Dewey and Peirce shared a common focus on the elaboration of a model of inquiry that seeks to remove doubt concerning the answer to some question by identifying potential answers to the question, ascertaining the evidence available for evaluating the candidacy of such answers as solutions to the problem posed, conducting experiments to acquire more evidence and deciding on the basis of the available evidence which of the potential answers to add to the stock of knowledge. My own proposals concerning how to model well-conducted inquiry depart in several respects from the proposals of both Peirce and Dewey. But these two great philosophers gave classical expression to the ideas that inspired the projects I have undertaken. In this essay, I shall comment on some aspects of Dewey's vision of the logic of inquiry, pointing to important respects in which I depart from his approach. Because I shall be arguing with Dewey, I wish to emphasize here and now that I am arguing not to dismiss him or his ideas but to sharpen some of my ideas by confrontation with one of the points of view that inspired them.