

Democratic Governance in South Korea: The Perspectives of Ordinary Citizens and Their Elected Representatives

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The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. (James Madison, 1788)

Democracy is not only a (polyarchical) political regime but also a particular mode of relationship between state and citizens, and among citizens themselves, under a kind of rule of law that, in addition to political citizenship, upholds civil citizenship and a full net work of accountability. (Guillermo O'Donnell, 1999b)

The third wave of global democratization has established a large family of over six dozen new democracies (The United Nations Development Programme, 2002a: 63). With the proliferation of new democratic political systems throughout the globe, democratic governance has become a subject of increasing and widespread concern in scholarly research and policy planning circles. In the scholarly community, for example, democratic governance is increasingly viewed as a powerful force shaping the process of consolidating new democracies (Dominguez and Lowenthal 1996; Inoguchi, Newman, and Keane 1998; Prezeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999; Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999).

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In policy circles, it is widely endorsed as the key to the enhancement of human welfare, especially among the poor and the deprived (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank 1992; The United Nations Development Programme 2002b; The United States Agency for International Development 2002). The purpose of this paper is to provide new perspectives on democratic governance by ascertaining its characteristics and problems from the vantage point of both ordinary citizens and their elected representatives in South Korea (Korea hereinafter).

Korea as a third-wave democracy

Korea is widely known as one of the success stories of the ‘third wave’ of democratization. Since the country formally began its transition to democratic rule in 1987, it has successfully carried out a large number of electoral and other reforms to transform the institutions and procedures of military-authoritarian rule into those of a representative democracy (Diamond and Shin 2000; Shin 1999). Unlike many of its counterparts in Latin America and elsewhere, Korea has fully restored civilian rule by extricating the military from power. As a result, Korea is widely regarded as one of the most vigorous and analytically interesting third-wave democracies (Diamond and Kim 2000; Diamond and Shin 2000; Gibney 2003).

As is the case in established democracies of North America and Western Europe, moreover, free and competitive elections have been regularly held at all the different levels of government. In the presidential election held on 18 December 1997, Korea established itself as a mature electoral democracy by elevating an opposition party to political power. In the latest presidential election held on 19 December 2002, the Korean people elected for the first time a relatively young and liberal candidate in his fifties to lead their nation – a nation where age has long played an important role in political and all other aspects of Korean life (Choo 2002; Lee and Baik 2002). In this fourth democratic presidential election, moreover, high-speed and mobile internet services played an active and crucial role as the new information technology of ‘digital democracy’ and ‘e-politics’ to an extent that has not been observed in any other democratic state, including those in Western Europe and North America (York 2002). The election of Roh Moo Hyun, a human rights activist, who is seen as being committed equally to the two democratic values of freedom and equality and who is also seen as being strongly committed to a policy of engagement with North Korea, has ushered in a new era for democratic political development. In Korea today, the signs are ubiquitous that free and competitive elections constitute the only possible political game in town (Demick 2002; *The Economist* 2002).

Holding such elections at all levels of government on a regular basis alone, nonetheless, cannot be equated with the establishment of complete democracy (Rose and Shin 2001). To complete the process of democratization and become a fully democratic state, a new democracy, such as the one in Korea, requires a functioning system of governance in which the parliament and its elected representatives play a

key role in the process of policy-making. It also requires a system of governance that aggregates and transforms the interests and preferences of ordinary citizens into the sort of public policies that would enhance their welfare (The United Nations Development Programme 2002a, 55).

How has the National Assembly, the democratically elected legislature in Korea, fared as the key institution of representative democracy? Has the Assembly become increasingly independent of the executive branch that ruled the country with an iron hand for three decades? How successful has it been in holding the executive branch accountable and responsible for its actions, as provided for in the constitution of the democratic Sixth Republic of Korea? What specific role do members of the National Assembly play in the process of legislation? How satisfied are they with the role they play as representatives of the electorate? How democratic do ordinary citizens think their current system of governance is? How satisfied do they feel with the system as a whole and its key components? With the legislative records of the National Assembly and data culled from recent surveys of the Korean electorate as well as elected representatives, this paper addresses these questions to determine how much progress Korea has made in democratizing its system of governance.

The notion of democratic governance

Democratic governance is an important policy goal that every democratic state strives to improve. It is, nonetheless, a nebulous political phenomenon the meaning of which is difficult to pin down (Ames 2000; Norris 1999; O'Donnell 2000). In both new and old democracies, it is too often used as a buzz word or slogan for political reform, which refers to a variety of political activities and programs, such as decentralization and deregulation (Haggard 1999; Root 1996; The United States Agency for International Development 2002). As a conceptual tool for analyzing the contours and dynamics of democracy-in-action, however, the notion of democratic governance requires clear definition. Only then can it be distinguished from other related concepts, such as democratic government or regime.

In the present study, we define democratic governance as a process of transforming public preferences into substantive outcomes according to the principles and rules of representative democracy, which are prescribed in the constitution. (For other definitions of this concept, see Hagopian 1996; Kaufmann, Lraau, and Zoido-Labaton 1999; Lowenthal and Dominguez 1996; March and Olsen 1995; The United Nations Development Programme 2002a). At the core of this process lie constant interactions between citizens and elected officials (O'Donnell 1999a: 321). As voters, ordinary citizens elect and send their representatives to parliament. As elected members of the legislature, elected representatives are expected to represent their voters in the process of lawmaking. What legislators accomplish in this process presumably should affect their chances of reelection to the legislature. Their legislative actions also affect the chances of their political party to remain a majority or minority party within the legislature. In order for a new democracy to develop a fully functioning democratic

system of governance, therefore, its citizens and elected officials have to interact with each other on a continuing basis. Through this iterative process of participation and representation, public preferences are aggregated into policy alternatives, and those alternatives are transformed into substantive policies of distributive, regulative, and other natures for implementation by the executive branch. This multi-stage process of interactions involving voters and lawmakers becomes fully democratic only when: (1) a democratically elected parliament is vested with institutional powers and other necessary resources to represent the electorate; (2) it actually plays a key role in legislation; and (3) it oversees and holds the actions of the executive branch accountable on behalf of the electorate (cf. The United Nations Development Programme 2002a: 55). As Lim (2002: 5) aptly suggests, therefore, the most significant question to be addressed in the systematic study of democratic governance is to determine whether a parliament functions as the primary representative institution.

Theoretically, this notion of democratic governance is predicated on the two fundamental principles of representative democracy. The first is the principle of popular sovereignty. It holds that in democracy the people are sovereign, and that they exercise their sovereignty through their representatives in parliament (Dahl 1998; MacPherson 1977). The second principle is that of constitutionalism. It holds that popular sovereignty is not absolute; the popularly elected government and the state agencies are subject to the rule of law (Bobbio 1989; Rose and Shin 2001).

Operationally, the proposed notion emphasizes the importance of the legislature playing an active and independent role in formulating public policies, and assumes the separation of powers between different branches of government and adequate checks and balances among those branches as the *institutional dimension* of democratic governance (Madison 1788). It includes a *Rechtsstaat*, i.e., the legislation of public policies and their implementation according to the existing laws and rules, as its *constitutional dimension* (Blondel 1998; Linz and Stepan 1996; Sklar 1999). In addition, it considers holding the actions of the executive branch accountable to the legislature and keeping the legislature responsive to the electorate as its *substantive dimension* (Dahl 1971; O'Donnell 2000). In short, our notion of democratic governance, as defined above, accords with President Abraham Lincoln's dictum that democracy is 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people'. It features the dynamics of interactions within and between political actors and governmental institutions. To provide a comprehensive and dynamic account of democratic governance in Korea, we examine its institutional, substantive, and constitutional dimensions from the perspectives of ordinary citizens and their elected representatives.

Organization

Our analysis of democratic governance in Korea begins with scrutiny of the institutional dimension with an analysis of the relationship between the National Assembly and the executive branch. Thereafter, we analyze a recent survey of members of the National Assembly in order to ascertain the specific roles that the Assembly and

its individual members play in the process of budgetary policy-making. To determine how well the current system of governance responds to preferences of the people, we analyze a recent survey of the mass public. This public opinion survey also reveals how citizens perceive democratic institutions and elected officials within a constitutional context. On the basis of these analyses, we highlight the notable features of democratic governance in Korea and discuss their cultural and institutional antecedents.

The National Assembly as a democratic legislature: legislative–executive relations

According to the constitution of the democratic Sixth Republic of Korea, the National Assembly is vested with the legislative power. It is also vested with the power to deliberate and decide on the national budget, and to oversee the activities of the executive branch. Does the Assembly function as a fully democratic legislature playing a leading role in legislation and fiscal control, as the constitution provides? Or does it still play a perfunctory part as it did under three decades of military rule? This section addresses these questions in an attempt to determine whether the Assembly still remains subservient to the president and his aides in the Blue House during the legislative process. According to earlier research, democratic regime change has failed, by and large, to put an end to the authoritarian character of the legislative–executive nexus featuring the hegemony of the president over the legislative process (Jang 2000; J. C. Park 2002; C. M. Park 1998; C. W. Park 2000; Shin, Park and Yoon 2001).

Legislative sessions

To fulfill its legislative prerogatives and oversee the activities of the executive branch, the National Assembly has to meet year-round in either plenary or special session. As in the authoritarian past, nonetheless, its sessions are not year-round in duration. According to the current democratic constitution, the regular session, which opens annually on 10 September, may not last more than 100 days, only ten days longer than under the military rule of the Fifth Republic. In addition, the constitution allows a special session to last no longer than 30 days. Such a session may be convened at the request of the president or at least one-fourth (formerly, one-third) of the Assembly's membership. Such restrictive constitutional provisions regarding the lengths of plenary and special sessions and the conditions for a special session limit the prospects for the National Assembly to serve as a co-equal branch of government.

In Table 1, we report the number of days a year in which the Assembly remained in session as an indicator of its activism as a legislative institution representing the Korean people. The sessions of the two assemblies elected under military rule averaged fewer than 130 days per year [121 days for the 11th Assembly (1981–1985) and 134 days for the 12th Assembly (1985–1988)]. The sessions of the three democratically elected assemblies, in contrast, averaged more than 190 days per year [157 days for the 13th Assembly (1988–1992); 163 days for the 14th Assembly (1992–1996); and 260 days for the 15th Assembly (1996–2000)]. When these figures are compared across the two different

Table 1. *The number of days in which the National Assembly were in session a year*

National Assembly	Total sessional days (A)	Floor sessional days (B)	Relative index of activism (B/A)
Authoritarian period			
11th Assembly (1981–1985)	121	36	0.30
12th Assembly (1985–1988)	134	39	0.29
Democratic period			
13th Assembly (1988–1992)	157	41	0.27
14th Assembly (1992–1996)	163	42	0.26
15th Assembly (1996–2000)	260	54	0.21

Notes: The sessions of the National Assembly are as follows: 11th session (11 April 1981 through 10 April 1985); 12th (11 April 1985 through 29 May 1988); 13th (30 May 1988 through 29 May 1992); 14th (30 May 1992 through 29 May 1996); and 15th (30 May 1996 through 19 May 2000).

Source: The Secretariat of the Korean National Assembly.

regime periods, it is apparent that the demise of military rule has enabled the Korean legislature to exercise a more active role than it did in the authoritarian past. From its current practice of holding floor sessions for a period of less than two months, however, it is evident that the National Assembly falls far short of being a continuing deliberative legislative institution.

Lawmaking

The legislature interacts with the executive branch to make laws, formalize budgets, and conduct legislative oversight. To investigate and compare the patterns of legislative–executive relations in the Fifth and Sixth Republics, we look at lawmaking, in which both the members of the National Assembly and the executive branch can introduce legislative bills. The executive branch’s proposals are called government bills. The average number of bills introduced yearly was 122 in the 11th Assembly (1981–1985), and 126 in the 12th Assembly (1985–1988). But those numbers almost doubled during the democratic Sixth Republic: an average of 235 bills was introduced each year during the 13th Assembly (1998–1992); the comparable figures for the 14th (1992–1996) and 15th (1996–2000) Assemblies were 225 and 488. This sharp increase in legislative workload especially in the current Assembly may reflect proliferating popular demands for government action and appropriate laws in a newly emerging democratic regime. But an increase in the sheer load of legislation does not necessarily mean that the National Assembly has strengthened its legislative oversight of the executive branch (C. W. Park 2000).

Of all the bills introduced, the proportion of member bills serves as an indicator of legislative initiative from legislative members relative to the executive branch. Throughout the history of the National Assembly, government bills have often outnumbered member bills. The question is whether members’ legislative initiatives have become more visible in the democratic era than they were in the authoritarian era.

Table 2. *The proportions of legislator-sponsored bills*

National Assembly	Legislator-sponsored (A)	Government-sponsored (B)	Total bills (C)	Legislature proportion (A/C)
Authoritarian period				
11th (1981–1985)	202	287	489	0.41
12th (1985–1988)	211	168	379	0.56
Democratic period				
13th (1988–1992)	570	368	938	0.61
14th (1992–1996)	321	581	902	0.36
15th (1996–2000)	1,144	807	1,951	0.58

Notes: The sessions of the National Assembly are as follows: 11th session (11 April 1981 through 10 April 1985); 12th (11 April 1985 through 29 May 1988); 13th (30 May 1988 through 29 May 1992); 14th (30 May 1992 through 29 May 1996); and 15th (30 May 1996 through 29 May 2000).

Source: The Secretariat of the Korean National Assembly.

Table 2 shows that the proportion of member bills was 41 per cent in the 11th Assembly, and 56 per cent in the 12th Assembly. The comparable figure in the 13th Assembly was 61 per cent and 36 per cent in the 14th Assembly. In the latest Assembly, the 15th, the figure rose considerably to 58 per cent. Thus, the regime's democratization has had no consistent effect on the pattern of the members' legislative initiatives.

It must be noted that the executive branch drafts legislative proposals to a greater extent than suggested by the figures above. In every session, some bills prepared by the executive branch are formally proposed and sponsored by the ruling party's legislative members (Shin, Park, and Yoon 2001). In the 14th Assembly, for example, these included such reform measures as a public officials' ethics law and an election law. This Assembly even passed a special law, drafted by the executive branch, to prosecute those involved in the military *coup d'état* and the brutal crackdown of the Kwangju uprising in which two former presidents (Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo) were involved (C. W. Park 2000). Presidential aides initiated and prepared most of these bills and delivered them to ruling party members for formal introduction.

The passage rate of government bills can also indicate legislative influence from the executive branch. As expected, the passage rate for government bills declined somewhat under democratic rule (lowest in the 13th Assembly). During the Chun Doo Hwan government (1983–1988), the National Assembly passed more than nine out of ten government bills (93 per cent). With the advent of democracy, this ratio declined to 82 per cent in the 15th Assembly, as Table 3 shows. Executive dominance remained obvious in a democratic legislature with four out of five government bills adopted. The lawmaking process remained dependent upon executive leadership even in the democratic era. Nevertheless, since the end of military rule, the passage rate difference in favor of the executive branch has steadily declined from +62 in the 12th Assembly to

Table 3. Comparing the passage rates of bills sponsored by the executive branch and legislators

National Assemblies	Legislature (A)	Government (B)	Difference (B – A)
Authoritarian period			
11th (1981–1985)	0.41	0.90	+0.49
12th (1985–1988)	0.31	0.93	+0.62
Democratic period			
13th (1988–1992)	0.30	0.87	+0.57
14th (1992–1996)	0.37	0.92	+0.55
15th (1996–2000)	0.40	0.82	+0.42

Notes: The sessions of the National Assembly are as follows: 11th session (11 April 1981 through 10 April 1985); 12th (11 April 1985 through 29 May 1988); 13th (30 May 1988 through 29 May 1992); 14th (30 May 1992 through 29 May 1996); and 15th (30 May 1996 through 29 May 2000).

Source: The Secretariat of the Korean National Assembly.

+42 in the 15th Assembly (see the last column of Table 3). Perhaps this is a harbinger of growing autonomy in the Assembly from the executive branch.

The modifications that a legislature makes to government bills are often considered a measure of its influence on the executive branch. According to Jang's (2000) analysis, under authoritarian rule (1972–1988), the National Assembly passed about 90 per cent of government bills without any revision, testifying to the powerlessness or subservience of the legislature to the executive branch. This figure dropped somewhat to 84 per cent in the 13th Assembly (1988–1992), when Roh Tae Woo was the first president of the democratic Sixth Republic. Later the figure fell to 47 per cent in the 14th Assembly (1992–1996), when Kim Young Sam was the first civilian president. These figures suggest growing action in the National Assembly to reduce the policy dominance of the executive branch in the legislative process. It also indicates that the Assembly has enlarged its initiative within the process. Undoubtedly the regime's democratization has reshaped the character of the legislative–executive interaction, offering a greater challenge to the hegemony of the president over the legislative process.

Fiscal control

The constitution mandates the National Assembly to deliberate and decide on the national budget bill. Within 90 days before the beginning of a new fiscal year, the Assembly receives a budget proposal in its plenary session from the executive branch. It immediately refers the proposal to its standing committees for consideration. Each standing committee examines the portion of the budget that concerns that committee's jurisdictional counterpart in the executive branch. The special Committee on Budget and Accounts (hereinafter the CBA) then examines the overall budget. After the CBA approves a modified budget proposal, it is reported to the plenary session for final approval.

The modifications the National Assembly can make to the executive branch's original budget proposal are strictly limited to budgetary reductions. According to Article 57 of the current constitution, 'The National Assembly shall, without the consent of the Executive, neither increase the sum of any item of expenditure nor create any new items of expenditure in the budget submitted by the Executive.' During the democratic Sixth Republic, the Assembly has changed the original executive branch's budget requests by only about 1 per cent each year, with the single exception of the budget for the fiscal year 1990 (The Ministry of Planning and Budget 2002). This figure is unchanged from that of the Assembly during the authoritarian Fifth Republic.

On the whole, it is fair to conclude that the democratization of military rule in 1988 has brought no discernible changes in the pattern of the National Assembly's budget review process. First, the time schedule remains much the same, and thus hardly conducive to a thoroughgoing legislative review. Standing committees' preliminary reviews of the original proposal last only five or six days; the overall review of these committees' recommendations in the CBA is conducted within a period of no more than two weeks. Second, there is a significant constitutional constraint on the legislature's deliberations. If the legislature wants to increase the amount for any item of expenditure or create a new item in the budget, it must obtain the consent of the executive branch in advance. Third, the National Assembly law itself is also restrictive in this regard. To amend the budget proposal in the plenary session, the Assembly requires the support of at least 50 of its 273 members. Scrutiny of the budget for the National Intelligence Service (formerly the Central Intelligence Agency), furthermore, is only subject to preliminary review by the intelligence committee in a closed session, thus bypassing a comprehensive review by the CBA. In a nutshell, the Assembly remains a passive reviewing body. The way it exercises the power of purse does not provide it with decisive leverage over the executive agencies.

Lawmaker's assessments of budgetary policy-making: a survey of members of the Assembly Budget and Accounts Committee

Despite the passivity of the National Assembly regarding the state's budget and accounts, the review function constitutes a very important component of all the legislative activities conducted in the National Assembly. How extensive is the Assembly's role in the formulation and implementation of the national budget? How much influence do individual lawmakers exercise in the making of budgetary policies? Do they exercise greater influence in the wake of democratization? In this section, we explore these and several other important questions concerning budgetary policy-making with data from a recent survey of the members of the Assembly Committee on the Budget and Accounts.

During the months of December 2000 and January 2001, a questionnaire, composed of 15 items, was administered to all the members of the CBA. Of the

Table 4. *Lawmakers' perceptions of key players in budgetary policy-making*

Governmental and other institutions	Institutions perceived as playing a key role (A)	Institutions preferred to play a key role (B)	Discrepancy (A–B)
President/Blue House staff	7% (3)	0% (0)	+7%
Relevant government agencies	77 (33)	47 (20)	+33
National Assembly committees	14 (6)	51 (22)	–41
Social organizations and groups	2 (1)	2 (1)	0

Source: 2001 survey of lawmakers serving on the National Assembly's Committee on the Budget and Audit.

50 lawmakers currently serving on the CBA, 43 filled out the questionnaire, registering a high response rate of 86 per cent. These respondents include 42 males and one female; 39 district and four non-district members; and 19 ruling party members, 21 opposition Grand National Party members, and three United Liberal Democrats. All are college educated and their ages range from 32 to 63.

Key budget makers

Who plays the key or leading role in making policies on the national budget and accounts? Who should play such a role? Should it be the legislature or executive branch? As Table 4 shows, more than three-quarters (77 per cent) of those lawmakers directly involved in the budgetary process identified the relevant ministries of the executive branch as the key budget makers. Only a small minority (14 per cent) saw themselves and their legislative institution playing such a role. Among those lawmakers who are most directly involved in budget deliberations, there is very strong consensus that the National Assembly and its lawmakers are not the key players in the budget making process.

When asked which particular institution should play the key role, however, there is no consensus among CBA members. Table 4 shows their choices are almost evenly split between the categories of the legislature and government ministries. While 51 per cent chose the former, 47 per cent preferred the latter. When these figures are compared with the ones reported earlier, there is a considerable gap between what CBA members think these institutions should do and what they actually do. On the index measuring this gap (see the third row of Table 4), the Blue House and government ministries register positive scores, but the National Assembly posts a negative score. Obviously, the legislature is not performing the leading role that many of its members believe it should play while the executive branch is playing a role that many of its members believe it should not. Clearly, lawmakers themselves recognize that the National Assembly exercises little control over the budget, though many think the legislature should be a key player in the budget process.

Mode of economic policy-making

How do the key identified decision-makers, whether elected or not, formulate economic policies? Do they decide policies unilaterally or on the basis of extensive consultation with other officials and civic groups? To ascertain the prevailing mode of decision-making, the survey asked: 'To what extent do you think that a particular leading organization named above seeks to collaborate with other relevant organizations, individual citizens, and groups in making economic policies – very actively, somewhat actively, not much or not actively at all?' A majority (61 per cent) reported very active or somewhat active collaboration. It is noteworthy that about one in seven (14 per cent) CBA members observed 'a lot' of consultation by the key decision-makers with other agencies or civic associations. Although not yet extensive, there is some evidence here of active consultation in present-day Korean budgetary policy-making. In this respect, the process of budgetary policy-making appears to be more democratized than what it was under the military government, which did not allow for such consultations with civic associations.

Legislative control over the budget

How much influence does the National Assembly exercise in the making and implementing of the national budget? To estimate the extent of the Assembly's leverage over the executive branch with respect to deliberations of the national budget, the survey asked CBA members two separate questions. To what degree did they think the Assembly amended the budget bill that the executive branch proposed for the 2001 fiscal year? Secondly, to what extent did they think the Assembly controlled the implementation of the budget?

As discussed above, the National Assembly rarely modifies the government-proposed budget bill by more than 1 per cent. The reduction the National Assembly made to the 2001 budget was just 0.8 per cent of the executive branch's original proposal (The Ministry of Planning and Budget 2002). In fact, this cut was not a significant departure from previous practices by the National Assembly regarding the budget. This is well reflected in the survey results. When CBA members were asked about the extent of revision over the original budget proposal, about two-thirds (67 per cent) said that the National Assembly revised it just a little. Nearly one-fourth (23 per cent) stated that the legislature modified almost nothing. The remaining respondents said that they made quite a few changes. On the whole, the lawmakers' perception of legislative control over budget policies is quite close to the objective reality of the National Assembly's policy leverage.

When asked to evaluate the National Assembly's role in overseeing the implementation of the budget by the executive branch, the survey confirmed that legislative control is, by and large, far from being effective. Specifically, the survey asked: 'Overall, how well or poorly do you think the National Assembly controls and oversees the formulation and implementation of the budget by the executive branch?' There was not a single lawmaker who rated the legislature as doing that job very well.

Only one in eight (12 per cent) was somewhat positive in the evaluation of legislative control over budget implementation. In sharp contrast, more than two out of five (44 per cent) legislators were somewhat or very negative about budgetary control. By a large margin of 8 to 1, positive ratings were outnumbered by neutral and negative ratings.

This pattern of responses from the CBA members is consistent with the legislature's procedures to control the executive's implementation of the budget. At least 120 days before the beginning of the new fiscal year, for example, the Board of Audit and Inspection, an executive agency under the president's direct control, submits to the National Assembly the annual accounts of revenue and expenditure for the previous fiscal year, with its audit findings. The accounts are then reviewed in part by each standing committee, in full by the CBA, and are finally approved in the plenary session. In general, this process of overseeing budget implementation is nothing more than perfunctory. In many respects, it is much more perfunctory than the one involved in the deliberation of the budget proposal that occurs near the end of each fiscal year. During the annual inspection of government ministries and agencies that is conducted during its regular session, the National Assembly fails to scrutinize thoroughly the appropriateness and accuracy of budget implementation.

How do CBA members feel about what has happened to the National Assembly in the wake of democratic regime change? A large majority (72 per cent) recognized that the influence of the National Assembly in budgetary policy-making has increased at least somewhat in the wake of democratization. A small minority (14 per cent), however, did not agree with such an assessment. Instead, they judged that the Assembly's influence in the wake of the regime's democratization actually declined, although it is difficult to perceive why democratization has seemed a lost cause to this minority.

The role of the CBA

The second part of the survey asked CBA members to examine the status of their own committee in the National Assembly and the several key aspects of deliberation and decision-making taking place within the committee itself. A pair of questions was first asked to determine the exact place the CBA occupies in the legislature. With the exception of one member, all respondents from the committee agreed that the deliberations on the state's budget and accounts constitutes a very important component of all the legislative activities conducted in the National Assembly. In a similar vein, equally many (94 per cent) approved enthusiastically of the recent elevation of the CBA to the status of a standing committee approved by the revision of the National Assembly Act in February 2000.

Before the revision of this law governing the organization of the Assembly, the Committee on the Budget and Accounts served merely as a temporary special committee. It was organized on an ad hoc basis whenever a proposed budget came to the legislative agenda, and it was dissolved upon the passage of the budget. Now the committee has become a permanent special committee that can review budget matters

on a year-round basis. The survey asked respondents how much they expected this change in the committee's status to contribute to the strengthening of the National Assembly policy influence in budgetary policy-making. Forty-seven per cent expected that the change would contribute a lot to the expansion of legislative influence. Another 47 per cent expected some strengthening of legislative leverage. The remaining 7.0 per cent expected little or no change. Thanks to the reorganization of their committee, CBA members anticipate a larger role for their committee. They believe this will, in turn, enhance the National Assembly's influence over budget policy-making.

Budget deliberations within the budget and audits committee

For a comprehensive account of the budgetary deliberations in the CBA, our survey prepared a set of four statements concerning the workings of the CBA and asked CBA members the extent of their agreement with each statement. As to the role of partisanship in budget deliberation, about one in eight (12 per cent) said that partisanship matters little or not at all. One-quarter (26 per cent) said 'a lot' and three-fifths (63 per cent) said 'somewhat'. When asked about the differences in policy position across political parties, an overwhelming majority (92 per cent) recognized party differences as the locus of conflict in the legislature. It is evident that partisan interests and views greatly affect deliberations and decision-making even within the committee dealing with the state's budget. This confirms the popular perception that political parties dominate the legislative process in Korea.

One cannot expect the easy achievement of negotiations and compromises in a place where partisan views frequently collide head-on. In this regard, the survey asked CBA members how much they would agree or disagree with the statement that their own committee does a good job of negotiating conflicting opinions and views among its members. Nearly nine out of ten (88 per cent) disagreed with the statement, revealing the difficulty of reaching such necessary cooperation between rival parties.

When asked to assess the level of expertise individual members of their committee command on budgetary matters, more than three-fifths (63 per cent) of CBA members affirmed the view that they have a high level of expertise and knowledge about budget matters. Despite their modest effects upon the budgetary process, the survey reveals that the committee members have a positive sense regarding their own expertise. Currently in the legislature there are numerous limitations that militate against the buildup and exercise of individual lawmakers' special knowledge and expertise. First of all, due to the prevalence of partisanship, as discussed above, even those members with a high level of policy knowledge and skill do not necessarily have a strong voice in the deliberative process. Second, a committee member's term of service on the Budget and Accounts Committee is just one year, which does not allow a member to apply the expertise they gain from the experience over the long run. Third, the current schedule for budget deliberations does not provide the members with ample time for expert scrutiny of the budgetary details. On average, the full committee conducts its budget review in just 12 days, while the subcommittee for adjusting budget figures does so in eight days. Even

if committee members are policy experts, therefore, it is highly unlikely that they can actually exercise their expertise in the deliberative process in such a short span of time.

The role of individual lawmakers

In a situation where the legislature has little or no control over what the executive branch does with the budget, it is unlikely that individual lawmakers will see themselves as exercising a great deal of influence over the budgetary process. As expected, about half (51 per cent) of the legislators evaluated their own influence as very modest. While 44 per cent claimed ‘a little’ influence, 7 per cent said ‘almost none.’ As much as they are critical about the role their legislature plays, CBA members are unsatisfied about their own role, too. Equally notable is that only one out of 43 respondents to the survey saw lawmakers exercising a great deal of influence over the budget. Among Korean lawmakers there is consensus that the National Assembly as well as its members are not highly influential in the budgetary process.

To no one’s surprise, a large majority (79 per cent) of survey respondents was not pleased with the little influence they hold over budget policies. When asked to evaluate the amount of influence they exercise personally over those policies, only one-fifth (19 per cent) expressed any degree of satisfaction. Out of 43 respondents, only one lawmaker reported a high level of satisfaction. There is, then, a consensus among Korean lawmakers about their dissatisfaction with what they do in the budgetary process. We may note that because these respondents serve on the CBA, and it has primary responsibility over budget policies, they should have more influence over the process than their peers who are not on the committee. There is little doubt that the rest of the members of the National Assembly are also dissatisfied with the current level of their policy leverage over budget matters.

Whom do CBA members contact for the necessary information to do their committee work? To explore this question, the survey asked them to identify the two most important sources of information in their deliberation of budgetary matters. Their own personal staff was mentioned most frequently (27 per cent), followed by government ministries (22 per cent), the committee staff and special staff working in the National Assembly’s Secretariat (14 per cent), civic associations and other interest groups (19 per cent), in that order. The two other sources less frequently cited include the mass media (7 per cent) and constituents within electoral districts (7 per cent). Party colleagues and leaders were also mentioned, but their importance appears to be negligible.

Each lawmaker has six personal staffers, including a chauffeur, an attendant, and a clerical worker. Of those six staffers, three people at most may be able to assist the members with information for his or her committee work, a meager amount of support. Not surprisingly, CBA members also frequently called upon the bureaucrats for policy information, precisely those whom the members are supposed to oversee and control, for obtaining policy information. Why do they not utilize other professional services available within the National Assembly? The Budget and Accounts Committee, for

example, has as many as ten full-time professionals whose job is to provide its members with specialized policy assistance. The Budgetary Policy Bureau, a recently reorganized support agency, also has an additional 26 professionals with budgetary expertise. More than ever before, these professionals can supply the necessary information in a timely fashion. Yet, individual lawmakers are either unaware of their availability or reluctant to rely on them. Following old habits, they still rely most heavily on their own personal staff with limited expertise and time and the bureaucrats of the executive branch.

The Constitution of the democratic Sixth Republic enables the National Assembly to play a key role in the formulation and implementation of the national budget. For a variety of reasons, including institutional constraints and partisan conflicts, the Assembly as the foremost institution of representative democracy is not yet capable of fully exercising its constitutional prerogatives. As in the authoritarian past, it has little or no control over the budgetary process. In this situation, it is unreasonable to expect that public needs and preferences would be appropriately injected into that process. CBA members confirm this expectation. With the exception of one lawmaker, the CBA members surveyed agreed that the will of the people is not well reflected in the existing process of formulating, deliberating, and implementing the national budget. Both procedurally and substantively, Korea still has a long way to go to fully democratize the process of budgetary policy-making.

Citizens' assessments of the current system of governance

There is no doubt that the political regime in which the Korean people currently live meets all the criteria for a robust procedural democracy or polyarchy as specified by Robert Dahl (1971) and Larry Diamond (1999) among others. A remaining question is whether or how well it performs as a system of democratic governance. This section seeks to explore the quality of democratic governance in Korea with data from a recent national survey of the Korean electorate. During the month of March 2001, the Korea Democracy Barometer (hereinafter KDB) survey conducted face-to-face interviews with 1,004 voters chosen by the method of multi-stage random sampling. The survey asked a number of questions, tapping popular perceptions of the current regime's character and the quality of its performance.

Global assessments

Do the Korean people perceive that their political system performs as a democracy? To explore this particular question, the KDB survey asked respondents to rate their country on a ten-point scale in which a score of 1 means complete dictatorship, and a score of 10 means complete democracy. About seven-tenths (68 per cent) rated the current regime as democratic by placing it at 6 or above on the scale. We find that a substantial proportion, nearly one-third of the Korean population still refuses to accept the regime as a democracy. When asked to rate how

Table 5. *Popular perceptions of the current system of governance*

Democratic character	Satisfying performance	Distribution	
		Per cent	(N)
No	No	26.6%	(220)
No	Yes	4.4	(83)
Yes	No	40.8	(280)
Yes	Yes	28.2	(382)

Source: 2001 Korea Democracy Barometer survey.

well their current Kim Dae Jung government handles problems facing Korean society, the survey respondents as a whole expressed more dissatisfaction than satisfaction with its performance. More precisely, two-thirds (67 per cent) rated democratic governance negatively by placing it at 5 or below on the scale in which a score of 1 means complete dissatisfaction and a score of 10 means complete satisfaction. In the eyes of ordinary Koreans, their current government does not function well as a system of democratic governance.

The perceived character of the current regime and its perceived performance quality are considered together to identify four different views of current governance: (1) non-democratic and unsatisfactory, (2) non-democratic and satisfactory, (3) democratic and unsatisfactory, and (4) democratic and satisfactory. As shown in Table 5, only two-sevenths (28 per cent) of Koreans believe that the current regime is a well-functioning democracy. A large majority remains critical of it because it is perceived as lacking in either democratic character, proper performance, or both.

Missing elements

Why do the Korean people as a whole tend to think that their current system of governance fails to work as a well-functioning system of democratic governance? What substantive qualities of democratic governance do they think are missing from their own system? To explore these questions, the KDB asked a pair of questions. Specifically, respondents to the 2001 KDB survey were asked: 'How much influence do you think the votes of people like yourself have on the way our country is governed: a lot, some, a little, or none?' 'To what extent do you think government leaders take the interests and opinion of people like yourself into account when making important decisions: a lot, some, a little, or none?' On the basis of responses to these questions, we attempt to determine the specific quality of democratic governance that the Korean people think is most lacking.

A clear majority (61 per cent) reported feeling at least some amount of empowerment under the present system of government. This suggests that Koreans tend to feel that they have a way to express their opinions and promote their interests under the present system. Unfortunately, a larger majority (70 per cent), nonetheless, reported that the system is only a little, or not at all, responsive. This suggests that,

Table 6. *Popular assessment of democratic governance*

Qualities		Distribution	
Empowerment	Responsiveness	Per cent	(N)
No	No	33.6%	(328)
No	Yes	5.7	(56)
Yes	No	36.3	(353)
Yes	Yes	24.4	(238)

Source: 2001 Korea Democracy Barometer survey.

Table 7. *Critical assessments of the current political regime among those experiencing the divergent qualities of democratic governance*

Types of governing experience		Critical assessments	
Empowerment	Responsiveness	Per cent	(N)
No	No	32.9%	(316)
No	Yes	10.7	(56)
Yes	No	32.6	(337)
Yes	Yes	10.9	(233)

Note: Entries are the per cent ages assessing the current regime as both undemocratic and unsatisfying.

Source: 2001 Korea Democracy Barometer survey.

although the people have the ability to express their opinions, they do not perceive the government as being responsive to them.

For a more comprehensive account, four different levels of democratic experiences were first collapsed into two broad categories, one affirming and the other denying the experience of the two substantive qualities – empowerment and responsiveness – of democratic governance. Afterwards, we jointly considered these two categories of democratic governance qualities in order to identify four patterns of experiencing democratic governance. The first pattern refers to the absence of either quality. The second and third patterns refer to the presence of only one of these two qualities, which indicates a partial achievement of democratic governance. The fourth pattern, however, refers to the presence of both qualities, attesting to the achievement of democratic governance to the fullest degree.

Table 6 shows that less than one-quarter (24 per cent) experienced both qualities of democratic governance. A little over two-fifths (42 per cent) experienced one of these qualities, while about one-third (34 per cent) experienced neither. Among the Koreans who experienced only one quality, those expressing the sense of empowerment outnumbered those experiencing the responsiveness of the government to their preferences by a large margin of 6 to 1 (36 per cent vs. 6 per cent). This finding should raise concern within the Korean leadership about the adequacy of governmental responsiveness and the likelihood of sanctions from the Korean people.

In Table 7, we compare the aforementioned four patterns of governing experiences in terms of the proportion rating the current system of governance as both

undemocratic and unsatisfactory. A notable feature of the table is that the Koreans fully critical of the system are three times more numerous among those experiencing neither empowerment nor responsiveness than those experiencing both qualities (33 per cent vs. 11 per cent). Between the Koreans experiencing only one of those qualities, those experiencing responsiveness are over three times less likely to be fully critical of the system than those experiencing empowerment (11 per cent vs. 33 per cent). More notable is the finding that those who feel capable of influencing the government are critical of it as much as those who do not feel so (29 per cent vs. 29 per cent). These findings make it clear that the failure of the government to respond to public preferences is the root cause of disillusionment about the current system of governance among the Korean people.

Distinctive features of democratic governance

We have analyzed the practices of lawmaking and fiscal control in the National Assembly and lawmakers' own perceptions and assessments of budgetary policy-making in the Assembly. We have also examined citizens' perceptions and assessments of how the current Sixth Republic of Korea performs as a system of democratic governance. On the basis of these analyses, this section highlights its notable institutional, constitutional, and substantive characteristics.

Democratic political systems vary a great deal in their governance (Dominguez and Lowenthal 1996; Kaufmann, Lraau and Zoido-Lobaton 1999; Kenney 2000; Lijphart 1999; O'Donnell 1994; Zakaria 1997). Korean democracy features a presidential system of governance. As in all other presidential systems, the Korean constitution provides for the popular election of a president, but this incumbent may serve for only a single term of five years. The constitution also provides for the separation of powers among the three branches of government and checks and balances among them as well. However, unlike his counterparts in the United States and many other countries especially in Latin America, the Korean president is mandated to nominate the Prime Minister as the head of the cabinet with the consent of the National Assembly. Despite the formal appearance of a semi-presidential system that allows the sharing of executive power between the president and the Prime Minister, the former dominates not only the executive branch but also the legislature (Lim 1998, 2001, 2002; Mo 1998). As in other presidential systems, a Korean president serves as the head of the state as well as the head of the executive branch.

What really makes the Korean presidency 'hegemonic' or 'imperial' is not statutory power at all. Much of the president's power derives from sources other than the constitutional provisions that define formal functions and duties, including legislative vetoes (Hahm and Plein 1997; Shim 2002). It is the political power that derives from the top position in a highly coherent and disciplined ruling party and as the boss of a regional voting base (Croissant 2003; C. M. Park 1998; cf. Boylan 1999). Specifically, the president retains the headship of the political party that elects him or her to the presidency and thereby exercises strict control over the process for selecting candidates

for parliamentary elections and financing their electoral campaigns. Like the head of a family, he or she tells elected representatives how to vote on every major issue and censures them when defied (Jaung 2000; B. Kim 2000). Through this non-statutory, political power of partisan and regional natures, the president can extend the power of the political party into control of the legislature. This accumulation of power makes the Korean presidency into ‘an imperial presidency’ and distinguishes Korea’s presidential system of governance from what is typical in most other presidential systems (Croissant 2002).

The National Assembly consists of 273 seats, three-quarters of which are elected from single-member districts for terms of four years. In all the four parliamentary elections held since the democratic regime change in 1988, more than three political parties participated (Jaung 2000). Not one of them is truly a national party in scope. They are all regional parties whose support bases are concentrated in particular regions of the country. To date, none of these parties, therefore, has been able to win a majority of parliamentary seats (Croissant 2001a, 2001b; On 2000; C. W. Park 2001). Each of these minority parties functions under the domination of their respective leaders, i.e., Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong Pil.

Institutionally, therefore, Korea constitutes a presidential system of governance combined with multiple minority parties. As in other presidential systems, a Korean president needs to secure majority support in the National Assembly because not all presidential systems featuring the separation of powers have built-in mechanisms to ensure legislative majorities. Whether these systems can secure such majorities depends largely on the nature of their party system (Ames 2000; Haggard and McCubbins 2000; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). With two parties, the president’s party often has a majority or close to it. In presidential systems with multiple parties, like the one in Korea, this rarely happens; the ruling party becomes more often than not a minority party in the legislature (Kenney 2000; Mainwaring 1993).

In Korea, moreover, multiparty presidentialism is combined with a system of staggered elections. To date, this system of governance has produced a *divided government* in which different parties control the presidency and the legislature at the same time (Croissant 2002; Lim 2002). Typically pursuing separate and antithetical programs, competing majorities in these two branches of the government have led to ‘immobilizing executive–legislative institutional deadlock’ (Mo 1998; J. C. Park, 2002). A recent example of this deadlock lasted for a period of three months, starting from July 2002, when the Assembly refused to confirm President Kim Dae Jung’s two nominees in succession for the post of prime minister. To avoid this sort of institutional gridlock, all three democratically elected Korean presidents have resorted to political or extra-legal tactics, including those of merging political parties and intimidating opposition lawmakers (Croissant 2002: 15). These are the tactics, which O’Donnell (1994, 1999a) characterizes as ‘governing on the edge of the constitution’. In short, the persistence of institutional deadlock is another notable *institutional feature* of democratic governance in Korea.

When Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated as the third president of the democratic Sixth Republic in February 1998, for example, the former ruling Grand National Party (GNP hereinafter) commanded a comfortable majority of the legislative seats with 161. Soon after his inauguration, his government conducted successive rounds of formal investigations and intimidations aimed at opposition lawmakers. When the state prosecutors ended the second round of its investigations in November 1998, the GNP sustained a loss of 24 seats and no longer remained a majority party in the National Assembly, having declined from 161 to 137 members. As Larry Diamond (2002) correctly points out, such erosion of the opposition party's strength came 'through pure manipulation of state prosecutorial power', not through ideological reorientations among individual lawmakers or as a result of midterm electoral realignment, as is often observed in the United States.

In February 2001, three regional parties had representation in the National Assembly. President Kim Dae Jung's ruling Millennium Democratic Party (hereinafter the MDP) held 115 of 273 legislative seats, much less than a legislative majority. And the United Liberal Democrats (hereinafter the ULD) held only 17 seats. This small regional party was, therefore, unable to achieve the formal status of a negotiating group in the Assembly because it was three seats short of 20 seats, the minimum legally required. In order to compensate for this shortage and enable the party to be registered as a negotiating group in the legislature, the ruling MDP leased four of its lawmakers to the ULD. And then the two parties formed a ruling coalition. This unprecedented political maneuvering by the ruling party was widely viewed by the news media and the electorate as 'low-quality political comedy', which epitomizes the ignoring of basic principles in democratic politics by political leaders. It strained further the working relationship between the ruling and opposition camps and added to their partisan conflict and *legislative deadlock* (*Chosun Ilbo* 2001; *JoongAng Ilbo* 2001).

When the news media persisted in being critical of President Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine policy of engagement with the North in February 2002, his government ordered the National Tax Service to conduct an investigation of the business practices of six main newspapers and their reporters' personal bank accounts (Cho 2001). This investigation led the government to impose huge tax penalties totaling 505.6 billion won on those media outlets over unreported income. More recently, news reports said that the Kim Dae Jung government secretly wired 400 billion won to North Korea (Bang 2002). Working through Hyundai Merchant Marine with a loan from Korea Development Bank, Kim was reported in the news media to have paid for a historic visit to its capital city in June 2000, which helped him to win a Nobel Peace Prize (*Dong-A Ilbo* 2002; S. Lee 2002).

It has also been reported that the National Intelligence Service regularly conducts large-scale illegal wiretapping of phone conversations among politicians, lawmakers, and media people (B. Choi 2002a). Park Kwan Yong, the current speaker of the National Assembly, confirmed that his phone conversation with the head of his group of supporters in March 2002 was illegally wiretapped (Lee and Nam 2002). As to the

absence of law and order in the way the current government is run, Kim Dae-Joong (2002), the country's most influential journalist, recently made the following observations:

We have laws and structures, but from the echelons of the regime itself we saw attempts to circumvent, or otherwise go around the system to do as they wanted. Instead of the law and the system, we had presidential directives and intentions to interpret everything about what happened; and this got to the point where it created an 'emperor'. 'Illegality' and 'legal violation' became everyday occurrences, while the sense that this was something that they need to feel ashamed about did not exist.'

Illegitimate practices such as conducting unwarranted prosecutions, questionable tax audits, and illegal wiretapping reveal that Korea today, as in the authoritarian past, suffers a great deal from the absence of an authentic rule of law. Political use of investigative power, abuses and misuses of mandated authorities, and misappropriations of state funds by the executive branch constitute the most notable *constitutional feature* of democratic governance in Korea. The democratic procedural norms of competition, compromise, cooperation, and tolerance have yet to be internalized among ruling and opposition politicians as the basic principles of democratic governance.

Even after the inauguration of the democratic Sixth Republic in 1988, Korean politics has been deeply marred by biases toward and against particular regions (On 2000). The first two governments of the Sixth Republic, which were headed, respectively, by Presidents Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam, showed favoritism toward the Yeongnam region in the appointment of key government officials. The recent Kim Dae Jung government, in sharp contrast, focused its favoritism on the Honam region. This government is known to have increased the Honam region's proportionate shares of political appointees from 14 per cent under the previous Kim Young Sam government to 27 per cent. Its senior and mid-level civil servants increased from 11 to 28 percent (Y. Choi 2002; see also S. W. Park 2001). For this reason, the Kim Dae Jung government is not widely regarded as the government for all the people in Korea; instead, it is often viewed as 'a Honam government'. The most notable *substantive feature* of democratic governance in Korea is that all the democratically elected governments to date have served a regional minority rather than the whole nation.

Summary and conclusions

Korea has been remarkably successful in building the institutional foundation for representative democracy. Since its transition to democratic rule in 1988, free and competitive elections have occurred regularly to elect a president and lawmakers to the National Assembly. For a decade-and-a-half of democratic rule to date, however, the Assembly has fallen short in the task of representing the electorate. Specifically, it has failed to play an active and independent role in legislating public policies and exercising fiscal control over the national budget. It has also failed to check the executive branch

even when the presidency and other state agencies are engaged in activities that violate the norms and rules of representative democracy. These failures epitomize the dismal state of democratic governance in Korea.

The Korean legislature's failures to function fully as a representative institution are attributable to two disparate sources, institutional and cultural. Institutionally, the current system of governance features the blending of a semi-presidentialism, a multiparty system, and staggered presidential and parliamentary elections. This system produces immobilizing institutional deadlock in the form of divided government with competing majorities in the presidency and the legislature. Without stable majority support in the legislature, Korean presidents lack appropriate institutional means to deal with the protracted policy gridlock. Even with the political power that these presidents do wield as the heads of their ruling party and the favorite sons of a particular region of the country, they remain ineffective in tackling recurring crises of governance. What should be done to avoid the recurrence of such crises in the future? What can be done to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of malfunctioning democratic governance in Korea? Recently scholars, pundits, and presidential candidates have proposed a variety of institutional reforms, urging another round of constitutional amendments (Choi 2002b; Kang 1998; Kim and Lijphart 1997; H. Lee 1992; Lim 2002; J. C. Park 2002; S. W. Park 2002). One proposed reform, to require the president to share executive power with the Prime Minister, is likely to make the presidency less imperial. To hold presidential and parliamentary elections concurrently would reduce the chances for a divided government with competing majorities in the executive and legislative branches.

Nonetheless, institutional reforms should not be considered a panacea for all the problems facing fledgling democratic rule in Korea today. Before politicians attempt to fix the current system of democratic governance by amending the constitution once more, they should note that the most recalcitrant of those problems is deeply rooted in the age-old Confucian belief that justifies the rule by man over the rule of law (Mo 1998, 2001; Shin 1999). They should also note that the current malpractices of democratic governance are in part a response to the legacies of military authoritarian rule. Its decisive and strong leadership is widely credited for creating national economic prosperity, a feat not yet matched by democratic governance.

It is our contention that institutional reforms without the further democratization of authoritarian hearts and minds will not bring about significant improvement within the current system of democratic governance, which suffers a great deal from an imperial presidency, institutional deadlock, policy gridlock, the rule of lawlessness, and regionalism (Steinberg 2000). Such improvements can be expected only when ordinary citizens and government officials are transformed into authentic democrats and follow the norms and rules of representative democracy by dissociating themselves from the political traditions of Confucianism and the virtues of authoritarianism (Shin 2001; Shin, Park and Jang 2002). It is, therefore, our judgment that the process of fulfilling democratic governance in Korea will necessarily be an intergenerational phenomenon,

a socialization process that will take a much longer period of time than was required to put in place the procedure necessary for making operational a democratic regime or government.

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Appendix A

Survey questions

1. Global assessments of the current system of governance

(Q30a) Here is a scale measuring the extent to which people are satisfied with the government. Please choose a number on this scale where 1 means complete satisfaction and 10 means complete dissatisfaction. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way the Kim Dae Jung government handles problems facing our society?

(Q53c) Here is a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 10. On this scale, 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. On this scale, where would you place our country under the Kim Dae Jung government as of right now?

2. Qualities of democratic governance

(Q39) How much influence do you think the votes of people like yourself have on the way our country is governed:

1. A lot
2. Some
3. A little
4. None

(Q40) To what extent do you think government leaders take the interests and opinion of people like yourself into account when making important decisions?

1. A lot
2. Some
3. A little
4. None