

society. Sygkelos contends that, since the 1930s, Soviet leaders realized the power of nationalism for consolidating their legitimacy domestically while they also channeled that ideology to other communist parties through the Comintern. Sygkelos sees the Leipzig trial of 1933 as a pivotal moment because Dimitrov first combined nationalist, internationalist, and class elements in his defense. The author also emphasizes the importance of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935, which distinguished between bourgeois chauvinism and communism patriotism and promoted the national message as an element of the popular front strategy of building political alliances among antifascist groups.

Grounded in discourse analysis, Sygkelos insightfully explains that Bulgarian “communists appealed to patriotism rather than the class consciousness of the proletariat” by presenting their political takeover not as a socialist revolution but as a “national liberation movement” that would save the country from a “national disaster” (55). The author emphasizes that the communist takeovers in eastern Europe involved not only coercion but also consent, claiming that the national language was a “central factor in legitimizing [the] regime” (73) both in domestic politics and foreign affairs. Sygkelos’s meticulous reconstruction of the national rhetoric, showing how the BCP interchangeably used terms such as nation, people, state, and party is refreshing and ingenious. But this analysis leaves the reader wondering about the agendas of the specific politicians and intellectuals involved in the exchanges as well as the fine line between BCP language and author’s analysis.

Cold War geopolitics complicated the BCP’s use of the national rhetoric in foreign affairs. While after 1944 BCP leaders articulated territorial aspirations against Greece, an “enemy nation,” in Thrace, they developed contradictory policies in Macedonia because Yugoslavia was now a “friendly nation” (125). Sygkelos analyzes the BCP attitude to the Balkan Federation, not as a “national treachery,” as Bulgarian historians have recently proposed, but as a plan to create an independent Macedonia that would gravitate toward Bulgaria. Despite their professed internationalism, BCP cadres “did not imagine the Macedonians . . . as separate from the Bulgarian [nation]” (158).

Sygkelos further explores the BCP-sponsored national discourses in the writing of history textbooks and the use of national holidays and symbols. After 1944, intellectuals affiliated with the BCP tried to marry the new, Marxist socioeconomic analyses of modes of production with old, deeply entrenched national(ist) interpretations of historical events. Sygkelos describes how post-1944 history textbooks interpreted discreet historical periods from prehistory to 1944, but the reader is often unclear what the BCP innovations were since many of the main events and figures discussed by Sygkelos (such as Khan Asparukh, Cyril and Methodius, or Vasil Levski) had already acquired a deep meaning in interwar Bulgarian society.

The book’s strength lies in demonstrating that the choice to use national rhetoric was not a Stalinist imposition but a strategy of building political legitimacy in the conditions of social upheaval after World War II. The author would benefit from better explaining the continuities and discontinuities in the BCP’s use of national discourses, however, because, while he recognizes that a process of remembering and forgetting was at stake, some dynamics are not placed in their specific historical or intellectual contexts. Overall, this is an illuminating study of the functions of national language in communist ideology and practice. The lesson of this work is that, rather than disappear, the rampant interwar national(ist) discourse became a key element in the legitimization strategies of eastern European communist parties.

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Zwischen Anlehnung und Abgrenzung: Die Jugoslawienpolitik der DDR 1946 bis 1968. By Friederike Baer. Dresden Historische Studien, no. 11. Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2009. 327 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. €37.90, hard bound.

This book traces the tortuous path of relations between Yugoslavia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from the early years of the Soviet Occupation Zone until 1968, a

watershed year in Yugoslav dealings with the two German states. This story focuses on East German developments, but sufficient attention is given to Yugoslav affairs to provide a proper interpretive context. (Serbo-Croatian sources are not used, but the author repeatedly draws on works in translation for Yugoslav perspectives.) The analysis is grounded in a close review of primary sources produced by East Germany's leading Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the foreign ministry of the GDR.

Baer divides the history of the relationship into five periods, marked by both distinctive new problematics and continuing basic tensions. The initial period lasted from the end of the war through 1948. Initially, the SED, despite common interests with the Yugoslavs and substantial ideological unity, essentially lacked any "strategic foreign-policy concepts" (46) toward Yugoslavia. This early benign passivity was quickly supplanted by a more definite stance as the GDR reacted to Yugoslavia's new, independent line and its ultimate expulsion from the Cominform with a vigorous rejection of any notion of a "separate road to socialism" (56) and support for the Soviets' push to purge international communism of Jozep Broz Tito's supporters. Here Baer's account proves strongest and most expansive with respect to the (already well-studied) basic domestic and international political contexts in which the leaders of the GDR and Yugoslavia found themselves; the specific content and evolution of bilateral relations between the two countries are discussed less thoroughly.

A second phase from 1949–1953 saw the relationship in turmoil, as the GDR leadership, concerned with creating a "copy" (60) of communism in the USSR and in a position of "total dependency on the Soviet Union" (67) on foreign-policy questions, had little choice but to follow the Soviet line of mistrust and condemnation. This posture of separation and distancing (*Abgrenzung*) would be, as Baer emphasizes continually, one of the fundamental East German responses toward Yugoslavia. But with the death of Iosif Stalin, relations between the two countries moved into a third period (1953–1957), one in which the GDR leadership found both reasons and opportunities to seek, albeit tentatively, closer and more cooperative engagements with the Yugoslavs. A particularly revealing chapter on these years shows how the GDR began to discover possibilities for pursuing its own interests, most notably in the long and important quest for normalized diplomatic relations, thereby departing to some extent from the prior mode of near-lockstep endorsement of the Soviet line. (Worries about Soviet approval were never far from the minds of SED leaders, however.) These efforts at rapprochement culminated in Yugoslavia's formal recognition of the GDR in late 1957, inaugurating a new period from 1958–1963 in which considerable progress was made despite occasional setbacks resulting from starkly divergent conceptions of communism and other unresolved points of contention. Finally, the period from 1964–1968 saw the East German leadership take advantage of more maneuvering room with respect to Yugoslavia, as Soviet influence diminished to some extent and a recognition of common interests with the Yugoslavs created incentives for both sides to pursue a higher level of cooperation in a number of spheres, especially economics and trade. Profound political differences nevertheless continued to complicate the relationship. Yet Baer is impressed by the extent to which mutual interests could at times win out over ideology, going so far as to portray the GDR's foreign policy as "challenging, goal-oriented, conscious of its own power, and provocative" and ultimately finding even an "aggressive" (305), self-interested, and self-directed stance that other scholars have called into question.

Baer is mindful of the various contexts that shaped and limited the bilateral relations in question, repeatedly emphasizing the importance of international economic connections and, especially, the abiding interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, which long militated against a Yugoslav-GDR thaw. This was apparent most notably through the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, Bonn's refusal to maintain diplomatic relations with states recognizing the East German state. The Federal Republic of Germany broke off contacts with Yugoslavia after its 1957 diplomatic recognition of the GDR until 1968, when an emerging new Ostpolitik made the continuation of such punishment unnecessary.

The text is typically direct and clear, with sensible organization and periodization. In conjunction with other scholarship on the subject, the volume should prove useful to historians of Yugoslavia, specialists in GDR foreign policy, and more generally to those in-

terested in the often-problematic relationships among communist states during the Cold War era.

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Sprachpolitik und nationale Identität im sozialistischen Jugoslawien (1945–1991): Serbokroatisch, Albanisch, Makedonisch und Slowenisch. By Ksenija Cvetković-Sander. *Balkanologische Veröffentlichungen. Geschichte—Gesellschaft—Kultur*, no. 50. Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2011. 452 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. €76.00, hard bound.

Ksenija Cvetković-Sander has written a thorough examination of language policies and politics in the period of socialist Yugoslavia. Understanding her object of study as both a set of deliberate actions to effect public communication within a language and negotiate its relationship with other languages, as well as ways in which speakers' understandings of linguistic communities affect the processes of identification, Cvetković-Sander offers a wide and detailed diachronic sweep through the interrelated histories of languages standardized and spoken in the lands that, from 1945 to 1991, constituted socialist Yugoslavia. As she illustrates, over the decades linguistic struggles played a critical role in the broader political and national arguments that became crucially significant in the years leading up to the country's breakup.

Although her focus is on the socialist period, Cvetković-Sander provides an excellent—and extensive—summary of pertinent (pre-) history, from Vuk Karadžić and the Illyrianists through the *ustasha* linguistic policies during World War II. This is important, as nineteenth-century and interwar Yugoslav debates about standardization of the literary language, variants, and unity or separateness of the languages provided a matrix in which similar debates were carried on in socialist Yugoslavia. One can also trace the reverberations of Herderian ideas about language and nation, embraced by Karadžić in the nineteenth century, which, as Cvetković-Sander's work implies, undergirded many linguistic arguments and disagreements in Yugoslavia in the second half of the twentieth century.

The focus of the work, as the title explicates, is the period between the end of World War II and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Cvetković-Sander's analysis encompasses, in fact, three different topics. First, the issues regarding the literary language spoken by the majority of Yugoslavs. Is it one unified literary language? If it is, how many variants does it encompass—are the languages spoken and written in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, subvariants of the variants standardized in Belgrade and Zagreb, or variants in their own right? Second, the status of Slovenian and Macedonian, each different from Serbo-Croatian (the name, as the author shows amply, is complicated, but will do here), but both official languages in a country in which the overwhelming majority of the population did not speak either one of them. Finally, the question of Albanian, the language of the largest national minority in the country as well as that of a neighboring country, unrelated linguistically to other Yugoslav languages. The push of these questions, as Cvetković-Sander shows, spilled into the political realm, with fateful consequences for the history of Yugoslavia in this period.

Despite the immensity of the undertaking, Cvetković-Sander succeeds not only in pursuing systematically the key task her work seeks to accomplish—to “reconstruct the contradictory history of language policy in socialist Yugoslavia against the background of the national question” (24)—but also in doing so in a comprehensive, sustained way that allows for establishing parallel timelines and important connections between these different areas of her study. In order to do this, she relies on a wide variety of sources, from published programmatic texts and contemporary newspapers and journals to archival materials documenting key events relevant for her discussion; sources include both those from the realm of politics proper (i.e., party documents) as well as those from various other actors in the public sphere. The reach of the author's analysis ranges from milestone events and texts, such as, for example, the Novi Sad Agreement (1954) or the “Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary Language” (1967), to the questions of bilingual