Few contemporary crises have reshaped public policy as dramatically as the COVID-19 pandemic. In its shadow, policymakers have debated whether other pressing crises—including climate change—should be integrated into COVID-19 policy responses. Public support for such an approach is unclear: the COVID-19 crisis might eclipse public concern for other policy problems, or complementarities between COVID-19 and other issues could boost support for broad government interventions. In this research note, we use a conjoint experiment, panel study, and framing experiment to assess the substitutability or complementarity of COVID-19 and climate change among US and Canadian publics. We find no evidence that the COVID-19 crisis crowds out public concern about the climate crisis. Instead, we find that the publics in both countries prefer that their governments integrate climate action into COVID-19 responses. We also find evidence that analogizing climate change with COVID-19 may increase concern about climate change.

Despite 97 per cent of scientists agreeing on anthropogenic global warming, the remaining 3 per cent play a critical role in keeping the debate about climate consensus alive. Analysis of climate change contrarians from multi-signatory documents reveals 3 per cent of signees to be climate experts, while the remaining 97 per cent do not meet expert criteria and are also involved with organizations and industries who make up the climate change countermovement. The data also reveal most contrarians to be aged sixty-five or older. As a result, we explore other factors (for example, collective memories and ideological views) that may have also contributed to expert and non-expert views.

We analyze the design of an international climate agreement. In particular, we consider two goals of such an agreement: overcoming free-rider problems and adjusting for differences in mitigation costs between countries. Previous work suggests that it is difficult to achieve both of these goals at once under asymmetric information because countries free ride by exaggerating their abatement costs. We argue that independent information collection (investigations) by an international organization can alleviate this problem. In fact, though the best implementable climate agreement without investigations fails to adjust for individual differences even with significant enforcement power, a mechanism with investigations allows adjustment and can enable implementation of the socially optimal agreement. Furthermore, when the organization has significant enforcement power, the optimal agreement is achievable even with minimal investigative resources (and vice versa). The results suggest that discussions about institutions for climate cooperation should focus on information collection as well as enforcement.

How does naming and shaming affect public support for compliance with international agreements? We investigated this question by conducting survey experiments about the Paris Agreement, which relies on social pressure for enforcement. Our experiments, administered to national samples in the United States, produced three sets of findings. First, shaming by foreign countries shifted domestic public opinion in favor of compliance, increasing the political incentive to honor the Paris Agreement. Second, the effects of shaming varied with the behavior of the target. Shaming was more effective against partial compliers than against targets that took no action or honored their obligations completely. Moreover, even partial compliers managed to reduce the effects of shaming through the strategic use of counter-rhetoric. Third, identity moderated responses to shaming. Shaming by allies was not significantly more effective than shaming by non-allies, but Democrats were more receptive to shaming than Republicans. Overall, our experiments expose both the power and the limits of shaming as a strategy for enforcing the Paris Agreement. At the same time, they advance our understanding of the most significant environmental problem facing the planet.

Global warming and some climate change policies pose additional social risks that necessitate novel responses from the welfare state. Eco-social policies have significant potential to address these challenges, but their wide-scale adoption will depend, among other factors, on public support. In the current article, we theorise how public opinion about eco-social policies is likely to be influenced by a set of contextual and individual-level factors, as well as the perceived welfare deservingness of the target groups. Alongside contributing to the emerging body of literature on eco-social policies, this theoretical framework could help policymakers to anticipate the social groups that will support or oppose eco-social policy agendas and how some of the contradictions could be reduced through policy design.

The Youth Strike for Climate raised important global attention to interconnected climate, energy and environmental issues — it also compelled us to consider what we will do to address these pressing challenges. Developed through consideration of such dynamics, we propose critical energy literacy as an emerging theory that denotes understanding of the social, environmental, political and economic challenges, benefits and impacts of various energy sources, developments and technologies. Critical energy literacy is grounded in critical and decolonising approaches to STEM education; considerations for collaborative multi-, inter- and Trans disciplinary pedagogy; critical place-based inquiry and pedagogy; critical gender perspectives and critical media literacy and engagement. Enhancing societal critical energy literacy will assist with more equitable energy, transit, construction and environmental planning by and for communities, businesses and governments. In this theory-building commentary, we share insights related to and principles for our emerging theory of critical energy literacy which coalesced through personal experience with and previous studies into related initiatives and areas of inquiry, and recent reviews of literature as well as K-12, post-secondary and not-for-profit curricula in Canada with consideration for international contexts. A discussion of renewable energy development and education focused on the Canadian province of Alberta is presented as an illuminating exemplar.

There is evidence from the development and humanitarian sectors that purposeful engagement of women can increase the impact of development. We conducted a literature review to examine whether this is also evident in conservation and natural resource management. The following themes emerged from our review: existing societal and cultural norms affect and generally limit how women can engage in conservation and natural resource management; women interact differently with the environment than men, so if they are excluded, their knowledge and perspectives on particular resources may not be considered in conservation actions; and there is often a lack of resources or dedicated effort by conservation or natural resource management programmes to understand and address the barriers that prevent women's engagement. Although there was evidence of a positive relationship between the engagement of women and environmental outcomes, some studies showed that positive conservation outcomes do not necessarily benefit women, and when women are not considered, conservation activities can perpetuate existing inequities. We conclude that although the importance of integrating gender into conservation is acknowledged in the literature, there is a need to examine how women can be meaningfully engaged in conservation. This must go beyond treating women as a homogenous group, to consider intersectionality including race, ethnicity, age, religion, poverty and disability. In addition, conservation and natural resource management institutions need to address the inclusion of women in their own staff and programmes.

2020 was to be a landmark year for setting targets to stop biodiversity loss and prevent dangerous climate change. However, COVID-19 has caused delays to the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the 26th COP of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Negotiations on the Global Biodiversity Framework and the second submission of Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement were due to take place at these COPs. There is uncertainty as to how the COVID-19 disruption will affect the negotiations, whether parties will pursue more ambitious actions or take a weaker stance on issues. Our policy analysis shows there are broad opportunities for climate and biodiversity frameworks to better respond to COVID-19, by viewing future pandemics, biodiversity loss, and climate change as interconnected problems. Importantly, there needs to be greater focus on agriculture and food systems in discussions, establishing safeguards for carbon markets, and implementing nature-based solutions in meeting the Paris Agreement goals. We can no longer delay action to address the biodiversity and climate emergencies, and accelerating sustainable recovery plans through virtual spaces may help keep discussions and momentum before the resumption of in-person negotiations.

Finding the ways that work to deliver the innovation needed should be given parity of esteem with getting the prices right as a focus of the economics profession and policy systems. Learn from experience as regards carbon pricing and carbon-reducing innovation; insights from the latter coming mainly from the US, China and Europe; demographically relatively small countries – Denmark (wind) and Australia (solar PV) – can make outsize contributions. A carbon price ceiling is too low to drive innovation; generating carbon-reducing innovation requires that it be explicitly recognized as a priority, and nurtured accordingly: identify the priority area(s) where innovation at scale will be necessary to make progress; baseline the elements of the innovation ecosystem which are already in place, and the gaps that need to be filled. Key elements include institutions and incentives that promote innovation, a research and enterprise community that make it happen, and a supportive public.

After four years of not simply inaction but significant retrogression in U.S. climate change policy, the Biden administration has its work cut out. As a start, it needs to undo what Trump did. The Biden administration took a step in that direction on Day 1 by rejoining the Paris Agreement. But simply restoring the pre-Trump status quo ante is not enough. The United States also needs to push for more ambitious global action. In part, this will require strengthening parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement; but it will also require actions by what Sue Biniaz, the former State Department climate change lawyer, likes to call the Greater Metropolitan Paris Agreement—that is, the array of other international actors that help advance the Paris Agreement's goals, including global institutions such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Montreal Protocol, and the World Bank, as well as regional organizations and non-state actors. Although the Biden administration can pursue some of these international initiatives directly through executive action, new regulatory initiatives will face an uncertain fate in the Supreme Court. So how much the Biden Administration is able to achieve will likely depend significantly on how much a nearly evenly-divided Congress is willing to support.

Despite the global alarm caused by accelerating climate change, hydrocarbon companies are exploring and opening up new oil and gas fields all over the world, including the Arctic. With increasing attention on the Arctic, companies address the growing global environmental pressure in their public marketing in various ways. This article examines the webpages of Norwegian Equinor and Russian Gazprom & Gazprom Neft. Building on feminist discussions, I analyse the different justification strategies these fossil fuel companies working in the Arctic utilise in order to support their ongoing operations. This article concludes that in order to justify their operations in the Arctic, the Norwegian and Russian companies emphasise values based on discourses that have historically and culturally been associated with masculine practices, such as the control of nature enabled by technology. These justifications are thus reinforcing the narrative of the Arctic as a territory to be conquered and mastered. Even though the companies operate in different sociopolitical contexts, the grounds of justification are rather similar. Their biggest differences occur in their visual presentations of gender, which I argue is part of the justification. Approaching the fossil fuel industry from a feminist perspective allows questioning the dominant conceptualisations, which the justifications of Arctic hydrocarbon companies are based on.

Australia has committed to reducing emissions under the Paris Agreement by 2030, in alignment with the United Nations' (UN) Sustainability Development Goal (SDG) climate action. This article investigates the responses of Australian high-emission businesses to Australian government action and legislation in relation to climate change, specifically the carbon tax, and how this knowledge can assist in delineating future carbon legislation. A qualitative study of the responses of 17 high-emission businesses and three industry associations to carbon legislation during the implementation of the carbon tax in Australia identified the use of resistive, reactive or cooperative strategies by the businesses. Issues related to carbon legislation identified by businesses included differences in time orientation, multiple regulations, political uncertainty, international positioning and the need for long-term and consolidated policies. Given these findings, this article argues that well-designed top-down legislative measures are necessary to steer businesses towards a carbon-neutral regime.