The groundbreaking, viewpoint theory of Merker et al. explains several properties of the conscious field (the “conscious field” is defined as all that one is conscious of at one moment in time). As noted by Merker et al., the framework
accounts for the singularity and uniqueness of the subjective origin of consciousness: there is only one four-dimensional origin {0}, from which all possible perspectives on the three-dimensional ambient space are taken through PGL(4). For another, it explains why this origin or viewpoint cannot appear in perception or more generally be simply perceptually objectified as an object in the ambient three-dimensional space, not even through the imagination, which is governed by the same constraints according to the model (sect. 6, para. 19).
We propose that Merker et al.'s model of the structure of the conscious field, a multidimensional structure that places “the observer” of the contents of consciousness in a dimension that must be separate from the dimensions that contain all possible conscious contents, not only sheds light on the peculiar arrangement in which the observer cannot directly apprehend, nor introspect about, itself (Schopenhauer, Reference Schopenhauer1818/1819), but also can predict another, immanent characteristic of the conscious field: Why most of the contents of the conscious field are “encapsulated” from the will of the passive and ever-present observer. A conscious content is said to be encapsulated when its nature or occurrence cannot be influenced directly by voluntary processes (e.g., by the desires of the observer, as is obvious in the case of pain or nausea) or, for example, by higher-level knowledge, as in the case of perceptual illusions (e.g., the Müller-Lyer illusion; Firestone & Scholl, Reference Firestone and Scholl2016; Pylyshyn, Reference Pylyshyn1984), which persist despite one's knowledge regarding the true nature of the perceptual stimulus. According to some accounts (e.g., Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger, & Gazzaley, Reference Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger and Gazzaley2016), most of the contents of consciousness are, and should be, encapsulated, not only from the will of the observer, but also from each other, such that one conscious content cannot directly influence the nature or occurrence of another conscious content.
To understand the nature of encapsulation and its relationship to the conscious field, it is helpful to consider the nature of a mixing console at a recording studio. When one hears a song on the radio, it is not obvious to one that each instrument heard in the song is actually recorded by itself on an independent “track.” For example, there might be one track devoted to the recording of the drums, one track devoted to the recording of the guitar, and yet another, separate track devoted to the recording of the vocals. It is not uncommon for songs to require scores of such tracks. These tracks are often recorded at different times, independently from each other, and without being able to directly influence each other. Once all the many tracks composing a song are recorded, the mixing console is used to collate (“mix”) the tracks and generate one master recording that, when played on the radio or through some other medium, presents to the listener all of the instruments playing at the same time. Analogously, it has been proposed that the contents of consciousness (e.g., nausea, the experience of a yellow afterimage, or the smell of lavender) are independent of each other, stemming from content generators that are independent of each other (Morsella et al., Reference Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger and Gazzaley2016), just as the tracks at a recording studio are independent of each other. For example, one track could be devoted to representing phonological information. This track could, for instance, present the phonological effect one experiences in the McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, Reference McGurk and MacDonald1976), an effect that is dependent on both visual inputs and auditory inputs.
It is only through the conscious field that these contents can influence action selection collectively (Morsella, Reference Morsella2005). Figuratively speaking, the conscious field is a mosaic composed of the collation of all the encapsulated contents that are activated at one moment in time. The conscious field is sampled only by the (unconscious) response codes of the skeletomotor output system. We invite Merker et al. to speculate on how the multidimensional structure they propose, in which the observer must be separated from conscious contents, sheds light on encapsulation.
In addition, in viewpoint theory, Merker et al. introduce a new, potential constitutive marker of consciousness (sect. 6). We would like to learn from Merker et al. how this potential marker might be more progressive than the notion that an organism possesses consciousness if there is something it is like to be that organism (Nagel, Reference Nagel1974). As Nagel (Reference Nagel1974) notes, “I have said that the essence of the belief that bats have experience is that there is something that it is like to be a bat” (p. 438). Similarly, Block (Reference Block1995) claimed, “The phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state” (p. 227).
A theory of consciousness must identify the key difference(s) between conscious and unconscious processes in the brain. In addition, it must explain how this difference accounts for phenomenological data. We believe that our questions about encapsulation and subjectivity will lead to answers from Merker et al. that will expand the explanatory scope of the viewpoint approach and further advance the scientific understanding of consciousness.
The groundbreaking, viewpoint theory of Merker et al. explains several properties of the conscious field (the “conscious field” is defined as all that one is conscious of at one moment in time). As noted by Merker et al., the framework
accounts for the singularity and uniqueness of the subjective origin of consciousness: there is only one four-dimensional origin {0}, from which all possible perspectives on the three-dimensional ambient space are taken through PGL(4). For another, it explains why this origin or viewpoint cannot appear in perception or more generally be simply perceptually objectified as an object in the ambient three-dimensional space, not even through the imagination, which is governed by the same constraints according to the model (sect. 6, para. 19).
We propose that Merker et al.'s model of the structure of the conscious field, a multidimensional structure that places “the observer” of the contents of consciousness in a dimension that must be separate from the dimensions that contain all possible conscious contents, not only sheds light on the peculiar arrangement in which the observer cannot directly apprehend, nor introspect about, itself (Schopenhauer, Reference Schopenhauer1818/1819), but also can predict another, immanent characteristic of the conscious field: Why most of the contents of the conscious field are “encapsulated” from the will of the passive and ever-present observer. A conscious content is said to be encapsulated when its nature or occurrence cannot be influenced directly by voluntary processes (e.g., by the desires of the observer, as is obvious in the case of pain or nausea) or, for example, by higher-level knowledge, as in the case of perceptual illusions (e.g., the Müller-Lyer illusion; Firestone & Scholl, Reference Firestone and Scholl2016; Pylyshyn, Reference Pylyshyn1984), which persist despite one's knowledge regarding the true nature of the perceptual stimulus. According to some accounts (e.g., Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger, & Gazzaley, Reference Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger and Gazzaley2016), most of the contents of consciousness are, and should be, encapsulated, not only from the will of the observer, but also from each other, such that one conscious content cannot directly influence the nature or occurrence of another conscious content.
To understand the nature of encapsulation and its relationship to the conscious field, it is helpful to consider the nature of a mixing console at a recording studio. When one hears a song on the radio, it is not obvious to one that each instrument heard in the song is actually recorded by itself on an independent “track.” For example, there might be one track devoted to the recording of the drums, one track devoted to the recording of the guitar, and yet another, separate track devoted to the recording of the vocals. It is not uncommon for songs to require scores of such tracks. These tracks are often recorded at different times, independently from each other, and without being able to directly influence each other. Once all the many tracks composing a song are recorded, the mixing console is used to collate (“mix”) the tracks and generate one master recording that, when played on the radio or through some other medium, presents to the listener all of the instruments playing at the same time. Analogously, it has been proposed that the contents of consciousness (e.g., nausea, the experience of a yellow afterimage, or the smell of lavender) are independent of each other, stemming from content generators that are independent of each other (Morsella et al., Reference Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger and Gazzaley2016), just as the tracks at a recording studio are independent of each other. For example, one track could be devoted to representing phonological information. This track could, for instance, present the phonological effect one experiences in the McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, Reference McGurk and MacDonald1976), an effect that is dependent on both visual inputs and auditory inputs.
It is only through the conscious field that these contents can influence action selection collectively (Morsella, Reference Morsella2005). Figuratively speaking, the conscious field is a mosaic composed of the collation of all the encapsulated contents that are activated at one moment in time. The conscious field is sampled only by the (unconscious) response codes of the skeletomotor output system. We invite Merker et al. to speculate on how the multidimensional structure they propose, in which the observer must be separated from conscious contents, sheds light on encapsulation.
In addition, in viewpoint theory, Merker et al. introduce a new, potential constitutive marker of consciousness (sect. 6). We would like to learn from Merker et al. how this potential marker might be more progressive than the notion that an organism possesses consciousness if there is something it is like to be that organism (Nagel, Reference Nagel1974). As Nagel (Reference Nagel1974) notes, “I have said that the essence of the belief that bats have experience is that there is something that it is like to be a bat” (p. 438). Similarly, Block (Reference Block1995) claimed, “The phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state” (p. 227).
A theory of consciousness must identify the key difference(s) between conscious and unconscious processes in the brain. In addition, it must explain how this difference accounts for phenomenological data. We believe that our questions about encapsulation and subjectivity will lead to answers from Merker et al. that will expand the explanatory scope of the viewpoint approach and further advance the scientific understanding of consciousness.
Financial support
There was no funding associated with the writing of this commentary.
Conflict of interest
None.