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Cognitive control constrains memory attributions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2020

Colleen M. Kelley
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL32306Kelley@psy.fsu.edu
Larry L. Jacoby
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO63130. lljacoby@wustl.edu

Abstract

Cognitive control constrains retrieval processing and so restricts what comes to mind as input to the attribution system. We review evidence that older adults, patients with Alzheimer's disease, and people with traumatic brain injury exert less cognitive control during retrieval, and so are susceptible to memory misattributions in the form of dramatic levels of false remembering.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020

We agree with Bastin et al. that attributional processes play an important role in memory performance, but we argue that attributional processes should be considered in the broader context of issues related to cognitive control. In particular, the authors emphasize the importance of attributions that follow a potential response coming to mind but they make only passing reference to the role of task context as well as goals that are important for bringing a potential response to mind. In contrast, we need to distinguish forms of cognitive control that constrain retrieval processing to restrict what comes to mind (pre-access control) and post-access source monitoring. Burgess and Shallice (Reference Burgess and Shallice1996) used a similar distinction to argue that confabulation stems from a failure to properly constrain retrieval processing, rather than being limited to post-access monitoring. In what follows, we briefly describe data from our studies done with others to show that a difference in ability to constrain retrieval is important for understanding memory misattributions in special populations.

Our early work revealed both correct attributions of fluency (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas Reference Jacoby and Dallas1981) as well as memory misattributions of the sort focused on in the target article (e.g., Jacoby et al. Reference Jacoby, Kelley, Dywan, Roediger and Craik1989; Kelley & Rhodes Reference Kelley, Rhodes and Ross2002). Our more recent work shows the importance of pre-access cognitive control as a means of avoiding memory misattributions. Jacoby et al. (Reference Jacoby, Bishara, Hessels and Toth2005a) used a response-priming procedure to reveal dramatic false remembering by older adults. Younger and older participants studied word pairs (e.g., knee bone), and their memory was tested by providing the left-hand member of each pair along with a fragment of the right-hand member (e.g., knee b_n_) as cues for its recall. Immediately prior to the recall test for each pair, a prime was presented that was either (i) the same as the target word (a congruent prime; e.g., bone), (ii) a misleading alternative to the target word (an incongruent prime; e.g., bend), or (iii) a neutral, non-word stimulus (a baseline prime; &&&). The misleading prime word fit the word-fragment context, making it a plausible response. A decline in cognitive control was revealed in that older adults were much more likely to report the misleading prime as being the word previously studied than were young adults. Further, they were 10 times more likely than were young adults to show dramatic false memory by claiming to “remember” having studied the misleading prime (0.42 vs. 0.04). A multinomial model fit to these data revealed that the poorer performance of older adults largely reflected a deficit in their ability to constrain retrieval. Older adults were more likely to be “captured” by the misleading prime to an extent that prevented any subsequent attempt to recollect.

A subsequent study using the capture procedures (Millar et al. Reference Millar, Balota, Bishara and Jacoby2018) found that participants in an early stage of Alzheimer's disease (AD) were more likely to be misled by an incongruent prime than were normal older adults. Results from the multinomial model revealed that AD participants were more often captured by the misleading prime (see Balota & Duchek Reference Balota, Duchek, Lindsay, Roediger, C, Kelley and Yonelinas2015 for a review of evidence that a deficit in cognitive control underlies memory deficits in AD participants.) A parallel study showed that patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI) also are prone to being captured by the misleading prime (Dockree et al. Reference Dockree, O'Keeffe, Moloney, Bishara, Carton, Jacoby and Robertson2006), and have higher rates of false “remembering” of the prime than do normals. These studies show that memory deficits sometimes reflect a deficit in the ability to constrain retrieval processes, rather than reflecting a late occurring, post-access deficit in memory attributions.

Cognitive control problems reflecting capture are general. In a preliminary study, Failes et al. (unpublished manuscript) found a high correlation for older adults between false memory and false hearing. The capture procedure was used to show false memory, whereas the procedure for showing false hearing used a capturing sentence context that misled responding. False hearing can reflect poor cognitive control in the form of an absence of careful listening; instead, people rely on what readily comes to mind. Similarly, false memory can be described as reflecting a deficit in careful remembering (recollection). In a related vein, Dockree et al. (Reference Dockree, O'Keeffe, Moloney, Bishara, Carton, Jacoby and Robertson2006) found that correct responding by TBI participants in the misleading prime condition of the capture paradigm was positively correlated with performance on a prospective memory task.

For older adults, Jacoby et al. (Reference Jacoby, Bishara, Hessels and Toth2005a; Reference Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova and Rhodes2005b) found that use of a recognition memory test largely eliminated the effects of a misleading prime, showing that capture effects are largely pre- versus post-access. Although recall tests are likely to be more revealing of deficits in cognitive control, such deficits can be revealed on recognition memory tests. Jacoby et al. (Reference Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova and Rhodes2005b) used a memory-for-foils procedure to reveal such a deficit. During a study phase, words in one condition were “deeply” processed (judge pleasantness), whereas those in another condition were “shallowly” processed (Does the word contain an O or U?). For both conditions, studied words were intermixed with new words (foils) for a test of recognition memory. Subsequently, a test of memory for the foils was given. Younger adults showed better memory for foils from the prior test of deeply encoded words, compared to memory for foils from the prior test of shallowly encoded words, showing that they had recapitulated the encoding task in an attempt to constrain recognition memory. In contrast, such pre-access cognitive control was not shown by older adults, suggesting that they did not engage in source constrained retrieval during the recognition test. Kelley and Alban (Reference Kelley, Alban, Lindsay, Roediger, Kelley and Yonelinas2015) describe results from further experiments using the memory-for-foils procedure to investigate differences in cognitive control.

The above-mentioned studies show the importance of specifying the nature of misattributions, distinguishing between pre-access cognitive control of what comes to mind and post-access monitoring of why a response came to mind after it has done so. Much prior research has focused on post-access attribution processing (source monitoring). Deficits in pre-access cognitive control are likely as or more important. Pre-access constraint on what comes to mind limits the possibility of memory misattributions, whereas a lack of constraint places people at risk.

References

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