

attitudes and patterns of political behavior evolve differently in nondemocratic contexts, which raises the possibility that political culture is not a cause of democratization but is its effect. Their work also calls into question the idea of a “national culture” by showing that there can be substantial systematic deviations in fundamental political attitudes and behaviors within countries. This finding should encourage more scholars to look at subnational variations in attitudes and, as Hiskey and Moseley argue in their conclusion, for surveys to be designed in a way that facilitates inferences about subnational units.

In addition, even though the analyses are sophisticated and leverage subgroup differences to isolate potential causal mechanisms, the book is also very accessible. Hiskey and Moseley nest their analyses inside a larger narrative about cases; each chapter begins with illustrative vignettes of subnational authoritarian actors behaving in ways the model describes and with interviews of opposition activists that illustrate the challenges those actions created. These vignettes enrich the data analysis and also enhance the book’s value for students and area specialists.

The largest question this book leaves unanswered is about the causal nature of the patterns that the authors document. Although attitudes and behaviors clearly diverge between dominant-party and multiparty contexts, it is unclear whether this difference is caused by those contexts or is reinforced by them. The difficulty in establishing causality also raises questions about how quickly attitudes and behaviors will change if the party system were to change. The authors acknowledge this difficulty; two chapters present four cases in Mexico that transitioned from dominant-party rule during the survey window to show that these changes resulted in reduced corruption victimization and increased support for some democratic norms. Unfortunately, they do not use these data in the other two chapters on patterns of accountability and participation. Thus we cannot know how fast these behaviors change when democracy emerges. Patterns of participation in newly democratic regions would have been especially interesting to document to see whether stripping former ruling parties of state resources changes their ability to mobilize supporters and whether patterns of participation become less instrumental.

I also wanted more information about the opposition-party supporters in dominant-party enclaves; the former are individuals who have reasons to switch their allegiance but do not. Are they more strongly partisan than supporters of the same parties in more competitive regions? Do they have more extreme issue preferences that make them unwilling to switch allegiances? Are they a residual category of apolitical individuals? Much of the analysis of subnational authoritarian regimes focuses on the ruling party, but Hiskey and Moseley’s microlevel data potentially provide a window into the dynamics of where opposition to the regime is concentrated.

These open questions do not undercut, however, the fundamental importance of this book for scholars of democratization, political culture, and comparative political behavior. Hiskey and Moseley provide clear evidence that behaviors diverge across contexts and that these behaviors have implications for how democracies are likely to develop in the future. Scholars and practitioners will leave this book with a greater understanding both of why democratization is hard and of the high costs of failing to fully consolidate it.

The Inclusionary Turn in Latin American Democracies.

Edited by Diana Kapiszewski, Steven Levitsky, and Deborah J. Yashar.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021. 537p. \$120.00 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592721003960

— Fernando Rosenblatt , Universidad Diego Portales
fernando.rosenblatt@mail.udp.cl

The Inclusionary Turn in Latin American Democracies, edited by Diana Kapiszewski, Steven Levitsky, and Deborah J. Yashar (KLY), is an excellent collaborative effort and a must read for scholars interested in the dynamics of political inclusion in Latin America and elsewhere. It is a masterpiece on the comparative politics of Latin America that deals with one of the region’s most challenging processes: the political inclusion of the popular sectors. The edited volume honors one of the most influential schools in the study of the comparative politics of Latin America—that of the Political Science Department at UC-Berkeley and two of its most influential scholars, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier. Their pathbreaking work, *Shaping the Political Arena* (1991), is a foundational work in the comparative historical analysis of political incorporation, organization, mobilization, and representation in Latin America. Over the last three decades, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier and the school of scholars they mentored—some of whom wrote chapters for this edited volume—have made major contributions to our understanding of these crucial theoretical issues.

The Inclusionary Turn describes and explains the efforts made by Latin American states and governments to incorporate previously marginalized sectors during an episode of inclusion that occurred between the 1990s and the 2010s. Given the high levels of inequality in Latin America and the multidimensional nature and persistence of the phenomenon, the expansion of meaningful citizenship to popular sectors is a crucial, and fiercely resisted, political process. The book presents a rigorous analysis using different methodological perspectives to tackle different angles of this episode of inclusion.

The prologue of *The Inclusionary Turn*, by Ruth Berins Collier, presents the long-term perspective on political inclusion in Latin America and identifies two

“inclusionary episodes” (p. xxv). This first episode entailed the political incorporation of the working class. It established the institutions that legalized unions, “shaped the nature of workers’ representation in the party-electoral arena” (p. xxix), and granted unions access to the policy-making process (p. xxxi). The main flaw of this episode was its inability to extend the benefits of meaningful political incorporation to women, informal workers, or Indigenous peoples.

The second episode of incorporation that Berins Collier identifies, and the main subject of this edited volume, was marked by a “more complex and fragmented” social structure (p. xxxii). The globalization of capitalism and associated neoliberal market reforms were also important contextual factors, as was the persistence of democracy. Berins Collier also emphasizes that unions were not the main actors in the second episode of incorporation. Rather, other types of interest organizations, such as civil society organizations and NGOs, emerged and flourished. In turn, a pluralization and fragmentation of organizations created a new landscape of popular interest participation, mobilization, and representation.

Chapter 1 defines the main traits of the second episode of inclusion. KLY conceptualize inclusion as various efforts by democratically elected governments that, beginning at the end of the twentieth century and extending to the 2010s, expanded “the boundaries of citizenship” (p. 1) to previously marginalized sectors. These efforts include the recognition of rights and providing access to decision making, policy making, or to resources (material, financial, or legal).

KLY evaluate the inclusionary turn (recognition, access, and resources) in terms of institutional (“parchment”) changes that target marginalized popular sectors, especially informal and rural workers, Indigenous people, and racial minorities (p. 14). They also conclude that the second episode of inclusion involved a broader set of the population (not only unionized formal workers) and was more pluralistic: “Inclusion has thus benefited a more diffuse, fragmented, less organized set of actors, often with weak political leverage” (p. 17).

The persistence of democracy and that of multilevel inequality, KLY claim, are the most important factors in explaining this second episode of inclusion. The politicization of inequality, the concomitant mobilization of demands by the popular sectors, and politicians’ interest in capturing popular sector votes, incentivized by sustained democratic competition, are the main triggers of this inclusionary turn. Candelaria Garay argues that high electoral competition for “outsiders” and social mobilization that advocates for social policy expansion determine the establishment of “large-scale nondiscretionary benefits for outsiders” (p. 67).

The chapters also delineate and explain cross-national variations in the breadth and depth of the inclusionary

turn. Sebastián Etchemendy’s and Brian Palmer Rubin’s chapters emphasize that there was variation in the types of linkages between the popular sectors (and their organizations) and the governments or other agents of inclusion. The rootedness of the linkage (programmatic or organizational) between the political Left and the popular sectors (especially their organizations) explains the depth and stability of the inclusionary turn. Samuel Handlin’s chapter emphasizes that the absence of a prolonged state crisis and an institutionalized leftist party set the stage, for example, for a more durable and less contentious inclusionary turn. Kenneth Roberts claims that past processes of incorporation and the dual transition to democracy and a market economy influenced the nature of the second episode of inclusion. The dual transition determined both the broad, pluralistic nature and organizational diffuseness of the second episode (p. 519). Maxwell Cameron goes even further, noting the role that colonial legacies played in shaping long-term processes of inclusion.

KLY identify three main limits to the inclusionary turn. First, they note that conservative forces and the wealthy use democratic institutions to thwart redistribution. Second, the inherent weakness of state institutions also hampers inclusion. Third, participatory institutions are not populated by members of the popular sectors. The remaining chapters also highlight the main pitfalls and limits of this process. For example, Benjamin Goldfrank’s chapter concludes that, even though there is some variation in the region, new participatory institutions created as part of an inclusionary effort gave citizens only a vague consultative role, and in general, “the reach of participatory institutions remains limited” (p. 119). The chapter by Thad Dunning and Lucas M. Novaes adds another limit: the role of clientelistic brokerage. Parties’ and, in turn, governments’ alliances with local-level brokers are unstable (based on a quid pro quo exchange), affecting the permanence of social programs. Sebastián Mazzuca’s chapter describes how the “rentier populism” of ruling coalitions that seek to take advantage of the commodity boom by (1) yielding to the “expropriation temptation” by advancing economic populist measures (p. 444) and (2) seeking to hegemonize political power (p. 450) affects the sustainability of the inclusionary turn. Maxwell Cameron’s chapter highlights how instances of popular mobilization faced violent opposition from the elites; the countries in which this opposition occurred experienced cycles of inclusion and repression, which resulted in limited inclusionary turns (p. 424).

The Inclusionary Turn covers a crucial recent episode in Latin America; meaningful political inclusion of marginalized sectors remains a major structural challenge in the region. This book makes four significant contributions: it presents a broad picture of the political processes that led to this second episode of inclusion; describes its different

manifestations; explains its nature and potential long-term effects; and highlights its limits and pitfalls. *The Inclusionary Turn* opens many avenues of inquiry, such as research into the long-term effects of this episode of political inclusion, how the deinstitutionalization of many Latin American party systems shaped particular forms of inclusion, and the role direct action played in politicizing the demands of the popular sectors.

Managing Transition: The First Post-Uprising Phase in Tunisia and Libya. By Sabina Henneberg. Cambridge University

Press, 2020. 266p. \$99.99 cloth.

doi:10.1017/S1537592721003522

— Kirstie Lynn Dobbs , Merrimack College
dobbsk@merrimack.edu

Managing Transition: The First Post-Uprising Phase in Tunisia and Libya by Sabina Henneberg offers a comparative analysis of the role of interim governments after the fall of the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Libya following the 2011 Arab Spring protests. Henneberg wishes to “restore the importance of local agents’ choices in critical moments during the transitions” (p. 14). Focusing on the role of these actors themselves is just as important as the debates surrounding the religious–secular divide and questions on national identity that have “consumed so many analysts” (p. 14) investigating Libya and Tunisia. Henneberg fills a significant gap left open in the post-revolution literature, especially regarding the Arab Spring: she reveals that both the agency of the interim governments and the structural environments in which they made decisions were of critical importance for each country’s transition. Tunisia made the transition to a successful, albeit precarious, representative democracy, whereas Libya’s transition resulted in violence and conflict among groups competing for political power. Overall, the book presents a theory for analyzing interim governments in post-revolution or democratizing contexts based on three key elements or challenges that they face: bridging the old and the new institutions, securing internal and external legitimacy without being elected, and creating agreed-on power-sharing rules.

This study uses qualitative data based on interviews conducted with political elites and other actors involved with the interim governments in Tunisia and Libya. It also uses primary and secondary sources, such as official texts, laws, reports published by international organizations, and news articles from credible outlets. Although the author traveled to Tunisia to conduct interviews, she did not conduct interviews “on the ground” in Libya—possibly explaining the lack of voice given to grassroots civil society activists in Libya, especially compared to the Tunisian case. Overall, however, the analysis is incredibly rich in detail and useful for quantitative methodologists seeking to build a dataset on interim governments.

Managing Transitions sheds light on the delicate balance between continuity and stability and revolution and change. The book carefully connects each country’s historical past with the decisions made by the interim governments. For example, the *Destour Sagheer* (the constitution passed immediately in the interim phase in Tunisia) reflected the country’s 1861 constitution that pushed for reform and modernization; this showcased how the country’s long-standing trends in institution building influenced decision-making in 2011. Establishing new governing institutions in Libya proved more challenging. Since independence, Libya has never possessed a strong unifying national identity and has consistently lacked a strong central governing entity in which security, economic, political, and judicial institutions carried out daily functions of government. The lack of governing norms in Libya’s past carried over into the transition phase and significantly affected the decision-making of the interim government. Furthermore, Qaddafi’s susceptibility to foreign influences during his last decade in power put international pressure on the interim government that also affected its decision making when building institutions, ultimately to the detriment of the transition.

Henneberg carefully notes the costs and benefits that individual actors face when negotiating the trade-offs in bridging political and social divides at times when countries face a national identity crisis brought about by a major transition and an influx of new spaces for political contestation. A much-appreciated aspect of the book is that it takes a psychological approach in describing the individual personalities of the elite actors and why their dispositions for compromise or past associations as a moderate or technocrat had a considerable impact on the decision outcomes of interim bodies and the transitions. For example, it mattered that Ben Achour, one of the leading figures in Tunisia’s interim government, possessed a disposition well suited for compromise and consensus; it had a great impact on the work of the transition government—ultimately culminating in the *esprit de consensus* that characterized the interim government.

Political mistrust created by the former regime also carried over into the post-revolution era. Tensions between members of interim governments proved consequential in the decision-making processes; overcoming barriers of mistrust left over from the previous regime was a major challenge for interim governments in both Tunisia and Libya. In Libya, Mustafa Abd al-Jalil was nominated as chairman of the interim government because he was seen as apolitical and had a public image as a unifying figure. Yet, tensions arose between Jalil and Mahmoud Jibril, who became the prime minister based on his connections with the Qaddafi regime. Mistrust between members of the interim government in Tunisia also persisted, especially when those connected to the former regime were connected on their ability to be independent and nonpartisan. During