From the end of 1706 Russia faced Sweden one to one. As Peter wrote to Admiralteets Apraksin, “the war has come to rest with us alone.” The new situation made the internal rivalries of the Russian elite and its relations with Peter even more critical, for the danger existed that Sweden would try to exploit these rivalries and dissensions to its own advantage. There was nothing unexpected or unusual in such a move in the Europe of the early eighteenth century. Spain had tried to use the frondeurs against Mazarin and the young Louis XIV, and Louis himself funded expeditions against his English rivals many times, sending fleets and troops to Ireland and Scotland in the hope of encouraging a rebellion against King William and Queen Anne. Peter himself had begun his war against Sweden in contact with Patkul and other discontented Livonian noblemen. In later years both Peter and Charles XII would simultaneously intrigue with the Jacobites against George I of England. Any dissension, whether dynastic, aristocratic, political, religious, or regional, was fair game for intrigues in time of war. Peter could not expect Charles to be any different, and in fact he was not. From the very moment that Charles disposed of Augustus II, if not before, he intended not merely to defeat Peter but also to encourage a revolt that would end in the overthrow of Peter or the reorganization of the Russian state. This was a threat that Peter had to take into account.