

# On the Alleged Augustinianism in Kant's *Religion*

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## Abstract

Both critics and defenders of Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* have raised worries about its alleged employment of an 'Augustinian' conception of moral evil as well as the accounts of grace and moral regeneration consequent to it. Combined, these aspects of the *Religion* are often seen as responsible for its principal 'wobble', 'conundrum' or 'internal contradiction', and are likewise among the key reasons why the *Religion* is commonly seen as at odds with the epistemic strictures and moral principles which shape Kant's broader Critical corpus. It is the purpose of this article to reassess these charges and to show thereby that rather than accepting this alleged Augustinianism, Kant engages with and ultimately *rejects* its core tenets.

**Keywords:** Kant, Augustine, Augustinianism, Pelagianism, theology, religion, original sin, evil, grace, change of heart, conundrum

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## 1. Introduction

It is often claimed that *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* is vitiated by a series of 'wobbles' (Michalson 1990: 8) or 'conundrums' (Wolterstorff 1991: 40), is frequently 'tensive' and 'ambiguous' (Byrne 2007: 173), and is, in varying ways, at odds with the Enlightenment picture of morality usually associated with Kant's works (Allison 2002: 338). The principal cause of these difficulties is often taken to be the allegedly 'Augustinian' aspects of Kant's account of moral evil in Part One of the *Religion* and its consequent account of grace and moral regeneration.

Recent interpreters have sought to address these concerns in various ways. Some have proposed that the *Religion's* 'wobbles' can be immediately

overcome once it is realized that the text is in no way ‘engaging in theological speculation’ (DiCenso 2012: 117) but is only concerned with religious imagery, our moral ideals in ‘imaginatively enhanced or pictorial form’ (DiCenso 2012: 28). More conventionally, interpreters accept that the philosophical tensions are there in the text, but downplay them as residual ‘nostalgia towards’ pre-modern inquiries into the nature of morality (Wood 2005). What, however, has not been directly assessed is whether or not the oft repeated claims about Part One’s alleged Augustinianism are, in fact, correct. It is thus the purpose of this article to consider this issue and its bearing on the frequent and long-standing criticisms of the *Religion* as both internally inconsistent as well as incompatible with the epistemic strictures and moral principles which shape Kant’s broader corpus.<sup>1</sup>

I will begin with a discussion of the *Religion*’s overall structure and aims, so that I may then consider Kant’s engagement with Augustinianism in light of this. As we shall see, rather than being a passing or incidental concern, Kant’s appraisal of core Augustinian tenets is integral to the fundamental project of the *Religion*, as an inquiry into the relationship between Christian doctrines and what Kant calls the ‘pure rational system of religion’ (henceforth, ‘PRSR’). I will then interpret Part One in light of this discussion, attending to the particular tenets which shape the Augustinian conception of moral evil and how these tenets are received by Kant. From there, I will turn to Part One’s ‘General Remark’ or *parergon* to consider the distinctive function Kant assigns to this section of Part One and the salience of that function to its discussion of grace and moral regeneration. In short, this article will illustrate the importance of reading the *Religion* with due attention to its overall aims and structure, and will thereby offer a defence against the core ‘conundrum’, ‘wobble’ and ‘internal contradiction’ most often attributed to the text.

## 2. Interpreting the *Religion*

Towards the opening of its Second Preface, Kant remarks that ‘doubts have been expressed’ (*Rel*, 6: 12) about the title of the *Religion*, and offers in response his now familiar image of two concentric circles or spheres.<sup>2</sup> The title, *Religion within [innerhalb] the Boundaries [Grenzen] of Mere Reason*, he there explains, is meant to suggest an embedding relationship between the wider sphere of traditional religion (i.e. the doctrines of ‘historical faith’) and the more narrow sphere of natural or rational religion.<sup>3</sup> The project of the *Religion* is thus to determine the ‘boundary’ (*Grenze*) between historical faith and natural/rational religion, and more fully, to engage in the ‘experiment’ (*Versuch*) (6: 10, 12)<sup>4</sup> of comparing these two

domains so as to determine how much 'unity' or at least 'compatibility' (6: 13) there is between them.

Such a project is, of course, hardly unique to Kant. Philosophers and theologians have long debated the relationship between natural and revealed religion, their respective contents and level of overlap. Kant, likewise, in his three *Critiques*, *Prolegomena*, lectures on metaphysics and religion, and in various shorter works, touches upon this relationship, either commenting on the standard division between natural and revealed religion (e.g. 'Only Possible Argument', 2: 111; A631/B659; 'Orientation in Thinking', 8: 142; L-Th, 28: 1117–18),<sup>5</sup> criticizing various *theoretical* approaches to natural or rational religion (e.g. A583–4/B661–2, Prol, 4: 355–6, 'Orientation', 8: 133–4, 'Philosophical Trials', 8: 253–4, L-TH, 28: 1013–14), or developing aspects of his own *moral* approach to religion (i.e. PRSR).

Overwhelmingly, however, the latter discussions focus on issues usually associated with natural/rational religion (proofs for God's existence and an afterlife, religious epistemology, rational grounds for belief, etc.) rather than the more distinctive doctrines of revealed religion (the Fall, grace, providence, atonement, the incarnation, etc.) or what relationships may exist between them.<sup>6</sup> It is thus in the *Religion* where Kant finally turns to the issues of revealed religion in detail, reviewing its core doctrines and exploring how much 'compatibility' or 'unity' may exist between them and PRSR.

This is very much how Kant describes the project of the *Religion* in the Second Preface, subsequent to its account of the text's title. Though the 'experiment' to assess the question of 'unity' between natural and revealed religion is mentioned in the First Preface (*Rel*, 6: 10), it is there somewhat buried amidst other issues of concern. However, in the Second Preface, Kant more directly explains the text's overall aim or 'experiment' as one of comparison: 'starting from some alleged revelation', holding some fragment of a 'historical system' 'up to moral concepts' so as to see whether it 'lead[s] back' to the 'pure rational system of religion' (6: 12).<sup>7</sup> That is, as noted above, through the *Religion*, Kant seeks to determine how much 'compatibility' or 'unity' exists between the two spheres of revealed/historical and natural/rational religion.

However, as the Second Preface moves forward in its account of this 'experiment', the project of comparison gains an evaluative import. Kant presents the 'pure rational system of religion' as 'sufficient to genuine religion' (*Rel*, 6: 12). He then distinguishes between 'religion' and

‘cult’ (6: 13), and suggests that the extent to which a historical faith falls outside the boundaries of mere reason, the more it is ‘cult’ than ‘religion’. This is then followed by an analogy, as Kant describes his inquiry into the scope of ‘compatibility’ or ‘unity’ as a way of separating out the layers of a historical religion, so that like ‘oil and water’ the ‘purely moral religion (the religion of reason) [can] float to the top’ (ibid.).

One can thus read each of the *Religion*’s four parts as a stage in this ‘experiment’. A religious tradition contains numerous doctrines, only some of which cohere with rational religion. Kant’s aim is to identify these doctrines, the overall ‘unity’ or at least ‘compatibility’ a historical religion has with rational religion, and thus the extent to which its doctrines (a) serve as ‘vehicles’ for genuine religion, or (b), as Kant finds for the virgin birth (*Rel.*, 6: 80n.), are of little consequence, or finally (c) endanger genuine religion, promoting instead a ‘religion of roagation’ (*Gunstbewerbung*) or ‘mere cult’ (6: 51).<sup>8</sup>

Part One, accordingly, serves as Kant’s inquiry into the ‘compatibility’ or ‘unity’ between the Christian doctrine of original sin (especially as rendered through the prevailing Lutheran and Lutheran Pietist theology with which Kant was most familiar) and its rational corollary. Part Two then moves on to the Christian doctrine of atonement and its rational corollary. Part Three, ‘The victory of the good principle over evil, and the founding of a kingdom of God on earth’ (*Rel.*, 6: 93) considers the social and historical dimension of religion, specifically the need for a church and its role in promoting the highest good. Part Four then focuses on ‘service and counterfeit service’ (6: 151), i.e. ecclesiastical rituals and practices. Of the *Religion*’s four parts, it is the most polemical, as rules of piety often come to supplant morality as the means through which one becomes ‘well-pleasing to God’ (6: 170).

With this brief – and hopefully clear – explanation of the *Religion*’s overall project, we have now a way to read each part of the text. In the case of the present inquiry, while we may find various Augustinian tenets within Part One, the challenge is to determine how each tenet is assessed by Kant. When he holds them ‘up to moral concepts’ (*Rel.*, 6: 12) does he find them to have ‘unity’ or at least ‘compatibility’ with PRSR? Do they cohere with genuine religion? Or are they in the end more in the service of ‘cult’? To answer this, we must, however, get past the general claim about Part One’s Augustinianism and consider instead its particular tenets, how they are portrayed by Kant in the *Religion*, and his findings with regards to their compatibility with rational religion. It is to this that I now turn.

### 3. Kant *contra* Augustine: Moral Depravity and Original Sin

One finds time and again reference to the supposed Augustinianism of the *Religion's* treatment of moral evil. Part One is said to be 'firmly ensconced within the Augustinian tradition' (Quinn 1988: 91), replete with 'Augustinian echoes' (Mariña 1997: 379), 'accommodating' (Wood 1970: 246) or built around tenets 'fundamental to Augustine' (Beiser 2006: 594), or resting upon an 'Augustinian metaphysic' (Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 136). Its account of evil is supposedly 'closer to that of the later Augustine' than either 'the standard views of the Enlightenment' or the 'intuitions of present day philosophers, including numerous Kantians' (Allison 2002: 338).

To see, however, how far from being the case this really is, let us begin by gaining some clarity as to what Augustine and his Reformation proponents actually claim. In particular, let us consider the following core Augustinian tenets:

1. Our common progenitor, Adam, disobeyed God, committing the 'primal sin' whose consequences we have inherited.
2. These consequences include both a corruption of our cognitive powers such that we can no longer know *the* good and a corruption of our volitional powers such that we can no longer will it.
3. Although we are naturally oriented towards the good, due to the corruption of our faculties, we (a) mistake the 'lesser' goods of self-interest for *the* good, and (b) are volitionally incapable of willing other than in accordance with self-interest.
4. Due to (2) and (3), neither can we recognize our moral depravity, nor were we able to recognize it, would we want to overcome it. Hence, neither would we seek divine aid nor choose to accept it if offered.<sup>9</sup>

Although many interpreters have used Kant's claim that humanity as a whole is morally corrupt as their basis for linking the *Religion* to the Augustinian tradition, this is not a claim that Kant sees as specific to either Augustinianism or even to Christianity. Instead, he begins Part One by stating first '[t]hat "the world lieth in evil" is a complaint as old as history' (*Rel*, 6: 19), and then continues through the remainder of the paragraph to reference quite disparate traditions, as varied as Hinduism and Hellenistic mythology, each reflecting the idea that the world and humanity is 'fallen'.

While at this level of generality there is certainly a point of agreement between Kant and Augustine, each of the above four tenets are nonetheless considered and rejected. To see this, let us begin with the first,

particularly its claim that evil can be ‘inherited’. Contemporary readers will likely find this challenge to Augustinian Christianity the least disconcerting, for the notion that procreation can transfer a moral liability is anathema to our scientific worldview.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, it should be apparent that for Kant the causal order of nature cannot serve as the mechanism through which we acquire our moral status. He thus writes: ‘[w]hatever the nature . . . of the origin of moral evil in the human being, of all the ways of representing [it] . . . the most inappropriate is surely to imagine it as having come to us by way of *inheritance* from our first parents’ (*Rel*, 6: 40).

Where the Augustinian has humanity sharing a common liability because of Adam’s primal sin, one that is then forgiven or repaid through the crucifixion, it is axiomatic for Kant that the acquisition of one’s moral status must ‘always be a deed of freedom’ (*Rel*, 6: 21). Hence, where the Augustinian allows us to be either good or evil through no act of our own, Kant is quite clear that there is no ‘*transmissible* liability’, either as a liability inherited from our Progenitor or through our being ‘relieved’ (*entschlagen*) of it through a ‘foreign satisfying merit’ (6: 118).

This, of course, has great bearing on the ‘Christian Story’, since original sin and redemption through the Cross are partner doctrines (the former tendered in service to the latter). So, where the dominant Augustinian version of this story does not consider the exercise of free will as necessary for our moral status, Kant is unambiguous on the matter. As such, neither can we have our moral condition transmitted to us, nor can we be relieved of it through its transmission to another.

The second and third of the above tenets can be understood as capturing the essential mechanics of the Augustinian conception of moral evil. Although there are some differences between how Augustine himself and his followers in the Reformation describe the consequences of the Fall, they all nonetheless subscribe to a *privation* account of evil, where as a result of Adam’s primal sin, human nature is now such that we can neither know the good nor be moved to act on its basis. Where Adam had, according to Augustine’s roughly Platonic worldview, a noetic grasp of the Form of the Good, his violation of God’s will compromised this capacity both for himself and his progeny. Hence, we are now left having to rely upon our senses for more than what they are capable of offering to us, grasping as a result only distortions or shadows of the true good, most notably the ‘lesser’ goods of corporeal need and subjective interest.

Similarly, the Fall is taken to have affected our volitional powers, for where Adam, in his original state, was moved to act by the good, we are now driven only by self-interest. Bodily desire, the ambitions of our ego, lust, pride and what Kant refers to as our 'malignant inclinations' (*Rel*, 6: 94) are all that now move us. Hence we have among Luther's best known works *The Bondage of the Will*, where he argues against Erasmus, very much as Augustine argued against Pelagius, that our fallen wills are without the capacity to choose the good. We are thus, according to this tradition, out and out 'slaves to sin', existing, moreover, in a state of 'total depravity'. For not only are we without any interest in doing the good for its own sake, but we are moved to act solely by the 'lesser' goods that drive our fallen nature. That is, this tradition would (in Kantian terms) hold that while we may out of self-interest still act *in conformity with duty*, there is no acting *from duty*.

Readers of the *Religion* who believe that Kant adopts an Augustinian conception of moral evil have, quite understandably, dismissed the text as in tension with, if not a departure from, the rest of the Critical corpus. For while Kant likewise recognizes that moral depravity has both cognitive and volitional characteristics, he by no means thinks that we are either incapable of knowing the good nor unmoved by it.

With regards to our cognition, Kant recognizes that our innate propensity to evil disposes us to '[t]hrow dust in our own eyes' (*Rel*, 6: 38) so that we can, through one 'inner lie' or another rationalize away what morality commands. Yet rather than having here a *privation* thesis, that our immorality is due to a *lack* of the cognitive powers needed to know the good, Kant is quite clear that there is no '*corruption* of the morally legislative reason' (6: 35), no '*lost* incentive for the good', for 'were we ever to lose it, we would also never be able to regain it' (6: 46).

Likewise, instead of our wills being reduced to an *arbitrium brutum*, such that we are moved by nothing other than desire, Part One of the *Religion* (esp. 6: 24) offers one of the clearest statements of what Henry Allison calls Kant's 'Incorporation Thesis', i.e. that 'an incentive can determine the will to an action *only insofar as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim*' (Allison 1990: 40). Hence, while Kant depicts our propensity to evil as innate, whether or not we accede to it still depends upon an original 'deed' of freedom.<sup>11</sup> In fact, where the Augustinian follows a *privation* account, Kant presents our Propensity to Evil as a 'positive principle' (6: 59), an 'active and opposing cause' (6: 57) which draws us away from the moral law and towards our giving priority to self-interest in our 'supreme maxim'.

Perhaps even more to the point, Kant does not think that once we have given in to this propensity that we lose or suspend our free will. Although we choose as our ‘supreme maxim’ one which gives priority to self-interest over morality, Kant nonetheless maintains that this priority endures only so long as we continue to reaffirm it. On this he writes: ‘whatever his previous behavior may have been, whatever the natural causes influencing him, whether they are inside or outside them, his action is yet free and not determined’ (*Rel*, 6: 41). Likewise, he maintains that ‘it must equally be possible to *overcome* this evil, for it is found in the human being as acting freely’ (6: 37).

Accordingly, quite unlike the Augustinian, not only does Kant explain our moral condition in terms of a ‘positive principle’, but neither is evil understood in terms of a lost cognitive or volitional capacity. We do not become ‘slaves to sin’ and are not left without the cognitive and volitional powers necessary for choosing the good.<sup>12</sup> Part One of the *Religion*, thus, rather than offering a position even *compatible* with Augustinianism,<sup>13</sup> instead advances an account of moral evil fundamentally at odds with it. Kant does not here ‘wobble’ or ‘capitulate’, but rather discusses the Augustinian account of moral evil and *rejects* it.

#### 4. Kant *contra* Augustine: Divine Aid and the Change of Heart

According to the Augustinian tradition, there is nothing whatsoever we can do to morally better ourselves. We cannot overcome our fallen condition. We can do nothing to merit divine aid. Nor can we even choose to accept it if offered.<sup>14</sup> Although other soteriologies allow for such possibilities, that is not so with Augustine, Calvin or Luther. What technically marks out a position as semi-Pelagian is that it claims that we *are* capable of having a role in our moral restoration, even though divine aid is still necessary for the process. Hence, in contrast to the original Reformers, many further Protestant movements, including Arminianism, Methodism, Lutheran Pietism, Moravianism and Baptism (as well as contemporary American Evangelicalism), are all technically semi-Pelagian in that they maintain some form of *concursum* or ‘syncretism’ whereby we must in one manner or another do our part in order to receive grace and/or allow it to do its work.<sup>15</sup> The unmitigated Augustinian, however, proffers a ‘monergism’ until our powers are restored, and only thereafter a *concursum* as we work with God to persevere in our transformed state. In accord with this monergism, Augustine, Luther and Calvin maintained a set of further doctrines which, as we shall see, are not merely rejected by Kant, but are treated with contempt.



The first and most essential of these doctrines is typically called the 'passive reception of grace'. As we are 'slaves to sin', lacking both the cognitive and volitional powers to choose the good, there is nothing we can do in support of our moral transformation. Hence, as the term indicates, we are completely passive beneficiaries of God's reshaping of our natures, restoring our lost capacities. Second, we are, in our fallen condition, oriented towards self-interest alone, for not only do we lack the powers to cooperate with grace, but we actively resist it. Accordingly, grace is described as 'efficacious', as it is sufficient to override our resistance. Lastly, the Augustinian tradition maintains the 'Mystery of Grace', for since we have no positive role to play, whether or not we are made to be among the 'elect' is solely a matter of God's will.<sup>16</sup>

As should be expected, Kant does not find much in the above compatible with PRSR. Although he employs the preferred Pietist term 'Change of Heart' to represent the inner transformation by which we become 'well-pleasing to God', it is repurposed to represent the '*revolution* in the disposition of the human being' (*Rel*, 6: 47) as opposed to the restoration of capacities lost to us in original sin. Likewise, rather than being passive recipients of a transformative grace, Kant describes the Change of Heart as the restoration of 'the *purity* of the law, as the supreme ground of all our maxims' (6: 46). This restoration, moreover, is not brought about through a 'foreign influence' that does the work for us, but rather demands the 'exertion' of our own powers (6: 51).

I will say more about this shortly, but before moving on, let us briefly look at Part One's closing comments on Augustinianism, for we find there not just a philosophical critique, but an outright invective against its account of grace. While the passive reception of grace and its underlying privation account of evil is promoted by Augustinian Christianity under the guise of our need to be humble before God, it is rather, for Kant, illustrative of the 'moral frailty' that earlier in Part One was characterized as one of the three fundamental manifestations of our propensity to evil. Pulling no punches, Kant denounces the Augustinian picture as itself a delusion promoted by those who 'find moral labor vexing'. It replaces 'moral religion' with a 'religion of roagation (of mere cult)', for if we are incapable of being moral, our relationship to God becomes one of just empty ritual. Hence, to Kant, Augustinianism is driven by our desire to relieve humanity from the 'expectation of self-improvement', for 'under the pretext of a natural impotence', it 'conjures up ... all sorts of impure religious ideas' (*Rel*, 6: 51).<sup>17</sup>

## 5. Moral Hope and the Limits of Kant's Philosophical Theology

In the second edition of the *Religion*, Kant adds a brief discussion of the function of the 'General Remarks' or *parerga* found at the end of each of its four parts. Where the main body of each attends to specific doctrinal issues (original sin, atonement, providence, church rituals) so as to assess the extent to which there is 'unity' between PRSR and Christianity, their closing *parerga* consider matters of interest to rational religion that nonetheless exceed what can be adduced from its guiding principles.

Hence, we have in Part One an account of moral evil shaped by Kant's familiar principles; and yet, in light of this account, we are led to a question for which he does not have an answer: whether or not, given our moral corruption, we can through our own powers bring about a Change of Heart, or whether divine aid is needed. For rather than defaulting into a Pelagian or semi-Pelagian view, or coming in the end to accept the Augustinian account of divine aid, Kant acknowledges that the guiding moral and epistemic principles which shape PRSR are on their own insufficient to yield an answer.

Unfortunately, this critical point of agnosticism has not been appreciated. For according to most Anglophone interpreters, Kant *does* advance a specific view – for some it is Augustinian, for others Pelagian, and for many, an unstable combination of the two. It has often been claimed that Kant's attempt in the *Religion* ultimately leaves him with the 'conundrum' that, on the one hand, he seems to follow the Augustinian account of moral evil while at the same time he subscribes to the 'Stoic Maxim' that 'a person's moral worth is determined entirely by that person himself'.<sup>18</sup> Hence, through much of the past century, starting with Karl Barth and then repeated by a number of Christian philosophers, the *Religion's* soteriology is vitiated by a fundamental 'internal contradiction'.<sup>19</sup>

Of course, we have already seen that half of the above critique is quite off-base, for Kant does not accept the Augustinian account of moral evil. Moreover, as I will discuss below, what we may call the 'conundrumists' are also wrong about what they claim as Kant's 'Stoic Maxim'. But first, let us look at a key passage frequently quoted to establish Kant's allegedly inconsistent views on the need for divine aid. In German, 'Gesetzt, zum Gut- oder Besserwerden sei noch eine übernatürliche Mitwirkung nöthig' (*Rel*, 6: 44). Following the earlier Greene/Hudson translation, di Giovanni (Kant 1996) translates this as 'Granted that some supernatural cooperation is also needed'. What is missed here is the subjunctive form of the statement, for rather than a 'granting' of divine aid, Kant is offering

it – as the issue of this *parergon* – as a conjecture to be pondered. It is thus more aptly translated by Pluhar (Kant 2009) as ‘Supposing that, for him to become good or better, a supranatural cooperation were also needed’.<sup>20</sup>

As discussed, Kant's account of moral evil does not eliminate the capacities needed to undergo a Change of Heart, and yet because we have given priority to self-interest over morality, there is a question as to whether or not we still might need God's help to get ourselves out of this commitment. For as he states, even though our powers remain intact, there is still the question of ‘how can an evil tree bear good fruit?’ (*Rel*, 6: 45).

Kant's response to this question, however, will only take us so far. Following the project of the *Religion* described in its Second Preface, Kant holds this question ‘up to moral concepts’ (*Rel*, 6: 12), but unlike the Augustinian, semi-Pelagian or Pelagian, he does not commit to a determinate answer.<sup>21</sup> To see this fully, let us look at the three key moral principles which inform this *parergon*.

The first and most obvious is *ought implies can*: for since we *ought* to undergo the Change of Heart, it must be possible. What is less obvious, however, is what is implied by this possibility. According to the conundrumists, Kant is committed to the maxim that ‘a person's moral worth is determined entirely by that person himself’. Hence, even if we follow the above correctives to how Part One is to be read, as neither supporting the Augustinian privation account nor as ‘granting’ the necessity of divine aid, Kant's alleged Stoic Maxim would still force upon him another dogma, this time, of Pelagianism.

While a charge of Pelagianism may be devastating to a Christian theologian, it is without *philosophical* teeth, for hardly would the philosopher be so impacted by the thought that they might be taken as a moral optimist. Accordingly, when the conundrumists sought to take Kant down, they could not simply accuse him of Pelagianism, but rather set it within what would be a philosophical objection: namely that of self-contradiction. Hence, they claimed that Kant both ‘grants’ the need for divine aid but at the same time maintains the ‘Stoic Maxim’ which would seem to bar it.

We have already addressed the first half of this alleged conundrum and shown that it is not only based upon an error of translation, but also a misunderstanding of Kant's views on the nature of moral evil. As such, we have already seen that our moral restoration may not need divine aid, for unlike the Augustinian we are not without those powers necessary to bring it about.

Nevertheless, if they were correct about the maxim in question, it still offers a basis for concern, as it does seem to require that our Change of Heart must be accomplished unaided. However, as we shall see, Kant does not subscribe to that maxim, at least as portrayed by the conundrumists, and so is not forced to deny God a role in our moral restoration.

Although it quite aptly follows from *ought implies can* that if we have a duty, we must have the powers necessary to act upon it, it does not follow from this that the receipt of any aid whatsoever is incompatible with our observance of the duty. Likewise, although we earn moral merit through the use of our powers, again it does not follow that we cannot still earn merit even if our powers are aided. This can be seen quite easily through the following examples.

Consider Kant's use of *ought implies can* in connection with the highest good. There, *ought implies can* leads us to posit God, for the *can*, rather than referencing *our* powers, instead recognizes that without God's ability to judge our worthiness and secure our moral deserts, the highest good would not be possible. Hence, in this familiar use of *ought implies can*, there is a shared effort between God and humanity with our role specifically being to earn moral merit.<sup>22</sup>

Or consider what is perhaps an even more apt example, namely, our duty to further our talents. Imagine a young violinist who, in order to pursue this duty, takes lessons, obtains scholarships and attends the local symphony. She thus receives aid from teachers, arts organizations or wealthy patrons, and likewise finds inspiration watching accomplished musicians perform. All these aid her in her efforts, and yet despite that she still would be deserving of praise, including moral praise, for her dedication, her sacrifices and her growing prowess. There is, in short, nothing here to suggest that the receipt of aid prevents one from earning moral merit.

While in one sense it is correct that 'a person's moral worth is determined entirely by that person himself', for what moral worth they gain must be due to the employment of their own powers, because there are numerous ways in which aid may *facilitate* the use of these powers rather than replace them, there is no reason to claim that divine aid is necessarily incompatible with moral merit. Kant, in fact, brought out this point directly in both the *Religion* and the *Conflict of the Faculties*.

As characterized in the *Religion*, the Change of Heart, as the means by which we become 'well-pleasing to God',<sup>23</sup> 'must be the effect of our

own work' rather than something produced through 'a foreign influence to which we remain passive' (*Rel*, 6: 118). Similarly, Kant writes, 'what is to be accredited to us as morally good conduct must take place not through foreign influence but only through the use of our own powers' (6: 191). Likewise, in the *Conflict of the Faculties*, there are two lengthy discussions of this topic where Kant maintains that the Change of Heart 'must be represented as issuing from the human being's own use of his moral powers, not as an effect [resulting] from the influence of an external, higher cause by whose activity the human being is passively healed' (7: 42). He then directly rejects both the Lutheran Pietist and Moravian accounts of grace because 'on their view the effect of this power would not be our deed and could not be imputed to us' (7: 59).

Yet none of this should be understood as a denial of divine aid *überhaupt*. What is rejected is specifically the representations of divine aid found in Augustinian and semi-Pelagian soteriologies. Insofar as both hold (though to different degrees) that we are incapacitated due to original sin, they both find need to posit a 'foreign influence' responsible for our Change of Heart. However, as Kant maintains that our powers remain intact, divine aid is given a different form, one that, instead of doing the moral work for us, rather supports the use of our own powers, be it through (as described at the opening of this *parergon*) a 'diminution of obstacles' (*Rel*, 6: 44), the 'moral prototype' of Jesus, who serves to inspire us by example (6: 48, 63), or some form of 'positive assistance' (6: 44). God's aid for Kant is thus likened to that of a protector, teacher or patron, rather than, as the Augustinian would have it, a physician restoring the function of failed organs.

Finally, a third key principle which shapes this *parergon*, one that has been taken for granted through the above, is that our salvation depends upon earning moral merit. Not only is such merit made impossible by the Augustinian, but for additional theological reasons as well, they maintain that grace is an unmerited gift of God. Kant's rejection of this should be apparent enough from the above quotations, as well as from his rejection of vicarious atonement. Moreover, in numerous passages, Kant rejects the idea of divine forgiveness or mercy (*Rel*, 6: 73, 74, 76, 141, 145n., 146n.), for whatever it is that may be given to us in grace must always be 'fully in accord with eternal justice' (6: 76).

This is not a minor concern for Kant, nor an *ad hoc* principle. As the highest good is the basis upon which 'morality inevitably leads to religion' (*Rel*, 6: 6, 8n.), both the broader themes as well as the particular details

of PRSR flow out of this doctrine. Because the highest good reflects our need for an ultimate distribution of happiness in accordance with moral worth, rational religion in turn offers a soteriology whereby we can, in contrast to Augustinianism, each earn such worth. Hence, whether or not we become ‘well-pleasing to God’, whether or not we ultimately are rewarded or punished, cannot be determined through an unmerited dispensation, but, as Kant repeatedly states, must fully accord with divine justice.<sup>24</sup>

Where this leaves us when facing the question of this *parergon* can be understood as follows. First, given *ought implies can*, the Change of Heart must be possible. Second, Kant does not consider divine aid incompatible with moral merit. Third, it is in light of the highest good that Kant’s soteriology is invested in the importance of earned merit. Yet these together still do not for Kant give us the answer, for while we have the cognitive and volitional powers necessary for restoring morality to its rightful priority over self-interest, and while it is through the exercise of these powers that we are to earn moral merit, it remains an unknown as to whether our powers, although necessary, may nonetheless *not be sufficient* for the Change of Heart. Hence, Kant recognizes that we *might* need divine aid, not because we lack the powers to bring it about, but rather because, having committed ourselves to the priority of self-interest over morality, we would not in light of this priority ever choose otherwise.

The problem of the Change of Heart is thus, for Kant, not one engendered by the absence of our cognitive or volitional moral capacities, but rather a problem based upon the logic of what we have chosen for our supreme maxim: since we have chosen to give priority to self-interest over morality, we would not, in light of this commitment, ever choose the Change of Heart. Yet, as Kant makes quite clear, we continue to recognize, even under the reign of self-interest, that we *ought* to undergo this change. Likewise, we remain free to will it: for Kant holds that our supreme maxim goes unchanged only so long as we continue to reaffirm it.<sup>25</sup> The mystery, then, is what brings us to make this change? ‘How can an evil tree bear good fruit?’

This is the *parergon* of Part One of the *Religion*, the limit of what can be offered by PRSR. Instead of either affirming or rejecting divine aid, he responds to the worry over what occasions the Change of Heart not by forsaking either his moral or epistemic principles, deferring to one dogmatic solution or another, but through the far more modest proposal that, given *ought implies can*, if our powers in the end are not sufficient,

then be it through the 'diminution of obstacles' or a 'positive assistance' (*Rel*, 6: 44), God will aid us in the employment of our own powers to bring about the Change of Heart.

Only recently, such as in Andrew Chignell's (2014) 'Rational Hope, Possibility, and Divine Action', is Kant's actual attitude towards divine aid starting to be carefully examined. For while it is through one's own 'decision [that] a human being reverses the supreme ground of his maxims by which he was an evil human being' (*Rel*, 6: 48), we are nonetheless unable to determine whether or not we can, unaided, come to make this decision. What Kant then proposes in light of this circumstance is not a 'foreign influence' that does the work on our behalf, nor the Pelagianism that would deny any need for divine aid whatsoever, nor even the semi-Pelagianism that too assertorically holds that divine aid is necessary. Instead, we are led to a hope, or more precisely, a *conditional hope* 'that what does not lie in his powers will be compensated for by cooperation from above' (6: 52; my translation).<sup>26</sup> For in light of what would otherwise become a 'hindrance to moral resolve' (6: 5), Kant recognizes a moral need for this quantum of solace.

## 6. Conclusion

Much of the *Religion's* troubled history could have been avoided if more attention had been paid to its prefaces. As I have elsewhere argued (e.g. Pasternack 2014), it is not a trivial matter that the First Preface begins with a discussion of the highest good, a discussion leading to the claim (twice made) that it is in virtue of this doctrine that 'morality inevitably leads to religion' (*Rel*, 6: 6, 8n.). Interpreters have broadly ignored this point, and thus have not considered the extent to which the highest good serves as the foundation for PRSR. And further, as illustrated in this article, the *Religion* as a whole should be read as an inquiry into the 'compatibility' or 'unity' between historical faith and rational religion. For once read in this manner, it becomes far more evident that its engagement with historical faith in the form of Augustinianism is not incidental to the text, nor some residual nostalgia, nor even worse, as affirming this tradition. Rather, as this article has demonstrated, Kant introduces core Augustinian tenets in order to assess their 'compatibility' or 'unity' with PRSR.

The outcome of this assessment is that Kant rejects the Augustinian conceptions of both evil and grace. Moreover, it has been argued that interpreters are likewise wrong to have attributed to Kant the 'Stoic Maxim' whereby divine aid is treated as incompatible with moral merit. Accordingly, this article has argued that the philosophical theology

contained in the *Religion* is not vitiated by an ‘internal contradiction’, ‘wobble’ or ‘conundrum’ between incompatible Augustinian and ‘Stoic’ commitments. Neither of these two elements accurately reflect the text. The notorious ‘conundrum’ is, rather, an unfortunate artefact of the secondary literature, one that could have been avoided if the overall structure and aims of the *Religion*, as communicated in its prefaces, were better understood.

### Notes

- 1 Worries about the internal consistency of the *Religion* and its compatibility with Kant’s Critical philosophy date back to its original reception. One finds in the correspondence between Goethe and Herder e.g. a discussion as to whether or not through the *Religion* Kant is ‘capitulating’ to Christian orthodoxies (to Herder, 7 June 1793; in Goethe 1965: 166). The *Religion* also raised the ire of both the Tübingen school of theology (the *Ältere Tübinger Schule*) and, more fatefully, the conservative Prussian court of Frederick William II, the latter leading to Kant’s (temporary) censorship (see Hunter 2005). The allegations which will be the focus of this article have their more recent source in Karl Barth’s *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert*, where he portrays the *Religion* as divided between incompatible Augustinian and Pelagian commitments (Barth 1947: 238–9).
- 2 Citations of Kant will be to the Akademie Ausgabe by volume and page, except for the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where citations will use the standard A/B edition pagination. Unless otherwise noted, English quotations will be from Kant (1992–).
- 3 The term ‘natural religion’ is traditionally used to refer to the body of religious doctrines which can be known through the ‘natural’ powers of the mind, including reason and sensation. It is sometimes, however, used with a more narrow meaning, referring to religious doctrines which can be inferred from experience (e.g. an intelligent designer) as opposed to reason. Likewise, ‘rational religion’ is ambiguous across a few possible meanings. On the one hand, it can refer to the natural theology found in German rationalism, i.e. metaphysical demonstrations of religious doctrines. In this sense, rational religion can be understood as a subset of natural religion in the first, but not the second sense mentioned above. Given, however, the epistemic strictures of transcendental idealism, Kant rejects the rationalist variant of rational religion and thus proffers instead a mode of rational religion grounded in practical rather than theoretical reason. Accordingly, what he varyingly calls the ‘pure philosophical doctrine of religion’ (*Rel*, 6: 10), ‘the pure religion of reason’ (6: 12), ‘the pure rational system of religion’ (*ibid.*) and ‘pure rationalism’ (6: 155) reflects this practical/moral variant of rational religion, grounded in the highest good.
- 4 I use the singular ‘experiment’ rather than present the *Religion* as guided by two distinct ‘experiments’. John Hare, likewise, suggests that the unstated ‘first experiment’ is not part of the *Religion* proper but rather develops through the amalgam of passages where Kant explores the highest good, its postulates and principles (Hare 1996: 40). Similarly, I have proposed in my commentary on the *Religion* (Pasternak 2014) that it is best to see it as guided by a singular ‘experiment’, and more recently (2017a) have written specifically on what is meant by *zweiten Versuch* at *Rel*, 6: 12.
- 5 It is interesting to note that eighteenth-century works on natural/rational religion differ widely with regards to what religious principles can be known to us through reason and experience. Although one often thinks of Deism as the prevailing form of natural religion during this period, that was not at all the case in Germany. It was there broadly criticized, not only by more Pietistic philosophers and conservative theologians, but it was also



sternly attacked by Christian Wolff and his followers, who saw it as not meaningfully different from atheism (Wolff 1736: §§ 535–8). Accordingly, Wolff's natural/rational religion includes e.g. divine providence; and Baumgarten goes even further to include as well the Fall (Baumgarten 1757: §966) and grace (§975). This is a point of considerable historical significance, for it offers us an important insight into how the original readership of the *Religion* would have understood 'rational religion', and thus the scope of doctrines which comprise the inner sphere of religion. The *Religion* is thus an exercise in comparing not some rarefied philosophical theology to historical faith, or utilizing the latter to create content for the former (see Palmquist 2015: 116), but rather, as Kant emphasizes in the Second Preface, it compares two different 'systems' (*Rel*, 6: 12): one whose source is reason, the other whose source is (alleged) revelation.

- 6 It would nonetheless be apt to regard Kant's discussions of the highest good and its postulates as at least *loosely* affiliated with doctrinal issues. We see this e.g. in the second *Critique's* treatment of the postulate of immortality, given the impossibility of ever becoming *fully* worthy of happiness – thus the need for divine mercy (5: 123n.). It is not, however, until the *Religion* that Kant begins to process in detail the relationships between his moral religion and the particulars of Christian theology.
- 7 The full passage from which I here quote is hard to render. I have not mentioned Kant's comment that when he considers 'some supposed revelation' and its place within its 'historical system', he will do so while 'abstracting from pure rational religion' (*Rel*, 6: 12; trans. Pluhar, Kant 2009). This may seem befuddling if his aim is to compare the contents of 'supposed revelation' to the latter. However, his point, I take it, is that one needs to first look at these 'supposed revelation[s]' on their own, without already giving them an interpretation informed by 'pure rational religion'. One then can conduct the 'experiment' of holding them up to 'moral concepts' to see whether they 'lead back' to rational religion. In other words, one takes a historical doctrine, considers what 'moral concepts' it may represent, and thereby finds out if that doctrine has 'compatibility' or 'unity' with PRSR. Precisely this process will be illustrated in section 3 of this article.
- 8 The above rendering of the *Religion's* overall project parallels the one recommended by Palmquist. It differs, however, in a number of important respects. First, it is not meant as an interpretation of the so-called 'Two Experiments' reading of the *Religion*; second, it rejects Palmquist's notion that the pure religion of reason is *inadequate* to 'genuine religion' and must borrow from revelation (Palmquist 2015: 116); and third, no claim is here made as to a point of transition within each of the four parts as Kant moves from exploring the question of 'compatibility' or 'unity' to an evaluative judgement. Sometimes the latter is simply implied (e.g. *Rel*, 6: 64, 72). Sometimes it is *very* explicit (e.g. 6: 51, 125–6, 168–9). And thus Kant adapts his exposition to the doctrines at issue. Let me further add that interpreters need to be acquainted with the background theological issues with which Kant is engaging in order to recognize them in the text and follow the course of his analysis. Although there is an industry of scholarship on Part One of the *Religion* which treats it as a straightforwardly philosophical work, it is (and the prefaces are vital to seeing this) a project of *comparison*. We shall see precisely the importance of understanding the *Religion's* background theology in the next section of this article.
- 9 These four tenets are primarily offered in order to acquaint contemporary readers with core doctrines of this tradition and will be subsequently used to challenge claims made in contemporary literature regarding the affinities between Augustinianism and Kant's account of moral evil. That is, the tenets here offered are to provide some touchstones for Kantians unfamiliar with the Augustinian tradition. It is not the aim of this article to philosophically evaluate Augustinianism, to work through the various periods of Augustine's writings, or assess the extent to which Reformation theology correlates with

early versus late Augustine. For readers interested in the historical sources for these tenets, see Augustine's own works including *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, and *De Spiritu et Littera*. They are also codified more overtly in a number of key Lutheran and Calvinist documents, such as the former's *Small Catechism* and *Book of Concord* and the latter's *Canons of Dort*, *Westminster Confession* and the essential Calvinist credo, commonly known by the acronym of *TULIP*. There are, of course, differences between Augustine, Calvin and Luther, but again it is not the aim of this article to philosophically assess Augustinianism. It is also beyond the present aim to examine issues of interpretation internal to Augustine scholarship (see Couenhoven 2013). Likewise, for some of the differences between Augustine and Reformation Augustinianism, see McGrath 2005. With respect to Kant's reception of the Augustinian tradition, there is no significant textual material whereby we can discern the extent to which he understood the differences between Augustine, Luther and Calvin. In the *Conflict of the Faculties*, of course, we find a brief contrast between Pietism and Moravianism (7: 54–7). Kant's treatment of sin and grace in the *Religion* tracks more closely with his account of Pietism in the former than with Moravianism, though his philosophical objections (which will be discussed later in this article) should be understood as critical of both. For additional discussion of Kant's relationship to the Augustinian tradition, see also Mariña 1997 and Clem 2018.

- 10 To avoid a possible misunderstanding, one may of course grant a biological origin to various influences upon our will (e.g. physical desires). However, the point at issue here is that Kant rejects the idea that the *moral culpability* of our 'first parents' could be biologically transferred to their progeny (*Rel*, 6: 40).
- 11 To help address a common confusion, the fact that we have an innate propensity to evil is not, on its own, what makes humanity evil. Our moral status instead depends upon how we respond to it. To help make it more clear that we are not evil merely because we bear this propensity, consider that for Kant one who has undergone a 'Change of Heart' and thus is 'well-pleasing to God' still has this propensity. It is an innate feature of humanity, and as such it is 'inextirpable' (*Rel*, 6: 51) and 'cannot be eradicated' (6: 32). Accordingly, even after the Change of Heart we are still affected by it, and 'in incessant danger of relapsing into it' (6: 94). It is a feature of human nature that we are self-interested and, quite simply, self-interest would dispose us towards giving our interests priority over morality. We of course must choose to adopt or 'incorporate' the related principle, but it should be clear enough that, if we are innately self-interested, this would be something we would be naturally disposed to do. Why, however, Kant claims that the whole of humanity makes the same choice cannot here be fully discussed. But once again, given that our moral status is only imputable in light of the use of our free will, it cannot be that we are determined or necessitated to adopt an evil *Gesinnung*. We thus have here a claim of universality without necessity – an option that Kant does recognize, calling it 'comparative' versus 'strict universality' (B4). See Frierson 2003: 39.
- 12 It might be thought that once we have established as our supreme maxim one that has given priority to self-interest over morality, so long as it rules, we would never act *from duty*. But this does not follow. Our prioritization of self-interest has given it veto-power so to speak, but it need not be exercised, such as when there are duties that do not run contrary to self-interest. Hence, even under moral depravity, we may still, at least episodically, be morally praiseworthy. Of course some actions may involve the dual motives of self-interest and morality, but there is nonetheless conceptual space still for actions where self-interest just pays no heed and so may be done *from duty* alone.
- 13 Unlike those who hold that Kant simply followed Augustine on the nature of moral evil, Allen Wood suggests instead that Kant's account is more aptly seen as just compatible

with it. See Wood 1970: 246n. Note also that while Mariña (1997) recounts the received view on the *Religion*'s 'Augustinian echoes', her focus there is on the issue of grace. In particular, she opposes the common Pelagian interpretation of Kant on grace, concluding that it overlooks Kant's far more Augustinian than Lutheran soteriology. Sections 4 and 5 of the present article advance a different reading of the text.

- 14 While many contemporary forms of Christianity maintain that we must 'accept' grace, giving such an allowance to our wills is technically semi-Pelagian. According to Augustine, and as all the more fervently presented by Luther and Calvin, neither are we, in our fallen condition, capable of making this choice nor would we, in light of our depravity, want anything but to continue in sin.
- 15 There is likewise a variety of different views within the Catholic tradition, ranging from the early semi-Pelagianism of John Cassian and Chrysostom to the Jansenist movement that much more fully aligned itself with the more extreme Augustinianism of the Reformation. Between these is Aquinas, who arguably avoided the semi-Pelagian heresy by suggesting that while, due to our corrupted natures, we cannot positively will the good or even choose to accept grace, we nonetheless still remain empowered to choose *against* sin, so as to foster a state of 'quiescence' whereby we at least cease to resist God's aid.
- 16 As should be apparent, from this we have the well-known Reformation doctrine of predestination. Although more famously tied to Calvin (as he accepted the consequence that both the condemned and saved are destined by God's will), Luther too held that it is foreordained by God who is given grace, and thus who is redeemed.
- 17 Here is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the stated project of the *Religion* where we find an instance of historical faith (namely, passive reception of grace) being compared to PRSR and found to be not only incompatible with it but a moral danger. We may further speculate that this vitriol has its source in the emotional scars left upon Kant from his religious training at the Pietist *Collegium Fridericianum*. For as Kuehn reports in his biography of Kant, the 'leaden atmosphere of punishment' (Kuehn 2001: 52) and 'heavy discipline of the fanatics' (53) left its mark on Kant, such that, even decades later, 'terror and fear would overcome him as soon as he thought back to the slavery of his youth' (45).
- 18 Wolterstorff 1991: 48. See also Hare 1996: 60–1. Note that Hare has since softened his view on this point (see Hare 2009: 168).
- 19 Wolterstorff 1991: 49.
- 20 Pluhar's translation reflects the fact that the German uses the subjunctive *sei* rather than the indicative *ist*. The English indicative chosen by Greene/Hudson, and later by di Giovanni, misses the grammatical mood of the original German. When translated as 'granted', the reader is given the impression that the General Remark starts out by (dogmatically) affirming the need for divine aid, rather than, as is here argued, tendering the idea of divine aid as a supposition to be evaluated by way of moral concepts.
- 21 An anonymous reviewer raised the question: if unlike Augustine, Kant does not claim that our capacities for morality have been themselves corrupted, why does Kant 'not just say that we can make ourselves good?' There are a number of ways to address this point. First, as a general point, our being able to act from duty in specific circumstances does not mean that we can also act from duty with regards to the requirement to undergo a Change of Heart. But this may just be restating the problem at issue, for the reviewer seems to be asking: why wouldn't our capacity to act from duty episodically also be sufficient to act from duty with regards to the Change of Heart? One possible answer is that a person with an evil *Gesinnung* can only act from duty when so doing is not perceived as contrary to self-interest (see note 12). But I think the best way for me to answer this question, given the aims of this article, is to consider it in relation to the agenda and

framework of the *Religion*, as presented above in section 2. Kant's stated goal is to assess core Christian doctrines so as to determine their 'compatibility' or 'unity' with PRSR; and the question of the Change of Heart is placed by Kant within a *parergon* because it exceeds what can be adduced from the guiding principles of PRSR. Hence Kant takes the question 'How can an evil tree bear good fruit?' to be a legitimate problem for rational religion and thereby recognizes in the traditional appeal to divine aid a point of 'compatibility' or 'unity' with PRSR. It is not that the latter holds that the Change of Heart necessarily depends upon divine aid, but that (a) by way of the logic of *ought implies can*, since we ought to undergo the Change of Heart, it must be possible; while (b), we are not in a position to determine whether or not this change can be realized through our efforts alone. See pages 116–17 above for further discussion.

- 22 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between God and humanity in the highest good see Pasternack 2017b.
- 23 Note that Kant's account of how we come to merit happiness in the *Religion* (and other texts of the 1790s) is different from the account given in the *Critique of Practical Reason's* discussion of the Postulate of Immortality. There, he holds that our moral worthiness is a function of our eternal striving for moral perfection (5: 123n.). However, in the *Religion* and elsewhere, it is instead tied to whether or not we prioritize morality over self-interest in our supreme maxim—i.e. whether or not we have undergone a 'Change of Heart'. There are a number of important differences that come as a result of this shift, including Kant's claim in the 1790s that whether or not we come to deserve happiness depends upon just this life, rather than our continued striving in the next. He thus writes: 'at the end of life our account must be completely closed, and nobody may hope somehow to make up there for what was neglected here' (*Rel*, 6: 71n.; see also 'End of All Things', 8: 330).
- 24 To reprise an earlier point of this article, divine justice is not for Kant some antecedent doctrinal commitment, but rather as we postulate God for the sake of the highest good, we construct our concept of God as a being endowed with the powers necessary and sufficient to bring it about (see e.g. A815/B843, *CPrR*, 5: 129, L-Th, 28: 1012). Kant, therefore, must reject the prevailing Christian idea of an unmerited salvation. There is no 'appropriation of a foreign satisfying merit' (*Rel*, 6: 118); whatever we are given in grace, must always be 'fully in accord with eternal justice' (6: 76).
- 25 Since the choice to bring about this change requires that, in effect, the change has already been accomplished, for being willing to subordinate self-interest to morality would mean that we have already chosen to prioritize morality over self-interest, Kant aptly recognizes the paradox. Yet this paradox should not be misunderstood to claim that we are trapped, for that would treat our wills and its principles too mechanically. The rules of an organization could set up a 'Catch-22', but that does not mean there is no way out of such an impasse. Imagine even a situation where the Catch-22 is in an organization's rules for how rules are to be revised. Since we are here considering our 'supreme maxim', this would be our analogue. How then are the rules of the organization to change? *Revolution*. Hence Kant writes: 'so long as the foundation of the maxims of the human being remains impure, [the Change of Heart] cannot be effected through gradual reform but must rather be effected through a revolution in the disposition of the human being' (*Rel*, 6: 47); 'so a "new man" can come about only through a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation' (*ibid.*); 'a revolution is necessary in the mode of thought . . . by a single and unalterable decision a human being reverses the supreme ground of his maxims by which he was an evil human being (and thereby puts on a "new man")' (6: 48).
- 26 While I am in agreement with Chignell that the *parergon* of Part One culminates in an appeal to hope, he frames this appeal in a manner distinct from my own. For unlike what has here been argued, he assumes that the 'conundrum' interpretation is correct, that

Kant is stuck in a conflict between Augustinian and Pelagian theses. Chignell, however, appeals to hope as the way out, arguing that, while Kant ultimately does not leave room for divine aid in the Change of Heart, the incompatibility here does not rise to 'the most fundamental modal level'. This is because, Chignell argues, so long as the object of hope is not modally impossible, it can 'withstand rational scrutiny' (Chignell 2014: 114–15). As should be apparent, I do not think an appeal to the gap between the level of 'laws' and the 'modal level' is necessary. For the 'conundrum' problem that motivates Chignell to make these moves instead rests, as I have argued throughout this article, upon an interpretative error.

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