

In subsequent chapters, each is addressed in this order, as Thurston guides readers into deeper awareness of these spiritual locations in their own lives.

Nazareth is the place of formation, of prayer and work, of ordinariness and humility, yet also of hidden depths of identity known to God alone. In Foucauld's life, Nazareth is seen in the formation of his calling and the apparent failure of a missionary who converted only two people, but whose influence in Muslim-Christian dialogue, Thurston explains, has been overlooked. His spirituality also bore fruit in the emergence of the orders of the Little Brothers of Jesus and the Little Sisters of Jesus.

Thurston's experience and sensitivity are evident in her discussion of the second location, where she writes, "Only those who have lived in the desert and eaten sand are qualified to assist and guide others in the arduous journey through it" (79). The desert takes its time. Though perilous, the desert empties, makes room, and offers the thirst for God known through felt absence of the divine. Sojourn in the desert is not failure but a severe grace. Turning to the third spiritual location, that of active, public life, Thurston finds two key themes: radical openness to others and apparent failure, each apparent in the lives of Jesus and Foucauld. This location thus returns to the themes of hiddenness and of the importance of not being attached to results.

This retreat ends with a meditation on cross bearing as the active choice to accept a cross that is not self-selected but proffered by Jesus. Taking up a cross "is to choose actively for Jesus' sake"; it is not a matter of passive, even if noble, endurance (111). Thurston says that "we don't get to choose our own crosses" (110), yet we can choose to accept them, not intellectually, but as a way of faith. The final questions of the retreat ask readers to consider what cross Jesus has chosen and is offering to them in this moment, as well as what crosses readers have made for themselves and need to put down. Those painful and liberating questions are a fitting conclusion to a retreat interested readers will want to make more than once.

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*Between Faith and Belief: Toward a Contemporary Phenomenology of Religious Life.* By Joeri Schrijvers. Albany: SUNY Press, 2016. xvii + 380 pages. \$30.95.

doi: 10.1017/hor.2017.77

Joeri Schrijvers' latest study in contemporary Continental philosophy and the possibility of the religious steers immediately toward very familiar terrain:

the possibility of atheism, the phenomenon of secularism, and the “return of religion” in recent Continental thought. Considering a number of popular writers, such as John Caputo, Jean-Luc Nancy, Peter Sloterdijk, and Jean-Luc Marion, to name only the most prominent, Schrijvers not only looks to how their arguments are rooted in the nuanced philosophies of Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida, but also begins to critique the narrow interests they maintain in attempting to overcome ontotheology and metaphysics once and for all (the subject too of his earlier study, *Ontotheological Turnings*, also with SUNY Press). Such efforts, according to Schrijvers, are really a matter of philosophical hubris—that is, of presenting a totalizing narrative that really cannot be declared as such to exist as an enclosed space. By focusing on lesser-known figures such as Reiner Schürmann and Ludwig Binswanger, Schrijvers deftly parses the arguments given for moving *beyond* Christianity in the work of several of the aforementioned authors, and advances a position that faith without belief is “phenomenologically impossible,” as this formulation leaves our embodied existence out of the picture. In short, these critiques of metaphysics attempt to present a world without love and a love without world.

Schrijvers mounts a subtle criticism but also defense of tradition in this book through the turn to love and life as they “outwit” tradition, while simultaneously grounding themselves in it. It is the task of the book as a whole to preserve metaphysics as a possibility through a philosophical account of incarnation developed alongside Binswanger’s phenomenology of love. By contrasting Binswanger with Heidegger, in order to elucidate a phenomenology of religious life, Schrijvers promotes a more robust, intersubjective way of being in the world that can more adequately account for the role of love in one’s life—an acknowledgment too of the necessity for being with others (and otherness itself) that describes how we, ontically, *do* exist in our world, and *in* the lived institutions and religions that comprise it. We cannot simply abandon such ways of being in the world in favor of a purely abstracted critique of every institutional order.

The other before us gives us something that we cannot give ourselves, and, to put things rather bluntly, this matters a good deal in terms of how we experience life and love. To abstractly develop an anarchic, gnostic, or antinomian critique of all institutional, systematic, ordered, and religious ways of being in our world without acknowledging our embodied (“incarnational”) reality of needing such forms (such as he charges Caputo, Nancy, and Sloterdijk of aiding) is to miss a major feature of what it means to be human. Though this may sound like an overly simplistic account of Schrijvers’ rigorous treatment of a much more complex argumentation as it is pursued in each

thinker's works, it is a major strength of the book that he is able to distill matters into such clear lines of thought.

What struck me time and again while reading this book was its entirely readable quality, as if I were listening to someone who wasn't trying to hastily dispatch a difficult argument but has such a strong grasp of the field as to render their commentary in crisp and lucid prose. This book is a reliable guide to a series of ongoing debates in Continental thought that have seemed for some time to be at an impasse. My intuition is that this impasse has mainly resulted from somewhat partisan entrenchments (phenomenology versus deconstruction) that refuse to engage with the connections between diverse methodologies. Schrijvers' fine work navigates this impasse with precision and fairness, and thereby gives us a path forward for maintaining embodied religious practice in our world today.

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*Prophecy without Contempt: Religious Discourse in the Public Square.* By Cathleen Kaveny. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. ix + 451 pages. \$49.95.

doi: 10.1017/hor.2017.78

At a time when contempt is pervasive in political discourse, arguing for more prophetic political speech may seem counterintuitive. Yet Cathleen Kaveny's most recent book tries to do just this. Readers who are familiar with Kaveny from her writing on faith and politics in *Commonweal* magazine, as well as her recent books, *Law's Virtues: Autonomy, Community, Solidarity in American Society* (2012) and *A Culture of Engagement: Law, Religion, and Morality* (2016), will know that Kaveny has something subtle and provocative to offer. Unsurprisingly, she succeeds in her ambitious attempt to retain prophetic political speech while placing it firmly within the boundaries of a pluralistic society.

In this weighty work, she attempts to (1) dismantle three influential narratives that seek to explain why public discourse has become so fractured, (2) trace the history of the jeremiad in order to show how this popular form of prophetic speech that originally served to unite Americans gradually came to divide them, (3) distinguish between two forms of public discourse: practical deliberation and prophetic indictment, and (4) identify best practices for prophetic rhetoric in public life while insisting on practical deliberation as the default.

Kaveny's critiques of philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre and John Rawls and legal scholar Stephen Carter are largely persuasive. MacIntyre's diagnosis fails to account for vigorous disagreement among those who inhabit the same