Bullot & Reber (B&R) are concerned with developing what their title says is a “science of art appreciation.” That is commendable, art appreciation being a complex skill that might well develop like other skills, through the Dreyfus's five stages of “novice,” “advanced beginner,” “competent,” “proficient,” and “expert.” B&R's a priori levels of “basic,” “artistic design stance” and “artistic understanding” might not surprise art historians or connoisseurs, but could, with more construct definition, become useful research tools.
A problem for B&R is “mission creep,” their science of art appreciation rapidly incorporating “science of art,” “empirical aesthetics,” “art appraisal,” “artistic understanding,” “appreciation of art works,” and “aesthetic and artistic universals.” If historians notoriously are “lumpers” and “splitters,” B&R are lumpers, as when they say, “research in the psychology of art does not essentially differ from neuroaesthetics” (sect. 1.1, para. 2), a statement unlikely to be subscribed to by many in empirical aesthetics, particularly those disagreeing with the methods and theories of, say, Zeki or Ramachandran. Theologically, B&R's all-encompassing psycho-historical framework gives the impression of being a universal route to salvation, with absence of contextualism identified as mortal sin. B&R's severe psycho-historical scrutiny and methodological lumping then seems to result in the entire scientific literature on art being weighed in the balance and found wanting. The inquisitorial tone shows particularly in footnote 3, when Martindale is revealed not as a true psycho-historical contextualist, but instead as a “pro-naturalistic historicist,” and hence a deviationist and a heretic.
B&R particularly criticise two papers, “representative of empirical aesthetics” (sect. 4.2). It was flattering to be an author of one of them (McManus et al. Reference McManus, Cheema and Stoker1993), despite the perceived deep flaws. Along with Locher et al. (Reference Locher, Overbeeke and Stappers2005), our paper sinned in, “fail[ing] to consider the predictions suggested by a contextualist approach to the appreciation of imbalance” (sect. 4.2, para. 2). Dogma is then proclaimed magisterially, with the doctrine, “experiments on art appreciation should…probe the appreciators' sensitivity to art-historical contexts” (sect. 4.2, para. 5).
Dissecting apart the precise offenses is not easy, particularly as neither paper specifically concerned itself with “art appreciation” per se. Curiously, B&R describe little of the papers' methods, only their bibliography revealing that both analyse paintings by Mondrian. Our paper asked, “to what extent are the placings of the elements of a Mondrian painting merely arbitrary, and how much can they be seen as the optimisation of a compositional problem…with their particular placing been seen as aesthetically more successful than a range of similar but different placings?” Is that not a legitimate question for aesthetics? Our conclusion that, “the result supports what most sensitive viewers of [Mondrian's] paintings have long known: that the pictures are not random configurations of lines,” we hoped might have some general interest. That we “present[ed] artworks as ‘stimuli’ ” (sect. 1.1, para. 2) was not presumably problematic, as serious art historians do the same thing (Engelbrecht et al. Reference Engelbrecht, Betz, Klein and Rosenberg2010), and elsewhere Reber (Reference Reber, Shimamura and Palmer2012, p. 229) approvingly cites Plumhoff and Schirillo's (Reference Plumhoff and Schirillo2009) study that also manipulated Mondrian's. Our study also did consider, “participants' sensitivity to art-historical contexts” (sect. 4.2, para. 1) by including controls and art students, the latter presumably having greater knowledge of art appreciation (albeit the two groups performed similarly [Cheema Reference Cheema1989]). None of our participants had PhDs in Mondrian studies, but presumably B&R could not have intended that as a criterion for “sensitivity.” Although B&R correctly state, “the dependent variable [was]…the participants' preferred work” (sect. 4.2, para. 2), they wrongly infer that participants chose the image, “that apparently had the more balanced composition” (sect. 4.2, para. 2). The word “balance” actually occurs but once, in our literature review, and nowhere in the participant instructions.
B&R's major complaint is that McManus et al. “fail to consider the predictions suggested by a contextualist approach to the appreciation of imbalance” (sect. 4.2, para. 2), adding that, “violation of balance can enhance judged preference if imbalance fits the context [an artwork] is supposed to convey” (sect. 4.2, para. 3). It is a curious criticism as, paradoxically, it ignores the art-historical literature on Mondrian and his painterly aims.
Mondrian's paintings, described as “so spare that they seem almost to defy interpretation,” “[offer] art historians precious little opportunity to display their detective skills by ferreting out…artistic inspirations and thematic sources” (Blotkamp Reference Blotkamp1994) (p. 9). Indeed the critic Rosalind Krauss saw Mondrian and other modernist grid painters whose styles changed little in their mature years, as a “paradigm or model for the antidevelopmental, the antinarrative, the antihistorical” (Krauss Reference Krauss1979, p. 64; my emphasis).
As for what Mondrian was doing, there is no shred of evidence of a concern with violation of balance. In the “totalizing philosophy” of his writings, the art historian Christopher Green describes how “Mondrian turned painting into a field of force” (Green Reference Green, Green and Wright2012, p. 20), neo-plastic art aiming to bring the multiple components into an equilibrium, a mutual equivalence. Green therefore talks of “a particularly well balanced compositional type,” of Mondrian, “working once more to achieve equilibrium,” and of “economy, precision and balance” resulting from “[Mondrian's] pursuit of ‘dynamic equilibrium’” (Green & Wright Reference Green, Wright, Green and Wright2012, pp. 92, 144; my emphases). In consequence, Mondrian's working techniques, akin to modern optimisation techniques, involved continual small adjustments to his paintings (Cooper & Spronk Reference Cooper and Spronk2001; Rowell Reference Rowell, Solomon and Guggenheim1971).
Our participants, I admit, were not sophisticated viewers of Mondrian. Consider, though, one of Mondrian's first viewers who wrote, “the paintings were entirely new to me & I did not understand them on this first [viewing], and indeed only partially understood them on my second [viewing] a year later.” That was the painter Ben Nicholson visiting the Rue du Départ studio in 1934 and 1935. As for theory, Nicholson said, “I could not be bothered to read Mondrian's theories.…What I got from him – and it was a great deal – I got direct from the experience of his painting” (Green Reference Green, Green and Wright2012, p. 26; my emphasis).
Sophistication and background knowledge are not prerequisites for viewing artworks, not least as even sophisticated viewers are unsophisticated when first viewing an artwork. Art history should of course inform scientific research (and maybe even vice versa), but B&R's blanket criticisms of these “representative studies” are surely unjustified.
Bullot & Reber (B&R) are concerned with developing what their title says is a “science of art appreciation.” That is commendable, art appreciation being a complex skill that might well develop like other skills, through the Dreyfus's five stages of “novice,” “advanced beginner,” “competent,” “proficient,” and “expert.” B&R's a priori levels of “basic,” “artistic design stance” and “artistic understanding” might not surprise art historians or connoisseurs, but could, with more construct definition, become useful research tools.
A problem for B&R is “mission creep,” their science of art appreciation rapidly incorporating “science of art,” “empirical aesthetics,” “art appraisal,” “artistic understanding,” “appreciation of art works,” and “aesthetic and artistic universals.” If historians notoriously are “lumpers” and “splitters,” B&R are lumpers, as when they say, “research in the psychology of art does not essentially differ from neuroaesthetics” (sect. 1.1, para. 2), a statement unlikely to be subscribed to by many in empirical aesthetics, particularly those disagreeing with the methods and theories of, say, Zeki or Ramachandran. Theologically, B&R's all-encompassing psycho-historical framework gives the impression of being a universal route to salvation, with absence of contextualism identified as mortal sin. B&R's severe psycho-historical scrutiny and methodological lumping then seems to result in the entire scientific literature on art being weighed in the balance and found wanting. The inquisitorial tone shows particularly in footnote 3, when Martindale is revealed not as a true psycho-historical contextualist, but instead as a “pro-naturalistic historicist,” and hence a deviationist and a heretic.
B&R particularly criticise two papers, “representative of empirical aesthetics” (sect. 4.2). It was flattering to be an author of one of them (McManus et al. Reference McManus, Cheema and Stoker1993), despite the perceived deep flaws. Along with Locher et al. (Reference Locher, Overbeeke and Stappers2005), our paper sinned in, “fail[ing] to consider the predictions suggested by a contextualist approach to the appreciation of imbalance” (sect. 4.2, para. 2). Dogma is then proclaimed magisterially, with the doctrine, “experiments on art appreciation should…probe the appreciators' sensitivity to art-historical contexts” (sect. 4.2, para. 5).
Dissecting apart the precise offenses is not easy, particularly as neither paper specifically concerned itself with “art appreciation” per se. Curiously, B&R describe little of the papers' methods, only their bibliography revealing that both analyse paintings by Mondrian. Our paper asked, “to what extent are the placings of the elements of a Mondrian painting merely arbitrary, and how much can they be seen as the optimisation of a compositional problem…with their particular placing been seen as aesthetically more successful than a range of similar but different placings?” Is that not a legitimate question for aesthetics? Our conclusion that, “the result supports what most sensitive viewers of [Mondrian's] paintings have long known: that the pictures are not random configurations of lines,” we hoped might have some general interest. That we “present[ed] artworks as ‘stimuli’ ” (sect. 1.1, para. 2) was not presumably problematic, as serious art historians do the same thing (Engelbrecht et al. Reference Engelbrecht, Betz, Klein and Rosenberg2010), and elsewhere Reber (Reference Reber, Shimamura and Palmer2012, p. 229) approvingly cites Plumhoff and Schirillo's (Reference Plumhoff and Schirillo2009) study that also manipulated Mondrian's. Our study also did consider, “participants' sensitivity to art-historical contexts” (sect. 4.2, para. 1) by including controls and art students, the latter presumably having greater knowledge of art appreciation (albeit the two groups performed similarly [Cheema Reference Cheema1989]). None of our participants had PhDs in Mondrian studies, but presumably B&R could not have intended that as a criterion for “sensitivity.” Although B&R correctly state, “the dependent variable [was]…the participants' preferred work” (sect. 4.2, para. 2), they wrongly infer that participants chose the image, “that apparently had the more balanced composition” (sect. 4.2, para. 2). The word “balance” actually occurs but once, in our literature review, and nowhere in the participant instructions.
B&R's major complaint is that McManus et al. “fail to consider the predictions suggested by a contextualist approach to the appreciation of imbalance” (sect. 4.2, para. 2), adding that, “violation of balance can enhance judged preference if imbalance fits the context [an artwork] is supposed to convey” (sect. 4.2, para. 3). It is a curious criticism as, paradoxically, it ignores the art-historical literature on Mondrian and his painterly aims.
Mondrian's paintings, described as “so spare that they seem almost to defy interpretation,” “[offer] art historians precious little opportunity to display their detective skills by ferreting out…artistic inspirations and thematic sources” (Blotkamp Reference Blotkamp1994) (p. 9). Indeed the critic Rosalind Krauss saw Mondrian and other modernist grid painters whose styles changed little in their mature years, as a “paradigm or model for the antidevelopmental, the antinarrative, the antihistorical” (Krauss Reference Krauss1979, p. 64; my emphasis).
As for what Mondrian was doing, there is no shred of evidence of a concern with violation of balance. In the “totalizing philosophy” of his writings, the art historian Christopher Green describes how “Mondrian turned painting into a field of force” (Green Reference Green, Green and Wright2012, p. 20), neo-plastic art aiming to bring the multiple components into an equilibrium, a mutual equivalence. Green therefore talks of “a particularly well balanced compositional type,” of Mondrian, “working once more to achieve equilibrium,” and of “economy, precision and balance” resulting from “[Mondrian's] pursuit of ‘dynamic equilibrium’” (Green & Wright Reference Green, Wright, Green and Wright2012, pp. 92, 144; my emphases). In consequence, Mondrian's working techniques, akin to modern optimisation techniques, involved continual small adjustments to his paintings (Cooper & Spronk Reference Cooper and Spronk2001; Rowell Reference Rowell, Solomon and Guggenheim1971).
Our participants, I admit, were not sophisticated viewers of Mondrian. Consider, though, one of Mondrian's first viewers who wrote, “the paintings were entirely new to me & I did not understand them on this first [viewing], and indeed only partially understood them on my second [viewing] a year later.” That was the painter Ben Nicholson visiting the Rue du Départ studio in 1934 and 1935. As for theory, Nicholson said, “I could not be bothered to read Mondrian's theories.…What I got from him – and it was a great deal – I got direct from the experience of his painting” (Green Reference Green, Green and Wright2012, p. 26; my emphasis).
Sophistication and background knowledge are not prerequisites for viewing artworks, not least as even sophisticated viewers are unsophisticated when first viewing an artwork. Art history should of course inform scientific research (and maybe even vice versa), but B&R's blanket criticisms of these “representative studies” are surely unjustified.