In their path-breaking target article, Boyer & Petersen (B&P) lay out a theory of folk-economic beliefs. Primarily, their focus is on prototypical market transactions, linking evolved psychological abilities to beliefs about the processes and outcomes of immense numbers of freely transacting and exchanging people. Within a prototypical economic market, the choices of many anonymous and interchangeable people and firms determine the quantities and prices of goods and services. But the market is not the only mechanism through which resources are allocated. As future researchers build on the target article's insights, we would encourage them to study not just economic beliefs, but also political economic beliefs. Political economy focuses on the logic of group decision-making, power, and authority – notions not captured in the concept of a laissez-faire market (Mueller Reference Mueller2003). When political leaders change regulatory policies or when citizens vote in a referendum to enact a new law, citizens' pocketbooks are affected – though clearly not through the operation of market transactions. Folk political economic beliefs, we propose, can also be understood within B&P's evolutionary–cognitive framework.
Take, for example, their own discussion of emporiophobia. Just as humans are not adapted to large-scale transaction markets, they are not adapted to large-scale decentralized political systems. Unlike in small hunter-gatherer societies, where leaders are typically known directly by their subordinates, in modern nation states reliable data about potential leaders is difficult to find. Furthermore, citizens receive little usable feedback on whether or not their judgments are right (Kuklinski & Quirk Reference Kuklinski, Quirk, Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin2000). Often this means citizens rely on cues that are inappropriate in the modern environment when selecting candidates, such as cues of physical strength (Riggio & Riggio Reference Riggio and Riggio2010). Like agents in the free market, policy makers in the modern environment are impersonal and difficult to identify, as they act as individuals nested within legislative bodies and bureaucracies. These cues should trigger the same alarms as market transactions, that this anonymity may lead to exploitation (Petersen Reference Petersen2013). Results from the General Social Survey provide evidence this may be the case in the United States, as only 5% of respondents in 2016 had a great deal of confidence in the United States Congress and a majority of respondents had hardly any trust in Congress (see Smith et al. [Reference Smith, Marsden, Hout and Kim2016] for General Social Survey datafile).
Consider a related example, again involving power and leaders. Throughout human evolutionary history, communities have been organized with some people having greater power and authority than others (Fiske Reference Fiske1992). In part, this is because there can be benefits for a group to cede power to a leader (Van Vugt et al. Reference Van Vugt, Hogan and Kaiser2008). Nonetheless, powerful people can exploit their subordinates. To prevent this, subordinates, even if individually weaker, can band together in coalitions to thwart exploitive leaders (Boehm Reference Boehm2009). This suggests that the human psychology of power and groups includes mechanisms for assessing and responding to the potential of exploitive leaders. Some relevant cues might be whether there are large power differentials between leaders and subordinates and the extent to which the actions of the powerful benefit the subordinates. Because the government is impersonal and powerful, and citizens have little direct say in legislator behavior outside of voting, government regulation may activate intuitions related to exploitation by powerful leaders.
Although B&P review data showing that people often believe government regulation works, there may be circumstances in which contradictory folk political economic beliefs arise. First, the impersonal nature of the government may generate feelings similar to emporiophobia, where individuals worry that government regulation generates a social cost. Second, regulatory action taken by the government may activate fear of exploitation. Previous work has used rational choice theory to show the conditions under which citizens should be wary of government regulation and the provision of public goods (Miller & Hammond Reference Miller and Hammond1994). However, this wariness persists even in the face of well-structured regulation designed to solve important collective action problems.
Consider institutions designed to reduce pollution and mitigate climate change. Research attempting to design economically efficient and environmentally effective political institutions to combat pollution assumes that any solution which generates a revenue for the government will not be politically viable, tapping into the intuition that citizens may oppose large-scale government regulation (Franciosi et al. Reference Franciosi, Isaac, Pingry and Reynolds1993; Ledyard & Szakaly-Moore Reference Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore1994). Not surprisingly, this holds true when the revenue would be redistributed to the polluting industries being regulated (Noll Reference Noll1982). But it also holds true when the revenue would be directed to programs for mitigating pollution (Goeree et al. Reference Goeree, Palmer, Holt, Shobe and Burtraw2010).
Though these complex institutions with many checks on government power ultimately use generated revenue to better mitigate climate change, they still may activate relevant cues for monitoring leaders. Because citizens have little direct say in revenue distribution, large-scale redistribution makes salient the power differential between citizens and the government. Furthermore, it can be difficult to attribute successful pollution reduction to individual policies, making it difficult for citizens to see the benefit of government redistribution. Together, these cues may activate fear of exploitation, and the rhetoric surrounding climate change mitigation often involves folk political economic beliefs that the government is wasting taxpayer money on mitigation efforts.
The authors emphasize how the characteristics of the market that make it an effective problem-solving system also activate evolved systems that generate distrust. Future research should aim to better understand how political institutions which share these characteristics similarly interact with human cognitive systems. Evolved cognitive systems surrounding leadership and power, as well as group decision-making and problem-solving, play an important role in how citizens respond to government intervention. Unfortunately, citizen responses often conflict with normative political and economic theory. The target article lays a strong foundation for a research agenda that connects folk-economic beliefs to evolved cognitive systems, and we encourage researchers to keep issues of power and group decision-making institutions in mind as they pursue questions about folk-economics.
You have
Access
In their path-breaking target article, Boyer & Petersen (B&P) lay out a theory of folk-economic beliefs. Primarily, their focus is on prototypical market transactions, linking evolved psychological abilities to beliefs about the processes and outcomes of immense numbers of freely transacting and exchanging people. Within a prototypical economic market, the choices of many anonymous and interchangeable people and firms determine the quantities and prices of goods and services. But the market is not the only mechanism through which resources are allocated. As future researchers build on the target article's insights, we would encourage them to study not just economic beliefs, but also political economic beliefs. Political economy focuses on the logic of group decision-making, power, and authority – notions not captured in the concept of a laissez-faire market (Mueller Reference Mueller2003). When political leaders change regulatory policies or when citizens vote in a referendum to enact a new law, citizens' pocketbooks are affected – though clearly not through the operation of market transactions. Folk political economic beliefs, we propose, can also be understood within B&P's evolutionary–cognitive framework.
Take, for example, their own discussion of emporiophobia. Just as humans are not adapted to large-scale transaction markets, they are not adapted to large-scale decentralized political systems. Unlike in small hunter-gatherer societies, where leaders are typically known directly by their subordinates, in modern nation states reliable data about potential leaders is difficult to find. Furthermore, citizens receive little usable feedback on whether or not their judgments are right (Kuklinski & Quirk Reference Kuklinski, Quirk, Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin2000). Often this means citizens rely on cues that are inappropriate in the modern environment when selecting candidates, such as cues of physical strength (Riggio & Riggio Reference Riggio and Riggio2010). Like agents in the free market, policy makers in the modern environment are impersonal and difficult to identify, as they act as individuals nested within legislative bodies and bureaucracies. These cues should trigger the same alarms as market transactions, that this anonymity may lead to exploitation (Petersen Reference Petersen2013). Results from the General Social Survey provide evidence this may be the case in the United States, as only 5% of respondents in 2016 had a great deal of confidence in the United States Congress and a majority of respondents had hardly any trust in Congress (see Smith et al. [Reference Smith, Marsden, Hout and Kim2016] for General Social Survey datafile).
Consider a related example, again involving power and leaders. Throughout human evolutionary history, communities have been organized with some people having greater power and authority than others (Fiske Reference Fiske1992). In part, this is because there can be benefits for a group to cede power to a leader (Van Vugt et al. Reference Van Vugt, Hogan and Kaiser2008). Nonetheless, powerful people can exploit their subordinates. To prevent this, subordinates, even if individually weaker, can band together in coalitions to thwart exploitive leaders (Boehm Reference Boehm2009). This suggests that the human psychology of power and groups includes mechanisms for assessing and responding to the potential of exploitive leaders. Some relevant cues might be whether there are large power differentials between leaders and subordinates and the extent to which the actions of the powerful benefit the subordinates. Because the government is impersonal and powerful, and citizens have little direct say in legislator behavior outside of voting, government regulation may activate intuitions related to exploitation by powerful leaders.
Although B&P review data showing that people often believe government regulation works, there may be circumstances in which contradictory folk political economic beliefs arise. First, the impersonal nature of the government may generate feelings similar to emporiophobia, where individuals worry that government regulation generates a social cost. Second, regulatory action taken by the government may activate fear of exploitation. Previous work has used rational choice theory to show the conditions under which citizens should be wary of government regulation and the provision of public goods (Miller & Hammond Reference Miller and Hammond1994). However, this wariness persists even in the face of well-structured regulation designed to solve important collective action problems.
Consider institutions designed to reduce pollution and mitigate climate change. Research attempting to design economically efficient and environmentally effective political institutions to combat pollution assumes that any solution which generates a revenue for the government will not be politically viable, tapping into the intuition that citizens may oppose large-scale government regulation (Franciosi et al. Reference Franciosi, Isaac, Pingry and Reynolds1993; Ledyard & Szakaly-Moore Reference Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore1994). Not surprisingly, this holds true when the revenue would be redistributed to the polluting industries being regulated (Noll Reference Noll1982). But it also holds true when the revenue would be directed to programs for mitigating pollution (Goeree et al. Reference Goeree, Palmer, Holt, Shobe and Burtraw2010).
Though these complex institutions with many checks on government power ultimately use generated revenue to better mitigate climate change, they still may activate relevant cues for monitoring leaders. Because citizens have little direct say in revenue distribution, large-scale redistribution makes salient the power differential between citizens and the government. Furthermore, it can be difficult to attribute successful pollution reduction to individual policies, making it difficult for citizens to see the benefit of government redistribution. Together, these cues may activate fear of exploitation, and the rhetoric surrounding climate change mitigation often involves folk political economic beliefs that the government is wasting taxpayer money on mitigation efforts.
The authors emphasize how the characteristics of the market that make it an effective problem-solving system also activate evolved systems that generate distrust. Future research should aim to better understand how political institutions which share these characteristics similarly interact with human cognitive systems. Evolved cognitive systems surrounding leadership and power, as well as group decision-making and problem-solving, play an important role in how citizens respond to government intervention. Unfortunately, citizen responses often conflict with normative political and economic theory. The target article lays a strong foundation for a research agenda that connects folk-economic beliefs to evolved cognitive systems, and we encourage researchers to keep issues of power and group decision-making institutions in mind as they pursue questions about folk-economics.