Secularism Beyond the State: the 'State' and the 'Market' in Islamist Imagination*

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Abstract

This paper will build on my ethnographic engagement with the Jamaat-e-Islami
to explore aspects of a shift in Islamist practice and imagination from the 'state'
as the inspiration for projects and movements to the 'market'. In doing so I
hope to investigate not just what this might tell us about Islamism in Pakistan,
but also about the ability of the state to manage religion more generally. My
aim is three-fold: first, to record the particular modalities of changes within
Islamism in Pakistan; second, to show that these shifts betray a closer alignment
between the global political imagination and Islamism than has previously been
acknowledged; and third, in discussing these issues, to explore the implications
of the idea of market as an important contender to the dominance of the idea
of the state in political mobilizations. While recent discussions about secularism,
following Talal Asad,[1] have tended to focus on the disciplinary force exerted by
the state, this paper suggests that the market has emerged as a potentially more
significant, though under-recognized, disciplinary force.

Secularism beyond the State: the 'state' and the 'market' in Islamist imagination

'*I am proposing only that we should abandon the state as a material object of
study . . . while continuing to take the idea of the state extremely seriously.*'[2]

Islamists are defined as those among Muslim revivalists who focus
on taking over the state—they certainly seem to take the state, both

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the State course at LUMS who raised incisive and productive questions and comments.

[1] Asad, Talal (2003) Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity,
Stanford University Press, California.

[2] Abrams, Philip, (1988: 75). Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State, *Journal
of Historical Sociology* 1(1): 58–89.

as an idea and as a material object, very seriously.[3] However, even as taking over the state remains the proclaimed aim- prompting, in response, an alarmist discourse about the imminent dangers of an Islamist coup, actual strategies pursued over the last two decades have involved a subtle move away from the state as the locus for mobilizations. It is argued here that in rough alignment with the shift in global political imagination where the state is no longer the dominant mobilizer of political energies and projects, Islamist strategies belie a move towards using the market as an alternative engine for defining and facilitating moral and political change. This shift does not imply a complete break with the past and certainly at the rhetorical level the focus on the state continues. However, as shown below, increasingly marginalizing Maududi's vision of the state as the central agent of change in the modern world, contemporary Jamaat-e-Islami activists are grappling with the many contradictions in their relationship with the market as an engine for the formation and transformation of the moral community.[4] Moreover, the idea of the market remains infused with conflicting sentiments. On the one hand, the market is seen as an arena of suspect and selfish desires, on the other, as a place of autonomous moral choice and assertion. This shift in strategies flows from the space that the state has had to concede to the market within global political imagination and is important to analyse critically to build a nuanced understanding of the relationship between Islamism and the political landscape within which it operates.

Initial recognition of a serious change in Islamism is beginning in academic writings, and some attempts at grappling with the nature and extent of these alterations within Islamism are already underway. The most cogent of these by far is Asef Bayat's nuanced description

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[3] See for instance, Graham Fuller, (2003). *The Future of Political Islam*, Palgrave, New York.

[4] I am not suggesting a readily formed and concrete 'community' that the Jamaat-e-Islami can mobilize. The Jamaat-e-Islami activists' own use of the notion of 'community' ranges from a small Jamaat-e-Islami core to all the Muslims in the world—the putative community of the *ummah*. In fact, it is precisely the formation and definition of the community that is the challenge. See David Gilmartin, (1988). *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*, University of California Press, Berkeley, for a perceptive analysis of the creation of particular conceptions of 'community' during colonial rule.

of the phenomenon that he calls 'Post-Islamism'.[5] His contention is that Islamism has lost much of its initial energy, and is in the process of reconciling itself to notions and practices of democracy and pluralism. The debate about the validity of the term 'Post-Islamism' is linked intrinsically to the idea that Islamism has failed. Roy has proposed that Islamism has indeed failed; Kepel and Ahmad sidestep the question of failure by emphasizing that Islamism has now morphed into Post-Islamism with a decentring of the focus on state, and greater acceptance of plurality within and outside the movement.[6] In responding to the widespread use of the term 'Post-Islamism', Bayat points out his understanding of the term as representing 'both a condition and a project'. As a condition, it refers to the draining of energy from the initial sources of legitimacy of Islamism. As a project, Post-Islamism refers to a more explicit negotiation with democracy and liberalism. Bayat's arguments are compelling, and certainly the case is clearer for Egypt and Iran (the two countries that Bayat deals with) than for Pakistan. In part this is because in Pakistan, unlike Egypt, there is still some hope for Islamists' electoral ambitions, and unlike Iran, Islamism has not yet exhausted its potential because it has not been directly in power, or for long enough. Jamaat-e-Islami, one of the key Islamist parties in Pakistan, and indeed an influential one internationally, continues to be closely engaged in the electoral process, in claiming its continued ambition to influence and control the state. Yet, there are important echoes of the changes that Bayat describes: a subtle shift has taken place in the strategies of the Islamists, linked to a shift in political imagination, even though their rhetoric has remained relatively unchanged.

These modifications in Islamism are too often studied only in terms of changes within the territorial bounds of nation-states and without reference to a global political imagination.[7] The term 'political imagination' is capacious enough to accommodate both intellectual

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[5] Bayat, Asef, (2005). What is Post-Islamism? *ISIM Review* 16; and (2007) *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*, Stanford University Press, Stanford.

[6] Roy, Olivier, (1994). *The Failure of Political Islam*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge; Kepel, Gilles, (2002). *Jihad; The Trail of Political Islam*, I.B. Tauris, London; Ahmad, Irfan, (2009). *Islamism and Democracy In India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami*, Princeton Univesity Press, Princeton New Jersey.

[7] For an exception to this trend see Devji, Faisal, (2005). *Landscapes of Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. While Devji places Islamism within the context of a global political imagination, he is not concerned with changes within Islamism.

history and popular political discourse. This capaciousness is useful because it allows conversations about some general trends, which are valuable in their contributions to our understanding of politics, and would otherwise be impossible to conduct. Historians of political thought/intellectual history have employed it to discuss the rise and use of political concepts such as democracy, empire, secularization or Europe.[8] Whether interrogating the path of particular political concepts from the works of canonical writers to broad public appeal, or contextualizing their writings by placing them in the concerns of the period, these works have provided an insight into how, when, and why, certain ideas have inspired political action. Building on such usage, I distinguish it slightly from the concept of social imaginary as used by Charles Taylor by which he means, as do I, 'something broader and deeper' than social theories.[9] However, rather than taking as given the distinction between theory and imagination, as Taylor does, this paper explores the ways in which both are implicated together in broader political changes.

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[8] See for instance: Stedman-Jones, Gareth and Katznelson, Ira (eds), (2010). *Religion and the Political Imagination*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Pagden, Anthony (ed.), (2002). *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Pagden, Anthony, (1990). *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination*, Yale University Press, New Haven; Skinner, Quentin and Strath, Bo, (2003). *States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; Pocock, J. G. A., (2009). *Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Perhaps the example of Europe is a useful one. That Europe is ultimately an idea rooted in a particular imperial imagination rather than a clear geographical zone provides an interesting example for our purposes here. Both Europe and South Asia are appendages to the vast landmass that is Asia. In terms of landmass, physical space, population, number of languages, religions and ethnic groups, South Asia is bigger than Europe. There is a clearer demarcation from Asia in the form of the mighty Himalayan mountains compared with the murky boundary between Europe and Asia. Yet, South Asia is a 'sub-continent' while Europe is a 'continent'. This imagination is linked to specific and concrete sets of institutions such as the European Union. See also Lewis, Martin and Wigen, Karen, (1997). *The Myth of Continents: A critique of Metageography*, University of California Press, California.

[9] Taylor (p. 23) then goes on to distinguish imaginaries from theories on three accounts: (1) imaginaries are how ordinary people 'imagine' their world. This is then represented not in theoretical terms but instead carried in images, stories and legends; (2) while theory circulates within a small number of people, imaginaries are shared by large groups of people; and thus (3) social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy. Taylor, Charles (2004). *Modern Social Imaginaries*, Duke University Press, Durham.

Islamism and the State: from Lenin to Gramsci

To understand this shift one must first grasp the nature of Jamaat-e-Islami's focus on the state. Irfan Ahmad and I have both argued that the importance of the state in Jamaat-e-Islami discourse is not the result of a theological compulsion within Islam, but a result of the context in which it was founded.[10] A key feature of this context is the increased reach and importance of the modern state—a general name for particular arrangements of power—in colonial India. I contend that it is not just the increased intrusion of the state, but also the specific kind of secularism that the colonial state practiced which has shaped and defined Islamism's focus. Thus, the relationship between Islamism and secularism is not one of negation alone, but of creation and suggestion. This paper will focus on two key components of colonial secularism that were critical in supporting the rise of Islamism, itself an innovation in Islamic thought and practice. The first is the structural vehicle of this secularism: the modern state that was much more intrusive than the Mughal state had been. More importantly this state engaged in an ontological remapping of individuals as part of the practice of modern state-craft. The second component relates to the substantive aspects of this policy that allowed only particularistic attachment to Muslim practices, attaching universalism to those modes of belief and behaviour that seemed secular to the colonial administrators, but particularly Christian to the colonized. Islamism, like many other movements that originated in a period that was particularly thick with debate and alternatives, cannot escape engaging with the state, but it inverts the substantive elements of colonial secularism by attributing universalism to Islam and claiming its compatibility with modernity.[11] In a sense, it is a mirrored reversal of colonial secularism. Of the various responses possible and produced, Islamism replicates the structure and concerns

[10] Ahmad, Irfan, (2009). Genealogy of the Islamic state: reflections on Maududi's political thought and Islamism, *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute*, No. 15 (1): 145–162; Iqtidar, Humeira, (2010). 'Colonial Secularism and the Genesis of Islamism in North India' in Gareth Stedman-Jones and Ira Katznelson (eds), *Religion and the Political Imagination*, Cambridge University Press.

[11] It is possible to see the richness of debate, and the depth and nuances of alternatives that were discussed within India at the turn of the century as a response not just to the demands made by the idea of nationalism but also to the problem of squaring nationalism with the dominant political entity of the time: the modern state, i.e. how to make a nation-state.

of colonial secularism most closely by inverting them in an Islamic idiom through its focus on the state, its conception of Islam as a cohesive system that is central to political life and its aspirations to universal application.

Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, was a journalist and activist who was sympathetic to Indian nationalism initially, but then began to distrust nationalism for its propensity to divide Muslims. During his years in Delhi he interacted with a wide range of intellectuals and activists including the socialist Khairi brothers.[12] Many such influences on his thinking go unacknowledged by him and by key commentators on his work,[13] but it is possible to discern the definite imprint of his exposure to Leftist debates and strategies.[14] Jamaat-e-Islami is organized as a Leninist cadre-based party; Maududi's focus on ideology, ideological training and structured organizational management belies the modernist aspirations of this so-called turn towards tradition. More than the structure of the organization though, it is the content of his writing that speaks of his modernist influences: his historicist reading of Islam, his insistence on the 'rationality' of religion and his attempts at purging Islam of 'irrational' and 'superstitious' practices such as saint worship. Maududi's message found some resonance among those who were

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[12] Humeira Iqtidar, (2009).'Jama'at-e-Islami Pakistan: Learning from The Left' in Naveeda Khan and Veena Das (eds), *Crisis and Beyond: Pakistan in the 20th Century*, Routledge, New Delhi.

[13] See for instance, Maududi's (1971) own essay on his life ('Main hoon Abul Ala Maududi' ([I am Abul A'ala Maududi], *Zindagi*, Lahore: January 1971: 21–30) and his daughter's account of life with her parents (Humaira Maududi, (2005). *Shajarhai Saya dar*, Al-Mansoor Publication, Lahore) where no mention is made of these influences. S. V. R. Nasr, (1996), in *Mawdudi and the making of Islamic revivalism*, Oxford University Press, New York; and K. K. Aziz, (1987), in *The Idea of Pakistan*, Vanguard Books, Lahore, hint at these but do not explore them in detail.

[14] I suggest that this leftist imprint is present not despite Maududi's opposition to communism but precisely because of it. What I do not wish to imply is that Maududi or the Jamaat-e-Islami was sympathetic to Leftist ideology. Indeed he saw in communism a challenge but one that he was willing to take on. While commenting on what he saw as the fallacy of a 'Muslim' university at Aligarh that did not in fact, aim to produce good Muslims, Maududi wrote: 'But, you could say that the British will never allow such a university. It is true to a point, but you can ask him that out of all Muslims and all Communists who do you prefer? You will have to choose one of the two. The Anglo-Mohammaden of 1910 will not be found for much longer. Now if you want to see all new Muslim generations as fully Communist then stay firm on your ancient anti-Muslim path...only one force can stop this plague and that force is Islam'. ('Humaray Nizam-e-Talim ka Bunyadi Nuqs', *Tarjuman-ul-Quran*, August, 1936. Article reproduced in Abul Ala Maududi ((1939) 1999) *Tanfihat*: 141).

educated—if not always very highly—urban, and committed to an idea of the Islamic route to modernity. However, it remains important to reiterate that there was a range of other ideological options also available to educated, urban Muslims of different regions and across classes at this historical juncture. In addition, Maududi's insistence on a cadre-based system and his desire to control the organization meant that while his writings influenced many and found avid readers across North India, the Jamaat-e-Islami remained a small, relatively tight-knit group for many decades after its inception. Indeed, the Jamaat-e-Islami can be seen as the best Leninist party in Pakistan in terms of its organizational structure and *modus operandi*.

After partition Maududi chose to come to Pakistan, and brought a faction of the Jama'at-e-Islami to Pakistan. Maududi had opposed the formation of Pakistan and his decision to live there was motivated in part by his political ambition: he calculated that it would be easier to form a Muslim state in a country that was formed on the basis of religious nationalism, than in India.[15] From the beginning, Maududi managed to create an effective lobby and pressure group through his Radio Pakistan lectures and mobilizations around the issue of the Objectives Resolution for the constitution of the newly formed country. At the same time, and again in contradiction to Maududi's 1930s argument against democracy, the Jamaat fielded candidates in provincial elections in the 1950s. Since then it has engaged continuously with the electoral process in Pakistan.

The 1960s and 1970s was a period during which socialism was a major influence in the global south, including in Pakistan. Socialism's focus on the state was, at that time, matched by Islamism's insistence on controlling it. Both were products of a context in which the idea

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[15] Maududi's resistance to the formation of Pakistan was due to his distrust of the idea of nationalism and his opposition to the division of Indian Muslims into separate nations. However, it is important to also remember that Maududi and Jamaat-e-Islami disavowed his earlier critique of Pakistan once the leftists brought it up in the 1960s. By then the Jamaat-e-Islami was busy casting itself as the defender of Islam in this nation of Muslims. One way in which the Jamaat-e-Islami side-stepped the issue of Maududi's initial resistance to the formation of Pakistan was to highlight, in Jamaat-e-Islami publications, Maududi's meeting and association with Mohammed Iqbal (the national poet of Pakistan credited with proposing the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India). By stressing that Maududi had been chosen by Iqbal to lead the model community of Muslims that Iqbal had helped fund at Pathankot, the organization attempted to present their relationship as a particularly close one when in reality they had only met once, a little before Iqbal's death (see for instance, *Zindagi*, January 1971:21–30).

of the state dominated political imagination. This is not to imply that there were no competing ideas at that time, and I shall take this up again later, but that the state was the dominant political idea of the period. More significantly, the shared focus on the state did not override fundamental differences in what the socialist and the Islamists wanted to do once they controlled the state. It is useful to remember that at that particular historical juncture, the Jamaat-e-Islami supported private landholding against the socialist programme even as it continued to focus on the state as the engine of all social and political change. Here I want to emphasize here is on the converging tactical and strategic focus of the Jamaat-e-Islami and the leftist groups on the state as the vehicle for transforming society. It is in part because of this focus that they came in direct conflict with each other. I have argued elsewhere, that while there has been significant study of the impact of Islamism on the left, there is little study of the impact of the left on Islamism.[16] A detailed look at the interaction between the leftist groups in Pakistan and Jamaat-e-Islami during the late 1960s shows that this contentious engagement forced the Jamaat-e-Islami to expand its activities, modify its strategies and engage with constituencies it had hitherto ignored. For instance, Jamaat-e-Islami was almost forced into more visible student activism by the threat of leftist control over institutions of higher education in the country[17]; prior to this, Jamaat-e-Islami's student wing had operated as a kind of study circle. This threat of leftist influence was a particularly potent one for the Jamaat-e-Islami because, with its modernist tendencies, and unlike the various ulema organizations, it did not at that time have its own madrassa network and relied heavily on universities and professional colleges for recruitment into the vanguard party that would take over the state.

The end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s saw the actual takeover of a state by the Islamists in Pakistan's neighbour, Iran. In Pakistan, too, the Islamists gained relatively sudden and unexpected access to the state through General Zia's military coup—an access that they had not adequately prepared for nor anticipated, given the Jamaat-e-Islami's disastrous electoral results in the 1971

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[16] Iqtidar, (2009). 'Learning from the Left'.

[17] It is interesting to note that the newly-elected fourth amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Syed Munawar Hassan, started his political engagement as a leftist activist during the 1950s. Munawar Hassan was initially associated with the leftist National Student's Federation. Later, as a student in Karachi University, he joined the Islami Jami'yat Tulaba the Jamaat's student wing.

elections. General Zia-ul-Haq, whose coup against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was approved of and supported by the US administration, became a key ally in the war against communism in Afghanistan. Zia did not hide his admiration for the ideas propounded by Maududi, who had died in 1979. Maududi's successor, Mian Tufayl, a compromise candidate and a long-term Maududi aide, did not hide how flattered he felt by Zia's attention and admiration for Jamaat-e-Islami. Key Jamaat-e-Islami ideologues and leaders had unprecedented access to influence policy decisions in both official and unofficial roles. In universities and colleges, the actual battlegrounds of the competition between the Jamaat-e-Islami and the leftists, Jamaat-e-Islami administrators, lecturers and students were handed positions of authority. In public sector enterprises where union activity had become quite strong during the Bhutto years,[18] Islamists unions were supported to break their strength.[19] In state departments and the army, pressure for public piety was slowly increased. Praying in public view, keeping a beard, not drinking alcohol, all became important for an ambitious career in the army and increasingly in the civil bureaucracy. More than the actual role of Jamaat-e-Islami members in shaping policy, it was Zia's use of Islamist vocabulary that accorded the Jamaat-e-Islami a public role much beyond its actual membership base.

Nasr has argued that Zia had used the Islamists and Islam to legitimize his rule.[20] Whether the Jamaat-e-Islami was used or was trying to use Zia, there is little doubt that the the Jamaat-e-Islami gained significantly in public exposure and political influence during Zia's regime. At the same time it is clear, through interviews and conversations, that the Jamaat-e-Islami was also an organization under great strain during the Zia years. There was real tension between those who used the Jamaat-e-Islami for personal gains and those who were committed to the ideological programme of

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[18] This is not to imply that Bhutto provided unconditional support to unions. Indeed, state patronage in certain sectors or for some types of union activity went hand in hand with suppression of others. See Asdar Ali, (2005). Strength of the Street Meets the Strength of the State: The 1972 Labour Struggle in Karachi, *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 37/1: 83–107.

[19] See in particular 'Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan: Learning from the Opposition' in Humeira Iqtidar (forthcoming 2011), *Secularising Islamists? Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-ud-Dawa in Pakistan*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago; also Omar Noman (1988), *The Political Economy of Pakistan*, KPI, London.

[20] Syed Vali Reza Nasr, (2001). *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the making of state power*, Oxford University Press, Oxford; and (1994). *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I-Islami of Pakistan*, University of California Press, Berkeley.

the organization and the movement. Quite apart from fears about corruption of ideology, Zia's policy of supporting the ethnically motivated Muhajir Qaumi Movement in Karachi brought the Jamaat-e-Islami in Karachi in direct political conflict with the regime. In Karachi, the commercial heartland of Pakistan and the city that absorbed the largest number of migrants from India at the time of partition, the Jamaat-e-Islami's strength lay among these very groups. During the first two decades of Pakistan's formation Karachi provided the most dedicated Jamaat-e-Islami workers, its largest constituency and several key ideologues apart from Maududi (such as Khurram Ja Murad). Zia's decision to support the MQM created a real schism in this key constituency of the Jamaat-e-Islami.

During the 1990s, the period beyond which the most authoritative English language study of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan does not extend, the Jamaat-e-Islami underwent significant transformations that have remained largely below the threshold of academic attention.[21] One serious limitation within the vast majority of academic studies of Islamism, and in this particular case of the Jamaat-e-Islami, has been their focus on the proclamations and writings of the founding ideologues.[22] What the current leaders say or do, how the ordinary member of the organization makes sense of the original writings and the newer pronouncements has not been studied in detail. For too long the Jamaat-e-Islami has been studied only in terms of the writings of Maududi. However, Maududi died in

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[21] Nasr, 1994. One reason for the relative neglect of the Jamaat-e-Islami has been the increased activities of more militant and radical groups and the resulting shift in academic interest towards those.

[22] The vast amount of literature produced on Islamism in both the Middle East and South Asia falls within this category (e.g., Nazih Ayubi, (1991). *Political Islam: religion and politics in the Arab world*, Routledge, London; John Esposito, (1997). *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?* Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado; S. V. R. Nasr, (1994). *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I-Islami of Pakistan*; Emmanuel Sivan, (1985). *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*, Yale University Press, New Haven; Tibi, Bassim, (1988). *The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City; and (1998). *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, University of California Press, Berkeley). Useful exceptions focusing on ordinary members and looking beyond leaders include Eickelman and Piscatori, (1996). *Muslim Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey; Singerman, Diane, (1995). *Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics and Networks in the Urban Quarters of Cairo*, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Ahmed, Irfan, (2009). *Islamism and Democracy In India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami*; and Collins, Kathleen, (2007). Ideas, Networks and Islamist Movements: Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucus, *World Politics*, 60 (October), 64–96.

1979 and his imprint on the organization has grown faint with each passing year. Under Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the third *amir* of the Jamaat-e-Islami (1987–2009), the Jamaat-e-Islami changed into a national political party, entering into alliances with other national and regional political parties. One such important alliance was the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance), with the precursor of the contemporary Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Sharif group, as its other major partner. More critically, since the late 1980s but particularly during the period 1997–2009, the Jamaat-e-Islami has undergone a subtle but important shift in the range and nature of its mobilization strategies and tactics, on the kinds of issues that are raised and some of the solutions that are suggested.

Through schools and colleges, dispensaries and hospitals, dowry funds and neighbourhood clean-up operations, micro-enterprises and skill-training in low income areas, the Jamaat-e-Islami's activists spend much more time in engaging with the 'society'[23] within the framework of the market than with preparing the vanguard party for an imminent takeover of the state. Taking one important example of this extended reach: the Jamaat-e-Islami's humanitarian/NGO face, the Al-Khidmat Foundation claims to be the biggest network of humanitarian services in Pakistan.[24] The Foundation has subsumed an earlier initiative started during the 1960s by a Jamaat-e-Islami sympathizer, currently called the Al-Khidmat Trust, which is managed and run by women affiliated to the Jamaat-e-Islami. However, it was only incorporated formally within the Jamaat-e-Islami organizational structure during the mid-1990s. Maududi was very reluctant to officially affiliate the Al-Khidmat Trust with the Jamaat-e-Islami even though the founder was keen on such a relationship.[25] Since the 1990s

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[23] There is some variation in the Jamaat-e-Islami's mobilization strategies across different parts of Pakistan. For instance, in the 2002 elections the Jamaat-e-Islami made political alliances with electable candidates of religious leanings who emphasized public morality in Sarhad closer to the Afghan border. In urban Karachi and Lahore the campaign emphasis was much more on service delivery and political accountability.

[24] The mission statement of the Al-Khidmat Foundation denies affiliation with any 'regional, ethnic or political party' but Jamaat-e-Islami activists claim it as their own. The Jamaat-e-Islami website listed the Foundation among its affiliates http://www.jamaat.org/new/urdu/otherweb/ [last accessed 7 June 2009]. However, the recently revamped Jamaat-e-Islami website does not contain a direct reference to Al-Khidmat.

[25] Interview, daughter of the founder of Al-Khidmat Trust (she did not wish to be named), at her residence, Defence Housing Authority, Lahore, 10 December, 2005.

though, there has been an exponential growth in the scope and scale of the Trust's activities. Although it is difficult to assess its claims as the largest humanitarian service provider in Pakistan, the diversity of its services does provide a glimpse into a well-established network. The Foundation and the Trust administer a new school system started by the Jamaat-e-Islami, called *baithak* Schools, women's vocational centres, adult literacy programmes, hospitals and mobile dispensaries, refugee care programmes, prisoner welfare programmes, orphan sponsor projects, drinking water projects, subsidized vaccination against Hepatitis B, emergency relief, Ramadan and dowry gifts, Eid gift packages, and *qurbani* (sacrifice—typically refers to animal sacrifice for Eid) programmes. These are all precisely the activities that Maududi had resisted during his lifetime and the Jamaat-e-Islami had avoided engaging in as an organization for more than a decade after his death, preferring to focus instead on political analysis and state-focused mobilization.

The emphasis away from controlling the 'state' and more clearly towards building a Muslim 'society' through other means can be seen, in particular, by the Jamaat-e-Islami's increasing involvement in funding, building and running schools in different parts of the country,[26] their legacy about a decade old. Despite the great importance that Maududi attached to education he had resisted moves to open schools as a part of the Jamaat's activities choosing instead to focus on public institutions of higher education as recruiting grounds for attracting the vanguard, Islamic elite that he hoped to induct into the party. During fieldwork in 2005 I visited newly opened 'baithak schools' in the working class neighbourhoods of Lahore with Jamaat-e-Islami activists. These schools were part of a new initiative, led by the Women's Wing within the Jamaat-e-Islami, to reach out to the poorer segments of society.[27] While the political goal of creating a vote bank within these previously ignored segments was a factor, of equal importance was the language of demand and supply, incentives and individual choice which were used to support the programme of creating a better 'Muslim society' that would be ready for the Muslim

[26] These are in addition to the schools that have been started by Jamaat-e-Islami affiliates as private ventures such as the Dar-ul-Arqam Schools of Islamic and Modern Sciences.

[27] In 2005 the Jamaat-e-Islami Women's Commission alone operated 125 schools, 24 madrassas and 14 industrial homes with enrolment by 11,010 students (male and female), 1,295 (male and female) and 265 (females only) (*Raftar* newsletter, Women's wing Jamaat-e-Islami, Islamabad, April–June 2005: 9).

state that the Jamaat-e-Islami would help establish. In conversations with activists, leaders and Jamaat-e-Islami sympathizers, I was struck by this inversion of Maududi's original formulation.

The Gramscian turn within the Jamaat-e-Islami is part of the process in which this Leninist party has been socialized. But it is also part of the larger process in which the state has been socialized in both academic theories and popular political imagination. At the theoretical level this socialization has meant viewing the state increasingly as a social actor enmeshed in specific institutions and path dependencies. At a popular level it has meant a mounting questioning of the notion of a state as an independent actor standing above and outside society. This questioning may be generated as much through patronage scandals involving politicians or bureaucrats acting out of a socially embedded expectation to support their family or *biradari*, as through the circulation of academic theories and ideas about state(s) through a globalized media.[28] From the late 1980s and particularly during the 1990s, the idea of the state started losing some of its dominance over global political imagination. As the Soviet state began to unravel, so too did the argument for the state as an engine of social transformation. Thatcher's TINA (There is No Alternative) and Reagan's Reaganomics, supported by corporate mass media, put immense pressure on the idea of the state as the creative engine for individual or collective development. Within academia too, by the 1980s the focus of research began to wander elsewhere. The related notion of nationalism came under immense critique during the 1990s converging with the slogans of promoters of corporate globalization who highlighted its promise, through common markets and free flows of ideas and people, to draw together populations artificially divided by the nation-state.[29] In this context, a question that many Jamaat-e-Islami activists raised when I spoke to them about this shift in their strategies is an important one for theorizing about the state generally:

[28] See Gupta, Akhil, (1995). Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics and the Imagined State, *American Ethnologist* 22:(2), 375–402 for a subtle treatment of the relationship between the discourse of corruption, the imagining of the state, media and international financial agencies such as the IMF.

[29] Most critiques of nationalism were locally generated and in response to repressive aspects of it, but as Arif Dirlik has pointed out there was too easy an appropriation of these critiques by the supporters of neo-liberal globalization. Dirlik, Arif, (1994). The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism, *Critical Inquiry*, 20:(2), 328–356,

how useful is it to think in terms of a strict division between the state
and society?

The State in international political imagination

Theorizing about the state has gone through a fairly erratic career.
As a new wave of enthusiasm about socialism gripped the global south
in the 1950s and 1960s, American academia in particular debated
the value of thinking about the state separately from society.[30] In the
late 1970s and early 1980s the debate was rejuvenated in an attempt
to 'bring the state back in'.[31] But at a fundamental level the debate
remained mired in the attempt at delineating the state from society.
From the 1980s onwards the state has been increasingly socialized in
academic writings: it has been defined increasingly as a social network,
or as an institutional actor. These attempts were abandoned partly
because of the criticism that this fuzziness obscured analysis, that this
socialized state was hard to place in an analytical framework. David
Held, representative of many writings of the period, declares, 'nothing
is more central to political and social theory than the nature of the
state, and nothing more contested'.[32] However, despite the continued
confusion, the state remains 'the master noun' of modern political
science.[33]

The curious disjuncture between the pervasiveness of the state
in political analysis, with an equally widespread confusion about

[30] For an excellent overview of these debates see Mitchell, Timothy, (1991). 'The
limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their critics', *The American Political
Science Review* 85:(1), 77–96. See also Migdal, Joel, (2001). *State in society: studying
how societies and states transform and constitute one another,* Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.

[31] Skocpol, Theda, (1985). 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in
Current Research', in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the
State Back In*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Hall, John, (ed.), (1986).
States In History, Basil Blackwell, Oxford; Held, David, *et al*., (1983). *States and
Societies*, Martin Robertson, Oxford; Vincent, Andrew, (1987). *Theories of the State*,
Basil Blackwell, Oxford; Jessop, Bob, (1990). *State Theory: Putting Capitalist States
in Perspective*, Polity Press, Cambridge; Migdal, Joel, (1988). *Strong Societies and Weak
States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton University
Press, Princeton New Jersey.

[32] Held, David, (1983). 'Central Perspectives on the Modern State', in David Held,
et al., *States and Societies*, Martin Robertson, Oxford, p. 1.

[33] Skinner, Quentin, (2007). 'What is the State?' The Tang Li Lecture, Wolfson
College, 24 October, 2007.

its precise meanings is bridged creatively by Timothy Mitchell.[34] He argues for taking the boundary between the state and society seriously, not in search of a clear demarcation between the two, but for interrogating the actual processes that create the effect of the state as a separate entity standing outside and independent of the society. Mitchell has concretized Philip Abrams' critique of theorizing about the state by showing exactly how the 'state' is created in a particular context—in this case, in Egypt—by parsing out the precise relationships between business and political projects, local rulers and colonial administration, landlords and international companies that constitute the state.[35] He details the particular nodes of power that remain unacknowledged and subsumed within the idea of the state. We see the state as a work in continuous progress rather than a fully realized entity at any point. Most importantly his meticulous attention to the precise modalities of power and negotiation gives a concrete understanding of the power that the idea of the 'state' lends to these interests, and that they would otherwise lack. The state then emerges as a particularly useful idea, a coming together of interests that cannot in reality be analysed by attempting to separate the political from the social and economic, or in other words 'society' from the 'state'. To fall into the trap of trying to theorize the limits of the state *vis-à-vis* the society is to lose sight of the very real power the idea of the state exerts on those who find it expedient for furthering their own interests but also those who resist precisely this imposition of interests. Abrams had rightly pointed out that even though elements of Marxist theory recognize the illusionary nature of the state, '... Marxist practice needs the state as a real-concrete object, the immediate object of political struggle'.[36]

To highlight Mitchell's critique is not to suggest that it also directly informs popular understanding of the 'state'. In fact the acceptance of his ideas within the discipline of political science seems to be relatively limited because although the term state is used ubiquitously there is a kind of moratorium on direct interrogation of the concept.[37] In recent years, the only concentrated critical academic attention that

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[34] Mitchell Timothy, (1991).

[35] Mitchell, Timothy, (2002). *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics, Modernity*, University of California Press, Berkeley.

[36] Abrams (1998) p. 70.

[37] For a useful attempt at analysing some of the reasons for this moratorium see Bartleson, Jens, (2001). *The Critique of the State*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

the state has received has been grounded primarily in the discipline of anthropology. Much of this literature focuses on the precise ways in which the state is experienced by different segments of society.[38] In an illuminating inversion of this view, James Scott shows how a state— any state, capitalist or communist—tends to look at populations under its control.[39] Mitchell's formulation may appear orthogonal to this stream of literature at first glance, but it seems to me that it actually clarifies many of the questions left unanswered by the anthropological interrogations of how the state may be experienced or exercised. One important question here would be why are these quite particular arrangements of power in Ecuador, or Indonesia, or India or The Netherlands called the state? The answer would have to go some way towards acknowledging that importance of the *idea* of the state: the state as an idea legitimizing the exercise of power in modern polities. Considering in particular Islamist mobilizations, Mitchell's work is very useful for two reasons. One, that it forces us to acknowledge the seriousness and importance of the 'idea' of the state, both in facilitating oppressive arrangements and in inspiring liberatory projects. Two, combining Mitchell's insights with the reality of a changed political imagination where the idea of the state has lost some of its previous dominance as an inspiration for projects and movements, raises important questions about the new arrangements and ideas, and the disciplinary forces accompanying them. What, then, is the idea that has emerged as a serious contender to the idea of the state for the Islamists?

At a popular level, it is commonplace that across the globe the state declined in importance from the 1980s onwards, particularly after the

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[38] See in particular: Hansen and Stepputat, (2001). 'Introduction: States of Imagination', in *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Post colonial state*. T. Blom-Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds), Duke University Press Durham and London; and (2005). *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Corbridge, Stuart *et al.*, (2005). *Seeing the state: governance and governmentality in India*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Ghosh, Kaushik, (2006). Between Global Flows and Local Dams: Indigenousness, Locality, and the Transnational Sphere in Jharkhand, India, *Cultural Anthropology*, 21:(4), 501–534; Li, Tania Murray, (2007). *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*, Duke University Press, Durham; Trouillot, Michel Rolph, (2001). The Anthropology of the State: Close Encounters of a Deceptive Kind *Current Anthropology* 42:(1), 125–38; Gupta, Akhil and Aradhana Sharma, (2006). 'Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in the Age of Globalization', in Gupta and Sharma (eds), *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
[39] Scott, James C., (1998). *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

fall of the Soviet Union. The failure of the Soviet state was held to be emblematic of the larger failure of 'the state' to be a sustainable engine for individual and collective development. If looked at closely though, it is possible to discern not a decline in the actual role of the state but a shift in the domains that were previously considered to be under the state's purvey and that went hand in hand with changes in the idea of the state. The notion of the 'developmental' state gave way to the 'regulatory' state.[40] Neo-liberal economic globalization and the associated WTO, IMF and World Bank injunctions popularized the notion of 'rolling back the state'. The rhetoric of rolling back the state hides the fact that while there has been shrinkage in one aspect of the state's role—its welfare and service provision role—there has been a great expansion of another one—policing and enforcement mechanisms. Even as service provision was increasingly constructed as beyond the responsibility of a state, regulatory mechanisms for supporting intellectual property right protection, private property, and paradoxically, 'unregulated' financial services were added to its core activities, particularly from the 1990s onwards. These regulatory mechanisms required greater policing strength and sophistication behind them and the relevant institutions within the state were strengthened through a redirection of resources from developmental projects.[41]

The more fundamental shift then was not in the 'strength' of the actual state but in its place in political imagination. The state did not fail, as neo-liberal reformers claimed, but the idea of the state was challenged seriously. The state as a project, as an inspiration to projects was no longer dominant whether in Britain, Argentina, Ghana or Pakistan. This fall from grace cannot be seen in absolute terms but has to be judged relatively: both by its own past importance and by its relationship with other competing ideas. The idea that emerged as the most potent challenge to the state as a mobilizer of ideas, political

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[40] See Sassen, Saskia, (1996). *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an age of globalization*, Columbia University Press, New York, for an argument about the re-territorialization and strengthening of state control to facilitate economic globalization. Also Dunn, John (ed.), (1995). *Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?* Blackwell, Oxford.

[41] In Pakistan's recent history, the Musharaf regime received $18 billions from the US alone to strengthen its policing, espionage and military services. For some details and deeper fears about the changes in the US context see Ackerman, Bruce, (2006). *Before the Next Attack: preserving civil liberties in an age of terrorism*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

energies and imaginaries is the idea of the market.[42] No doubt the idea of the market suffers from the same kind of theoretical problems as the idea of the state: how to distinguish the market from society. Is it a set of institutional arrangements or a product of a regulatory framework? Does it stand above, below or alongside the society? Yet over the last two decades the idea of the 'market' has exerted enough pressure to at least de-centre the focus on the state within the global political imagination.[43]

This shift in political imagination and its implications for activism within the Jamaat-e-Islami has not yet been sharply articulated but has been significant enough to merit reflection and comment by many middle-level activists with whom I interacted. I found the middle-level activists to be particularly perceptive towards changes within the organization. These middle-level activists are often long-term Jamaat members or sympathizers, they are embedded in their particular social contexts and act as a bridge between the national Jamaat leadership and particular localities. The notion of a bridge, though, is too static to bring out the transformations they are able to facilitate in the process of the movement of ideas, issues and debates across the two groups that they have access to. In the process of communicating, these middle-level activists also infuse the conversation with their own

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[42] My intention here is not to suggest an uncomplicated narrative about the failure of the state with the market having to step in to correct the wrongs of the state. Again Mitchell (2002, *Rule of Experts*) provides a useful corrective to this view through a detailed look at the performance of public sector enterprises in Egypt. These were, he argues, predominantly financially vibrant and viable. It was the construction of a particular discourse that exacerbated the crisis in state legitimacy by focusing on the inefficiencies of these state enterprises. While there are important variations due to local contingencies and modalities, as discussed later, there was a similarity in how the idea of the state was discredited through an enhanced and positive emphasis on the idea of the market as an alternative engine for growth and equity. For a critical account of the sale of the profitable state owned telecommunications company with a similar unsubstantiated focus on state inefficiency and the alleged need for its replacement by a putatively more efficient private entity in Pakistan, see Munir, Kamal, 'PTCL's Sullied Sale', *Herald*, December 2009. Munir shows how in fact the replacement of a public monopoly by a private monopoly led to a dramatic decrease in profitability and long term viability of the company.

[43] This is particularly noticeable in the discourse on development. For a critical look at the process through which such a decentring takes place see Ferguson, James, (1990). *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; and (2006). *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*, Duke University Press, Durham; Arturo Escobar, (1995). *The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey.

preoccupations and concerns. Their location allows them a view across policy making as well as policy implementation within the Jamaat-e-Islami.

One such long-time activist, Naeem,[44] in his forties when I met him, belonged to a 'Jamaat-e-Islami family'. This meant that his father was also a Jamaat-e-Islami sympathizer and activist in a medium sized Punjabi city, Sargodha. His father's involvement meant that as young adults Naeem and his siblings were exposed to Jamaat-e-Islami literature and study circles. Since the late 1950s, and particularly during the 1960s, Naeem's family had also been involved in door-to-door campaigns in Sargodha for Jamaat-e-Islami electoral or issue-based mobilizations. In the early 1970s, Naeem moved to Lahore and became active in student politics through the Jamaat-e-Islami. He continued his engagement with the Jamaat-e-Islami whilst serving in a government institution, and over the years became a locally influential organizer.

As he reflected on his years of engagement with the Jamaat-e-Islami, he spoke about the increasing difficulty in actually persuading Jamaat-e-Islami activists as well as members of the wider public to attend a *jalsa* or a meeting. Initially, he blamed it on the city of Lahore. Lahore was, he said, 'too big'.[45] The size of the city was a deterrent to people actually getting to know each other but also on a practical level it meant that commuting calculations played a big role in people's decisions. Having kept his ties with Sargodha alive through frequent visits to his siblings, who still live and mobilize for the Jamaat-e-Islami there, he was struck by the difference between the two cities. In Sargodha there was a greater cohesion—people knew each other— but more critically, there was *'more time'* (*ziada waqt*). 'In Lahore people are in a state of frenzy. They are working two jobs, ferrying their children to tuitions, going shopping. And it takes so long now to get

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[44] Names have been changed where individuals showed a preference for not using their real names.

[45] At the same time there is a deep realization within the Jamaat-e-Islami that its base is primarily within the cities and not in the rural areas. Chaudhry Rehmat Ilahi, long time Shura member and one of the oldest members in Lahore (interview 22 November 2005, residence Mansoorah) reflected often repeated opinions among Jamaat-e-Islami activists when he said: 'Our base is sronger in the cities because there is less pressure from feudal obligations, biradari ties (kinship). There the waderas (feudal lords) and the chaudhries can exert such pressure as to make life difficult for those who sympathize with us. Generally, resistance is easier in cities. There is a feeling of openness. It is easier for us to take our message to people and also for people to stand up in our favour'.

from one place to the next'. Initially he stated that people were almost forced into (*majboor hain*) this state of frenzy by the size of the city, but later he also ruminated that ultimately this was linked to the desire to consume new goods, gadgets and products that instead consumed human time and energies.

People have no time for the *tehreek* (movement).[46] They are convinced that they need a *TV*, a *DVD player*, *latest books* [all three in English] or clothes. They work two jobs, kill themselves to buy these things for themselves and their children. . .. Mostly, also they are not sure what they will achieve through political activities (*siyasi sargarmi*) but they know what they can buy!. . .How can we compete with that?

How indeed, does one compete with the subtle layers of disillusionment and despair that political action directed towards the state carries within it now? At a pre-election meeting in Mansoorah Women's College at the headquarters of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Lahore in August 2005, many speakers warned against the lure of the market as an alternative to politics. One speaker addressed this gathering of key local activists from within Lahore district by declaring, 'you will have to struggle against the shopping trips . . . both in yourself and with others. How can we buy these things? I don't understand—who has the money to buy these things when the country is being bled dry by the MNCs (*international companiyan*) and *the IMF*?' She then pointed towards the audience to say, 'Can you *afford* [she used the word in English] that *TV*? Can we [as a country] *afford* these cars and these fridges? Do you know how much we owe the *IMF*? And how did we end up with this loan? Were you asked about this? Is this government [*hakumat*] capable of fulfilling the obligations of the state [*riyasat*] towards the people?'

This disenchantment in the state and frustration at its takeover by the market is also shared by others outside the Jamaat-e-Islami. In the course of my fieldwork, political activists and leaders from the Jamaat, and also from other political parties such as the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Sharif group, emphasized repeatedly to me that the state has, in effect been taken over by the market. One way to understand this assertion is that the *idea* of the state is subservient to the idea of the market as officials and politicians justify actions and policies within the market

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[46] Many Jamaat-e-Islami activists think of the Jamaat-e-Islami as both a movement (*tehreek*) and a political party (*party, jamaat*).

paradigm. This argument is not about the extent of liberalization and privatization within Pakistan—that has varied even over the last three decades, although the general trend has been towards increased privatization—but about the emergence of an official discourse that recognized the primacy of the market in setting its agenda, what the philosopher Michael Sandel has called the state's 'market mimicking assumptions'.[47] The 'market mimicking assumption' about the state refers to the fact that not only is the paradigm of the market used for making state decisions but the main aim of the state is then defined as correcting for market failure. The conceptual ascendancy of the market is not without its impact on political options and spaces. During the course of my research, politicians, some of them former or current ministers, commented on the very slim margins that they had to play with as state officials. One long time politician represented the general feeling when he said:

Since our policies are not made here, I can't even get somebody a teacher's job now [particularly after the World Bank-led devolution reforms]. What do we offer our constituencies when we go to ask them for votes? Previously, the biggest favour we could do them used to be a job, preferably in a state institution. Now either the state institutions don't exist, or we don't have control over them or we find that people don't want those jobs anymore. . . . I have created my own security company to be able to provide some jobs to the men from my village.[48]

The Jamaat-e-Islami's own relationship to the market is ambivalent: on the one hand, as seen above, Jamaat-e-Islami activists and leaders speak against consumerism as well as the free market rhetoric that pervades Pakistan's public sphere and government decisions—an increasing criticism of the IMF/World Bank conditionalities within Jamaat-e-Islami official discourse is a discernable trend[49]—and on the other hand they are not immune to the allure of the market as a mechanism for bringing about societal and individual transformation.

[47] Michael Sandel, "Markets and Morals", BBC Reith Lectures, Tuesday 9 June, 2009.

[48] Incidentally, the key contracts for his security company were with three major international banks in Lahore.

[49] See for instance, the 2002 Jamaat-e-Islami election manifesto. In addition, CDs produced by the Jamaat-e-Islami affiliate Islamic Mass Media covering speeches by Sayeed Munawar Hussain (particularly, *Ijtima-'am*, 2004), Liaquat Baloch, and Professor Ghafoor Ahmed contain discussions along similar lines.

Islamism, middle class and the market

Contemporary Jamaat-e-Islami activists and leaders talk of the welfare/developmental state as the ideal they are striving towards. The idea of the developmental state in the immediately post-colonial years of Pakistan was not a complete break from the past. Indeed there was an important element of continuity, and post-colonial notions of the developmental state were a nationalist reworking of British ideas about the colonial state. The post-colonial state was seen as an engine of social and political transformation in ways similar to the British imagining of the colonial state. The state was seen to stand above and outside of society, yet at the same time it had the power to transform society. The role that science played in this imaginary was significant. The 'scientific empire' depended heavily on science for legitimizing and enabling structures of power.[50] The idea of science being harnessed by the colonial state both for its own effective management and the fulfilment of developmental goals was an important hallmark of the late colonial period. This reliance on scientific knowledge and expertise, due to its intrinsic superiority to local knowledge, was central also to the notion of the developmental state of the 1950s through to the 1970s not just in South Asia but within a global context.[51] Much of this emphasis on scientific knowledge and technology is reflected among contemporary Islamists.[52]

However, even at the peak of its hold on political imagination, the idea of the developmental state was not without challenges. A pronounced tension between the ideas of the 'state' and the 'market' has been a defining feature of twentieth-century politics. The relationship between the two has elicited a range of responses centred around the concern about a qualitative change in politics due to the increasing encroachment of consumerism. Interestingly,

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[50] Gilmartin, David, (1994). Scientific Empire and Imperial Science: Colonialism and Irrigation Technology in the Indus Basin, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 53:(4), 1127–1149.

[51] Escobar, Arturo, (1995). *Encountering Development*; Ferguson, James, (1990). *The Anti-Politics Machine*; Agrawal, Arun, (2005). *Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Makings of Subjects*, Duke University Press, Durham.

[52] See also Hatem, Mervat, (1998). 'Secularist and Islamist Discourses on Modernity in Egypt and the Evolution of the Postcolonial Nation-State' in, Haddad and Esposito (eds), *Islam, Gender and Social Change*, Oxford University Press, New York, for similarities in the Egyptian context.

the most prominent twentieth-century critics of consumerism—which can be seen as the engagement at the level of an individual with the 'market'—Marxists and Marxians, from Karl Mannheim, Theodore Adorno to Pierre Bourdieu, have shifted the focus, even if at times unintentionally, away from the state as the locus of mobilizations and political energies.

These tensions are often seen to play out most prominently within the middle class. The middle class in South Asia, as elsewhere, is a group particularly defined by its attempts at self-fashioning,[53] willing to use both the state and the market for realizing its aspirations as well as defining the substance of them. In an interesting analysis of fascistic movements within the Urdu middle class milieu in interwar North India, Daechsel highlights the particular susceptibility of the Urdu-speaking North Indian middle class to consumerism as a means to self-fashioning.[54] Yet, for others within the same middle class, the state too has been of considerable attraction for similar reasons of self-definition.[55] The vast majority of Jamaat-e-Islami members in Pakistan today are part of the aspiring middle class and bring to their politics their conflict-ridden relationship with both the market and the state, their interest in using both or either for self-fashioning and self-expression. Their previous experience supports a continued focus on the state but alternatives are increasingly being tested. The current leadership of the Jamaat-e-Islami comprises predominantly first generation university and college graduates who have, over the last 30 years, moved up the social ladder. Their route into this social mobility has been mostly through state sponsored schools, colleges and universities. It is therefore no coincidence that the threats to Jamaat-e-Islami membership through privatization of public universities under General Musharaf's regime were taken very seriously. The Board of Governors scheme, initiated in 2002, was

[53] Daechsel, Markus, (2006). *The Politics of Self Expression; the Urdu Middle Class Mileu in Mid-Twentieth Century India and Pakistan*, Routlege, New York; Chakrabarty, Dipesh, (1991). Open space/public place: Garbage, modernity and India, *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, No. 1, pp. 15–31; Joshi, Sanjay, (2001). *Fractured Modernity: Making of a Middle Class in Colonial India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi.

[54] Osella, Filippo and Caroline Osella, (2009). Muslim entrepreneurs in public life between India and the Gulf: making good and doing good, *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute* 15:(1), 202–221 provide an insight into middle class aspirations and the promise of the market from the point of view of the entrepreneur.

[55] Seal, Anil, (1968). *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Chatterjee, Partha, (1986). *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* Zed Books, London.

widely seen as a move to privatize the education sector and open it up for international institutions.[56] The Jamaat-e-Islami's critique of privatization of national education was couched in terms of the principle of equal access to health and education, but no doubt shaped by the Jamaat-e-Islami's continued dependence upon public universities for recruitment. The Jamaat-e-Islami moved quickly through the Islami Jamiat Tulaba, its student wing, to organize mass protests throughout the years 2002 to 2005. Waqas Anjum, Islami Jami'yat Tulaba national Nazim from 1995–1998 and now a Jamaat-e-Islami *rukn*,[57] was involved with these protests and explained:

The government is only increasing the segregation in society through these measures. Those who sit on a *taat* (jute mat) in their school will have one board [of education—for curriculum and examination etc.], the army has its own, and then the Agha Khan Board. They are creating different types of people— those who rule and those who are ruled. ... It is only the organizational capacity of Jamaat-e-Islami and my involvement in it that sustains me, otherwise the situation in Pakistan is truly depressing (*dil shakista karnay walay halat hain*).[58]

While the state remains the rhetorical focus of Jamaat-e-Islami mobilizations, the move beyond the state has been routed through the market. The use of market as a facilitator of middle class activism is an option at a time when the state is seen as ineffective as well as inaccessible. A response to the kinds of problems that Waqas Anjum raised are the private schools run by Jamaat-e-Islami affiliates, even as they continue to agitate in support of state provision of education. Over the last two decades Jamaat-e-Islami activists' engagement with a market that allows them space for politico-entrepreneurial activity as well as consumer activism has increased significantly. The two are

[56] The critics of the Board of Governors and Model University Ordinance (2002) pointed towards a World Bank report on the education sector in Thailand that was replicated almost verbatim by a Boston based consortium of consultants hired, with World Bank money, to formulate an education policy for Pakistan. The suggestion was that the Board of Governors scheme is part of a larger World Bank agenda to open up developing country markets for multinational institutions wishing to profit from the strong demand for higher education within these countries. Interview Nazim Husnain, President All Pakistan Lecturers' Association, at his residence in Iqbal Town, Lahore, December 2002.

[57] To become a *rukn* (or full member) of the Jamaat-e-Islami at his age (early thirties) means that Waqas Anjum is seen by those within the Lahore Jamaat-e-Islami hierarchy as a particularly promising activist.

[58] Interview Waqas Anjum Jaafari, 29 November 2005, Idara-Marafat I Islam, Mansoorah.

related precisely because consumption of veils in different colours with laces and embroidery,[59] Islamic CDs and DVDs, Islamic schools,[60] books, pamphlets and children's stories, catering companies that hire women to serve in the women's section at weddings and parties,[61] interest-free banking systems, taxi services that provide adequate purdah facilities, decoration pieces that involve calligraphy rather than human and animal forms, television and radio channels that provide Islamic content, entail both a political stance and public consumption. More fundamental than the actual goods and services bought and sold is a reworked conception of politics as a place of transactions, the need for incentives to structure action, the logic of demand and supply to situate mobilizations, the importance of efficiency and individual choice in locating the role of religion—the many facets of the language and paradigm of the market.

Unthinkable two decades ago, political action for many of the Jamaat-e-Islami activists I interacted with is infused by this new conception of politics. As I accompanied some upper-middle class Jamaat-e-Islami women from the suburbs of Lahore, to their weekly visits to inner city sewing schools and income-generation projects, it became apparent that the line between entrepreneurship and political mobilization—one that had been sharply delineated by Maududi for the Jamaat-e-Islami—had become a blurred one today. When I asked them how their work here was relevant to the work of the larger organization the Jamaat-e-Islami women responded that they were facilitating the work of the organization in two ways. First, through creating a relationship with the underprivileged in an area of the city previously closed to Jamaat-e-Islami influence they were opening the channels for a 'longer-term relationship' a euphemistic reference to electoral mobilizations.[62] Second, and more importantly through the exposure to Jamaat-e-Islami literature and proselytizing messages these women in the sewing schools and income-generating projects

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[59] See also Navaro-Yashin, (2004). *Faces of the State*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, Chapter 3 on Islamist fashion and consumption in Turkey.

[60] One important private school chain started by a Jamaat-e-Islami affiliate is the Dar-al-Arqam School system.

[61] Such strict gender segregation of service providers is a very recent development in urban middle class weddings and social functions.

[62] For some discussion on the resistance that residents of Lahore's inner city had shown to the JI see Iqtidar, Humeira, (2008). 'Terrorism and Islamism: Differences, Dynamics and Dilemmas' in special issue on 'Terrorism, Security and Business', *Global Business and Economic Review*, 10:(2), 216–228.

were being told about 'the right kind of Islam' (*sahih islam*) and being made into a 'suitable citizen for an Islamic state' (*islami riyast kay liyay mozoon shehri*); citizens who were pious, efficient, economically independent and 'tuned to the laws of demand and supply'. Coming back to the futility of separating society from the state, and in a neat inversion of Maududi's formulation, they would ask rhetorically what is a state without the right kind of society and citizenry to support it?

Quite apart from the ready stratification as consumers and producers, it is the use of market mechanisms as facilitators of moral and political projects that signals an important shift in Islamist imagination. This shift, manifested through the changes in their mobilization strategies and focus, are linked inextricably to the changes in the wider political imagination and the place of the state in it. However, there are slippages in the relationship between global political imagination, academic theory and local political imagination. This paper has attempted to show that even when the state idea has been seriously challenged in international political imagination, and even when the Islamists have accommodated these changes through shifts in their mobilization strategies, they cannot abandon the state idea completely, there are local imperatives for a continued Islamist engagement with the notion of the state including the past experience of the vast majority of its members and other path dependencies.[63]

Secularism beyond the State

Secularism is invariably conceived in relation to the state—whether in terms of a separation from or management of religion. However, if we recognize the state as an idea that allows particular configurations of power to function, it is important to recognize the competing, but also paradoxically complementary, place of the market in this equation. The role of the market—in regulating the 'conduct of conduct'—has received less direct attention than the role of the state, particularly with reference to religious practices. In his alternative reading of secularism as state management of religion, rather than a separation of religion and the state, Asad recognizes that the modes of governance he refers to are tied to the emergence of capitalism and the nation state; secularization led to the release of ecclesiastical

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[63] On such disjunctures between the local and the global see Aziz, this volume.

property into private hands and market circulation in the European context.[64] Nevertheless, the focus of Asad's argument remains the state and his understanding of secularism is tied closely to the notion of governmentality. In the South Asian context, the implications of governmentality during colonial rule have been explored in significant detail over the last three decades.[65] However, the changes in it in post-colonial contexts have remained relatively under explored.[66] It is critical to nuance our understanding by a deeper look not just across localities but also through temporal variations. Otherwise, rendering inconsequential the differences in governmentality across time and space, we run the risk of attributing too much or too little to certain modes of power.[67] The idea of the state engendered certain particular forms of governmentality. As the idea of the state weakens its hold on popular imagination so does, potentially, the ability of particular institutions associated with the state in managing and directing individual behaviour. The kind of scepticism that defines the relationship of the citizen with the state in Pakistan precludes any easy conclusions about the ability of state to regulate 'the conduct of conduct'.[68] At the very least we can easily establish that it is nowhere close to the kind of control that the Foucauldian French state exerted. The rise of the idea of market in this context bears further scrutiny.

[64] Asad, Talal, (2003). *Formation of the Secular: Christianity, Islam and Modernity*, Stanford University Press, California; Asad, Talal, (1993). *Genealogies of Religion: discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam*, John Hopkins University Press, London; See also Salvatore, Armando, (2005). The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 33:3, 412–437.

[65] Cohn, Bernard, (1996). *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Chatterjee, Partha. *Nations and Nationalism; Van der Veer, Peter, (2001). Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. However, see Washbrook, David, (1999). '. . . And Having Melted Into Thin Air, Then Rains Down Again', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 42:4, 571, for some important questions regarding the precise modalities of colonial governmentality.

[66] Notable exceptions in the case of India include Partha Chatterjee, (2004). *Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World*, Columbia University Press, New York; Corbridge, Stuart, *et al.*, *Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India*; Ghosh, Kaushik, 'Between Global Flows and Local Dams, Indigenousness, Locality, and the Transnational Sphere in Jharkhand, India'.

[67] See Kaushik Ghosh, Between Global Flows, 2006, for a perceptive discussion along these lines. Also Scott, David, (1995). Colonial Governmentality, *Social Text*, 43(Autumn), 191–220.

[68] For an insight into the genealogy of cynicism in Pakistan see Khan, Naveeda, (2003). *Grounding Sectarianism: Islamic Ideology And Muslim Everyday Life In Lahore, Pakistan* (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University).

Its implications for regulation and management of religious belief and practice appear important but remain relatively under-explored.

One important implication of framing political activity within the market paradigm is the increasing pull of individualization. The co-imbrication of market and piety in producing a particular kind of self has been perceptively articulated by Rudnyckyj through his investigations into 'market Islam'[69] which 'simultaneously draws on immersion in an Islamic discursive tradition, calculating economic rationality, and instilling principles and practices of self-management'.[70] He finds in his study of an Islamic management company at a state steel-producing plant in Indonesia that market Islam involves, 'designing a form of Muslim practice commensurate with the goals of eliminating corruption, promoting privatization, and enhancing productivity in an increasingly global market'—goals that Rudnyckyj identifies with neoliberal reforms in Malaysia. Similarly, Bryan Turner has identified an increased and specific kind of consumption as a means of religious fulfillment. Turner points out that 'life on earth is no longer merely a prelude to the consumption of happiness in the next world: the promise of consumerism is to have one's desires satisfied now'.[71] Not only does consumerism support a different theology—from 'prosperity religions' to 'spiritual economies' and 'occult capitalism'[72]—but also allows in some instances a fluid commitment and identity.[73] At the same time as consumption becomes

[69] Rudnyckyj, Daromir, (2009). Spiritual Economies: Islam and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia, *Cultural Anthropology*. 24:(1), 104–141; Rudnyckyj, Daromir, (2009). Market Islam in Indonesia, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*. 15:(1), 183–201.

[70] See also Rudnyckyj, Spiritual Economies: Islam and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia, for his discussion of spiritual economies.

[71] Turner, Bryan, (2009). 'Goods not Gods: New Spiritualities, Consumerism and Religious Markets' in, Ian Rees Jones, Paul Higgs and David J. Ekerdt (eds), Consumption and Generational Changes. The Rise of Consumer Lifestyles, Transaction, New Brunswick.

[72] For prosperity religions see brief introduction in Garett, Jeremy and King, Richard, (2005). *Selling Spirituality: The silent takeover of religion*, Routledge, London, p. 19; and Coleman, Simon, (2000). *The Globalisation of Charismatic Christianity: Spreading the Gospel of Prosperity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; for spiritual economy Rudnyckyj (2009), Spiritual Economies: Islam and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia; and for occult capitalism, Comaroff, Jean and Comaroff, John, (2000). Millenial Capitalism: First Thoughts on Second Coming, *Public Culture*, 12:(2), 291–343; and their (1999) Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony, *American Ethnologist* 26:(2), 279–303.

[73] This may vary across classes. Turner (2009), 'Goods not Gods: New Spiritualities, Consumerism and Religious Markets' p. 50, quotes the example of superstar Madonna

a route to practising citizenship and identity, the decisions around what and where to eat, buying clothes or choosing a drink cannot avoid becoming invested with political and religious significance.[74] Both as consumers, workers and producers Islamists, like others, operating at the nexus of religious inspiration and the market, operate at the dawn of new normativities and subjectivities. Activism structured around the idea of the market has the potential to transform investments in meanings of the success or failure of the Islamist project itself.

The shift in the place of the state in Islamist political imagination presents an interesting opportunity to explore some of the complexities generated at the interface of an international political imagination and local political dynamics. The Jamaat-e-Islami's focus on the state is in part a legacy of a period when the idea of the state played a dominant role in global political imagination. The precise relationship between the state and the Jamaat-e-Islami that Maududi articulated at that time was the result of local political configurations infused by a global imagination. As the idea of the state has changed over the last decades of the twentieth century in the larger political imagination, so has the Jamaat-e-Islami articulated subtle shifts in its mobilizational strategies. In the case of Pakistan, this link with the global remains curiously under-studied and over-used at the same time. On the one hand analysis of Pakistani politics, and particularly of Islamism, is almost never carried out without reference to an international political order[75] and on the other hand, specific developments within Pakistan have not been looked at in depth by linking them with an international political imaginary. This paper has looked at why and how ideas about the state have changed within the Islamist imagination and has briefly alluded to the implications of these changes. The Jamaat-e-Islami's shifts in activism and struggles with moral ambiguities that the ascendancy of the market in political imagination has catalyzed, force us to recalibrate the emphasis on the

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moving from Catholic themes to more Jewish ones as Rachel after her exposure to Kabbala.

[74] See Trentman, Frank, (2006). *The Making of the Consumer: Knowledge, Power and Identity in the Modern World*, Berg Publishers, Oxford, for an insight into historical and sociological discussions about the relationship between new subjectivities and consumerism.

[75] For instance, Baxter, C. and Wasti, S. R., (1991). *Pakistan: Authoritarianism in the 1980s*, Lahore: Vanguard Publications; Waseem, Muhammed (1987) *Pakistan under Martial Law 1977–85*, Vanguard, Lahore; Malik, Iftikhar, (1999). *Islam, nationalism, and the West: issues of identity in Pakistan*, Macmillan, Basingstoke.

state as the source of governmentality in terms of an active moulding of religious thought and practice.[76] That these struggles are tied to shifts in a global political imagination also compels us to re-adjust the emphasis from theology to context, the local to the global, and from the particular to the general. Interrogating global capitalist structures, with an eye to local developments, remains a challenging project. Debates and discussions about secularism in Pakistan cannot be meaningful without recognizing the particular configuration of the idea of the state informed as it is by an imaginary beyond the nation and the *ummah*.

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[76] Also see Sharma, Aradhana, (2006). Crossbreeding Institutions, Breeding Struggle: Women's Empowerment, Neoliberal Governmentality, and State (Re)Formation in India, *Cultural Anthropology*, 21:(1), 60–95.