Whether this relationship is "rational" is open to debate: The authors show that shifts in partisanship within a state have vastly more effect on perceptions than do comparable (one standard deviation) changes in actual inequality. As they note, this partisan perceptual bias wipes out most of the increase in overall public concern that we might have expected in an age of rising inequality, since Democrats (more concerned about inequality) have declined as a share of state electorates relative to Republicans (less concerned) over the period they study.

In addition to being driven by the skyrocketing incomes at the top, America's inequality explosion is also dominated by the growing inequality of what analysts sometimes call "market income"—that is, labor and capital income before taxes and public transfers. To explain why inequality has risen, therefore, we have to understand why income has become so much more concentrated at the top even before explicit government redistribution.

Yet Witko and Franko evince relatively limited interest in state policies that might affect this "predistribution" of market income, such as occupational licensing requirements and employment laws affecting wages, hours, and worker grievances (domains that have dramatically increased in importance at the state level over the last generation). With the prominent exception of the minimum wage, their emphasis is on *re*distribution rather than *pre*distribution—both at the top (higher taxes) and the bottom (state EITC supplements).

How much effect do these policies have on inequality? Witko and Franko do not really say, but the effect has to be small given the overwhelming role of market income in America's inequality surge. To be sure, top tax rates affect the pretax distribution of income as well as disposable income. The sharp decline of top federal tax rates over the past few decades has increased the incentive for companies to lavishly reimburse top executives and for those executives to seize a larger piece of the pie. Nonetheless, the fairly modest bite of state income taxes in even high-tax states means that these effects are likely to be similarly modest.

By contrast, the minimum wage is clearly a policy affecting market income—and, contrary to textbook economic models, it appears effective at raising the wages of lower-income workers without causing job losses. Although it cannot be a major contributor to income concentration at the top, its variation over time and across states clearly explains some of the patterns of wage stagnation at the bottom.

What is less clear is whether this variation reflects the pressures of public opinion. In an analysis closely related to Witko and Franko's, Larry Bartels (*Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded*, 2016) finds little evidence that opinion (overwhelmingly supportive of a higher minimum wage) drives policy—even in states with popular referendums. In contrast, he finds that the strength of labor unions is an important predictor of state-level increases in the minimum wage, especially in states with initiative processes. These results raise further questions about *The New Economic Populism*'s relatively sunny account of state responsiveness, especially given that the authors do not account for the role of unions (or any other interest group) in their models.

Witko and Franko also do not assess whether states have responded to rising inequality in ways that shape outcomes *beyond* wages and incomes. After all, the biggest state policy story of the past decade has been the uneven implementation of the (highly redistributive) Affordable Care Act. Due to a 2012 Supreme Court ruling, state governments were given the option to decline generous federal subsidies to expand their Medicaid programs. With regard to this crucial state choice, all signs are that the partisan hue of those governments has mattered much more than state public opinion. Within Republican-dominated states, however, there is evidence that interest groups *do* matter, specifically, organized business and professional groups supporting expansion, on the one side, and conservative donors and organizations opposing it, on the other—or at least that is the finding of Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Theda Skocpol, and Daniel Lynch ("Business Associations, Conservative Networks, and the Ongoing Republican War Over Medicaid Expansion," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law,* 41(2), 2016).

Still, Witko and Franko offer a timely reminder that state governments are not standing pat as the federal government repeatedly succumbs to gridlock. A long tradition of research has cast the states as regressive forces, oppressing marginalized minorities or racing to the bottom to attract and retain mobile capital. Against the backdrop of this work, *The New Economic Populism* breaks important new ground. In doing so, it suggests that some of the key forces that have abetted inequality at the national level—namely, partisan polarization and its increasing alignment with state borders—have also emboldened states where egalitarian forces remain strong. Whether or not this counts as responsiveness, it counts as progress for those who believe that rising inequality threatens not just the well-being of Americans but also the health of our democracy.

**The New Americans? Immigration, Protest, and the Politics of Latino Identity**. By Heather Silber Mohamed. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017. 260p. $45.00 cloth, $22.95 paper.

**Latino Mass Mobilization: Immigration, Racialization, and Activism**. By Chris Zepeda-Millán. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 308p. $99.99 cloth, $29.99 paper.
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— John A. Garcia, *University of Michigan*

During the spring and summer of 2006, Americans witnessed and experienced a sea of fervent as a previously



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less visible segment of American society protested House Bill 4437, which targeted "illegal immigrants" and made them subject to criminal prosecution (as well as anyone else who assisted them in the United States). Over a wide range of American cities, towns, and rural communities, the actual "faces" of this population, along with its supporters (in the collective millions), expressed their opposition to this proposed legislation and a series of political actions that stigmatized, penalized, and criminalized their status and survival. During this wave of protests, mobilizers, local community resources, public policy debates, and media engagement served as the dynamics that channeled these attempts at impacting the political life of the Mexican-origin community, as well as those of the larger Latino communities in the United States.

Two recent books, by Heather Silber Mohamed and Chris Zepeda-Millán, build upon these events to examine the "politics to identity link" and social mobilization dynamics that led to more active and engaged Latino communities. The 2006 immigrant protests served as both the context and the driver of Latinos' activism around immigration. The key concepts of policy feedback, political resources, grassroots and elite-driven social movements, group identity, social context, and mass media's role and functions are present in both books. At the same time, the central arguments are directed by different emphases upon Latino political engagement. Thus, the dynamics of context, public policy debates, and local communities interact differently in these two books to affect the frame and substance of public policy domains (i.e., immigration reform), in the authors' shared endeavor to provide "truer" characterizations of immigrants and their place in American society.

In *The New Americans?* Silber Mohamed develops a theoretical and analytical model of a "politics to identity link" (pp. 32–33) for Latinos. That is, the interplay of policy feedback and debate, framing of issues, context of political actions and actors, social movement dynamics, and group identity become the central components of her work. The immigration bill of Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) brought forth an unexpected response from immigrant communities throughout the nation, with public protests and the articulation of more "immigrant friendly" policy alternatives that would facilitate incorporation in the United States. The author raises questions about how the effects of heightened political involvement around HR 4437 affected Latinos' place in American society, their sense of belonging, and their view of American identity. Her discussion of political incorporation includes the extent and nature of assimilation as necessary for integration, as well as the bases for being American.

In the case of the latter, Silber Mohamed finds that ascriptive characteristics (i.e., being native born, being a Christian, speaking English, etc.) are the central drivers of defining who is an American. Using the Latino National Survey (LNS), she differentiates respondents' notions about being American and their identity as American in comparison to a pan-ethnic or national identity. Within the LNS there are other measures of being American in terms of democratic principles and processes, as well as defining "American" in terms of the diversity of the societal fabric and inclusivity. She stresses the importance of ascriptive characteristics as key factors driving a greater sense of "American identity" post-2006, and thus spurring particular kinds of protests in response to such claims.

For example, Silber Mohamed discusses the "strategic" decisions by movement organizers to place greater emphasis on protestors carrying American flags and reflecting a more visible American allegiance and identity. She provides evidence that post-2006 interviewees were more likely to take on an American identity (along ascriptive lines) with some variations. Her distinction of near and far periphery Latino national origin groups (Cubans and Puerto Ricans as nearer the American core, and Mexicans, Salvadorans, and Dominicans as far periphery) shows how these factors affected the salience of HR 4437, and the shift to identifying as American. She describes the importance of the dynamics of policy debates, the framing of immigrants exerting their rights as part of being American. In addition, their desire for more significant incorporation contributed to this Latino identity shift. For Silber Mohamed, politics is viewed as a dynamic process whereby strategies, issue framing, and adaptability are context driven. The intensity of positions taken with respect to immigrants and the question of which immigrants should be admitted has polarized segments of the American ideological and partisan spectrums. The post-2006 protest era has only magnified such divisions and kept Latinos central to immigration policy debates.

In Silber Mohamed's exploration of the politics-to-identity link, her title *The New Americans?* appears as an interrogative. However, the decision to frame these protests by placing emphasis on Americanness leaves some ambiguity as to whether this represented more of a strategic response by protestors and not necessarily Latinos' own notions of how they truly define themselves as American. The author notes that both pan-ethnic and national identities remain "stable" among the post-2006 respondents. This might suggest the situational nature of the "meaning" of American identity and the multiplicity of identities that extend beyond ascriptive attributes. Continual digging into the breadth and depth of this societal process is needed in order to understand the politics-to-identity link and the undercurrents of a changing America.



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In *Latino Mass Mobilization*, Zepeda-Millán examines extensively the 2006 immigration protests through the lens of social movements and their major conceptual components. For Zepeda-Millán, it is the sustained actions of "claim making" by those with organizational skills, resources, networks, traditions, and solidarities that really matter when it comes to pursuing goals, including that of greater empowerment. In this sense, HR 4437 served as the concrete "event" to activate a generally marginalized community of immigrants, racial-ethnic communities, and other overlapping marginalized status groups (i.e. those based on gender, undocumented status, etc.).

The author uses several dimensions related to social movements—scope, resources, source, timing, and the visibility of HR 4437—to examine and analyze this immigrant rights movement. Whether the "triggering" issue is a single source or a larger number of them, the clarity of the target provides a basis for groups to act and seek the redirection of current policies. In this case, he argues that the dynamics of escalating restrictive and punitive policies gave Latino immigrants (along with native and "legal" residents) the impetus to collectively speak out and push back against such actions. Mobilization occurred at local and national levels, and activists utilized extant resources within these marginalized communities (i.e., social and cultural groups, ethnic entrepreneurs, ethnic media, etc.), to achieve their ends. His analysis of the role of this movement in engaging the media provides valuable insights as to the symbiotic relationship between these marginalized communities and the interests and connectedness of ethnic media, such that advocacy, alerts, and extensive coverage were a major asset for this movement.

One strength of Zepeda-Millán's work is his placement of the contemporary 2006 protests in the context of neoliberal economic reforms that had shaped U.S. immigration policies, past immigration legislation, previous social movements within these affected communities, and state/societal activism. Thus, his analysis situates these "surprising" waves of protests as the result of hostility and continued marginalization. Most social movement researchers note that movements go through cycles of surges, declines, and challenges in activities and engagement. The author notes the "legacy" and indirect effects of the 2006 protests even though they subsided within a year. The building of coalitions, identifying and tapping local resources for political action, leadership development, and using media outlets increased both the knowledge and experiential foundations for subsequent actions and strategies.

Zepeda-Millán approaches the collective vehicle of group consciousness and identity, as well as group-linked fate, as critical elements for successful mobilization and outreach to members of the affected communities. The case studies of Los Angeles, New York City, and Ft. Myers, Florida, illustrate the dynamic "components" of framing, strategizing, and involving a broad base of support. Each community manifests the kinds of networks and resource conditions that affect the direction and "success" of organizing. Finally, the author's discussion of the strategic and ideological strands of this movement (We Are America Coalition (WAAC) and more radical elements) demonstrates their importance for framing an "American" persona, and thus the adoption of a more conciliatory posture regarding comprehensive immigration reform. All in all, the reader gets an expansive view of how and why this "unexpected" segment took to the streets for rights, social justice, and power.

At the end of these two books, the authors consider the political world of Latinos after the post-2006 protests. Both note the heightened polarization around immigration and increased governmental control (both legislative and enforcement actions) that Zepeda-Millán characterized as immigrant suppression. Today, the backlash is evident with more vocal and militant organizations pushing for greater immigrant restrictions, seeking to define those who are "good" immigrants, further criminalizing immigrants, and militarizing the U.S.—Mexican border. Both highlight the 2016 presidential election and the tenor, tone, and political views of Donald Trump. The phrase "Make America Great Again" complicates Silber Mohamed's queries about Latino identity in the American context. The sense of belonging has a strong foothold within the Latino community, but how that is represented in terms of being American is a big part of today's contentious politics. The "stability" of pan-ethnic and national origin identities while simultaneously being American challenges the ascriptive traits of being American. Does this require that Latinos reframe competing notions of what it means to be an American? And what are the costs/benefits of these kinds of efforts, given other persistent issues and concerns? A changing world can also result in digging in to fight change and promoting limited views of who is an American.

A strong electoral base is one of the other consequences of the 2006 protests, however. This is one of the legacies that might strengthen a community's will and provide insights as to the next steps for more effective social change. The dynamics of local communities and how they come together, utilizing what they have, navigating the media, facing countermovements, and accentuating the underlying bases for collective action would suggest that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution for Latino political development. A good indication of impactful work is not only the contribution it makes (theoretically, analytically, and knowledge-wise) but also the creation of additional questions, other perspectives, and the recognition of important interrelationships among scholarly and activist



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positions. On that score, both of these books are great successes.

**Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public**. By Donald R. Kinder and Nathan P. Kalmoe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017. 224p. $78.00 cloth, $26.00 paper.
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— Samara Klar, *University of Arizona*

Americans are more sorted into distinct partisan camps than ever before. Affective polarization is growing, with Democrats and Republican becoming increasingly disdainful of one another. Democrats and Republicans appear to be moving toward opposing ideological poles as well—Pew data, for example, demonstrate that the gap between the median self-reported ideology of Democrats and the median self-reported ideology among Republicans is growing larger over time.

What can this mean for Philip Converse's infamous argument that Americans are largely innocent of ideology ("The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," *Critical Review*, 18(1–3), 1964)? Surely partisan-ideological sorting among the American public runs contrary to Converse's claim that constraint in the belief systems of the citizenry does not mirror constraint among idea-elements visible at an elite level. If Americans are increasingly taking cues from an ever-polarizing party system, are they at least forming coherent ideological belief systems?

Donald Kinder and Nathan Kalmoe begin *Neither Liberal nor Conservative* with an exceptionally thorough review of Converse's classic work; indeed it is one that should be assigned alongside the original work itself in any course on American politics. It is, though, much more than merely a review of Converse's seminal work; it is an important intervention in the ongoing debate regarding the extent to which polarization pervades American public opinion.

The greatest feat the authors achieve in this book is the vigor with which they tackle the paradox of ideological innocence in an age of polarization. Americans might appear to be divided along ideological lines, but they are by no means ideological. With respect to partisanship, the authors argue, we are polarizing indeed; but ideologically we remain largely innocent, as Converse claimed.

First of all, the majority of us (literally over half) identify as moderate, and the authors take the relatively controversial position (one that I will return to) that "moderate" should not be considered an ideological category at all. In an Appendix devoted to this very issue, Kinder and Kalmoe calculate the ideological consistency of policy preferences among voters, and they find that moderates indeed commit to an incoherent mélange of viewpoints. The correlation between policy references among moderates is a starkly low 0.11.

If Americans are not particularly ideological now, however, the authors consider whether they are perhaps nevertheless becoming more ideological over time. Yet going back through 40 years of survey data, they find just a gentle but steady decrease in the proportion of Americans who call themselves moderate: 55% in 1972 versus 47% in 2012. Ideological extremists, on the other hand, have crept up from 3% in 1972 to 6% in 2012. This movement, the authors contend, is glacially slow and by no means indicative of a populace polarizing toward the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum.

The authors then demonstrate that self-identified liberals and conservatives do not disagree with each other when it comes to policy matters any more now than they did while Converse was writing his original work. If issue disagreement is illustrative of polarization, there is again nothing to see with respect to liberals and conservatives in America. Nor do liberals and conservatives appear to hold in-group/out-group biases against one another, as we do see with Democrats and Republicans. Again, going back 40 years, Kinder and Kalmoe find no consistent evidence that the two ideological camps are becoming less enamored with one another over time.

So why then have we sorted? Why are liberals more likely to identify as Democrats and conservatives more likely to be Republicans? The authors argue that this is, in fact, only true among the well informed. Just as Converse argued decades ago, there is indeed a small segment of the electorate who are knowledgeable and engaged and, it seems, they are largely responsible for the partisan–ideological sorting that is evidently occurring among the American people. Thanks to the polarization of Washington elites, informed Americans now choose the ideological label that best matches their preexisting partisan identity, but most Americans remain innocently "moderate" despite forming strong in-group biases with respect to their partisanship.

Kinder and Kalmoe anticipate some pushback, notably from scholars like Paul Sniderman, John Jost, and James Stimson who argue, respectively, that ideology and partisanship are locked together, that ideology exists and matters, and that Americans may hold views that align with one end of the ideological spectrum while personally identifying with the other. The authors defend their own views against these alternative arguments largely by pointing to the majority of Americans who identify as partisan yet claim to be ideologically moderate, which—in their view—signifies that they are not ideological at all.

Given the massive literature that underscores what we know and think about ideology, there are other views that I would be interested in hearing Kinder and Kalmoe address—particularly when it comes to moderates. For example, Shawn Treier and Sunshine Hillygus ("The Nature of Political Ideology in the Contemporary



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