Site Fights sets an important research agenda in the comparative study of the politics of divisive installations. It will be required reading for scholars of civil society, environmental politics, public administration, and comparative regulatory policy, as well as for policymakers seeking to better understand the underlying political dynamics that surround contentious land use.

Response to Alexander Cooley's review of *Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West*

doi:10.1017/S1537592709090975

— Daniel P. Aldrich

I am grateful to Alexander Cooley for his insightful comments and questions.

In his review, Cooley points out that the very category of "public bads" is dynamic and subject to contestation. I completely agree, and indeed much of *Site Fights* focuses on ways in which the Japanese government has used a variety of policy instruments when competing with civil society to set the agenda for unwanted facilities. For example, in the field of nuclear power plants, the Japanese state uses middle-school curricula, visits to host communities, and even children's comic books to control the frames around these issues. The state recognizes children as potential opponents or supporters and targets them with pronuclear information even from an early age. Antinuclear groups, on the other hand, have sought to recruit women—especially mothers—and has encouraged them to involve their children in antinuclear mobilization. Hence, civil society has sought to recast various controversial facilities as unacceptable, countering state decision makers' efforts to win over "hearts and minds" to the pronuclear position.

Cooley points out that recent technical innovations, such as the Internet and cell phones, have allowed for more rapid and cross-national responses, so that even small organizations can, in theory, mount effective advocacy campaigns against state projects. His point is well taken, and these new shifts have lowered transactions costs for nongovernmental organizations with few financial and administrative resources. While transnational contacts may be leveraged into stronger pushes from small groups, such as networked antimilitary base movements in South Korea, my research has found that bringing in foreign allies can actually backfire on opposition movements. For example, when handling the French antinuclear movement, French authorities pointed to the presence of German, Belgian, and Spanish protesters as signs of weakness in the native movement. Similarly, Japanese bureaucrats often told me that antinuclear groups at the local level seeking high visibility allies abroad—such as Greenpeace—in fact demonstrated the local group's inability to mobilize local residents.

Cooley argues that while the Japanese government may be able to target siting communities with laser-like precision, more decentralized and uncoordinated states like South Korea may not have the same capacity. However, even in the United States we have seen authorities adopting more focused tactics in dealing with contentious social movements, ranging from broad surveillance to undercover operatives. Indeed, rather than being a function of national state structure, the development of extensive policy toolkits varies even within the same nation. For example, although the Japanese agencies handling dams and airports had access to the same financial, administrative, and personnel resources as the bureau that manages nuclear power plants, these three bureaus developed very different tools because they faced very different opponents in civil society. While the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) encountered long-term civil society opposition to nuclear power, dams, and airports have not created such backlashes. The agencies within the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism responsible for dams and airports remained wedded to standard coercive tools, such as land expropriation and the blocking of access points. On the basis of this evidence, I argue that toolkits are more a function of the strength of opposition from civil society than a result of national bureaucratic culture or degree of state centralization.

Japan and France, with their comparatively homogenous resident populations, may not be the most instructive cases for testing the theories about environmental racism, as Cooley points out. Here I tend to agree with him, primarily because of the technical requirements for these facilities under study (see fn. 1 on p. 28). That is, nuclear power plants, airports, and dams cannot be located in the large urban centers in which many of Japan's resident minorities, such as *burakumin* and Koreans, dwell. On the other hand, while Hokkaido has the largest concentration of the indigenous people known as the Ainu, and Okinawa holds the vast majority of the ethnically distinct Okinawan peoples, neither prefecture has a larger-than-average number of these projects. To further confirm that the strength of civil society, more than the presence of minority groups, influences site selection, the spatial analysis in *Site Fights* should be supplemented with studies of smaller-scale facilities like incinerators, which can be placed in urban neighborhoods with larger concentrations of minorities.

Beyond the obvious similarities that cut across our studies—as both develop midlevel, dynamic theories based on evidence drawn from various nations—Cooley's book shares two additional characteristics with mine. He and I both categorize military bases as controversial, if not often unwanted, projects, and we both are sensitive to the ways in which nation-states use policy instruments in ways not often explored by standard social science. Future work

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592709090975 Published online by Cambridge University Press

on contentious politics and civil society—state relations should critically examine the role of such tools as land expropriation, the closing of access points to political challengers, the provision of incentives, and public relations campaigns.

I very much appreciate Cooley's review, which has raised important issues for future research and allowed me to further explain the findings of my study.

Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas. By Alexander Cooley. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008. 321p. $29.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592709090987

— Daniel P. Aldrich, *Purdue University*

On September 5, 1995, three United States military personnel abducted and raped a 12-year-old schoolgirl on Okinawa, an island in the Pacific that houses roughly 75% of the U.S. military facilities in Japan. After a month and a half of smaller rallies, more than 85,000 demonstrators gathered in late October that year to protest not only the crime itself but also the presence of the U.S. bases on this string of islands that sit a thousand miles south of mainland Japan. Despite the enormous tragedy of this incident, the widespread international attention it received, and the Okinawan governor's refusal afterwards to renew land to the bases, more than 48,000 U.S. military personnel, their dependents, and civilians remain today on the island, which is roughly the size of Los Angeles. Tragedies at other U.S. bases overseas have similarly not altered the bilateral contracts with the host nation. In 1998, for example, a marine airplane accidentally severed a ski-lift cable for a gondola in Cavalese, Italy, killing all 20 passengers aboard, but this incident did not negatively impact the presence of the U.S. military in that nation.

Yet only a few years earlier in 1990, Philippines President Corazon (Cory) Aquino completed negotiations that required all U.S. forces to pull out of that nation within a year (although the actual withdrawal was not completed until November 1992). There had been no well-publicized crimes committed by U.S. personnel, nor were there strong strands of anti-Americanism among nearby residents. Further, the United States had maintained a military presence in the Philippines since soon after World War II. In 2005, American forces were evicted from Uzbekistan despite the absence of any major international incidents. What forced Americans out of Subic Bay and Uzbekistan, but kept them in Okinawa and Italy? This well-written, extensively researched book focuses on the conditions under which host nations contest or honor U.S. military base agreements. Given the current North American military presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the book provides some uncomfortable predictions for planners hoping to both democratize these nations and maintain U.S. military bases in them.

To explain whether bases in foreign nations will be accepted, politicized, contested, or ignored, Alexander Cooley focuses on the role of two domestic political factors: the regime's political dependence on the security contract with the United States and the contractual credibility of the nation's political institutions. Where both factors are high, he predicts that foreign governments will accept U.S. military bases; where they are both low, political elites contest bases. High credibility combined with low dependence results in indifference, while low credibility with high dependence creates politicized base politics. The conditions within a nation can shift over time; in the Philippines, for example, the issue of bases moved from accepted in the 1960s (under U.S. occupation) to politicized in the late 1960s, then to contested in the late 1980s, with acceptance coming after 2000 (p. 90). South Korean base politics evolved through the same pattern between 1946 and 2007 (p. 135), while Japanese politics has stayed mostly within the accepted and depoliticized categories because of the high credibility of its institutions since the occupation that followed World War II.

A core message of this book is that contestation against and evictions of U.S. bases have "little to do with the conduct or policy of the United States" (p. xii); rather, "[i]nternal, not external, political calculations drove the changing politics of the base issue" (p. 256). While calamities such as the rape case in Okinawa and the cable car incident in Italy anger local residents, they have little impact on broader policy in nations where base issues have been depoliticized.

Cooley proposes three hypotheses linking base politics to domestic political institutions and finds strong evidence to support them. First, authoritarian hosts use U.S. military bases to extract private goods from the American government and will support bases in their countries only when they calculate that the gains from doing so offset any costs (p. 23). Francisco Franco, Islam Karimov, Park Chung Hee, Ferdinand Marcos, and Chun Doo Hwan partially populate the long list of autocrats who leveraged rent, legitimacy, and private goods from the presence of U.S. bases in their nations. Along the way, as Cooley points out, the United States government has regularly sacrificed official norms and values—democracy and human rights among others—when maintaining relationships with such dictators in order to keep bases abroad. Second, democratizing regimes demonstrate low contractual credibility because "deals were initially signed with authoritarian rulers and never ratified by democratic institutions" (p. 251), and therefore new decision makers in these regimes regularly contest bilateral contracts. Cases of such base politics include post-Marcos Philippines, Spain, Korea, and Turkey. Finally, consolidated democracies, such as mainland Japan, Italy, and Britain, maintain prevailing bilateral contracts despite incidents that inflame tensions between countries.

Cooley raises four alternative hypotheses to his theory of the interaction between dependency and credibility that

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592709090975 Published online by Cambridge University Press