When we reflect upon our phenomenal temporality – the way we experience the passage of time – we are presented with a number of apparent contradictions. One of the most striking is that, in a sense, the present is special – it is the only real moment that we directly experience. However, this privilege is almost instantaneously transferred to another moment, which then becomes the present, and so on. In a slogan, the problem is that if every moment is special, then no one is. This problem is addressed in a very promising way by the dual systems presented by the authors. The idea that adult humans retain a temporal updating system – a sort of timeless picture of what there is out there – alongside a temporal reasoning system, could explain the apparent paradox of having contradictory beliefs about the present. In this commentary I propose an analogy with another apparent paradox concerning our phenomenal temporality, presenting a similar dual systems perspective, and I tentatively suggest a way in which this other paradox may be explained in Hoerl & McCormack (H&M)’s view. In the final section, I also discuss some concerns that may arise about the clear-cut distinction between humans and animals.
Consider another apparent paradox of our temporal phenomenology. When we hear two gun shots (say 100 ms from one another), we have one experience of two sounds. We do not experience the first “as past’” when we hear the second. Nonetheless, when after some seconds we think about what happened, we know that one shot was before the other – we remember a sequence of temporal ordered sounds; the single experience of the two shots felt in the present is lost. But if we know that the present is technically point-like, and if we remember the two sounds as temporally diachronic, why do we experience them as temporally synchronic – part of the same phenomenological present? Maybe the simplest option is the right one. If we experience two such different things, it could be because there are two different cognitive processes going on. In Roselli (Reference Roselli2018), I have proposed an analogy with a spatial debate, in which two distinct ways of operating our intellect – counting and subitizing – were distinguished. The word “subitizing” (Kaufman et al. Reference Kaufman, Lord, Reese and Volkmann1949) refers to the immediate visual capture of a certain number of items, to be distinguished from the usual action of counting. Experimental results (Camos & Tillmann Reference Camos and Tillmann2008; Trick & Pylyshyn Reference Trick and Pylyshyn1994) showed a significant difference between judgments made for displays composed of one to four items and for displays of more items. Of course, response times always rise when the number of items showed is increased, but there is a dramatic difference between the two groups. I have argued that even in the temporal case there may be at work two different processes: Whereas a temporal subitizing is responsible for our directly experienced present (a single “temporal look” at an extended period of time, that comprises a succession of more sounds in an immediate co-conscious present temporal experience), a temporal counting has the more elaborate cognitive task to store in succession the auditory stimuli perceived.
Would it be possible to re-describe this solution to the “paradox of the present” in H&M's terms? Their dual systems approach could describe the extended phenomenological presentness as a result of the temporal updating system, whereas the temporal reasoning system would be responsible for the successive awareness of an after-before relation within that experienced extended present. As they point out, even if children are able to reproduce actions in the right order, this ability in itself is something that can fall within the scope of the temporal updating system. It is reasonable to assume that even in such cases what children have in mind is an extended present experienced in a certain way, rather than a temporal succession in which past, present, and future are distinguished. It is only thanks to the temporal reasoning system that we put events in a genuine temporal order and are aware of what that means. If the analogy holds, it is a very good sign for the authors’ system, because it would mean that another apparent paradox of our temporal phenomenology could be explained in the terms of their dual systems perspective.
Finally, I want to briefly discuss a potential source of concern. The authors claim that neither animals nor infants can think and reason about time, and that they can merely change their representation of the world as it is, instead of representing change. Two different systems of cognition are described, and a clear-cut distinction between humans (adult and sane) and other animals is drawn. This is, however, at least prima facie, problematic; do humans really have something that all the other species do not have? It is very likely that ants do not “represent change” in any meaningful sense but what about dolphins or chimpanzees? Note that not every human is intelligent in the same way. Where should the line be drawn? I am not convinced that it is possible to claim that all non-human animals are stuck in time. H&M admit that some birds “have timing mechanisms that would allow them to be sensitive to the length of a 124-hour period (or even longer)” (sect. 2.1, para. 3). But when a timing mechanism becomes so long, is it really possible to distinguish it from a “primitive” temporal reasoning? I suspect that examples coming from studies with primates could give even stronger cases for this (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin Reference Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin1996). It may be too much to claim that “animals are not capable of thinking about the past or the future at all” (sect. 6, para. 2). A chimpanzee's temporal reasoning system is probably a lot weaker than ours, but is it enough to draw a clear-cut line between humans and non-human animals?
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When we reflect upon our phenomenal temporality – the way we experience the passage of time – we are presented with a number of apparent contradictions. One of the most striking is that, in a sense, the present is special – it is the only real moment that we directly experience. However, this privilege is almost instantaneously transferred to another moment, which then becomes the present, and so on. In a slogan, the problem is that if every moment is special, then no one is. This problem is addressed in a very promising way by the dual systems presented by the authors. The idea that adult humans retain a temporal updating system – a sort of timeless picture of what there is out there – alongside a temporal reasoning system, could explain the apparent paradox of having contradictory beliefs about the present. In this commentary I propose an analogy with another apparent paradox concerning our phenomenal temporality, presenting a similar dual systems perspective, and I tentatively suggest a way in which this other paradox may be explained in Hoerl & McCormack (H&M)’s view. In the final section, I also discuss some concerns that may arise about the clear-cut distinction between humans and animals.
Consider another apparent paradox of our temporal phenomenology. When we hear two gun shots (say 100 ms from one another), we have one experience of two sounds. We do not experience the first “as past’” when we hear the second. Nonetheless, when after some seconds we think about what happened, we know that one shot was before the other – we remember a sequence of temporal ordered sounds; the single experience of the two shots felt in the present is lost. But if we know that the present is technically point-like, and if we remember the two sounds as temporally diachronic, why do we experience them as temporally synchronic – part of the same phenomenological present? Maybe the simplest option is the right one. If we experience two such different things, it could be because there are two different cognitive processes going on. In Roselli (Reference Roselli2018), I have proposed an analogy with a spatial debate, in which two distinct ways of operating our intellect – counting and subitizing – were distinguished. The word “subitizing” (Kaufman et al. Reference Kaufman, Lord, Reese and Volkmann1949) refers to the immediate visual capture of a certain number of items, to be distinguished from the usual action of counting. Experimental results (Camos & Tillmann Reference Camos and Tillmann2008; Trick & Pylyshyn Reference Trick and Pylyshyn1994) showed a significant difference between judgments made for displays composed of one to four items and for displays of more items. Of course, response times always rise when the number of items showed is increased, but there is a dramatic difference between the two groups. I have argued that even in the temporal case there may be at work two different processes: Whereas a temporal subitizing is responsible for our directly experienced present (a single “temporal look” at an extended period of time, that comprises a succession of more sounds in an immediate co-conscious present temporal experience), a temporal counting has the more elaborate cognitive task to store in succession the auditory stimuli perceived.
Would it be possible to re-describe this solution to the “paradox of the present” in H&M's terms? Their dual systems approach could describe the extended phenomenological presentness as a result of the temporal updating system, whereas the temporal reasoning system would be responsible for the successive awareness of an after-before relation within that experienced extended present. As they point out, even if children are able to reproduce actions in the right order, this ability in itself is something that can fall within the scope of the temporal updating system. It is reasonable to assume that even in such cases what children have in mind is an extended present experienced in a certain way, rather than a temporal succession in which past, present, and future are distinguished. It is only thanks to the temporal reasoning system that we put events in a genuine temporal order and are aware of what that means. If the analogy holds, it is a very good sign for the authors’ system, because it would mean that another apparent paradox of our temporal phenomenology could be explained in the terms of their dual systems perspective.
Finally, I want to briefly discuss a potential source of concern. The authors claim that neither animals nor infants can think and reason about time, and that they can merely change their representation of the world as it is, instead of representing change. Two different systems of cognition are described, and a clear-cut distinction between humans (adult and sane) and other animals is drawn. This is, however, at least prima facie, problematic; do humans really have something that all the other species do not have? It is very likely that ants do not “represent change” in any meaningful sense but what about dolphins or chimpanzees? Note that not every human is intelligent in the same way. Where should the line be drawn? I am not convinced that it is possible to claim that all non-human animals are stuck in time. H&M admit that some birds “have timing mechanisms that would allow them to be sensitive to the length of a 124-hour period (or even longer)” (sect. 2.1, para. 3). But when a timing mechanism becomes so long, is it really possible to distinguish it from a “primitive” temporal reasoning? I suspect that examples coming from studies with primates could give even stronger cases for this (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin Reference Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin1996). It may be too much to claim that “animals are not capable of thinking about the past or the future at all” (sect. 6, para. 2). A chimpanzee's temporal reasoning system is probably a lot weaker than ours, but is it enough to draw a clear-cut line between humans and non-human animals?
Acknowledgments
My research is supported by a Leverhulme Trust Grant (D/Ref: 75647).