Hostname: page-component-6bf8c574d5-t27h7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-21T00:01:26.437Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The nontrivial doctrine of cognitive neuroscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126, and Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0374 valerie@vt.edu
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Gold & Stoljar's “trivial” neuron doctrine is neither a truism in cognitive science nor trivial; it has serious consequences for the future direction of the mind/brain sciences. Not everyone would agree that these consequences are desirable. The authors' “radical” doctrine is not so radical; their division between cognitive neuroscience and neurobiology is largely artificial. Indeed, there is no sharp distinction between cognitive neuroscience and other areas of the brain sciences.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press