consultants with little local expertise. Viewers seem to have "a much broader definition of news than the news professionals" (p. 89), resulting in an unmet need for news that goes beyond discussion of fires, police tape, and celebrities. This study shows how the need might be met effectively and profitably as well.

Rules and Restraint: Government Spending and the Design of Institutions. By David M. Primo. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 216p. $50.00 cloth, $20.00 paper.
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— Bruce E. Cain, *University of California Berkeley*

David Primo has written an ambitious book analyzing the ways in which rules alter the size and efficiency of budgets at both the state and federal levels. Even readers who do not buy into the central premise that public spending is driven by the uncontrolled bidding of distributive politics (which we might now call the McCain hypothesis in light of the 2008 election) will find many valuable insights in this study. The comparison of state to federal budgetary processes is by itself an important contribution to the political science literature.

The book begins with the observation that public spending has increased at all levels in the postwar period, and that while federal reforms have largely failed, some states have more successfully lowered their total spending and have more responsibly aligned it with per capita revenue changes. The solution to fiscal restraint, Primo maintains, is in the rules that govern the budgeting process. Properly designed and effectively enforced rules can constrain the inevitable political pressures to spend inefficiently. However, all too often, he laments, the design of effective rules is undermined by political considerations.

Using a game-theoretic model with many typical simplifying assumptions, Primo demonstrates that the allocation of distributive goods will often be inefficient because common pool problems (i.e., the temptation to overproduce concentrated benefits when costs are shared) and the powers that agenda setters have in putting together a support coalition are considerable. Unless these processes can be cabined by effective and enforceable externally or internally imposed rules, spending will increase even when everyone wants to cap it. Moreover, in flush times, legislators will commit to recurring expenses that are unaffordable in the long term.

The author also usefully demonstrates how under certain conditions institutional rules, such as spending limits, supermajority rules, and executive vetoes, can limit inefficient and excessive spending, but not always. Supermajority votes, for instance, can sometimes lead to extra, even if somewhat more efficient, spending as the proposer seeks to increase the coalition to match the higher threshold. In the end, Primo concludes that a no-carryover spending limit enforced by an elected judiciary is the most effective means for restraining budgets.

One of his empirical equations in Chapter 5 shows that public expenditures are indeed lower in states that have no carryover spending limits and elected judiciaries, controlling for other factors. A second, and perhaps more interesting, equation indicates that states with spending limits react to revenue increases more conservatively than do those without, which is consistent with other studies that have shown that states with spending limits have less volatile fiscal patterns and are more likely to put surplus revenue into rainy-day funds.

While there is much of value in this book, there are also a few leaps of faith (and perhaps ideology) and important evidentiary gaps in it as well. Even though Primo acknowledges that distributive goods (especially as he defines them) are only a small fraction of federal and state budgets, he focuses on them as the central objects of restraint. This is indeed analogous to John McCain's attempt to convince us in the last election that earmarks are the core economic problem in America. Quite aside from a point that Primo himself acknowledges—that distributive goods can grease the wheels of budgetary agreement—the main driving forces for budgetary expansion are not distributive goods but, rather, entitlements in the federal budget and nondiscretionary spending at the state level. The empirical model that allegedly proves his case only shows that spending is less in states with spending limits, not that spending on distributive goods is less. But as Primo discusses in Chapter 2, there is a tendency to underprovide for public goods due to free-rider incentives, and there is no way to tell from his empirical models whether spending limits are lowering distributive or public goods.

Another puzzling claim is that elected courts are crucial to budgetary restraint. The evidence for this is thin, hinging on the contention that the combined statistical effect of no-carryover rules and an elected judiciary is greater than their separate effects. Even so, this reader at least would like to have had some specific instances in which the courts acted to enforce spending limits, and some data that demonstrated that elected courts were more likely to take up these issues than nonelected ones. It is not obvious that elected judges are anymore likely to take on a legislature that controls their budget or wade into an issue that is so political than are appointed ones. An unstated assumption of Primo's view is that the courts are defending the public interest in restraining spending, but if the public's opinion is more divided than that, elected judges might see danger in fiscal decisions.

While I do not buy all of the premises or conclusions, there are important takeaway points in this book. The design of budget rules can shape fiscal outcomes in significant ways. External constraints will more effectively limit spending than internal mechanisms such, as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, but they introduce rigidities that make it harder to deal with crises. And most importantly, since short-term political considerations often undermine long-term fiscal goals, there is a need for well-designed rules to help legislators avoid irresponsible choices.

Party Influence in Congress. By Steven S. Smith. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 264p. $75.00 cloth, $24.99 paper.
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— Matthew Lebo, *Stony Brook University*

This is a helpful addition to the literature on congressional parties. After dispensing with the research problems inherent in studies that have answered "no" to the question of "Do parties matter?" Steven Smith sets out to redefine the research agenda for congressional scholars. To begin, researchers must more rigorously delineate *when* parties matter and *how* parties matter.

This is not an easy task. It is easy for legislative scholars to find anecdotes to support their claims about congressional parties. For example, it is impossible to read Robert Caro's *Master of the Senate* (2002) and argue that parties and their leaders have not affected the decisions of individual legislators. Caro's description/recounting of Lyndon Johnson twisting arms to the point of costing senators reelection are strong examples of senators not just following their ideological beliefs or maximizing their chances of reelection. But over the history of Congress, there are anecdotes to suit every theory.

The search for systematic empirical proof of congressional party influence is of course more challenging. This may be generally true, but Smith explains how finding statistical evidence of party influence is particularly difficult. There have been thousands of roll call votes in congressional history with dozens or hundreds of members participating in each roll call. Even if party influence were occurring in its simplest form and out in the open—perhaps if C-SPAN's cameras could capture leaders exerting party pressure through some version of the "Johnson Treatment"—we would still find the number of cases where legislators went against their particular interests overwhelmed by the cases where they were simply left to make their own decisions. And party influence can be wielded well in advance of any roll call being taken; indeed, parties may have their greatest influence in preventing a roll call from occurring or structuring how the vote will occur.

Smith is careful to sort through the ways in which we should look for evidence of party effects and the areas where we might find them. This is complicated by variation across issues, rules, eras, and chambers. In fact, his call for paying more attention to the Senate in studies of congressional parties is one of the key ways he sets the scholarly agenda. He explains how both direct and indirect forms of party pressure can be exerted and that we should expect the need for such exertions to depend upon majority status and upon the relative sizes of the party delegations.

One interesting question addressed by the book is whether the primary purpose of congressional parties is to maximize policy outcomes, electoral success, or both. Smith makes a case for "both," citing classic studies of party leadership elections. This differs from the conditional party government (CPG) approach where policy change (or, more precisely, maximization) is the paramount goal. Maximizing party seat share is helpful toward this goal, and some versions of CPG stress Richard Fenno's view that parties serve legislators who themselves have multiple goals. More recent discussions of cartel theory begin with the view that electoral goals are paramount but that policy maximization is central to that goal, and so the cartel model focuses on policy outcomes. The more recent theory of strategic party government (SPG) posits that parties seek to maximize seat share and that winning votes and changing status quo policies is an instrumental goal—parties do these things to bolster their reputation but not per se for the satisfaction of party members.

This leaves us with the subtle question: Do parties enact laws so that they can gain seats, or do they gain seats so that they can maximize their policy goals? We frequently observe behavior that is directed at both policy change and winning elections, but perhaps for the sake of parsimony we can reasonably treat one goal as paramount and the other as instrumental. The empirical question is whether a significant amount of legislative behavior can *only* be explained by a double-goaled approach: parties forcing through policy changes that are adverse to their electoral interests *and* parties acting in ways that promote their electoral interests while betraying their policy preferences. In *Party Influence in Congress,* Smith does not carry this empirical exercise very far, but he does lay out a feasible alternative to the prevailing theories on congressional behavior, and in doing so, the biggest contributions here are the structure he gives to the search for party influence and the challenges he makes to congressional researchers to engage the agenda he sets out.

Speech Out of Doors: Preserving First Amendment Liberties in Public Places. By Timothy Zick. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 344p. $90.00 cloth, $29.99 paper.
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— Brian K. Pinaire, *Lehigh University*

Addressing itself to "speech" (but also assembly, petition, and the press) "out of doors," Timothy Zick's fantastic new book convincingly demonstrates that what he terms the "expressive topography"—the "public space in which First Amendment liberties may be exercised"—has been severely diminished over the last several decades (p. 5). The implications of this general erosion, ordering, and management of expressive space are especially profound