

Taylor and Zwicker provide in-depth mathematical theory of a kind not often found in political science. Their primary audience is game theorists, by which they do not mean economists. *Simple Games* is itself proof that there is great subtlety and complexity hidden in this straightforward model. But whether these mathematical results can ever be adapted to produce practical group decision processes, embodying principles appropriate to real-world institutions, is another question, one that Felsenthal and Machover, with *The Measurement of Voting Power*, help us answer.

Thucydides' Theory of International Relations: A Lasting Possession. Edited by Lowell S. Gustafson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. 262p. \$55.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

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Too often edited volumes are a farrago of barely related essays that amount to the academic equivalent of the proverbial camel: a horse built by committee. Lowell S. Gustafson is to be commended for compiling a coherent collection of essays that are united not only by their common conviction that Thucydides' great work does indeed possess a "theory of international relations" but also by their common desire to contrast this theory with current trends in the discipline. According to the contributors, Thucydides is not the father of "realism" or its variants because his understanding of international politics is essentially moral: Every approach to international politics that studies power to the neglect of justice, necessity to the neglect of freedom, will prove to be an inadequate tool with which to understand the political deeds of human beings. However much we may be impinged upon by necessity, we remain fundamentally free, and however much we may seek brute power, we nonetheless also strive to be just.

The book is divided into four sections ("Thucydides as Theorist of International Relations"; "International Politics and the Regime"; "Varieties and Refinements of Realism"; and "Ethics of International Relations"), and each contains helpful contributions. Laurie M. Johnson Bagby's excellent overview of the "fathers of international relations" culminates in the programmatic suggestion that Thucydides' work supplies a model for a political science that is genuinely scientific precisely because it is thoroughly political ("normative"). In part 2, W. Daniel Garst persuasively argues that neorealism yields "an overly simple and misleading account of the behavior and interaction of states" (p. 84) because it neglects the domestic sources of international conduct; by drawing attention to the care with which Thucydides details those domestic sources, Garst demonstrates that the neorealist reading distorts or neglects Thucydides' complexity. Jack Riley, in his sweeping account of Athenian imperialism, especially in its tension with the demands of sound domestic politics, makes the provocative argument in part 3 that "human reason and statesmanship" (p. 150), guided above all by a certain moderation, may yet succeed in doing what the Athenians only came close to doing: combining freedom and empire.

Yet, as important as it is to show the inadequacy of a realism that issues in either "an overly simple . . . account . . . of states" (p. 84) or a "superficial" reading of Thucydides (p. 78), we run the risk of misconstruing Thucydides' profound understanding of states if from the beginning we apply only our own concerns or categories to his work. Thucydides chronicled the Peloponnesian War because he believed it revealed something true about "the human way"

or "human nature" (*History of the Peloponnesian War* I.22.4 as well as III.82.2 and 84.2); by his own account he sought to understand the necessities at work in human nature, especially with respect to those claims that most presuppose our freedom from necessity, the claims of justice.

It is not quite accurate to suggest, then, that "what most interests Thucydides . . . is the question of how this distribution of power [in fifth-century Greece] came about, particularly why Athens rather than Sparta acquired an empire" (p. 69). Indeed, several contributors put questions to Thucydides that are not his own, and it is not surprising that they prove dissatisfied with his answers to them. Thucydides is said to be burdened by a "limited methodology" (p. 62; also p. 233) and "appears unable to provide a definitive diagnosis [of Athens], let alone a prescription for a cure" (p. 214); Plato himself is made to say that Thucydides "cannot teach us anything" (p. 61). The ground of this last claim appears to be the assertion—as unsubstantiated as it is surprising—that Thucydides is not a philosopher but an historian (p. 61; also p. 180). Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides never speaks of "history," although he does speak repeatedly of "nature."

To begin to grapple with Thucydides the student of nature, the philosopher, one must set forth the correct premises and full implications of the "Athenian thesis." In its most consistent form, it calls into question the very existence of justice because it denies the prerequisite, what might be called the freedom of the will. Cities, like the individuals who make them up, are finally in the grip of a certain compulsion. To say, then, that the principle of Athenian foreign policy is that "the strong rule the weak regardless of justice" (p. 167) may not yet be to grasp fully its radical character: One cannot regard what does not exist.

Moreover, to speak of "the flaws of human nature" (p. 207) or of politics as "tragic" (pp. 22, 43, 138, 150, 152, 154, 163, 166, 171, 172, 233, 243) is not only to expect man and world to be fundamentally other than what they are but also to judge them in the light of this expectation. Does Thucydides himself, who never speaks of "tragedy," hold such an expectation? Although the present volume consistently deplors "realistic" arguments from necessity, often doing so in vivid language (e.g., "pathological thinking," p. 217), to deplore a position or its consequences is not yet to refute it. The greatest contribution of the book is to remind students of Thucydides how difficult that task is and how much depends upon it.

Thucydides' own view of justice and its fate in the world is admittedly controversial, but for that very reason it must remain an open question whether he "judges politics" by means of a "moral compass" (p. 154). In his "icily controlled prose" (p. 233), it is surely hard to see that he was "overwhelmed" or even "appalled" by the "tragedy" (pp. 233, 43) he witnessed. Could it be that in helping us to recover the forgotten ground of his remarkable equanimity, by compelling us to reflect on the central question he insists we see, Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War may prove to be for us, too, a "lasting possession"?

Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders. By Don Herzog. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 559p. \$29.95.

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Readers of Don Herzog's earlier volumes, *Happy Slaves* (1989) and *Without Foundations* (1985), will know that they should expect a bracing time when they open his books. They will not be disappointed. This is, without a doubt, a book