange, such as in markets, “goes against [our intuitive] motivations to generate bonds of cooperation” (sect. 5.4, para. 3) with others. The term “goes against” again needs clarification as to whether it implies that markets force people to not form cooperative bonds or that a strict market economy requires that cooperative bonds should not be taken into consideration in economic markets. The former possibility seems rather odd, as one would suppose that intuitive cooperative bonds (good or bad), by definition occur intuitively (without deliberation or control) with any form of social exchange – regardless of whether market economy allows it.
A market economy that is indifferent to cooperative bonds for specific issues which we are adapted to value differently (e.g., moral norms) (Stanford Reference Stanford2018) is, however, emotionally repulsive. Indeed, we are more adapted to cheater-detection in social domains than in other domains (Cosmides & Tooby Reference Cosmides, Tooby and Buss2005). It is likely that we are repulsed by economic markets in the same way that we find individuals of consequentialist decisions less trustworthy (Everett et al. Reference Everett, Pizarro and Crockett2016) or atheists less moral (Gervais et al. Reference Gervais, Xygalatas, McKay, van Elk, Buchtel, Aveyard, Schiavone, Dar-Nimrod, Svedholm-Häkkinen, Riekki, Kundtová Klocová, Ramsay and Bulbulia2017) – insofar as they violate certain social contracts.
In light of these considerations, we propose that the fear of markets is not general and that it is specific to items for which markets tend to assault certain social values. Emporiophobia may be better explained by the intuitive moral emotion of disgust – an emotion elicited not only in response to physically revolting stimuli, but also by social and moral norm violations (Pizarro et al. Reference Pizarro, Inbar and Helion2011). For example, the supposedly impersonal market interactions (which differ from the types of social exchanges we evolved to value and process) occur primarily through the transfer of monetary assets from the buyer to the seller in return for some goods or services. But, as the authors themselves note in the target article, attempts to acquire certain goods of communal sharing through other means (such as money) would elicit shock. A similar idea, termed the sacred value protection model (Tetlock Reference Tetlock2003), asserts that certain items in society have sacred value, and when these values are threatened or diminished by secular consideration, people respond with moral outrage (i.e., emotions such as moral disgust and anger).
These emotional reactions are not necessarily due to economic markets not allowing us to track the reputation of social exchangers or because market-based transactions are emotionally unsatisfying (and therefore do not satisfy the necessary inputs for our intuitive inference system), but because the very nature of some of these transactions may undermine social values. Obvious examples include leaving a tip on the pillow of a romantic partner for a job well done, or paying your grandchildren to visit you on your deathbed. Brennan and Jaworski (Reference Brennan and Jaworski2015) discuss how disgust can act as a deterrent to market economy – essentially by saying that some people get automatic disgust reactions when considering the market-based transactions (that almost everything can be sold or bought from the market) of certain goods which have intrinsic dignity or social value. What indeed has such intrinsic value is culturally defined, and so are FEBs.
Market economics continues to spread into almost every sector of our life – medicine, education, government, law, art, sports, even family life and personal relations – and there are lesser things which money cannot buy (Sandel Reference Sandel2012). The marketization of sacred social items (i.e., they may be purchased with money), and that the resulting transactions of these items are competitive in nature (i.e., driven by notions of profit), may even strongly evoke our disgust response to such phenomena. There is also evidence to suggest that sensitivity to disgust explains significant variation in political ideology – political conservatives are more easily disgusted than liberals, especially regarding policies pertaining to the moral dimension of purity (Inbar et al. Reference Inbar, Pizarro and Bloom2009). We argue that in considering FEBs about market economy as well as other socio-economic policies, the role of intuitive emotional evocation in response to the interaction between economic transaction and social value must be emphasized.