But social movements can raise public awareness of an issue and that can lead to a variety of pressures for political change.

One reason that demonstrating clear causal links between social movements and policy is so difficult is because of the array of pressures or factors involved in any change of policy. There were, for example, massive protests against the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, yet the war continued for a number of years. There was no major protest movement against the U.S. involvement in Somalia in the early 1990s, yet the televised image of one American soldier being dragged naked through the streets of Mogadishu so shocked and revolted the American public that within a few days, President Bill Clinton initiated steps to withdraw all American troops.

As with any works, some questions remain unanswered, which is good because it leaves open a rich terrain for future researchers. Global activists are demanding a new type of politics. But are mass protests or mass concerts more effective in bringing about the changes they seek? (After a mass concert and a protest march organized by U2's Bono and Bob Geldof in 2005 to pressure leaders at the G8 summit, the G8 leaders agreed to double aid to Africa from $25 million to $50 million.) If narratives are important in protests and politics, then researchers should be able to come up with additional cases, and good stories, that support this claim. Those interested in such questions will find that these two books offer a good starting point for their research.

Making War and Building Peace. By Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 400p. $24.95.

Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. Edited by Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 392p. $55.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070661

— Michael J. Gilligan, *New York University*

The two books discussed in this review address the same substantive question: How does one establish sustainable peace after civil war? However, their approaches are quite different. The Roeder and Rothchild edited volume focuses on one aspect of establishing postwar peace—the post–civil war political institutions of the country. Doyle and Sambanis focus on the role of the United Nations in helping to establish sustainable postwar peace. I will first address the edited volume and then turn to the Doyle and Sambanis book before offering a few concluding remarks.

Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars is a terrific edited volume. I can think of no edited volume where the individual chapters fit more nicely together into a cohesive whole. As with the other volume discussed in this review, the primary purpose of the book is to offer policy prescriptions regarding how to establish peace in post–civil-conflict settings. The focus of the book is on domestic political institutions—which postwar political institutions are most conducive to establishing a postwar sustainable peace. In addressing this topic, the book calls into question what might be called the conventional wisdom on this topic, namely that power-sharing arrangements are the best approach to establishing sustainable peace in postconflict countries and offers instead another prescription what the editors call "power-dividing institutions."

Power-sharing arrangements have been employed by the international community recently in the peacebuilding efforts in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and other post–civil-conflict situations. The editors of this volume identify what might be called "the dilemma of power sharing": "Power-sharing institutions frequently facilitate a transition from civil war but they thwart the consolidation of peace and democracy" (p. 12). Power-sharing arrangements can induce combatants to lay down arms by assuaging their fears that they will be locked out of power in the subsequent peace; however, these arrangements also ossify the political cleavages that lead to the war in the first place. The argument makes a great deal of sense, and contributions to this edited volume do a very good job of calling into question the empirical validity of any claims that power-sharing arrangements produce sustainable postwar peace and democratization.

The editor's policy recommendation is for post–civil-conflict planners to create power-dividing rather than power-sharing institutions. They argue power-dividing (i.e., separation-of-powers) institutions create cross-cutting cleavages that require actors to make political alliances across the divide of the old ethnolinguistic or religious cleavages along which the previous war was fought and in that way encourage political stability and sustainable peace. In their words, "one limits majorities not by empowering minority groups with parts of the government's power but by expanding individual liberties and rights at the expense of government and by empowering different majorities in independent organs of government" (p. 15).

To bolster its case against power-sharing institutions, the book offers chapters on some of the common power-sharing prescriptions for postwar stability (e.g., territorial decentralization, ethnofederalism, proportional electoral system, and fiscal power sharing) and shows that none of these institutions is significantly related to postwar sustainable peace. The book also offers case studies of Lebanon, India, Ethiopia, and South Africa that suggest that the instances of sustainable peace following civil conflict in deeply divided societies may be outliers. The book is convincing about the questionability of power-sharing arrangements as a means to sustainable postwar peace, but one obvious question concerns the issue of military force. It seems imprudent to apply the same prescription about

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707070661 Published online by Cambridge University Press

power-dividing institutions to that particular state function. Some kinds of power trump others. A program of "empowering different majorities"—one in charge of the judiciary, one in charge of economic policy, and one in charge of the armed forces—leaves two majorities with powers that exist only as long as the third is willing to allow. To be fair, the book is not silent on this issue; one contribution shows quite clearly that power-sharing arrangements for the armed forces are correlated with longer-lasting postwar peace.

However, the question of military power brings me to my one criticism of the volume. The focus of the book is explicitly on domestic political institutions. The chapters of this volume do a thorough job of dismantling confidence in power-sharing institutions, but one is left wondering if the power-dividing institutions they espouse could fare any better. Are any domestic political institutions self-enforcing in the contexts where these civil wars occur? How can institutions be created to make the use of violence too costly for those who control the armed forces? The absence of much sustained discussion of the role of military force or the threat of violence in a book about post–civil war politics is a shortcoming.

While these comments indicate that the book does not provide the full story regarding the establishment of postwar peace, the book does do a good job contesting the conventional wisdom regarding power-sharing institutions and it offers an alternative. The book is quite accessible. I have already assigned it to students, both graduate and advanced undergraduate, who are doing research on the effects of political institutions on averting civil war.

The second book in this review is *Making War and Building Peace* by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (hereafter DS2006). To review a book on UN peacekeeping that comes with a laudatory blurb on the back cover from the current secretary general of the UN is, to say the least, a daunting task. The argument of this book will be very familiar to those who have read the authors' earlier article ("International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 94 [no. 4, 2000]: 779–801; hereafter DS2000) on the same topic. The theory of peacebuilding offered by DS2006 is the same "peacebuilding triangle" from DS2000. Peacebuilding success is characterized as a triangle-shaped reservoir filled by "local capacity" and drained by "hostility." If the reservoir is insufficiently full, peacebuilding fails. When local capacity is low and hostility is high, both can be compensated with "international capacity," which, in this case, mainly refers to UN operations. What is missing is a theoretical story about why the *agents* in a civil war behave in such a way as to produce the triangle. While the correlations posited by the triangle are certainly plausible (e.g., more international capacity, more local capacity, and less hostility make sustainable peace more likely), the triangle fails to explain why individuals involved in the war would actually behave in a way as to produce the triangle, that is why UN operations encourage individual combatants to lay down arms and not take them up again.

The main policy recommendation that the triangle offers is that, when it comes to UN intervention, more is better than less. In other words, more international capacity is more likely to bring about sustainable peace than less international capacity is. Only at the limit where hostility is at its maximum and local capacity is nonexistent can international capacity be ineffectual according to the peacebuilding triangle. However, the link between the area of the peacebuilding triangle and the prospects for peacebuilding success is less clear when the authors turn to the empirical section of the book. For example, Cyprus, which is characterized as a failure by the authors, has a peacebuilding triangle that is about 50% larger than that of East Timor, which is characterized as a success (although the events of last summer may prompt the authors to change their coding of the latter conflict).

The quantitative empirical analysis is quite similar to the original DS2000 analysis, which has been criticized of late by Gary King and Langche Zeng who argue that the results are highly "model dependent," meaning the results are driven mainly by their specification assumptions rather than by the data. The inferences about the effect of UN intervention are based on extrapolations of what would have happened in counterfactual cases that are very different along a variety of dimensions (e.g., duration of conflict and number of casualties). The problem is that the cases in which the UN intervened are quite different from the cases in which the UN did not intervene. Thus the analysis compares apples and oranges, or more precisely, it draws inferences about the effect of a treatment on apples based on the effect of that treatment on oranges. This book does not address this issue, presumably because it was in print before the issue was raised. The qualitative empirical section of the book has been expanded over DS2000 and accounts for the great increase in the length of the project over the last six years, mainly through the inclusion of several in-depth case studies of successes and failures in UN peacebuilding efforts.

Finally, the authors offer more policy prescriptions in addition to those described above. In particular, they offer a seven-step program for peacebuilding success. The steps include establishing national and regional security, achieving quick "wins" by distributing food and supplies, establishing the rule of law and property rights, and democratizing and improving education. Each step of this program certainly sounds plausible, however it is unclear how these recommendations follow from the peacebuilding triangle or the empirical analysis earlier in the book.

Taken together the two volumes discussed in this review are a good example of the old adage, "It is better to light a

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single candle than curse the darkness." Both books, despite the daunting challenges to their tasks, seek to offer insight into how to build sustainable peace after civil war. The Roeder and Rothchild volume focuses on domestic political institutions, questions the assessment that power-sharing institutions are the most effective way to build sustainable peace, and offers instead power-dividing institutions as a possibly superior alternative. Doyle and Sambanis, by contrast, do not focus on domestic political institutions but instead address the most effective ways that the international community, mainly through the UN, can foster post–civil war sustainable peace. Although neither book completely dispels the darkness over our understanding of civil wars, both books illuminate an important piece of this complex and important political phenomenon.

Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy. By Colin Dueck. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 236p. $29.95.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070673

— Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Tufts University*

The six years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have seen a proliferation of books on the limits of U.S. primacy, the origins of the Bush doctrine, and the future of U.S. grand strategy. The conventional wisdom is that the George W. Bush administration's grand strategy—chiefly its unilateralism, its hubris, its open embrace of "preemption" (more accurately preventive war) as means to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, its pursuit of democratization in the Middle East as a cure-all for jihadist terrorism, and its refusal to plan for or devote sufficient resources to the postwar reconstruction of Iraq in 2003–4—represent a radical break with the grand strategies of previous administrations.

In *Reluctant Crusaders,* Colin Dueck not only challenges conventional wisdom, but also offers a warning: For better or ill, realism and liberalism will likely remain warring imperatives in U.S. foreign policy discourse, and future administrations will likely respond to international threats through the lens of liberal internationalism and limited liability. To paraphrase John Quincy Adams, America will likely continue to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy, but will be loath to buy a large enough sword to finish the task.

Dueck presents in-depth case studies of periods where the United States confronted new international threats and opportunities: the debate over participation in the League of Nations after World War I (1918–21); the aftermath of World War II and the origins of containment (1945–51); the debates over U.S. grand strategy following the Cold War (1990–2001); and the post-9/11 era and the Bush administration's "global war on terrorism." In each period, the United States enjoyed a clear power advantage over current and potential adversaries. Nevertheless, resulting shifts in grand strategy were not predictable based solely upon the international balance of power or underlying continuities in domestic politics and strategic culture. To explain this variation, Dueck develops a neoclassical realist theory of strategic adjustment. He tests his theory against two alternatives: the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer and cultural-constructivist theories of Thomas Berger, Alastair Iain Johnston, Jeffrey Legro, and Elizabeth Kier.

Neoclassical realism draws upon the rigor and theoretical clarity of the neorealism of Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and others without sacrificing practical insights about foreign policy and the complexity of statecraft found in the classical realism of Hans J. Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, Nicholas Spykman, and Arnold Wolfers. Systemic imperatives, chiefly relative power and anticipated power trends, shape the grand strategies of the great powers. Over the long run, international political outcomes mirror the distribution of power. However, as Gideon Rose observes, unit-level factors—namely leaders' perceptions and calculations about relative power and other states' intentions and domestic political constraints—often impede efficient responses to systemic imperatives. In the short run, the links between systemic forces and states' grand strategies are complex, indirect, and problematic (Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51 [October 1998]: 144–77).

Building in part on earlier neoclassical realist works (e.g., see William Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance,* 1993; and Aaron Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State,* 2000), Dueck posits a crucial intervening role for elite belief systems in strategic adjustment. In the U.S. case, classical liberal assumptions—chiefly a deep-seated and often naive belief in spreading liberal democracy and open markets abroad as means to make the United States more secure—act as filters on potential policy options, "allowing certain strategic alternatives while rendering others unthinkable" (p. 4).

Thus, for example, in 1919–20, the option of a peacetime alliance with Great Britain and France as a hedge against a resurgent Germany was simply unthinkable for President Woodrow Wilson; U.S. participation in the League of Nations was the only viable route to postwar security (pp. 48–50). An amicable divorce of the World War II grand alliance, wherein the United States and the Soviet Union would divide Europe and Asia into spheres of influence, initially had support from some officials in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. However, President Harry Truman and his advisers quickly rejected realpolitik spheres of influence in favor of the more ambitious and risky strategy of containment (pp. 86–88). Finally, after the USSR's demise, neither the George H. W. Bush nor the Clinton administrations considered replacing containment with a grand strategy of offshore balancing as

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