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Dominance as a competence domain, and the evolutionary origins of respect and contempt

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2017

Bernard Chapais*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of Montreal, Montreal, QC H3C 3J7, Canada. Bernard.chapais@umontreal.ca

Abstract

The hypothesis of a phylogenetic connection between protorespect in primate dominance hierarchies and respect in human prestige hierarchies lies in the principle that dominance is a domain of competence like others and, hence, that high-ranking primates have protoprestige. The idea that dominant primates manifest protocontempt to subordinates suggests that “looking down on” followers is intrinsic to leadership in humans, but that the expression of contempt varies critically in relation to the socioecological context.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

Gervais & Fessler's (G&F's) Attitude–Scenario–Emotion (ASE) model provides a stimulating, ontologically useful, and testable framework of the relations between sentiments, attitudes, and emotions. The sentiments they are concerned with, respect and its correlate contempt, are an integral part of the psychological foundation of status hierarchies, which are universal features of human societies (Anderson et al. Reference Anderson, Hildreth and Howland2015). Here I elaborate on the primate origins of respect, a topic the authors treat rather briefly, and on some implications of the idea that high-ranking primates show protocontempt towards subordinates.

G&F argue that respect tracks the value of others as competent partners, and evolved to facilitate the formation of efficacious relationships. In prior work (Chapais Reference Chapais2015), I suggested that the emotional underpinnings of attraction to higher ranking individuals in primate dominance hierarchies (protorespect) had been co-opted in the course of human evolution and given rise to the admiration (respect) of experts in all relevant domains of activities. The two phenomena would be homologous. Referring to that work, the authors go on stating that protorespect was co-opted “just as the emotion systems protopride and protoshame were co-opted from dominance hierarchies for use in prestige hierarchies” (target article, sect. 5.3, para. 2). I agree. However, there are some important differences between the processes involved in the co-optation of protorespect, on the one hand, and that of protopride and protoshame, on the other, and I take this opportunity to enlighten those differences and further characterize the primate origins of respect.

Dominance is the capacity to exercise coercive power and orient the behavior of others by undermining their welfare and reproductive capacity. Dominance status in animals is imposed upon others based on asymmetries in physical power, whereas prestige status in humans is freely conferred on skilled individuals based on their competence levels in any one of a vast array of domains and, hence, on their value as social partners. While dominance status stems from competition and involves intimidation and fear, prestige status stems from cooperation and involves competence and attraction. If only for that reason, it is tempting to conceive of dominance and prestige as distinct strategies of status-attainment having their own separate evolutionary origins (e.g., Cheng et al. Reference Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone and Henrich2013; Henrich & Gil-White Reference Henrich and Gil-White2001). In many primate species, however, dominance relationships are not limited to their competitive dimension. They may also have a significant cooperative component, and it is only by considering the latter that the evolution of respect may be understood (Chapais Reference Chapais2015). Once dominance relationships are established, the highest-ranking individuals, especially the alpha male and female, are uniquely positioned to provide specific types of benefits to subordinates, including efficient protection against aggressors, decisive support in conflicts, and access to monopolizable resources (mates or food). The high value of top-ranking individuals as potential partners may explain why subordinates are attracted to them, offering grooming and support in exchange for help and tolerance (reviewed in Chapais Reference Chapais2015). From that perspective, dominants have protoprestige and primate dominance hierarchies concurrently are prestige hierarchies.

Following the evolution of cumulative culture among hominins and, with it, the multiplication of technological, social, and ideational activities requiring high levels of competence, the cooperation-based psychology of protorespect towards dominants would have generated the respect of experts in all relevant cultural domains. In that view, the key principle for understanding the transition from primate-like dominance hierarchies to human-like prestige hierarchies is that dominance is a domain of competence per se and hence a source of prestige, from which it follows that it should be so in humans as well. Empirical findings support that prediction. Taller men are perceived as having greater leadership abilities (Blaker et al. Reference Blaker, Rompa, Dessing, Vriend, Herschberg and van Vugt2013; Murray & Schmitz Reference Murray and Schmitz2011; Re et al. Reference Re, DeBruine, Jones and Perrett2013; Von Rueden Reference Von Rueden, Cheng, Tracy and Anderson2014), and group members willingly grant a high status to physically formidable men owing to their leadership abilities and the services they may provide, such as punishing free-riders and negotiating with other groups (Lukaszewski et al. Reference Lukaszewski, Anderson, Simmons and Roney2016). This indicates that formidable men have a high status because they have a high social value, not just because they are feared, and that the attractiveness of formidable individuals is homologous between humans and other primates. That said, the capacity to exercise dominance in humans involves competence in several other domains, including in the handling of weapons, recruitment of allies based on ideational arguments, control of information and resources affecting others' welfare, and use of nonphysical entities to inflict physical costs.

The other point concerns the evolutionary origins of contempt, which G&F define as an absence of respect towards individuals perceived as having low value as social partners. They further suggest that a plausible homologue of contempt is found in primate dominance hierarchies in the attitude of high-ranking individuals “towards lower-ranking conspecifics that cannot deliver benefits upwards and fail to earn respect” (sect. 5.3, para. 2; emphasis in original) and are, as a result, the object of indifference, intolerance or exploitation. If this phylogenetic connection is right, it implies that “looking down on” followers is intrinsic to leadership; that is, leaders would by default be emotionally biased to exploit a substantial fraction of their followers. Assuming this to be the case, one expects the expression of contempt to vary critically in relation to the extent to which leaders are dependent on their followers' respect to acquire and maintain their status. When leadership is freely conferred on leaders based on their skills and willingness to cooperate, and hence may be revoked by followers – for example, in non-authoritarian societies, contempt and exploitation would be substantially muted. At the other extreme, in dictatorships, the exploitation of “followers” would be given free reign, but would focus on the (usually large) fraction of followers on whom leaders are not dependent for maintaining power. In all intermediate situations in which leaders run the risk of being deposed by their followers, either democratically or through revolutions, leaders would tend to exploit followers whenever opportunities arise, but covertly. History is filled with kings and nobles appropriating a disproportionate share of resources while publicly acting as if, and stating that, their subjects' welfare is their main concern.

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