On September 28, 2016, Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), overriding a presidential veto for the first and only time during Obama's presidency.Footnote 1 The Act allows Americans to sue foreign states for playing a role in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. While JASTA was written in general terms, it was drafted specifically to allow families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks to sue Saudi Arabia for its suspected role in those attacks.Footnote 2 The Act received widespread bipartisan support despite the administration's consistent stance that the Act would harm U.S. economic, diplomatic, and national security interests.
JASTA amends two statutes—the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)Footnote 3 and the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)Footnote 4 —to effectively overrule judicial constructions of those statutes that had foreclosed lawsuits against Saudi Arabia for its alleged support of the 9/11 attacks.
The FSIA establishes that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States.”Footnote 5 It also carves out a number of exceptions to such sovereign immunity, including an exception for noncommercial torts.Footnote 6 This exception allows an American to sue a foreign state for damages if he or she is injured in the United States as the result of the tortious conduct of a foreign government, its officials, or its employees. In litigation against Saudi Arabia related to the 9/11 attacks, U.S. courts had interpreted this exception narrowly to apply only to tortious conduct occurring entirely within the United States.Footnote 7 Under this interpretation, a foreign state that commits a tortious act resulting in injury or damage in the United States remains immune so long as part of the tortious conduct occurred outside the United States.Footnote 8
JASTA expands what is known as the “terrorism exception” to the FSIA to implicitly overrule this judicial construction when it comes to acts of terrorism. Section 3 of the Act creates a cause of action for civil claims against foreign states (and their officials, employees, and agents) for committing torts anywhere in the world that contribute to a terrorist attack carried out on U.S. soil.Footnote 9 JASTA thus removes the geographic limitation on tort liability established by the courts, and allows Americans to sue foreign states for tortious conduct occurring abroad that causes injury or damage in the United States as the result of international terrorism. JASTA does not, however, authorize lawsuits against foreign states for acts of war or for torts based on omissions or negligence.Footnote 10
Section 5 of JASTA establishes a mechanism by which the U.S. government can seek a stay of proceedings brought against a foreign state under Section 3, referenced above. “[I]f the Secretary of State certifies that the United States is engaged in good faith discussions with the foreign state defendant concerning the resolution of the claims against the foreign state,” the court may stay proceedings against that defendant for up to 180 days.Footnote 11 Once a stay is granted, the attorney general may request 180-day extensions, which the court must grant if the secretary of state recertifies the United States’ engagement in such “good faith discussions.”Footnote 12 JASTA does not limit the number of such extensions.
The other statute amended by JASTA—the ATA—establishes a cause of action for U.S. nationals to obtain treble damages from those responsible for injuries arising out of an act of international terrorism.Footnote 13 Section 4 of JASTA adds a new provision to the ATA that explicitly allows ATA suits against individuals and entities under theories of secondary liability.Footnote 14 Specifically, it recognizes liability for aiding and abetting, or conspiring to commit, an act of international terrorism that is planned, authorized, or executed by a designated foreign terrorist organization.Footnote 15 This provision in effect overrules previous judicial decisions holding that the ATA does not encompass secondary liability.Footnote 16 JASTA applies retroactively to actions involving injuries dating back to September 11, 2001.Footnote 17
Both Democratic and Republican lawmakers sponsored JASTA.Footnote 18 The legislation reflects bipartisan sympathy for the families of 9/11 victims who want to try Saudi Arabia in U.S. courts—and who are unsatisfied by the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission, which found “no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded [Al Qaeda].”Footnote 19
Despite widespread sympathy for the 9/11 victims and their families, the Obama administration opposed the measure, expressing concern about the possibility of unintended consequences.
Prior to the passage of the bill, the White House consistently objected to JASTA due to its dilution of foreign sovereign immunity and its global implications for U.S. economic, diplomatic, and national security interests. “The whole notion of sovereign immunity is at stake,” said White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest.Footnote 20 “[S]overeign immunity is something that protects the ability of the United States to work closely with countries all around the world. And walking back that principle would put the United States, our taxpayers and our service members and diplomats at risk.”Footnote 21
One of the administration's main concerns was that other countries would enact reciprocal measures and open their courts to similar claims against the United States and U.S. officials.Footnote 22 As noted by President Obama in a letter to Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid, such lawsuits could have far-reaching repercussions: they could implicate Americans based on mere accusations of conduct violating foreign laws; they could lead to time-consuming discovery demands for sensitive intelligence information; and they could result in the attachment of U.S. government assets abroad.Footnote 23 Moreover, given the United States’ large international presence, the administration warned that reciprocal legislation would likely have a larger impact on U.S. interests than those of any other country.Footnote 24
The administration also worried that JASTA would remove decisions about foreign states’ involvement in terrorism—weighty decisions with serious diplomatic consequences—from the purview of the executive branch and delegate them instead to private litigants and courts. President Obama cautioned that such privatization could invite decisions that are inconsistent or based on incomplete information.Footnote 25 Prior to JASTA, only the secretary of state had the authority to abrogate a foreign state's immunity arising from potential involvement in terrorism; the secretary did so by designating a foreign state as a “state sponsor of terrorism.”Footnote 26 According to the White House, upsetting this “well codified” process could undermine the government's ability to effectively confront governments that sponsor terrorism and could erode cooperation from diplomatic partners who would be vulnerable to private allegations of terrorist-related activity.Footnote 27
After both houses of Congress passed the bill, President Obama exercised his veto and released a message that reiterated his primary concerns:
First, JASTA threatens to reduce the effectiveness of our response to indications that a foreign government has taken steps outside our borders to provide support for terrorism, by taking such matters out of the hands of national security and foreign policy professionals and placing them in the hands of private litigants and courts.
. . .
Second, JASTA would upset longstanding international principles regarding sovereign immunity, putting in place rules that, if applied globally, . . . could lead to suits against the United States or U.S. officials for actions taken by members of an armed group that received U.S. assistance, misuse of U.S. military equipment by foreign forces, or abuses committed by police units that received U.S. training . . . .
. . .
Third, JASTA threatens to create complications in our relationships with even our closest partners. [By exposing them to potential litigation in U.S. courts,] JASTA threatens to limit their cooperation on key national security issues, including counterterrorism initiatives, at a crucial time when we are trying to build coalitions, not create divisions.Footnote 28
Obama also noted that a number of U.S. allies and partners had expressed “serious concerns” about the law.Footnote 29 After Congress first passed the bill, the European Union urged the president to veto the legislation, based on its view that “JASTA would be in conflict with fundamental principles of international law and in particular the principles of State sovereign immunity.”Footnote 30 Saudi Arabia exerted significant lobbying efforts to try to stop the legislation and reportedly threatened to sell up to $750 billion in U.S. assets that it thought could be vulnerable to attachment under JASTA judgments.Footnote 31 Former members of the Bush, Clinton, and Obama administrations also spoke up, warning lawmakers that if JASTA was enacted, “[o]ur national security interests, our capacity to fight terrorism and our leadership role in the world would be put in serious jeopardy” as well as “our relationship with one of our most important allies, Saudi Arabia.”Footnote 32
Despite these warnings, more than two-thirds of both the Senate and House voted to override Obama's veto.Footnote 33 President Obama called the override a “political vote” and a “mistake” based on lawmakers’ fears of being “perceived as voting against 9/11 families right before an election.”Footnote 34 The enactment of the law had immediate effects: within two days, a 9/11 widower filed a federal lawsuit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia based on JASTA.Footnote 35
After JASTA was enacted, foreign governments again protested that JASTA violates international law. The Saudi Foreign Ministry stated, it “is of great concern to the community of nations that object to the erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity, which has governed international relations for hundreds of years.”Footnote 36 Russia's Foreign Ministry described the law as evincing a “complete disregard for international law” and a “policy of extending [U.S.] jurisdiction to the entire world and ignoring the concept of state sovereignty . . . .”Footnote 37 The United Arab Emirates’ Foreign Ministry declared that JASTA is “contrary to general liability rules,” “not equal with the foundations and principles of relations among states, and represents a clear violation given its negative repercussions and dangerous precedents.”Footnote 38
Some international law scholars have also voiced concerns that JASTA violates international law by exceeding recognized and accepted exceptions to sovereign immunity under customary international law.Footnote 39 Other commentators have been more cautious about that conclusion, noting that the imprecise boundaries of the recognized exception to sovereign immunity for some territorial torts could conceivably cover the circumstances contemplated by JASTA.Footnote 40
When asked directly whether JASTA violates international law, the White House press secretary sidestepped the question.Footnote 41 He confirmed that, to his knowledge, it does not violate any international agreements, but he did not express an official opinion as to whether JASTA violates customary international law.Footnote 42 He instead described sovereign immunity as a “legal concept . . . that countries around the world observe,” and said that “carving out exceptions” to it puts U.S. service members, diplomats, and companies at “legal risk.”Footnote 43 This response conforms with the administration's other characterizations of sovereign immunity as a “foundational principle of international law” that JASTA threatens to “degrade” or “roll[] back.”Footnote 44
Immediately after the law's passage, some members of Congress acknowledged potential downsides of the legislation.Footnote 45 Twenty-eight senators signed a letter asking JASTA's sponsors to “mitigate th[e] unintended consequences” of the law.Footnote 46 The White House press secretary characterized this congressional response as “rapid-onset buyer's remorse.”Footnote 47 In the weeks that followed, State Department representatives expressed their intention to engage with Congress in figuring out the best way to implement the new law.Footnote 48
In late 2016, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham initiated an effort to amend JASTA.Footnote 49 They proposed a “modest” “caveat” to the law, such that
if you are suing based on a discretionary function of a government to form an alliance with somebody or to make a military decision or a political decision, the only time that government is liable is if they knowingly engage with a terrorist organization directly or indirectly, including financing.Footnote 50
According to Senator Graham, “[t]hat would send a signal to the world that we are not opening Pandora's box.”Footnote 51
Despite efforts by both the State Department and White House to work with Congress to mitigate potential negative consequences of the law,Footnote 52 no amendment was passed during the lame-duck session. As Congress’ 2016 session neared its end, Secretary of State John Kerry said, “[w]e tried very hard to move on changing [JASTA] and we will continue to do that.”Footnote 53
As a candidate, President-elect Trump had expressed strong support for JASTA, reportedly describing President Obama's veto as “one of the low points of his presidency” and saying that he would have approved the law if he were president.Footnote 54 While advocating for a JASTA amendment, Senators McCain and Graham acknowledged the possibility that the law might not be “fixed” prior to 2017 and insisted, “[w]e are not going to stop until we have this problem fixed because it is a real problem for people serving the United States in real time.”Footnote 55