

## POLITICAL THEORY

**Rethinking Freedom: Why Freedom Has Lost Its Meaning and What Can Be Done to Save It.** By C. Fred Alford. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 192p. \$75.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

**Mourning and Modernity: Essays in the Psychoanalysis of Contemporary Society.** By Isaac D. Balbus. New York: Other Press, 2005. 264p. \$25.00.

— John Kurt Jacobsen, *University of Chicago*

Psychoanalysis has suffered rough treatment in American mass media in recent decades. Dubious sweeping neurological claims have displaced what are regarded as dubious “talking cure” claims. This cultural trend is reflected in the reflex-like skepticism with which especially under-50 scholars behold the works of Sigmund Freud and his schismatic followers. Political scientists rarely bother with psychoanalysis or tend at best to exhibit a “Freud for Beginners” grasp of the enterprise, which is, after all, an exploration, and canny effort at explanation, of our “inner world” and of the rule of unconscious elements over our intentions and best-laid plans. Inasmuch as the study of the unwieldy “inner self” militates against rational modeling, it is little wonder that psychoanalysis has fallen out of favor since Harold Lasswell’s heyday. Indeed, psychoanalysts offer some intriguing comments about underlying motives that drive those of us who pursue rationalist models as adequate depictions of reality, but we need not tarry there.

Here, we have two adept political scientists, adherents of the British variant of psychoanalysis developed by Melanie Klein, tapping this multifaceted tradition for insights into group behavior, a move that is, as analysts readily acknowledge, speculative and only to be conducted with numerous caveats strewn ahead. A methodology devised to probe the innermost recesses of individuals obviously does not commend itself for the analysis of groups or institutions, too. The greatest care must be taken when appraising the results of such a methodological leap. Freud, after all, cautiously warned that his own meta-psychological excursions (*Moses and Monotheism*, *Totem and Taboo*, etc.) were “his own affair.” People may have egos, ids, and superegos, but societies certainly do not.

The two books under review display certain merits and some weaknesses of psychoanalysis when applied within social sciences. In *Rethinking Freedom*, Robert Alford employs psychoanalytical lenses, so to speak, throughout a brilliant little volume examining the meaning of freedom among contemporary Americans. The irony is that Alford is so good an observer that one suspects he could have made many of the same interesting judgments without resorting to psychoanalytical concepts at all. His data unapologetically are some 50 extensive interviews with “about twice as many younger informants (18–30) as older

(31–74)” (p. 5)—largely a privileged group located either in elite universities or high-paid occupations. With due allowance for this small and socially circumscribed “sample,” the study is well worth considering.

In reply to “What’s freedom?” most interviewees answered “in terms of mastery, money, and power” (p. 9). No surprise. Partly, this robust mercenary view reflects the widening gap in the distribution of wealth, which worried interviewees do not want to wind up on the wrong side of. Partly, it reflects strong conformist, materialist, and homogenizing trends in American culture, which Tocqueville spotted long ago. And, partly, it reflects what Alford calls a borderline personality, writ large. A borderline personality (which is a much more serious clinical condition than the name might imply) is disposed, as one key trait, to all black/all white thinking.

For this young cohort: “Freedom is inversely proportional to dependence on others.” It “is an either-or choice,” which is underpinned by a fear of “narcissistic injury” by “other wills more powerful than your own” so that if interviewees “can’t be completely free they want none of it.” There are plenty of exceptions, but fully half the interviewees find no freedom whatever in an unbridled commercial country, democracy or no democracy (p. 13). Alford says they have a point inasmuch as the “political system under which we live is sclerotic, deeply influenced by private power and money and relatively inaccessible to ordinary citizens.” The objective for these interviewees is not freedom, but rather success in acquiring protective devices and gaudy ornaments. They can envision no “alternative social order” in a supposed “end of history era,” nor do they perceive “that control over one’s own life is a political, not personal, project” (p. 83).

In the questionable course of transforming a clinical term into a cultural diagnosis (like Christopher Lasch’s *The Culture of Narcissism* [1991]), Alford seems well aware of the tricky oscillation between inner representation and outer events, and “between type of society and the traits it selects for and exaggerates.” Borderline thinking, he argues, is exacerbated by modern conditions: “I was not interviewing men and women with a borderline personality disorder but men and women who live in a culture with a borderline conception of freedom” (p. 59).

Hence, freedom is freedom from dependence on others and from intrusion. Perfect isolation—autism, in a word—becomes the illogical ideal. Many fretful interviewees feel “trapped in conventional roles but see no way out” (p. 98). In a radically postmodern competitive universe, they accurately sense that “when all values are equal the power to get what one wants becomes the only standard” (p. 4). These young people are “harshly realistic” (p. 35). So far as they see, wealth and power are bestowed arbitrarily. Alford sees a “danger that they become so deeply cynical about the absence of justice in a world in which fate and force rule that they join with rather than resist it.”

Yet “no limits and no boundaries is narcissism, not freedom” (p. 39). Freedom “stands in a complex relationship with dependency,” argues Alford (p. 103). Rather than autarchy, freedom entails “more a quality of a skill of living with others.” In fact, “narcissism, convention, and obsessive attachment are mitigated by republican political practice” (p. 99.) Seeing clearly, in Alford’s terms, “means not so much seeing through or seeing past the reality of everyday life but seeing all the spaces and places within everyday life where alternative ways of living and being . . . are possible” (p. 98). And, he continues, “[I]t is through acts of transgression with others that individuals are most likely to understand their freedom’s often unwitting dependence upon others. This is what Tocqueville meant by self-interest well-understood” (p. 110). Out of this stance arises critiques, for example, of Robert Putnam for putting “social trust first, which is a resource for authority but not for oneself,” and of Jürgen Habermas for equating freedom with rationalism. Political activism mitigates the borderline tendencies Alford rues. In many ways, the book is a plea for, and a guide to, creative, even mischievous, collective action. It is not everybody’s cup of tea, but then everybody’s cup of tea is always bland.

Isaac Balbus’s *Mourning and Modernity*, a follow-up to his *Marxism and Domination* (1982), is a collection of 10 essays that apply Kleinian psychoanalytic concepts to an investigation of the upheavals of the sixties (and their interpretive aftermath), the works of Walter Benjamin, the debate over reparations to American blacks, consumerism, cyberspace fancies, and the ecology movement.

Marx is not enough even for Marxists because of his instrumental approach to nature, which is part of the problem (p. 19). The domination of nature, Balbus contends, “is an historically specific form of male domination that owes its existence to a peculiarly punitive form of mother-dominated child rearing” in Western industrial cultures. Against radical constructivists, psychoanalysis reminds us that there are indeed universal problems—the relationships between love and hate, men and women, and individual and groups—that everyone negotiates (p. 67).

Kleinian analysts see our most significant behavior patterns set in early childhood. In Western societies, care falls almost entirely upon the mother who, unable to fulfill impossible infantile demands for perfection, becomes “split” into a “good” and “bad” mother. The child, motivated by anxiety and guilt, learns to integrate both images into a single “mother who is recognized as neither all good or all bad.” Those who succeed in this task are best placed to cope later with emotional crises regarding adult partners or trying events. Most succeed but many fall prey to defenses of idealization, “manic denial,” and/or projection of self-loathed traits upon others. One consequence of such defenses is that women become a scapegoat for the human condition (p. 8). An urge to dominate women and nature is one result. Well, that is a theory.

Oddly, for a sixties activist, Balbus goes on to conjecture that activists have a “rage” against a “maternal” 1960s movement that failed to deliver utopia overnight, and so they contributed to its destruction. Perhaps, but one recalls that the combined police and surveillance powers of the U.S. state emphatically targeted the antiwar movement, too, and had an effect. The movement, in any case, is conceived as a child rebelling against Mom and Dad, exactly as many right-wingers reveled in portraying upheavals at the time (p. 88). He elsewhere argues that whites are “guilty” about denigrating blacks whose culture they love. Balbus, I believe, mistakes a love of aspects of black life for admiration for blacks as whole people (which is how racists can enjoy black music). The other essays are similarly contestable yet interesting forays into cultural critique. The overarching necessity of learning to live with ambivalence within ourselves and in others is not a bad lesson to learn.

**Democratic Faith.** By Patrick J. Deneen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 440p. \$45.00.

— Wayne Gabardi, *Idaho State University*

Contemporary democratic theory has been flourishing. Recent liberal, communitarian, republican, deliberative, agonistic, pluralist, postmodern, cosmopolitan, cyberspace, and realist models and theories abound. Patrick Deneen’s book is a significant contribution to this genre and original in its critical focus on those democratic theories that “insist upon the possibility of democratic transformation” and advance “a conception of human beings as both infinitely malleable and ameliorable” (p. 4).

Deneen frames his thematic approach in terms of a binary opposition between “democratic faith” and “democratic realism,” the former a flawed and risky political theology and the latter a more sound faith. He then proceeds to construct a robust dialogue between democratic optimists (Protagoras, Rousseau, Whitman, Dewey, Arendt, and deliberative and agonistic theorists) and democratic realists (Plato, Tocqueville, Reinhold Niebuhr, Christopher Lasch, Lincoln, and Deneen). He concludes that we should have faith in democracy. But what kind of faith? The answer—a chastened yet hopeful democratic religiosity grounded in the reality of our existential insufficiency.

The body, heart, and soul of *Democratic Faith* is to be found in five major claims: First, modern secular progressives and postmodern perspectivists, lacking existential depth, waver between the twin extremes of excessive democratic expectations and despair. Second, Plato was a friendly critic of democracy and the *Republic* should be read as a dialogue on the democratic soul. Third, Tocqueville rightly determined that the logic of modernity necessitates the need for a religious revival. Fourth, hope, humility, and charity, the core virtues of democracy, can only be truly understood from a Christian realist perspective. And finally, Abraham Lincoln’s second inaugural

address is the key to understanding both his political thought and the idea of democracy.

Deneen is at his best identifying Rousseau as the founding father of modern democratic faith and reminding us of the undervalued insights of Tocqueville and Reinhold Niebuhr. At the same time, he is at his most questionable in his faith in the infallibility of Platonic wisdom, in his superficial treatment of Hannah Arendt and postmodern democrats, and in his concluding thoughts about Abraham Lincoln.

Contrary to prevailing interpretations, Deneen reads the *Protagoras* as a warning against “the excess of human self-overestimation endemic to the democratic faith” (p. 139) and not as a pro-democratic dialogue on how political virtue can be taught and transmitted to subsequent generations. Plato’s subtle reinvention of the Promethean myth in Protagoras’s speech makes a weak argument for democracy stronger and “sets a trap” (p. 139) for the reader. By making Prometheus mankind’s savior rather than curse (as the myth appears in Hesiod), Protagoras’s speech lulls us into a false humanistic optimism.

While Deneen’s brilliant scholarship makes for a plausible interpretation of the *Protagoras*, the same cannot be said for the *Republic*. Here we are to believe that its central teaching is the vindication of the democratic soul as the means for attaining true justice. Rejecting the soul/city analogy and the philosopher-king model, Deneen concludes that Plato endorses the model of a *kallidemokratia*—“a self-ruled city of self-ruled souls” (p. 212). A type of “egalitarian self-rule is forged” (p. 212) where everyone has the opportunity to participate in cultivating the best possible soul. Plato thus joins the ranks of democratic realists, while at the same time offering us a model of democracy that outdoes “the most idealistic visions of the democratic faithful” (p. 192).

The author concludes with a moving chapter on Abraham Lincoln and how his tragic sense of democracy serves as “a model of democratic charity” (pp. 274–87). He maintains that Lincoln’s second inaugural address, which mirrors John Winthrop’s famous 1630 speech on Christian charity, essentially defines Lincoln’s political thinking if we carefully read “the import of his last words backward” (p. 276). We discover that Lincoln had a Calvinist understanding of democratic equality, that this political theology was grounded in humility, human insufficiency, and charity, and that democracy rests most fundamentally on the revealed existence of God (p. 287).

I prefer to make sense of Lincoln through the lens of political psychology and in terms of the complexity of both his protean character and historical circumstances. I read the second inaugural address as an expression of the historical Lincoln. The war changed his mind and his democratic faith. Thus, while his second inaugural may be used as a model for thinking about democracy, it does not define the essential Lincoln.

Overall, I think Deneen exaggerates both the necessity of religion in unraveling the human condition and the optimism of secular liberal progressives and postmodern perspectivists. Furthermore, noticeably absent from the debate is a major existentialist democratic voice (Albert Camus), the central democratic philosopher of our time (Jürgen Habermas), and today’s preeminent democratic realist (Danilo Zolo).

Deneen’s hermeneutic approach also raises questions. He consistently portrays the thought of “democratic optimists” as clear and straightforward. Yet the true wisdom of Plato, Tocqueville, and Lincoln lies hidden and must be carefully illuminated in typical Straussian fashion. Their true teachings can only be found in the submerged subtext and interstices of their work, while those thinkers he is critical of have no real hermeneutic depth. Their ideas are transparent and flawed.

It should also be noted that while this book will resonate with Americans, most Europeans will not find it convincing. The very success of post-Christian, secular social democracy in Europe refutes many of his arguments. The majority of Europeans have historically worked through political utopianism and Christian realism to emerge with very progressive, effective, and balanced models of democracy.

Finally, Aristotle should be acknowledged as a major voice in any debate on democratic political theory, more so than Plato. Aristotle’s qualified affirmation of democratic judgment, his defense of democracy as a key element in a more complex constitutional mix, his conception of citizenship as action, and his emphasis upon moderation occupy the prudent middle ground in between progressive optimism and conservative realism. It is a shame that Deneen fails to recognize Aristotle’s insights and contributions to democratic theory.

**Protestantism and the American Founding.** Edited by Thomas S. Engeman and Michael P. Zuckert. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004. 296p. \$65.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Michael T. Gibbons, *University of South Florida*

Thomas Engeman and Michael Zuckert’s unique collection of essays and commentaries, most written specifically for this volume, offer competing interpretations of the relationship between the “spirit of liberty” and the “spirit of religion,” as Tocqueville would put it, in the American Founding. The collection begins with a long essay by Zuckert that sets the terms of discussion of the book to which many of the contributors respond, and it concludes with a response by Zuckert to each of his critics.

Zuckert argues that the Founders sought to ground the public realm in a revision of Martin Luther’s two-cities doctrine. Whereas Luther derived the foundations of the political from Scripture, the Founders rejected political theology for political philosophy. Their thinking of the

two spheres gives evidence of an amalgam of different ways of understanding the religious and the political spheres (p. 62). In the discourse of the latter, natural rights, the nature of the covenant/social contract, and the justification of political authority are all rooted in a secular rationalism. The result was that although the “Americans were able to bring their still lively religious sensibilities to the sphere of politics,” it was, nonetheless, “in the service of a substantive politics very different from the traditional teachings of Christianity” (p. 69). Zuckert concludes that this substantial difference between religion and politics has been most advantageous to American politics when the two competing spirits avoid the “fall into disharmony and tension” (p. 69).

Excerpts from Tocqueville and Seymour Martin Lipset provide the historical and empirical context for the consideration of the development of religion in relation to politics. Tocqueville’s selection emphasizes the role of religion in creating a harmony among religion, liberty, and democracy that is part of America’s exceptionalism. But that harmony, always tenuous, was enabled in large part, Tocqueville claims, by the forbearance that clerics exercised in refraining from direct political activity. Lipset’s contribution demonstrates the historical continuities of American religion, showing that Americans have always exhibited greater religious affiliation than citizens of other Western countries and that “[s]ecularity has long been cited as a persistent trait of American religion” (pp. 88–89).

Isaac Kramnick and Laurence Moore’s previously published essay demonstrates that the Framers intended to produce a constitution based solely on secular principles. They base their argument on the response of the supporters of the U.S. Constitution to the criticisms of its prohibition of religious tests for holding office. The defenders of the rejection of religious tests, from Deists to clerics, all argued in one way or another that, to quote Oliver Ellsworth, the “business of civil government is to protect the citizen in his rights. . . . [C]ivil government has no business to meddle with the private opinions of the people. . . . I am accountable not to man, but to God for the religious opinions which I embrace” (p. 140).

Mark Noll and Peter Lawler similarly agree with Zuckert that the Framers sought to separate the political and religious spheres. But whereas Noll argues that the public sphere was “infused with a language of Christian virtue” (p. 247), Lawler sees the separation as a trivialization of and hostility toward religion that is politically problematic. “We do well in our time,” Lawler concludes, “to highlight those aspects of the American founding that dissent from the more extreme and discredited claims of liberalism, and to reconstitute liberalism on a less secular and individualistic foundation” (p. 182). Unfortunately, Lawler’s claim that Locke’s and Jefferson’s secular foundation of politics implies a hostility toward religion does not, as Zuckert points out, hold water (p. 264).

Thomas West argues that Zuckert falls victim to a secularization thesis that sees the American Founding as “not only not religious but . . . at bottom indifferent or hostile to religion” (p. 188). The root of the problem, West argues, is Zuckert’s claim that the Founders substituted political philosophy for the political theology of the early Puritans. Such secularization never took place. Rather, the Second Founding became even more religious than the first, extending the morality of the latter: “What happened was not *secularization* but the opposite: a *sacrilization* of what had previously been held worldly or low. For the eighteenth century Christians whom we are discussing, the earlier Puritans had mistakenly limited the sacred to the realm of human life that is found in the next world” (p. 215). Locke and the Second Founding corrected this shortcoming of the early Puritans with a thoroughgoing political theology, argues West, a point that Zuckert contests in his response (pp. 262–63).

Carey McWilliams’s essay is close to both Zuckert’s and Kramnick and Moore’s in seeing the Framers grounding the Constitution in a secular language that did not preclude the recognition of the claims that religion makes upon moral reasoning and the support that it lends to secular government. He demonstrates the extent to which even a devout, conservative Christian thinker such as Nathaniel Niles, starting from religious assumptions and understanding of human sociability radically different from Locke’s understanding of natural rights, enlists that understanding in support of the secular justification for separation from England. What makes this effective, McWilliams argues, is Niles’s understanding that religion, if it really does have the faith in itself that it purports to have, can afford to pick its battles carefully and not just tolerate but acknowledge the secularism that defines the public sphere.

In this respect, McWilliams’s essay diverges from each of the others in a significant way. The other contributors, whichever side of the secular/sacred issue they are located, make their arguments, or seem to, in the name of a greater, more perfect harmony, an unambiguous resolution to the divide between the secular and the sacred. The thrust of McWilliams’s position challenges this tendency, and it is previewed in his opening sentence, one that is a beguiling instruction about reading Tocqueville as well as the Founding: “As usual, Alexis de Tocqueville got it right: from the beginning of the republic, American political culture has been incoherent, an unresolved argument—ordinarily implicit and more or less civil—between the ‘spirit of liberty’ and the ‘spirit of religion’” (p. 143). Americans’ approach to the politics/religion divide has been marked by ambiguity, compromise, and ambivalence. That ambiguity is not the reason for despair: In many respects it is the occasion of politics. Moreover, the impulse to a perfect uniformity on the issue of religion, from secularists and believers alike, betrays a lack of needed assurance in their own projects. That assurance among the sanctified



“moderates any felt need for desperate measures” and “encourages a willingness . . . to abide by the armed truce of republican life.” “For that matter,” McWilliams adds, “a secular faith in progress can make liberals more willing to conciliate religion, making a place for it at the table of public life, readier to trust democratic politics without insisting as a precondition on a distinctively liberal code of rights and neutralities” (p. 158). And, as he concludes, it is that generosity of spirit on the part of both camps that could encourage a greater civility of political discourse that has been recently lacking.

**The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era.** By Micheline R. Ishay. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. 459p. \$24.95.

— Jamie Mayerfeld, *University of Washington*

Are human rights universal or culturally bounded? From what religious or philosophical premises are they derived? Do they conflict? Do they empower or instead disempower the weak and oppressed? What is their fate in an era of globalization? The key to answering these questions may lie more in historical than conceptual investigation. This is the hunch that inspires Micheline Ishay’s remarkably learned and wide-ranging book. It delivers forceful conclusions, which need no belaboring by the author, since she allows them to emerge from the historical record. Among the lessons we learn are that human rights should indeed be viewed as universal; that they draw nourishment from diverse ideological sources; that their meaning has always been contested, though not primarily along cultural lines; that civil and political rights on the one hand and socioeconomic rights on the other have historically been dependent on each other; that the claim to national self-determination as a human right has often been a cover for human rights violations; and that the idea of human rights has regularly been reborn, often strengthened, after periods of tyranny and oppression.

Ishay begins by recalling the quandary of the United Nations when in the late 1940s it assumed the challenge of drafting a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When UNESCO, its educational, scientific, and cultural organization, polled more than 70 leaders and scholars representing the world’s major religious and philosophical traditions, their responses demonstrated a broad if imperfect consensus regarding human rights norms and principles. Taking her cue from the UNESCO study, Ishay surveys the moral teachings found in Hammurabi’s code, the Hebrew Bible, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, classical Greek and Roman philosophy, the New Testament, and Islam. She discovers common themes that help lay a foundation for human rights: an effort to restrain violence and exploitation, a desire to soften the division between weak and strong through the assertion of reciprocal obligations, and an aspiration to peace and universal

brotherhood. But the contributions of the various traditions are not identical, and each enriches the idea of human rights in a different way—Hinduism in encouraging respect for all existence, Confucianism in requiring cultivation of the self, Buddhism in emphasizing compassion, Judaism in demanding an ethical life guided by law, Christianity in exhorting universal love, Islam in its insistence on human equality and social solidarity. Each tradition has its limits also, and Ishay makes no attempt to hide their exclusionary and intolerant elements.

The bulk of the book (Chapters 2 through 6) is a macrohistorical narrative of the human rights struggle from the early modern period to the present. Ishay devotes equal space to the intellectual history of human rights and to the social, economic, and political context in which it unfolded. The attention to context takes much of the sting out of quarrels regarding the cultural origins of human rights. Although the intellectual elements of the human rights idea had been present in each of the world’s major civilizations, it was only the historical conditions present in early modern Europe—political fragmentation, the Reformation and the ensuing wars of religion, the scientific revolution, the printing press, the empowerment of an independent merchant class, and the growth of the towns—that made possible their coalescence into a fully articulated and politically revolutionary theory. The subsequent story of human rights victories, setbacks, and transformations cannot be understood without attention to changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution, European imperialism, decolonization, globalization, and a series of increasingly destructive wars. The author’s grasp of the broad social forces that shaped the evolution of human rights is one of the most impressive features of the book; readers are treated to nothing less than a panoramic interpretation of modern world history.

Ishay’s intellectual history presents a huge cast of characters. It brings to life arguments that raged between the proponents and critics of human rights, points out that many of the bravest and most original champions of human rights have been left out of the political theory canon, and emphasizes the dizzying intellectual diversity within the human rights camp itself. The differences between “levelers” and “diggers” in the 1640s, say, or between utopian socialists and English radicals in the early nineteenth century seem no less dramatic than the larger contest pitting reformers against defenders of the status quo. Ishay recovers the voices of oppressed and stigmatized groups; their protests have not only challenged the privileged to live up to professed human rights principles but also fostered more just, generous, humane, and *universal* conceptions of human rights. If the Universal Declaration of Human Rights offers a more complete vision than, say, the 1689 English Bill of Rights, it is only because succeeding generations of excluded populations—women, children, the elderly, nonwhites, foreigners, colonized peoples,

indigenous groups, ethnic and racial minorities, workers, the poor, sexual minorities, ill people, disabled people, refugees, prisoners, and war victims—have fought to broaden the scope and meaning of human rights. A disappointing feature of the author's discussion, however, is the failure to address the mistreatment of prisoners and criminal defendants in the United States and elsewhere. The omission stands out in a book that is otherwise comprehensive in its coverage and compassion.

A major theme of the book is the debt owed to the socialist movement. Socialist writers and activists, including Marx and his entourage, helped lead the Herculean nineteenth-century struggle to realize the human rights vision in both the economic and political spheres—to broaden suffrage, extend education, humanize working conditions, and provide social insurance. Liberals have no reason to feel superior: “If liberalism—rightly celebrated for its contribution to civil rights—is more than its colonial legacy, socialism—which championed the rights of the hardworking and powerless poor—is more than Stalinism and Maoism” (p. 119). Socialists well understood the mutual dependence of civil-political and socioeconomic rights, and promoted the universal vision of human rights by fostering alliances between workers and other disadvantaged groups. Ishay takes seriously the debates over political strategy among socialists, though she is excessively generous in ascribing a human rights vision to radical figures like Lenin, given his ruthless subordination of means to ends and, as she herself points out, the political terror over which he presided. She casts a warier eye over the claim to self-determination as a human right, noting that Wilsonian self-determination became a rhetorical gift to Hitler during the Sudetenland crisis and continues to serve as a shield for repressive governments today. She concludes that “self-determination should be regarded as a formal and abstract right, devoid of content—unless one considers the fairness of the political, social, and economic arrangements awaiting the individuals comprising these subjected groups once they achieve independence” (p. 174).

In her final chapter, Ishay reminds us that the public and private spheres, both necessary for human rights, emerged slowly and with difficulty over the past few hundred years. Today, both spheres face threats from globalization and from the preoccupation with security after 9/11. Her verdict on globalization is mixed: While it has handed dramatic victories to multinational capital at the expense of the world's poor, it has also inspired new social movements to address problems of multicultural citizenship, labor rights, and environmental degradation. Observing that the rhetoric of a “War on Terror” dangerously undermines human rights, the author eloquently pleads for a more intelligent form of political realism, one that understands that a genuine, rather than merely nominal, commitment to human rights is necessary for enhancing global security.

Micheline Ishay vividly demonstrates the power of the human rights ideal. *The History of Human Rights*, almost encyclopedic in scope and filled with theoretical insights, is a major scholarly achievement. It joins Paul Gordon Lauren's *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (2003) as an indispensable reference. By illuminating past struggles that have informed contemporary human rights, Ishay improves our understanding of their meaning. She lets us overhear a sprawling and impassioned discussion spanning many centuries. As she makes clear, the conversation has barely gotten started.

**Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the Development of American Constitutional Law.** By Ken I. Kersch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 400p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

— Alison Dundes Renteln, *University of Southern California*

This is a fascinating book about constitutional development in the United States that questions traditional explanations for the genesis of constitutional rights. In this erudite study, Ken Kersch offers an account of the changing interpretations of constitutional rights by analyzing landmark cases in their historical context in order to show the interplay of ideological, political, and social forces that influenced them. The book provides a careful reconsideration of the jurisprudence concerning civil rights and civil liberties that effectively challenges the conventional wisdom about individual cases. Kersch's compelling analysis demonstrates that explanations for the expansion of particular rights are often more complicated than traditional constitutional works have assumed. He argues that the expansion of constitutional rights did not occur in a unilinear and unidimensional fashion (cf. e.g., pp. 132, 360). This is a brilliant interdisciplinary study that should interest scholars in many fields, including cultural studies, history, international law, law and society, and political science. This comprehensive book is rich in historical detail and full of surprises.

Kersch begins by advancing a strong argument in favor of investigating the ways in which constitutional interpretation reflects political efforts at building the “New American State.” It contains three elaborate case studies: one concerned with privacy and criminal process rights, another reviewing the relationship between labor rights and civil rights, and the third focused on education rights. The final chapter, despite being titled “Conclusion,” offers a new, provocative consideration of the relationship between American constitutional law and international human rights law.

Throughout, Kersch leads the reader to competing explanations for the advocacy of more rights as part of his intellectual strategy of problematizing standard accounts of doctrinal developments. He accomplishes this by using various techniques. He shows that contrary to expectation, those who championed broader interpretations of

rights were fueled by maleficent motivations. For instance, he notes that the Knights of Labor, who staunchly defended laws prohibiting child labor in the 1920s, wanted to protect “well paying jobs” for adults from children. Their primary concern was not ensuring that children pursue educational opportunities. He also describes how individuals historically known as the champions of particular principles actually held much narrower views (e.g., William Douglas on privacy, p. 114).

The first case study on the constitutional development of criminal procedure rights, that is, the Fourth Amendment search and seizure provision and the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination provision, is designed to show that the Supreme Court’s “new solicitude for civil liberties [in the area of rights of the accused] was not a progressive project” (p. 121). Kersch demonstrates that changes in privacy law were influenced by the emergence of new discovery rules. The modern view of privacy as conceptually linked to sexual autonomy overlooks earlier case law related to privacy that reflected the notion that the state was entitled to fact-gathering powers (p. 120). Another key insight is that the expansion of due process rights was strongly related to realizations about racial inequalities. The author suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in one case influenced the disposition of another case considered during the same term. For instance, he notes that in *Monroe v. Pape* (1961), the Court held that a black family was indeed harassed by police because they were shielded by immunity. A month later, he points out, the Court heard arguments in *Mapp v. Ohio* in which it established the exclusionary rule, thereby creating a disincentive for police misconduct inasmuch as illegally obtained evidence would henceforth be inadmissible at trial. Kersch suggests that the *Miranda* decision, following two cases in which police obtained coerced confessions from blacks, was inspired by a desire to deter police harassment of blacks (p. 124). To his credit, he includes in this study the analysis of attempts to employ human rights treaties as a basis for enlarging the scope of rights. He ultimately concludes that this approach is futile because the UN Charter is essentially a “dead letter” (p. 110) and notes that reliance on treaties was subsequently replaced by a strategy of invoking equal protection instead.

The second case study focuses on two major twentieth-century constitutional developments, labor rights and civil rights. Although they are usually analyzed separately, Kersch contends that examining the interrelationship between them is crucial to a complete historical understanding of these rights. One important part of his argument is that a careful examination of the changes in African American political thought reveals that they were tied to changes in the interpretation of labor rights.

In the third case study on education rights, Kersch begins by challenging the conventional view that education was not a part of state building in the United States, which

differs from the experience of European nations. Contending that the absence of a national educational policy does not prove the lack of a U.S. commitment to education, the author considers several controversial policies to demonstrate the role that education played in the construction of the American state: the Founders’ debate about establishing a national university, the twentieth-century campaign to enact compulsory education laws, and judicial treatment of the proper relationship between church and state. The many reasons why a national educational system was not favored are thoroughly explored in this chapter. Kersch’s elaborate analysis of the influence of anti-Catholic thought in some of the debates complicates the historical account of tensions between scientific and religious worldviews. Yet he shows that the conflict was not always between secularists and Catholics, as Protestants eventually began to join Catholics in later Establishment Clause litigation. Although he concedes that constitutional development via education failed in securing a national educational system and secularism, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning church–state relations, free speech, and racial segregation influenced American politics. The evolving jurisprudence in these areas shaped American views of citizenship in important respects.

*Constructing Civil Liberties* is beautifully written, engaging, and thought-provoking. Kersch is to be admired for the way he captures the historical context in which landmark decisions were rendered, by drawing on diverse and varied scholarship in intellectual history, film studies, scholarship on popular culture, and other disciplines. In his discussion of what led to particular doctrinal shifts in civil rights, he emphasizes the writings of Gunnar Myrdal. In the treatment of educational rights linked to cases concerned with religion, he highlights the influence of Paul Blanchard, who condemned American Catholicism by drawing comparisons between the Vatican and the Kremlin (p. 296). His nuanced treatment of the influence of intellectuals even captures shifts in their writings, for example, the discussion of Walter Lippman’s views on the relationship between silence and democracy (p. 275). Also highly impressive is the precise characterization of particular traditions, such as the Catholic objection to cremation (p. 302, n. 238).

The final chapter investigates what Kersch terms the rise of global or world constitutionalism. Here, when he considers differing European and American views of translational legal regimes, his analysis reflects skepticism about the validity of international standards. He says that American and European lawyers have been engaged in an enterprise of norm construction (although they deny they have invented them), in which he implicitly denies the status of customary international law. While Kersch’s willingness to include international law in his study of American constitutional development is commendable, his cynical reaction to customary law reflects almost exclusively the

American discussion of this topic, and suggests that he has not consulted the larger literature on this subject available via the *Index to Foreign Legal Periodicals*. It is odd that his bibliography contains only U.S. Supreme Court decisions, as he has omitted state court decisions as well as foreign ones (p. 363).

As an exemplar of interdisciplinary scholarship, this book is appropriate for graduate seminars and may be suitable for advanced undergraduate courses if students have studied constitutional law. Kersch forces us to question our underlying assumptions about the real forces that shape historical developments. He calls into question simplistic accounts of constitutional development with richly detailed case studies. This extraordinary book is an absolutely first-rate study that meets the highest standards and deserves to be widely read.

**Collective Dreams: Political Imagination and Community.** By Keally D. McBride. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005. 192p. \$45.00.

— Keith Fitzgerald, *New College of Florida*

The concept of community weighs heavily in the history of social and political theory but even more so in the collective imagination. The idea and varying visions of community traverse concepts of identity, public sphere, and state in theoretical discourses. Community also insinuates itself into discussions and decision making at the most practical level. Keally D. McBride's book offers a creative and probing exploration of how community has been imagined by theorists and how imagined communities inform practice. It does not claim to be a comprehensive synthesis of competing views, but rather succeeds as a provocative set of thematically linked, exploratory essays. While McBride acknowledges at the outset the importance of the analytic task of delineating the various conceptualizations of community, her project makes its contribution by explicating how visions of the political imagination of different eras inform the imagination of community. She shows how the resulting set of ideals and images creates and constrains real-world political possibilities. Throughout, she offers subtle judgments and useful provocations and, in the end, this book emerges as an important resource for everyone who values the possibilities of community, but wishes to remain critical of the concept's many traps and seductions.

McBride situates her own view of the status of "community" in relation to the vast literature on the topic in the early chapters of the book. A central premise of her argument is that community is a ubiquitous notion among theorists from Hegel forward since it provides not one but many solutions to the problem of the opposition between self and world. She stresses that the lesson that we should derive from Hegel's master-slave discussion lies in his recognition that the slave's identity emerges in his struggle

with the limitations imposed by an obdurate world as he tries to act on it. She uses this starting point to criticize and appropriate a host of contemporary theories of community, but also to explain why identity, community, and consumption have become so intimately intertwined in the real world of consumer capitalism as a sort of grand evasion of contemporary society's inability to generate a meaningful sense of self. McBride shows how the concept of identity can be used as a way of evading the fragility of self in the face of contemporary realities. The mass marketing and consumption of images of community become means of compensating for the limits to individuation that come with the overwhelming demand on people's time and other features of society. At its worst, community sometimes serves as an anodyne solipsism where its advocates demand to see, at some organic social level, a finished expression of their incomplete sense of self. The logic of competitive capitalism exacerbates this problem when it turns images of community into a commodity. The need for a sense of meaning and completeness in an anomic and hectic form of life is real enough, and a variety of ventures, including real estate developers with slick marketing packages, are there to fill the void.

McBride's contribution throughout the volume is to press for political wisdom. Beyond this critique of both theory and contemporary society, she strives to offer a better way of conceiving the relationship between community and individual identity formation than one finds in the literature. She thus resists the temptation to dispose of the idea of community altogether, and instead explores its potential as a generative concept, weaving both elements of existing theories and lessons from practice into her argument. From her work, one could conclude that the possibility for liberation contained in the idea of community is better redeemed in the effort to *make* community, and in the action involved in changing the world in which subjects find themselves, than in the product that emerges from community building. Yet, she attends to the material conditions necessary for community throughout her discussion.

In a short but provocative final chapter, McBride discusses instances of "community in practice," relying on West Philadelphia, and ironically (and in passing) New Orleans, as examples. She raises several challenging themes in this brief chapter. She identifies a set of important elements, including the right spatial arrangements, institutional commitments, and structural interdependence between key institutions, as well as the availability of time for at least some people to devote to turning specific locales into spaces with a liberating sense of community, what Hannah Arendt referred to as "spaces of appearance." This final chapter is concise, but it provides an important link between political theory, which often neglects the central concept of the built environment, and scholarly studies of old and new urbanism.



One hesitation some may have to embracing this challenging and important book lies in the way the author writes about new urbanism. She uses Celebration, Disney's residential real estate development to discuss the new urbanist movement, even after noting that Celebration is not at all representative of that movement. The broader points she makes in describing Celebration concern how it has commodified a collective imagination rooted in nostalgia and popular culture images of community—and how the actual place has jarring features that shatter this illusion. On this score, she is thought-provoking. However, those unfamiliar with the new urbanism should be warned away from the idea that Celebration offers a good read of it. The new urbanism itself is a complex and important phenomenon and it is not well represented by Celebration. Ironically, nowhere are there more practitioners devoted to thinking through how the built environment and social and political institutions, including democratic design practices, can contribute to richer social and political interactions than among the new urbanists. In other words, there is a far greater affinity between McBride's theory and the best of new urbanism than she recognizes.

The issues raised in this book's final chapter are familiar ones to those following the development of the new urbanism. McBride may have missed the opportunity to open up a dialogue between political theorists and urban designers by her lean discussion of Celebration, but it is a flaw that does not undercut the importance of this fine book. *Collective Dreams* creatively and judiciously moves the discussion of community in a constructive direction.

**Freedom Reclaimed: Rediscovering the American Vision.** By John E. Schwarz. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 264p. \$30.00.

— Mark Smith, *University of Washington*

In his book, John Schwarz develops a conception of freedom different from, and more expansive than, the one most common today. His crucial distinction echoes that of Isaiah Berlin's (1969) *Four Essays on Liberty*: Negative freedom (which Schwarz calls "free-market freedom") involves the absence of formal restrictions on personal conduct, particularly those coming from government, whereas positive freedom ("genuine freedom," in Schwarz's words) requires that society be organized such that people can and do attain a decent standard of living through their own efforts. Schwarz differs from Berlin, however, in seeing positive freedom not as a concept easily twisted for totalitarian ends but rather as the highest form of freedom. Emphasizing only negative freedom means ignoring the bonds that connect citizens to one another, leading to an individualistic, morally bankrupt notion that says we are all in this—alone.

Schwarz argues that carving out a political space for positive freedom involves restoration rather than innova-

tion, with the finest American traditions sustaining and reinforcing his robust vision. In a provocative chapter early in the book, he briefly examines the writings of some of the Founders (James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine), along with their philosophical ancestors (John Locke). Contrary to conventional wisdom, Schwarz contends, the Founders embraced an understanding of positive freedom holding that individual liberty becomes possible only under conditions of widespread economic opportunity. He offers evidence in another chapter that the American economy falls far short on precisely this point of providing sufficient opportunity through the availability and wages of work. A large pool of workers unable to find full-time employment, combined with the problems of low wages and a scarcity of health insurance, make economic opportunity an elusive aspiration. The author presents data indicating that these problems remained even in the best of times, the late 1980s and late 1990s, and became even worse during the less favorable parts of the business cycle.

Schwarz concludes that America takes the wrong turn not by having government do too much—as free-market advocates would hold—but by allowing government to do too little in defense of freedom. To advance the cause of freedom, he supports a broad array of policy changes, such as providing universal health care, establishing workplace training programs, raising the minimum wage, targeting immigration to the labor supply, expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, improving education in low-income communities, enforcing civil rights laws, extending unemployment benefits, and offering greater assistance for child care. He states that because his prescriptions are tied to the workforce and to the opportunity for all citizens to better themselves through personal initiative, the policies would facilitate the attainment of the American dream. By Schwarz's estimation, 95% of current government spending meets the guidelines he constructs for the kinds of policies that promote freedom. Accordingly, a view of genuine freedom helps us understand and appreciate the growth of government over time, the same growth incompatible with free-market liberty. The problem is simply that we devote too little attention and effort to what genuine freedom requires.

Near the end of the book, Schwarz chastises progressives for ceding the language of freedom to their ideological opponents. Modern progressives typically defend their policies by invoking arguments about equality, fairness, and community. According to the author, none of those arguments can rival the potency of rhetoric grounded in the mantle of freedom. In earlier generations, from which Schwarz offers the examples of Franklin Roosevelt during the New Deal and the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, progressives spoke the language of freedom. The failure of their successors to follow a similar path has pushed the nation into the hands of those upholding only free-market liberty.

Schwarz is crisp and concise in his writing, but there are a couple of places where he might have elaborated his arguments in greater detail. His discussion of the Founders, which will surprise many readers, could have benefited from a more thorough analysis to corroborate his interpretations. More space, too, could have been devoted to his attribution of modern liberalism's failures to its abandonment of the language of freedom. One would like to see evidence linking changes in the rhetoric of progressives to specific policy debates and outcomes where the free-market view prevailed. Similarly, one would want to consider alternative explanations, of which there are many, for why progressives have lost their foothold in the body politic. Of course, the fact that some of Schwarz's themes are a bit underdeveloped could be seen not as a weakness but as the inevitable by-product of an ambitious attempt to cover so much ground within two covers.

Assuming that he gains a broad readership—one that the book merits—would Schwarz succeed in convincing backers of free-market liberty to change their views? Asking a single book to accomplish such a goal surely sets the bar too high. Anyone seeking a clearly articulated position on these questions can expect to find in *Freedom Reclaimed* a well-crafted normative argument appropriately backed by theory, reasoning, and evidence. Although many of the individual points Schwarz makes are familiar, he distills, combines, and extends them in an original way. This is a book that would reward reading from those interested in the past, present, and future of freedom, government, the economy, and the welfare state.

**On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory.** By Brian Z. Tamanaha. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 188p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

— Stephen G. Engelmann, *University of Illinois at Chicago*

Brian Z. Tamanaha reminds us that the rule of law is a near-universal yet little-understood ideal. His book presents a brief and clear introductory history and analysis that defends the coherence and value of the rule of law and that gives a sense of its global reach, limitations, and prospects. Tamanaha wisely argues that what is called the rule of law is actually a family of doctrines. Crucial to it, on his view, are three “themes” (p. 114): government limited by law, formal legality (which “entails public, prospective rules with the qualities of generality, equality of application, and certainty” [p. 119]), and a distinction between the rule of law and the “rule of man” (p. 122). The theoretical core of the book deftly explicates Friedrich Hayek's defenses and Roberto Unger's criticisms of legal liberalism as a prelude to discussing the challenges of indeterminacy and surveying a range of thinner to thicker formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law. Tamanaha analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of each of these conceptions. These analyses are intelligent and fair-minded; his own

position is veiled, but suggests support for a relatively thin substantive and relatively thick formal conception (involving basic individual rights within a formally democratic legal order), friendly to Hayek and not too bothered by the acknowledged indeterminacy of legal rules.

Although the book succeeds as introductory legal theory, which is its primary mission, it has serious failings as history and political theory. Tamanaha's early history is surprising in its dated and narrowly “Western Civ” approach. Rather than, for example, a discussion of comparative religion or empire, we meet obligatory Greeks (pp. 7–10), more apposite Romans (pp. 11–14), “Dark Ages” (p. 15), crucial medieval concerns engaged only to be diminished as “trappings” falling away with “the rise of reason and science” (p. 27), the “rise of the bourgeois” (p. 28), and a “liberalism” of the seventeenth and eighteenth (rather than nineteenth) centuries (p. 32). This does little to serve his account of the rule of law, which enjoys a better start with the discussions of A. V. Dicey and Hayek. Similarly curious is a legal-academic history marred by an oddly tendentious title (“Radical left encourages decline” [chap. 6, pp. 73–90]) and scant or missing treatments: Feminist and critical race theory are given a total of a sentence and a half (pp. 85, 86), and the book contains no mention at all of the law and economics movement. The latter—through its transformation of legal subjects into scientifically reckonable actors and its consequent reinterpretations of rules and justice—arguably presents a more institutionally powerful threat to Tamanaha's legal liberalism than the positions he examines.

Political theorists will be perplexed by the identification of communitarianism as the “antithesis” of liberalism (p. 42), and troubled by the only sporadic treatments of sovereignty and the modern state. The author takes sovereignty for granted, and although he very much recognizes “the age-old question of how—or indeed whether—the government can be limited by law when it is the ultimate source of law” (p. 28), he does little to explore the paradoxes generated by familiar conceptions of politics as sovereignty. His treatment of the growth of the administrative state-as-welfare state shows his concern with the expansion of executive and judicial power and the blurring of law and policy (e.g., p. 72). Missing altogether, however, is any treatment of another dimension of security, the growth of the warfare state (sizable enough today to house many thousands of captives in legal limbo, including a U.S. citizen apprehended in Chicago). This omission does not stem from any aversion to contemporary commentary; the book's penultimate chapter discusses the global prospects of the rule of law, and gives voice to legal worries about the U.S.'s Realpolitik rejection of new international institutions (p. 130). Tamanaha's oversight regarding security is theoretically as well as politically significant. When he attempts to assess global rule of law in light of his first theme, “limited

government,” he fails to notice that government would in this arena be limited if at all from above, as it were, rather than from below (pp. 129–31). The blitheness of the disanalogy betrays a lack of engagement with the only apparently extrajudicial content of the sovereignty he assumes, and with law’s complex relationship to the violence it appears to constrain. For such an engagement, important to a more political-theoretical reflection on the rule of law, one might look instead to Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) *State of Exception*.

Such criticisms should not distract too much from this book’s virtues, however. Tamanaha is clearly a sophisticated institutionalist, and *On the Rule of Law* offers valuable insights. Although the book is generally optimistic about the character and prospects of the rule of law, it is perhaps at its best when delivering various caveats and cautions. The author urges us not to overload our definition of the rule of law and expect too much from it, and to recognize that its practice relies on a convinced and critical citizenry and a strong legal profession. He warns us further that the latter requirement, however necessary, is at the same time a source of danger, because of consequences ranging from the judicialization of politics to the rule of experts to legal imperialism. Ultimately, Tamanaha shares the constructive skepticism of Jeremy Bentham, whom he follows in noting that its “position . . . renders the legal profession . . . uniquely situated to undermine the rule of law” (p. 59). Recent events have only confirmed such worries about the rule of law, and about the work that might be done in its name.

**“Women’s Work” as Political Art: Weaving and Dialectical Politics in Homer, Aristophanes, and Plato.** By Lisa Pace Vetter. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. 190p. \$60.00.

— Arlene W. Saxonhouse, *University of Michigan*

Metaphors are a staple of the practice of political theory. Socrates’ “individual writ large,” Machiavelli’s “Fortuna is a woman,” Hobbes’s “leviathan”: These and scores of others speak to the power of metaphorical language in the theorist’s arsenal. Lisa Pace Vetter’s “women’s work” focuses on the metaphor of weaving, a craft associated with the female working at her loom by the hearth. Vetter explores this metaphor in four texts: the *Odyssey*, *Lysistrata*, *Statesman*, and *Phaedo*. She finds in the metaphor a “dialectical foundationalism” that mediates between subjectivity and objectivity, reason and emotion, action and deliberation (p. 7). Weaving incorporates complexity, creating a new whole without destroying the particularities that comprise it. This form of weaving she values, but it appears only in the Socrates speech in the *Phaedo* and the construction of Plato’s dialogue.

Weaving as dialectical foundationalism faces an impressive challenge, mediating at times between particularity

and universality, incorporating at others a multitude of opposites. Vetter describes dialectical foundationalism as having “vast ramifications for women’s issues” (pp. 6, 20) and for theories of discursive democracy; articulating this dialectical foundationalism deriving from the metaphor of weaving is the primary goal of the volume. Her more modest agenda is uncovering a democratic Plato who “accommodates complexity and particularity” (p. 3) and “universalist and subjectivist perspectives” (p. 162), and who is devoted to the “inclusion of the heterogeneous” as well as offering “kinds of universal standards” (p. 162). While Vetter may not persuade feminists or deliberation theorists that their difficulties will be resolved by returning to the weaving metaphor, she offers intriguing readings of familiar texts and supports a growing movement eager to salvage Plato from the dustbin of essentialism and dedicated to seeing him as sympathetic to democracy.

The heart of “*Women’s Work*” as *Political Art* discusses the significance of Penelope’s weaving, compares Lysistrata’s efforts at political leadership to the activity of weaving, discusses the Eleatic Stranger’s recourse to weaving in order to define the statesman, and draws attention to the images of weaving that pervade Socrates’ language on the day of his death. Vetter portrays Penelope initially as a woman on whom others project their personalities. Penelope plays this reflective role until she creates *homophrosunê* (same-mindedness) with her husband, “weaving through speeches” their complementary but distinct natures (p. 58). Somewhat anachronistically, Vetter contrasts Penelope’s “democratic alternative [*homophrosunê* through conversation] to Odysseus’s blood-vengeance” (p. 57). Lysistrata “weaves,” this time individual citizens into a “common ground” (p. 76). Yet Aristophanes’ heroine blunders by failing to “unweave the unified whole in a way that would protect the integrity of the individual parts” (p. 76) and instead advances a “brutal . . . tyranny that erases important distinctions among individuals” (p. 77). Though Penelope is spared the accusation of brutality and she “unwove” her web, she is guilty of pursuing too much “like-mindedness” with Odysseus (p. 81). The Eleatic Stranger fails when he employs the weaving metaphor, offering a “paradigm of statesmanship [that is] fundamentally static” where “the result would . . . be tyranny” (p. 92). Through a subtle analysis, Vetter concludes that the Stranger’s weaving leads to the death of philosophy.

The *Phaedo*’s Socrates is Vetter’s hero; in a very brief allusion to Penelope’s web, Socrates illuminates the “Socratic philosopher” (opposed to the “true” philosopher). The Socratic philosopher constantly moves back and forth between his earthly body and heavenly soul, the particular and the universal, heart and mind. In his weaving and unraveling, Socrates captures the movement of the Platonic dialogues. Plato leaves readers in a perennial tension by the flexibility of his works, drawing them into the constant rereading of the unraveling texts.

Readers thereby escape a static world of uniformity and finality.

Vetter delves deeply into her texts, but her language creates difficulties: Does the weaving metaphor have the power she attributes to it in the analyzed texts, or is it Vetter applying the weaving metaphor whenever she finds it a useful mode of expression? She becomes ensnared in her own language and falls into the familiar linguistic trope—as we all do—of saying that an author “weaves” points together. It is one thing when Lysistrata, making many references to the craft of weaving, proposes weaving as the solution to the Greeks’ problems. It is another thing for Vetter to say that Plato “weaves” when he “simultaneously ravel and unravels the . . . tapestry of ideas he . . . constructed by encouraging readers to relive the trial and death of Socrates” (pp. 129, 156). Here Vetter—not Plato—employs the metaphor. To describe Plato as “the supreme dialectical weaver” is to give life to a metaphor, not to analyze the metaphor. Describing Lysistrata’s bringing together Greek ambassadors as “her initial weaving” (p. 67) imposes Vetter’s language—not the ancient metaphor—on the comedy. Using the metaphor where Lysistrata does not, Vetter makes the problematic claim that Aristophanes would argue that “[w]omen form an important part of the dialectical process that should be at the heart of Athenian democracy,” thereby implying that “[w]hen any part of the conversation is silenced, everyone in the city suffers” (p. 66).

Vetter’s strengths surface when she analyzes Plato’s dialogues, remarking on how the dramatic elements and sequencing of the dialogue inform interpretations of characters’ speech, and when she develops the inadequacy of efforts to “conclude” a reading of the dialogues. But can we say that this Platonic openness is “unraveling” and “weaving” in anything more than metaphorical language? Has not Vetter now been trained by her texts to employ the metaphor?

The author frequently discusses commentaries that frame the chapters. She justifies this engagement as an effort to “weave,” preserving complexity by addressing others’ perspectives. This language illustrates the difficulties of the metaphor, but it also raises the question of what weaving accomplishes. Is weaving the *acknowledgment* of various perspectives as with Vetter’s attention to the secondary literature? Or is weaving the incorporation of opposing forces in the creation of something new? It is not always clear what weaving entails. On page 151, weaving is “balancing,” but balancing is not the same as engaging alternative discourses, nor is it the same as creating something new as does weaving when it creates a fabric. One of the difficulties with the metaphor throughout is that it is not clear what “new” thing is created for what purpose.

Vetter’s agenda is noble and her work is a contribution to renewed conversations about diversity drawing on the insights and imagery of classical texts. Fundamental to her

weaving is its capacity to unite complexity without losing the particularity of the threads out of which fabric is made. In her book, it is the particular readings that shine. The whole fabric, however, needs to be more taut before the ancient metaphor will have the “vast influence” that she envisions.

**The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility.** By David Vogel.

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 2005. 222p. \$28.95.

— Tom De Luca, *Fordham University*

Is there a “market for virtue”? If so, what can it do, and what can it not do to improve our world? In his incisive new book, David Vogel takes aim at these questions and the now-fashionable claim that there is a *business* case for corporate social responsibility (CSR). He concludes that there is no business case that can be generalized to all firms per se, but there is a political case for broadening what we mean by that much-used term.

Vogel begins by distinguishing the older notion of corporate responsibility that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s from the current version. In the older account, few expected social responsibility to help the corporate bottom line. In the newer version, firms do good to do well. He writes: “Virtually all contemporary writing on CSR emphasizes its links to corporate profitability” (p. 19).

Consider the example of socially responsible investing (SRI). When it was first politicized in the late 1960s, to “enable investors to reconcile their portfolios with their consciences,” there was no assumption “that a more ‘responsible’ portfolio would perform better or even as well as a less responsibly managed one.” Today, those advocating social investment “claim that it makes financial as well as moral sense” (p. 22). In general, advocates of CSR today feel they must “demonstrate, first, that behaving more responsibly is in the self-interest of *all* firms, and second, that CSR *always* makes business sense” (p. 34). There is *faith*—this is my word—in the premise that profit and social responsibility mutually enhance each other. The problem, Vogel finds, is that the evidence does not support the faith.

According to the author, “the consensus of the more than 100 studies of social investment funds and their strategies is that . . . share returns are neither harmed nor helped by including social criteria in stock selection” (p. 37). Some strong and well-positioned firms may be able to build *relatively* more responsible behavior into their business plan, and some firms in the nongovernmental organization (NGO) spotlight may do so to prevent being financially punished by anticorporate campaigns. Nevertheless, CSR costs money, a fact obscured in turn by the popularity of “the business case” and because CSR expenditures are quite low, falling “well within the limits of discretionary spending” (pp. 164–65). “*But if companies were more*



*virtuous*,” he writes, “*the costs of CSR would become much clearer*” (p. 166; author’s emphasis).

Vogel’s argument is a rebuke to those who want fat profits and easy consciences, too. His analysis is particularly sharp at questioning conventional assumptions. Does SRI portfolio prescreening, using normal financial criteria, remove companies that are socially superior but financially marginal, thereby giving a misleading impression of the financial viability of “socially responsible investing”? What constitutes a socially responsible company in the first place (pp. 39–40)? Yet Vogel is not a scold. The desire to build a business case for social responsibility in recent years, he argues, reflects the tightening constraints on corporations in today’s global investor capitalism, driven by financial markets, where shareholder value of necessity “has become a central objective of managers” (p. 26).

Vogel’s work is rich in detail, as he reviews the experiences of companies such as Nike, Ford, and Shell, social labels such as Rugmark, and NGO strategies like consumer boycotts and divestment. Consider some of his conclusions. Because coffee under the Fair Trade social label is comparable in price but not quality to specialty coffee, it struggles for market share, thereby limiting the impact of its business model. After four years of doubling in size, sales still constitute only 0.4 percent of global coffee purchases (p. 106). While some consumers will pay extra for products that provide tangible benefits, “few consumers are willing to internalize the environmental externalities of what they consume.” Globally, comparatively few voluntary codes govern corporate environmental practices (pp. 135–36). In the area of human rights, not even efforts by NGOs to point out to investors the business risks of investing in corrupt and repressive regimes have much traction (p. 160).

In order to prevent firms that want to act responsibly from being disadvantaged in the marketplace, compliance standards need to be raised for all. This can only be accomplished adequately by changes in public policy. Because the public policy positions the corporation takes “may well be “the most critical dimension of corporate responsibility,” Vogel concludes, “*the definition of corporate social responsibility needs to be redefined to include the responsibilities of business to strengthen civil society and the capacity of governments to require that all firms act more responsibly*” (p. 172; author’s emphasis).

Vogel situates his work in what he would like to appear to be the reasonable middle between critics on the right, such as Arthur Laffer, who argue that CSR is actually irresponsible to shareholders, as well as risk-averse, and those on the left, such as David Korten, who argue that profit-driven corporations are constrained from doing the right thing. Although there are important differences between them, Vogel’s appreciation of structural limitations to self-regulation—the weakness of the business case for CSR is one indication of those limits—and the central

role of government regulation are closer to analysts like Korten than he acknowledges.

Vogel’s rhetorical style, however, on occasion, clouds his actual position. He concludes his book by writing, for example: “Civil and government regulation both have a legitimate role to play in improving public welfare. The former reflects the potential of the market for virtue; the latter recognizes its limits” (p. 173). True enough. The fact remains for the author, however, that although civil regulation has done some good, and can do more, it has not and *cannot* come close to achieving the scope of changes he thinks necessary. For CSR to be really effective, the costs it engenders “need to be passed on to some combination of consumers, employees, and investors.” To accomplish that end, government must become more involved. *Because there is no business case for corporate social responsibility that is applicable to the corporate world in general, political means must be sought to achieve the objectives of decency, sustainability, and rights.* As Vogel trenchantly puts it, “The market for virtue does not clear” (p. 165).

If I am right to adjust the positioning of Vogel’s narrative, several questions follow him. Will efforts to include the political priorities of corporations within the definition of CSR meet fatal resistance from corporations? Were they to be included, what impact would they have in changing public policy as they run up against the constraining conditions of their consequences for profit and price that Vogel documents? Is it then necessary through policy changes, values, and political virtue to loosen the constraints that create binds for governments, corporations, and consumers in the first place? For example, should we simultaneously endeavor to ease the cycle of work, spend, and debt that Juliet Schor and others point to, and renegotiate international trade agreements to better incorporate worker, environmental, and rights standards?

What is a “market for virtue”? Virtue, after all, is by definition something you do simply because it is right. It is not a product and it is not for sale. Perhaps we should instead think about building a political and economic marketplace in which worker standards, environmental regard, and human rights protection have a far higher profile in democratic deliberation and decision making than they do today. This, I think, is Vogel’s real project. In engaging it with intelligence, precision, and craft, he has advanced significantly the debate on corporate social responsibility by setting the direction in which it needs to go.

**Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth.** By Robert B. Westbrook. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 272p. \$29.95.

— Peter T. Manicas, *University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa*

In this ambitious collection, Robert Westbrook aims to recover, from philosophical pragmatism, insight—and hope—regarding the promise of democracy. Following on

his *John Dewey and American Philosophy* (1991), Dewey is surely his main man. Part One, “Pragmatism Old,” offers critical discussions of Dewey, Charles Peirce and William James. Part Two, “Pragmatism New,” treats recent writers who have identified themselves with pragmatism, including Hilary Putnam, Cheryl Misak, Cornel West, and Richard Posner. Richard Rorty is surely the main character in these accounts.

Indeed, it seems that the motivation for this volume is very much a matter of Rorty’s influence in the “rediscovery” of pragmatism, and especially of Dewey. But this has its problems. Fundamentally, Rorty gets to set the context for the discussion. In the case of Dewey, this is especially troublesome, not merely because Rorty’s pragmatism is far removed from Dewey’s—as Westbrook sees—but because any proper understanding of Dewey requires that we acknowledge how radical was his effort to reconstruct philosophy. Mainstream philosophy is still almost entirely unaware of this, which is doubly ironic since rejection of the modern problem of epistemology was the one feature that Rorty shared with Dewey—even if Rorty’s “reconstruction” was much more in the form of destruction. As R. W. Sleeper well put the matter: “We must amend Rorty’s observation that Dewey was ‘waiting at the end of the dialectical road which analytic philosophy traveled’ by the observation that Dewey was trying to block that road from its beginning” (*The Necessity of Pragmatism*, 1996, p. 5). Put simply, Dewey aimed to replace both epistemology and metaphysics, as these are conceived, with a naturalistic “logic of inquiry,” which amounted to a wholesale attack on the philosophical uses of Bertrand Russell’s logic and the entire program of what became analytic philosophy. Failing to see what Dewey was up to, mainstream writers offer well-intentioned appeals to “experimental method,” “scientific communities,” “instrumentalist [*sic*] logic,” and “free inquiry.” Indeed, one suspects that they would agree with Alan Ryan’s assessment that Dewey’s *Logic* is “vast and somewhat baffling” (*John Dewey and the High Tide of Liberalism*, 1995).

The importance of this failure surfaces in what is the main concern of *Democratic Hope*: that Rorty is wrong in claiming that the pragmatists and postmodernists are distinguished by “the Americans’ unjustifiable social hope and ungroundable but vital sense of human solidarity” (p. 6). Presumably, “epistemological” grounds are available: The pragmatist’s “low-profile conception of truth” and “truth-apt character of moral and political beliefs” (p. 196) provides a “bridge” between “epistemic” and “deliberative democracy” where persons engage one another not merely as citizens but as pragmatists (p. 239).

There are two problems with this approach. First, Westbrook sees that Dewey did not offer any sort of “argument” for this bridge. But presumably, the arguments of Misak and Putman are arguments that Dewey could have made (p. 180). Part of the problem is that having rejected

the skeptical challenge of traditional epistemology, he saw no need for such a bridge. But since efforts were misunderstood, academic philosophers can still feel a need to respond to skepticisms, epistemic and moral. Dewey would not have been pleased with Rorty, but he would not have been pleased either to see that mainstream academics, despite good intentions, remain committed to the problems of philosophy. There are, we may note, philosophers working well within a Deweyan frame who are not engaged in this volume.

Indeed, one might insist that in today’s very undemocratic world, it is at least misleading to focus on “an epistemological justification of democracy” (p. 176). Of course, even the weakest forms of “democracy”—“liberal republics”—require free speech and access to pertinent information, but Dewey would have been puzzled by the idea that democratic hope is enabled by thinking of the institutions of radical democracy as engaged in “a quest for truth.” If anything, democracy is a quest for accountability, possible only with the active participation of citizens. Indeed, the far more problematic relation between Dewey’s philosophy of democracy and his theory of inquiry is whether, as C. Wright Mills noticed, he too often optimistically supposed that the conditions that forbid democracy could, in an undemocratic world, be overcome with persistent application of the method of intelligence.

Second, Dewey had all sorts of arguments for the genuine political problem of democracy: that citizens know best when the shoe pinches; that participation is essential to growth; but most critically (agreeing with Rousseau and Marx), that since interdependence makes possible domination, exploitation, and alienation, “the only possible solution” is “the perfecting of the means and ways of communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interests in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action.” Of course, neither Marx nor Dewey offered much direction about how this would look.

Still, for Dewey, democratic hope depends upon “community as a fact” and upon acknowledgment of the needs and capacities of persons living interdependently. Of course, as he well recognized, the conditions that make democracy possible are not easily achievable; but given what we know, they are not impossible.

Do these conditions include socialism? Westbrook has considerable sympathy for American “producer-republicanism,” with its emphasis on the “independence” of “yeoman farmers and skilled artisans” (p. 83). Indeed, for him, “the best of American radicalism has always marched under a ‘petty bourgeois banner’” (p. 210). Less contestably, he suggests also that Dewey would never “lose touch with the essential promise of producerism” and that this explains why he was “such a peculiar socialist” (p. 98).

This perspective especially informs Chapter 5, “Marrying Marxism,” a chapter that raises serious problems. While many pages would be necessary to engage this discussion, the central issue regards the current pertinence, if any, of both of two historically bankrupt visions: American producer-republicanism, *and* a Marxism still indebted to its 2d International genesis. Dewey may well have been nostalgic (again, as Mills argues), even if his arguments against the Marxism of his day were penetrating. But if so, perhaps one needs to exploit the deep affinities between Marx and Dewey. Cornel West is on the right track here, whatever misgivings one might have regarding the “prophetic” dimensions of his thought.

**In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument.** Collected essays by Bernard Williams, edited by Geoffrey Hawthorn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005. 196p. \$29.95.

— Richard E. Flathman, *Johns Hopkins University*

As the editor reminds us, until the early eighties Bernard Williams’s very strong reputation was primarily as a moral philosopher (albeit he also contributed valuable work in epistemology). It was clear, however, that his views had important implications for politics and political theory (no more so than in the superb essay “The Idea of Equality,” the one earlier essay reprinted in this collection). And beginning in the eighties, perhaps influenced by his friendship with Isaiah Berlin and the influence of the latter upon his thinking, Williams focused his thinking increasingly both on quite practical politics and on major issues in political theory. His interest in moral questions never waned, but his reflections concerning them almost always made connections to political and/or political theoretical issues.

The essays collected in this volume range over a wide variety of topics, including liberalism, pluralism, legitimation, freedom/liberty, relations between liberty and equality, toleration, censorship, rights—including the right to intervene in the lives of other people and peoples—and the place of truth in politics. Several themes run through the collection. One of these is a tempered skepticism, particularly concerning the reach and efficacy of theoretical constructions, whether political theoretical or more generally philosophical, a theme that Williams developed at length in his earlier *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (1985). This theme partly informs the “realism” of the book’s subtitle and also the “In the beginning was the deed” in the main title. Throughout the essays, Williams is concerned with maintaining close contact with the actions that agents take in political life and the conditions that influence those actions: “[P]olitical projects are essentially conditioned, not just in their background intellectual conditions but as a matter of empirical realism, by their historical circumstances. Utopian thought is not necessarily frivolous, but

the nearer political thought gets to action, as in the concrete affirmation of human rights, the more likely it is to be frivolous if it is utopian (p. 25). Williams is not quite a praxis theorist à la Herbert Marcuse or Jürgen Habermas, but in this respect his views have an affinity with theirs.

A second, related, theme concerns the notions of legitimacy and legitimation (LEG) and their relations with coercion, censorship, and human rights in “modern” societies. Williams acknowledges that a number of premodern polities that were neither liberal nor democratic could claim legitimacy in the sense that they were able, justifiably in the view of many of their subjects, to demand, including through coercion if necessary, the obedience to their laws and commands. But he argues that in modern societies, liberalism in one or more of its many formulations and “some kind of democracy, participatory politics at some level, is a feature of LEG for the modern world” (p. 15). Picking up on the previous theme, he argues, however, that theory cannot itself identify or determine the exact configuration of either liberalism or democracy appropriate to any particular polity. LEG is a “progressive project,” and “how much more” of either liberalism or democracy is “actually possible seems to me a question that belongs to level of fact, practice and politics, not one that lies beyond these in the very conditions of legitimacy” (p. 17).

With regard to LEG in modern states, Williams introduces what he calls the “critical theory principle” (p. 14). This principle “targets” the accepted social and institutional understandings on which legitimacy is based. Together with his rejection of the sweeping claims for legitimacy advanced by Rousseau and Hegel and his argument that Wittgenstein’s thinking does not support a conservative attitude toward established arrangements (Chapter 3) he makes it clear that he is not an unqualified enthusiast or apologist for legitimacy and state authority. But he regards anarchism—and presumably any very robust antinomianism—as an irrelevancy or perhaps a distraction. This is consistent with his skepticism concerning utopianism, but in this reviewer’s view, it does load both the theoretical and practical dice too heavily in favor of state authority. As J. S. Mill argued, and as experience with the current Bush administration in the United States indicates, governments confident of their legitimacy may become too prone to impose their preferences and their will in harmful ways.

Turning to liberalism, Williams’s version of this multi-colored ideology is a combination of Berlinian pluralism and Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear (see esp. Chapter 5), together with a conception of basic human rights strongly reminiscent of Hobbes and Constant. He agrees with Shklar that the greatest evils are violence, coercion, physical suffering, and cruelty, that effective protections against these evils are the most important and least disputable of rights, and that governments, while necessary in order to enjoy

these rights, have historically been the worst violators of them. Particular modern, legitimate governments may accord and enforce further rights, but this will be a matter of local history, values, and politics, and convincing generalizations concerning them are hard to come by. In this reviewer's judgment, these views warrant our acceptance.

It is also easy to agree with Williams's critique of various alternative versions of liberalism, particularly his opposition to autonomy-based theories such as Carlos Nino's (Chapter 2) and Thomas Nagel's (Chapters 2 and 6), strong rights-oriented theories such as Ronald Dworkin's (esp. Chapter 7), and aspects of John Rawls's "political liberalism." The several essays present potent objections to these forms of liberalism, but perhaps the author's most general objection to them is that they fail adequately to make contact with political realities.

The chapters on toleration, censorship, and humanitarian intervention (10, 11, and 12) offer closely argued and quite restricted construals of these notions, construals that I find to be improvements on the abundant literatures on these topics. The final chapter, on "Truth, Politics and Self-Deception," which presents the core of Williams's argument in *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy* (2002), features a distinction between sincerity and accuracy and argues that taken together, they demonstrate that both truth and truthfulness are essential elements in a decent politics. It is no doubt the case that the question of accuracy is important in many circumstances, but given the difficulties, in many domains, of establishing accuracy or even of deploying the concept in meaningful ways, sincerity seems to me to be the politically more important of these ideas.

Characteristically, all of the essays are closely argued, elegantly written, and strongly engaging. The book is a welcome addition to the literatures on the many issues it addresses.

### Political Exclusion and Domination: Nomos XLVI.

Edited by Melissa S. Williams and Stephen Macedo. New York: New York University Press, 2005. 400p. \$55.00.

— Roberto Alejandro-Rivera, *University of Massachusetts at Amherst*

This book is a collection of 14 essays dedicated to John Rawls, and all of them fit perfectly with the overriding concern with justice that lies at the core of Rawlsian theory. My review concentrates on some of these essays.

Danielle Allen opens the collection with "Invisible Citizens: Political Exclusion and Domination in Arendt and Ellison." It offers a rigorous account of Hannah Arendt's and Ralph Ellison's views of justice and citizenship during an important moment of the Civil Rights movement. Arendt criticized the struggle against segregation as one that was self-interested and unheroic. Parents, in her assessment, used their children as shields to promote their social advancement without exposing themselves. Ellison, by con-

trast, understood what Arendt did not. For him, the parents "suffered the abuse of their children . . . to help assure that the law worked," and they wanted "to render functional a legal system that had rejected segregation" (p. 39).

Ellison's view of American democracy presupposes that working from within the system of rights will force a moral crisis upon the dominators. According to Allen, "[f]rom Ellison's perspective, *the central question* for an effort to craft new citizenly techniques, then, is *how to integrate* into one citizenship the healthy political habits of *both the dominators and the dominated*" (p. 59; my emphasis). One aspect of Allen's discussion is particularly distressing. Her emphasis is on the sacrifices that *the dominated* must make and the extra mile they must walk. It is they who must render "functional" a legal system. It is not until the end of her essay that she expresses the hope that the dominators may begin to envision a new conception of a free people (p. 61). It is not clear why the onus and the burdens fall on the dominated. It is even less clear how long the dominated should continue hoping that the inherent ethical principles of American democracy will take them into account.

While Allen addresses the context of the dominated, Philip Pettit presents an abstract and elegant model of liberty whose intellectual roots he finds in the republican tradition. Pettit's main goal is to achieve nondomination, which he sees as "one of the central ideals in politics, if not the supreme political ideal" (p. 114). "An agent is dominated . . . to the extent that a group or individual is in a position to interfere arbitrarily in his or her affairs," he argues. Arbitrary interference is defined as an "accessible and uncostly" action that "worsens an individual's choice situation" (p. 93).

Pettit has in mind a society whose "citizens or members" answer "to interests they avow or are disposed to avow" (p. 88). But this assumption needs to address a prior question: Who or what disposes them to avow some interests? Better still, why are they disposed to avow some interests and not others? Likewise, though arbitrary interference "intentionally worsens an individual's choice situation . . . *contextual conventions and expectations* may be involved in determining whether a certain act *counts* as a way of worsening that situation" (p. 93; my emphasis).

Once these issues are introduced into the model, the ideal of nondomination loses its categorical character and becomes entangled in a circular reasoning. If my society socializes me to treat the salvation of my soul as my overriding goal, and to respect the wisdom embodied in a religious establishment that is linked to the state, I will very likely entertain doubts about the centrality of freedom of conscience. Furthermore, I will prefer the arbitrary interference of the state in my "choice situation." This interference will limit my choice of beliefs but will save my skin and spirit from eternal burning. It follows that I am not dominated. In one reading of Pettit's arguments, I am not dominated because my acceptance of the



state interference takes away its arbitrary character. On another reading, however, I am dominated because my choice situation has been tampered with. This essay does not clarify the relationship between the context and the idea of nondomination. Which aspect is more important: the individual's range of options to choose from or the context that determines that my choice situation has been worsened?

While Pettit is confident that by following his theoretical paradigm, the state's arbitrary interference in people's lives will not be significant, James Tully adopts a refreshing attitude of suspicion not only toward the liberal state but, equally important, toward its theoretical underpinnings. Tully invites us to adopt an "agonistic" perspective, to acknowledge the economic and social inequalities spawned by a global economy, and to reassess the way we conceive of and practice political theory. He defends a view of legitimacy and freedom in which citizens will deliberate about, and agree upon, the legal principles regulating their behavior and the state's policies, but these principles should be subjected to the citizens' scrutiny. Tully writes: "The contestable character of constitutional democracy should not be seen as a flaw that has to be overcome" (p. 208). An endless conversation follows.

Michael Blake responds along the predictable lines of liberal theory. In certain cases, he argues, it is precisely the removal of some principles from deliberation that makes it possible to have any discussion in the first place. As an example, he mentions the examples of vitriolic views that call for the extermination of homosexuals or Jews. When the dignity of all people is treated as something settled, sexual, ethnic, and racial minorities have the opportunity to be part of any democratic deliberation. Blake is right.

Yet the validity of Blake's argument does not need to rely on the settlement of views. This is so because an agonistic democracy depends on three principles that

demand an antecedent framework of individual rights that, so far, are best guaranteed by constitutional democracies. These principles are pluralism, contestability, and deliberation. There must be deliberation because people hold a plurality of different and conflicting views. And the deliberation must be constant because the political agreements are fated to be contestable, a contestability that extends to the way people see their own identity.

In other words, agonism itself relies upon certain normative premises. Tully does not seem to be aware that this is similar to the Rawlsian demand that public deliberations about justice must only include "reasonable" persons, that is, people who are already convinced or willing to accept "justice as fairness" as the principal virtue of both public institutions and their moral character.

All the essays in this volume mention, with different degrees of insistence, the importance of solidarity and communality within a constitutional order that protects human dignity through a system of rights. This insistence invites reflection on two issues. First, after more than two centuries in which liberalism has advanced as a theory and fountain of public policies, liberal societies keep reproducing structures of social and economic inequalities. Second, liberalism still presents itself as a utopia. The first issue provokes the question of whether there is something intrinsic in the liberal order that fosters different forms of domination. The second issue suggests questions of a quite different kind. Is liberalism still moved by a utopian impetus because liberal principles carry an inherent strength? Or is this utopian impetus a disguise to cope with an exhausted paradigm? This volume provides grounds for these interrogations. But more importantly, it brings to the forefront the hope of articulating theories and practices for a world in which the presence of domination and exclusion is so insidious. Granted, it is a fragile hope, but it is still a hope.

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## AMERICAN POLITICS

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**Fluid Borders: Latino Power, Identity, and Politics in Los Angeles.** By Lisa García Bedolla. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. 278p. \$21.95.

— José E. Cruz, *University at Albany, State University of New York*

In 1994, Lisa García Bedolla wondered about the impact on Latino political attitudes and activity of Latino participation in the campaign on Proposition 187. Would the young people who participated be more likely to be politically engaged later on? Would their involvement change their feelings of identity and efficacy? These questions drove her study of the political engagement of Latino immigrants and their children, which she conducted by com-

paring the political attitudes and behavior of Latinos involved in the campaign in two areas of Los Angeles County: East Los Angeles and Montebello, a working-class and middle-class majority Latino area, respectively.

Now García Bedolla tells us that efficacy is causally related to identity and that Latino political engagement is inversely related to feelings of stigma associated with group membership. This means that the presence of an affective attachment toward Latinos as a group, which she calls psychological capital, and of political opportunities and resources, dubbed contextual capital in the book, will enhance feelings of agency and political engagement on the part of Latino individuals, regardless of socioeconomic status.

*Fluid Borders* is based on 100 in-depth, semistructured interviews conducted during the summer of 1996 and

winter of 1996–97—half of them with high school seniors and the other half with adult school students. Using content analysis, García Bedolla produces a portrait of relations between immigrant and native-born Latinos and an analysis of electoral and nonelectoral participation, all in the context of a racialized environment during the 1990s, which she traces back to developments after the conclusion of the Mexican American War of 1846. She suggests that the anti-Latino political climate in California during the 1990s was largely a reflection of the historical experiences of Latinos in the state and finds that as a result of perceptions of stigma, many U.S.-born Latinos selectively dissociate themselves from Latino immigrants. According to the author, Latina women are more likely to participate politically than Latino men, and descriptive representation does not seem to have much of an impact on how Latinos respond to their political environment. She also finds that the more optimistic and politically engaged Latinos place a greater emphasis on self-help solutions, to community problems, while the more pessimistic and less politically engaged prefer governmental solutions even though their level of trust in government is low.

How is her concept of psychological capital different from Michael Dawson's concept of linked fate (*Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*, 1994)? According to García Bedolla, while Dawson sees linked fate as a connection between individual and group fortunes, she understands psychological capital as a similar connection that is regulated by the individual's assessment of the group's worthiness. Thus, group consciousness without a sense of group worthiness, she claims, is less likely to produce political engagement. She also expands on the concept of social capital by arguing that not all forms of membership are functionally equivalent. Here she takes on Robert Putnam (*Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, 2000), who focuses on associational involvement in general to determine levels of social capital. She finds that for Latinos in her sample, ethnic organizing, even when purely social or cultural, has greater significance for social capital than other forms of organization.

This book is rich with descriptive detail and insightful analysis. The author skillfully uses primary and secondary sources to describe how the experience of stigma combines with contextual factors to produce specific forms of political engagement. More importantly, on the basis of her findings, she formulates a strategy to increase political engagement based on the promotion of "positive group attachment, politicized social networks, and community-level organization" (p. 183). In her view, this will result in a more inclusive politics.

García Bedolla displays formidable analytical skills, theoretical sophistication, and superior scholarship, but her analysis is not without some flaws. Some conceptualizations are suspect, like blurring the distinction between

Latino social networks and the context in which they emerge or justifying a broad concept of politics with the argument that the separation of public and private arenas is artificial. She recognizes that generalizing from one case study is a problem, but instead of addressing it, she changes the subject and talks about the issue of validity. She claims that her study provides insights for Latino politics because it confirms the findings of previous studies. But this is a curious way of arguing that the causal connection between affective attachment and political engagement works for Latinos as a whole. The claim is doubtful given that 83% of her respondents were Mexican, 56% were between 15 and 19 years of age, and the majority were full-time students. In contrast, in 1990, Mexicans were 60% of Latinos; in 1995, only 8.4% of Latinos were between 15 and 19, and only 49% of Latinos between 3 and 34 years of age were enrolled in school in 1994.

Thus, beyond the study's sample, the finding concerning affective attachment is important but as an interesting hypothesis in need of exploration. One particular aspect that is worthy of further examination concerns the conditions under which affective attachment may increase the level of political engagement in electoral activities. This is important because political incorporation will be limited if, as it is true of García Bedolla's sample, a positive group attachment only increases political engagement in Latino-centered nonelectoral activities.

In the concluding chapter, García Bedolla suggests that positive feelings about the efficacy of nonelectoral activity may mean more political engagement by men from East Los Angeles. From that she infers the possibility of greater political participation by Latinos in general, both electoral and nonelectoral. From the finding on the effect of positive affective attachment on political engagement in East Los Angeles she suggests similar effects in Montebello under similar conditions, as well as for marginal groups in general. These are reasonable hypotheses and the basis of a worthy research agenda. Overall, this is an excellent book that should be useful for graduate and upper-level undergraduate courses both as a methodological exemplar and for its rigorous and thoughtful analysis.

**The Geography of Opportunity: Race and Housing Choice in Metropolitan America.** Edited by Xavier de Souza Briggs. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2005. 353p. \$29.95.

**The Social Medicine Reader: Health Policy, Markets, and Medicine.** 2d ed. Edited by Jonathan Oberlander, Larry R. Churchill, Susan E. Estroff, Gail E. Henderson, Nancy M. P. King, and Ronald P. Strauss. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. 288p. \$22.95.

— Sanford F. Schram, *Bryn Mawr College*

These two books, each in its own way, provide much-needed resources for thinking about how public policies should change to address the latest developments associated with the enduring problem of unequal access to basic

resources in U.S. society, including housing and health care. In recent years, unequal access to affordable and decent housing and uneven access to affordable and decent health care both have taken on new features posing new challenges for participants in the public policymaking process. *The Geography of Opportunity*, edited by Xavier de Souza Briggs, brings together a set of richly detailed essays that look at the housing disparity problem from the increasingly popular perspective of regionalism; and *The Social Medicine Reader*, edited by Jonathan Oberlander and colleagues, offers an equally informative group of essays that range more widely to address a variety of issues concerning the changed landscape of health care in the United States today. Both books are likely to prove to be critical resources for energizing renewed efforts to make policy less exclusionary in each area.

As William Julius Wilson highlights in his Foreword to *The Geography of Opportunity*, the persistent trends toward uneven development in metropolitan areas serve only to exacerbate racial and ethnic inequalities now that with the dawn of the twenty-first century, non-Hispanic whites for the first time are not a majority of the population of the largest 100 cities in the United States. Wilson agrees with the contributors to the book that a regional perspective now takes on a renewed sense of urgency, especially since the federal government has become decreasingly interested in funding housing development. Briggs's introduction underscores how far, in fact, federal as well as state and local housing policy has fallen away from the goal of promoting more inclusionary development in the metropolis. Briggs is not overstating the case, it seems, when he bluntly notes that racial and ethnic segregation has been removed from the policy agenda. It is no longer even an actively monitored issue that most policymakers feel the need to address. Things have changed radically. He notes that the volume is designed to help put that issue back on the agenda. And the chapters in this book provide a mass of information to help make that case.

The essays in the book are presented in four parts. The first set examines the role of discrimination in housing choice as affected by the actions of buyers, sellers, lenders, realtors, and just about anyone else who has anything to do with how residents come to live in one place or another in the metropolis. A really interesting issue is raised when Camille Zabrinzky Charles introduces the concept of "racial comfort zone," which implies that a significant number of residents choose location on highly racialized grounds that are not necessarily tied to explicitly racist attitudes as much as a preference for protecting the privileges associated with being white. Yet this distinction does not amount to much for Charles because it still ends up reinforcing racial segregation and all the problems associated with it. Race and place are still highly imbricated with each other, even if public policy has given up on doing much about it or its deleterious consequences. In other words, the problem is

not so much necessarily whether there are still the same levels of explicit racism operating in white society, though there are reasons to think that attitudinal surveys showing declines on this score need to be treated with at least a bit of skepticism. Instead, the issue is that racial segregation is still a significant preference point for many residents in the metropolis even if they do not hold explicitly racist attitudes. And therefore, correspondingly, the negative consequences of racial segregation, as in uneven access to basic resources like schools and jobs, are also still very much a major problem regardless of whether there is less racism in post-Civil Rights America.

The second set of essays reviews findings on the limited initiatives in place to help promote economic and racial integration in housing. John Goering's piece on the multi-site, experimental, demonstration project Moving to Opportunity (MTO) underscores both its importance, given the failure of public policy to promote development in poor inner-city neighborhoods, and its lack of positive results according to the extant research. While the research indicates that MTO can lead to improved social and economic well-being for the participants who get to move from racially segregated, low-income, inner neighborhoods, suburbs have often proven reluctant to participate, and not enough research is being done to understand which communities would be more receptive and how less-receptive communities could become more so. The third set of essays addresses the issues of coalition politics, especially when trying to devise regional solutions to racial segregation. The Twin Cities comes in for intensive analysis in the essay by Edward Goetz, Karen Chapple, and Barbara Lukermann, as well as the essay by Mara Sidney. The first highlights how the Twin Cities Metropolitan Housing Council in the 1970s was innovative but eventually failed to fight effectively segregationist housing patterns because it lacked both enough funding and enforcement power. The Sidney essay highlights how more recent developments in the Twin Cities to promote more affordable housing in the suburbs has floundered on the shoals of the racial issue because it failed to take that on explicitly. The two concluding essays drive home the point that racial segregation is highly institutionalized in housing policy and practices in the United States today, and that requires a broad coalition of diverse actors if effective change is to come about. Whether the result of a deep reservoir of persistent racism or an artifact of how racial disparities result from a failure to revise institutional practices, the deleterious consequences of racial and ethnic segregation continue to create some of the most significant social problems of our society.

*The Social Medicine Reader* is based on readings assigned in the interdisciplinary seminar Medicine and Society required of all first-year medical students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The course has been taught since 1978 and this volume under review is the

second edition of the third volume of the reader. This volume emphasizes the controversies in health policy. It is great to know that future doctors are reading this book. It ought to be required of all medical students. If it were, it is likely that a majority of doctors would have been pushing for national health insurance a long time ago. While the readings cover many issues, from rationing to managed care, to queuing for donated organs for transplants, to the intergenerational conflicts over health-care financing, an underlying theme is that while our highly privatized system of entrepreneurial medicine may lead to great innovations and wonderful care for those who can afford it, it also increasingly fails to ensure equitable access to quality health care and does so in ways that pose increasing risks for the well-being of our society overall. In her excellent chapter on managed care, Deborah Stone writes: "If we want compassionate medical care, we have to structure both medical care and health insurance both to inspire compassion. We must find a way, as other countries have, to insure everybody on relatively equal terms, and thus divorce clinical decisions from the patient's pocketbook and the doctor's personal profit. . . . There is no perfect way to reconcile cost containment with clinical autonomy, but surely, converting the doctor into an entrepreneur is the most perverse strategy yet attempted" (p. 17).

Although the book poses a variety of issues on how the health-care system in the United States operates in less than equitable ways, it is basically silent on the racial implications of uneven access. For instance, there is growing appreciation that even the issue of organ donor disparities is racialized in part due to a failure to reach out to and serve nonwhite communities, making donor matches based on blood type harder for some groups. This and other issues of racial disparities in health care need to be discussed in a volume like this, or future doctors will be at risk of not learning about the role of race in creating and perpetuating many of the most important issues of inequitable access and treatment in health care.

Taking these books together, we can see how race and class are seriously entwined in the United States in ways that political scientists have yet to fully comprehend. Through its examination of the persistence of housing segregation, *The Geography of Opportunity* highlights how many whites participate in housing markets in ways that underscore their fear of losing the class benefits associated with being white; and *The Social Medicine Reader* by implication can be used to show how many nonwhites are disadvantaged in accessing health care because of their low class position in our society. And what is true for housing and health care is also probably true for education and jobs and other critical resources. The challenge is to talk about the intersections of race and class and how they help create systematic inequities in access to the major social goods people need to thrive in the United States today.

### **Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court Nominating Process.**

By Richard Davis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 211p. \$28.00.

— Peter G. Renstrom, *Western Michigan University*

Richard Davis could not have produced his examination of the Supreme Court nominating process at a better time. The book was released just prior to the announced retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the death of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist—the first vacancies on the Supreme Court in 11 years.

Davis is not the first to critique the Supreme Court selection process, but he is one of the few to offer possible remedies. Before proceeding to the aspects of the process needing repair, he provides useful historical background, beginning with the constitutionally mandated process participants, the president and the Senate. These are the "internal players." Over the years, others have come to play roles in support of the president and Senate, such as the attorney general, others within the administration (particularly in the Department of Justice), the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the committee's staff and counsel. The author's discussion of these actors corresponds closely to those typically represented in the literature.

Davis contends that the process has undergone significant changes over the last half century as "external players," those not enumerated in the Constitution, now play an important if not decisive role in selecting Supreme Court justices. These external players are interest groups, the media, and the public. Davis contends that the current selection process is a "hybrid," whereby the constitutional provisions that favor elites (presidents selected by the college of electors and Senate members selected by state legislatures) intersect with the current realities of external participants having substantial impact on selection process outcomes.

Davis argues that the selection process began taking on its current character relatively recently, but he acknowledges that the nominations of Louis D. Brandeis (1916) and John J. Parker (1930) foreshadowed process change. While organized labor figured prominently in the defeat of Parker, interest groups did not appear frequently or extensively until the late 1960s. Twelve interest groups participated in the Senate hearings on Judge Clement Haynsworth in 1969, and group representation has since become a "staple" of Judiciary Committee hearings.

The media and the public are also late-entry external players. The media not only cover prospective Supreme Court nominees, as they do candidates for elective office, but they often investigate prospective nominees more extensively than the Senate does. One reason the external players have been able to wedge themselves into the process is because it has been "elongated"; data show that the time from a vacancy through Senate action has increased on average from less than three days during the first two



decades of the Republic to around three months currently. The external players not only take advantage of the longer process but in some respects are also responsible for lengthening it.

Davis reviews the generally accepted presidential selection criteria and offers comments that are relevant currently. He suggests, for example, that efforts to place friends (i.e., cronies) on the Court, a relatively common practice well into the twentieth century, have decreased. He argues that attempts to nominate friends are high risk, especially for a president with diminished political standing. The failed nomination of Bush White House Counsel Harriet E. Miers underscores the point—proximity to a weakened president can be a liability for the nominee and also have repercussions for the nominating president. Nominees closely associated with a president may be viewed as extensions of that president, as well as diminishing the perception of judicial independence.

The author's discussion of representativeness is similarly timely. A president's constituencies can be defined in a variety of ways. Clearly, solidifying a president's political base with a nomination is an ongoing priority, which George W. Bush addressed with his nomination of Samuel Alito. Ethnicity and gender were also forefront in considering replacements for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justice O'Connor. The withdrawal of Miers clearly changed the gender calculus, but gender was a substantial consideration in the selection of Miers, with several other women reportedly on Bush's short list. Considerations of ethnicity, particularly pressure for a Hispanic nominee, were also evident recently.

Court nominations have become media-oriented presentations. Increasingly, the nomination process is about creating and controlling image or media-oriented presentations. The White House is the primary image maker, and confirmation strategies can be damaged if others set or change images. A president who ignores the need for a "story" or nominates someone with well-known ideological views does so at his peril. The image must conform to public expectations and minimize the appearance of political factors. The nomination stage is no longer the exclusive domain of the internal players. Similarly, the Senate's review function is defective. The hearings are too lengthy and repetitive, and they invite evasive responses by nominees. The hearings have deteriorated into exchanges designed for interest group satisfaction or public consumption. These problems can be addressed by the internal players without constitutional change. But Davis proposes more fundamental changes. Previously proposed reforms aim at drawing the process inward—back toward the internal players. A better approach, in his view, is to legitimize and expand the participation of the external players. Davis suggests that the public vote on federal judges, as many do with state judgeships. Such a plebiscite would follow Senate review of all nominees. Turnover on

the Supreme Court would also be assured if justices were limited to a single term of 18 years.

Davis's reform proposals are controversial, to say the least. While adoption is unlikely, his discussion is very thought provoking. This subject occupies center stage at the moment, and *Electing Justice* ought to stimulate productive debate in classrooms and elsewhere. The author makes a strong case despite underplaying events that could strengthen his discussion. He contends that the selection process has been undergoing changes over the last 50 years, but largely ignores events surrounding Justice Abe Fortas in the late 1960s. Fortas was nominated to replace Earl Warren as chief justice in 1968, and when Fortas left the Court the following year, it took President Richard Nixon three tries to fill the vacancy. This period was as revealing as the Robert Bork episode. It was also the period of Watergate. Significant political changes stemmed from Watergate and generally affected political processes, including Supreme Court selection. This period falls within the 50-year period Davis features, and his analysis would have been enhanced by treating it more fully. That being said, he has produced a valuable review of this vitally important process.

**Liars! Cheaters! Evildoers! Demonization and the End of Civil Debate in American Politics.** By Tom De

Luca and John Buell. New York: New York University Press, 2005. 228p. \$60.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

— Robert L. Ivie, *Indiana University, Bloomington*

This is a book that looks toward achieving a democracy without demons—a more inclusive, respectful, egalitarian, participatory, and just political covenant—by examining the current proliferation of demonizing rhetoric in the United States as indicative of a dangerous and divisive moral paradox. America's moral paradox, according to Tom De Luca and John Buell, is a deeply rooted dilemma of two fundamentalisms—social "Puritanism" versus material "hedonism"—that must be negotiated with care if we are to avoid projecting hidden fears and forbidden desires onto "despised others" (pp. 48–49). Each pole of the paradox exists in every American, but when one pole begins to dominate, the desire to displace anxiety onto others begins to swell.

In an important sense, this book about political scapegoating is a call to community that respects individualism, identity, and difference. It nudges the likes of Jean Elshtain (*Democracy on Trial*, 1995) to stress not only the responsibility of citizens but also the right to participation by citizens who have been denied equality. True to their own sense of balance, the authors also call on theorists of inclusion, such as Iris Marion Young (*Inclusion and Democracy*, 2002), to recognize that widespread participation requires broadly shared commitments to "universals" or "common goods" such as "quality education, voting rights,

information access, and economic opportunities” (p. 188). Similarly, De Luca and Buell observe that Bonnie Honig’s insightful warning against xenophobic reactions to foreigners (*Democracy and the Foreigner*, 2001) is helpful for understanding problematic patterns of solidarity and American exceptionalism but does not erase the basic moral paradox of American politics.

To achieve a politics of equality embedded in a strong constitutional protection of rights will require a project of reform that mitigates the strong motive to demonize. Thus, the authors call for a program of change that will yield a “new political covenant” (p. 168), wherein political discourse shifts from rancorous wedge issues to quality-of-life concerns, from divisive rights claims to “a balance of self-interest and society’s interests” (p. 170). This is the attitude and aim that drives the book’s analysis and critique of the polarizing discourse that dominates American politics. The book explores a deep divide in which inequalities have increased considerably, political participation has decreased noticeably, the influence of money and media in politics has risen remarkably, and professionalized public interest organizations have become progressively more removed from their membership. War, as demonstrated by Michael Sherry’s *In the Shadow War: The United States since the 1930s* (1995), has become the dominant metaphor of contemporary American politics, a rhetoric that the authors recognize is “both cause and consequence of an ever less vital democratic process” (p. 88). Thus, political demonization, which reduces difference to deviance and evil, is as common to fighting culture wars at home as terrorism abroad.

Speaking of terror and terrorism, the authors do not duck the issue of evil. They do not excuse the deliberate killing of innocent people for political purposes or consider such terror anything less than evil. They argue instead that the charge of evil should not be made lightly and must be held to a high standard of public argument. To wrongly charge another with being or abetting evil is “the most reprehensible form of demonization” (p. 103). Accordingly, the Bush administration’s undifferentiated “war” on terrorism is regarded as problematic because it criminalizes legitimate dissent, threatens civil liberties, and undermines healthy dialogue among citizens, between citizens and their government, and between the United States and foreign governments. The Manichean logic of contemporary American political culture has been manipulated to conflate the war on terror with the ongoing culture wars at the expense of effective problem solving and to the detriment of public health and safety. At the moment we most need to understand an opponent’s or enemy’s thoughts and motives in order to respond appropriately and effectively, we fall prey to the rhetoric of caricature instead.

Demonizing rhetoric is more than just a symptom or effect of the degraded state of American politics. It has its own dynamic, according to De Luca and Buell, that dimin-

ishes democracy by deepening partisanship, exacerbating polarization, stifling dissent and dialogue, and distracting the public from structural inequities by focusing on the politics of character. They argue that demonizing discourse, as distinct from reflective criticism or careful moral censure, is a sustained effort to stigmatize individuals or groups for illicit gain or even self-righteous purpose. Demonization attributes evil or depravity to others, represents them as acting immorally, and does so without adequate inquiry, evidence, or justification. It “weakens our ability to deliberate in the most interesting and creative ways for the purpose of improving the quality of our lives” (p. 4). Both the political Left and the Right engage in demonizing discourse that constructs enemies rather than interlocutors. Demonization is a deleterious practice that cannot be eradicated, but De Luca and Buell believe it can be diminished enough to renew the nation’s democratic covenant.

This is a stimulating book that pursues its volatile subject in a straightforward, thoughtful, and insightful manner from start to finish. It progresses from conceptualizing the basic problem of political scapegoating to explaining and illustrating its core sources and key features in contemporary politics. It even suggests how we might work to overcome the worst of a bad legacy. It is more hopeful and illuminating than dark or depressing despite democracy’s recurrent degradation in an era of rampant demonization. Perhaps the book’s greatest achievement is that it sustains a style of presentation and argument that exercises political judgment on issues as threatening and divisive as terrorism without defaulting itself to demonizing discourse.

The authors argue for a progressive political program that seeks to increase equality and social security, improve community well-being, enhance citizenship, augment opportunities for work and leisure, and improve international relations. Ultimately, their aim is to improve the quality of democratic exchange enough to “let the chips fall where they may” (p. 182). One must wonder, though, if the moral paradox that perpetuates demonization American-style can be managed well enough to achieve such a healthy democratic process. This is the troubling question the book raises more successfully than it answers.

**Congress and the Constitution.** Edited by Neal Devins and Kieth E. Whittington. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. 320p. \$84.95 cloth, \$23.95 paper.

— Eileen Braman, *Indiana University*

For years, students of American government have been taught a highly compartmentalized version of our democratic system where legislative actors “make” law, actors in the executive branch “enforce” law, and judges in the judicial branch “interpret” law. Under this overly simplistic framework, the Supreme Court is often characterized as citizens’ exclusive protection from myopic lawmakers who

would flout the dictates of the Constitution to achieve their short-term policy goals and/or enhance their own authority. The collection of essays in *Congress and the Constitution*, edited by Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington, presents a challenge to this conventional wisdom.

Each essay envisions a more complex view of the congressional “role” vis-à-vis the Constitution, where members have both instrumental and philosophical reasons to consider the constitutional implications of their actions. For this nuanced perspective alone, the book is well worth a careful read by serious students of courts, Congress, and constitutional interpretation. The book, however, also raises many interesting issues about the capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution, the incentives members have to do a good job, and the standards by which we should evaluate their constitutional judgments—especially in areas where judges are loath to intervene, making legislative constitutional interpretation, in effect, the *only* constitutional analysis likely to influence the actions of lawmakers.

The essays vary widely in their approach and substantive areas of focus. This is a reflection of the multidisciplinary nature and appeal of the inquiry into the incidence, quality, and implications of congressional constitutional interpretation. The editors should be praised for their successful efforts to bring together law professors, practitioners, and political scientists who study the inner workings of Congress and the courts. The downside of this conglomeration of authors is that the essays do not flow very smoothly from one to the next, and some readers will find some essays more “satisfying” than others in terms of the empirical evidence authors bring to bear to support their assertions. Even strict empiricists, however, can surely learn something from the essay by David P. Currie, “Prolegomena for a Sampler,” about the history of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation before the Civil War. They may also gain new insights about how congressional agencies and lawyers operate to help members of Congress research constitutional issues in separate essays by Louis Fisher (“Constitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies”) and John Yoo (“Lawyers in Congress”), both of whom have practical experience working in Congress. Who knows? Reading these chapters might even lead to a testable hypothesis or two.

Sometimes the authors provide testable fodder themselves. For example, the first half of Michael J. Klarman’s historical essay, “Court, Congress and Civil Rights,” describing the give-and-take between the Congress and the Supreme Court in protecting civil rights, is both interesting and informative—but his conclusions about why each institution took the lead during different historical eras is certainly subject to question, or at the very least competing explanations. The same is true for his assertion that the reason the *Brown* decision was so influential in bringing about sweeping civil rights legislation in the 1960s was the national reaction to the sight of the violent effects

of a southern political culture galvanized against integration televised on the nightly news.

The collection is loosely organized into three undelineated sections roughly covering congressional capacity/resources to interpret the constitution, interactions between the Court and Congress, and the ramifications of current and proposed institutional design structures for promoting the overall quality of legislative interpretation. The book could have been organized differently, and arguably it should have been. Essays that speak directly to one another are too far apart. The most obvious example is the point-counterpoint offered by Neil Devins in “Congressional Fact Finding and the Scope of Judicial Review” and by Barbara Sinclair in “Can Congress be Trusted with the Constitution?: The Effects of Incentives and Procedures.” Devins argues that the Court should restrict the deference it pays congressional fact-finding to areas where it has real incentives to “get to the truth.” According to Devins, fact-finding done in committees typically involves a great deal of posturing that is subject to manipulation by committee chairs with incentives to “stack the deck” in one direction or another. Sinclair, on the other hand, points to political and procedural realities of congressional investigation that constrain members’ ability to consider only one side of an issue. As such, she argues that “the Court owes Congress deference, particularly on issues where the political and policy expertise that Congress possesses and the Court lacks is key” (p. 309).

Sinclair’s concluding essay, arguing in favor of congressional competence in “fact-finding, deliberation and even ‘doing what’s right, not what’s popular’” (p. 309), also provides a direct counterargument to the need for “incremental” design changes proposed by Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule in their essay “Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress.” The need for such measures are also called into question in “Evaluating Congressional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two Informal Case Studies” by Mark Tushnet, who concludes that Congress has been “responsible” in interpreting the Constitution in areas where the court is reluctant to intervene, including impeachment and war powers issues.

This brings me to my final point: The collection would benefit from a more comprehensive concluding overview of the ideas and findings in the book. Often, essays seem to contradict each other and even the premises of the editors in introducing the collection. Like many researchers who work at the intersection of Court/Congress relations, the editors perhaps overstate the conflict between the branches beyond what the evidence in the book realistically supports. They characterize Congress as reacting *against* an overzealous Court, describing the Rehnquist Courts “assault on Congressional power” in the 1990s with opinions that “pinch” Congress and “denigrate” the authority of Congress to interpret the Constitution (pp. 3–4). This characterization is not supported by all of

the essays in the collection. For instance, using survey data in “Constitutional Attitudes about Constitutional Interpretation,” Bruce G. Peabody finds that many members of 106th Congress *agreed* that it was correct for them to defer to the Court on constitutional issues (although they did take a broad view of their ability to engage in their own analysis prior to and/or in the absence of a definitive statement by the Court on particular matters). Moreover, research described by J. Mitchell Pickerill in “Congressional Responses to Judicial Review” shows that for the most part, Congress is reacting appropriately to constitutional rulings by acting to change statutes to comply with constitutional requirements set forth by the justices, rather than contradict them.

There is also compelling evidence that the lines of respect between judges and legislators go the other way. Devins and Sinclair both comment on the desirability of the established practice of giving deference to congressional fact-finding. The essay by William N. Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn, “Quasi-Constitutional Law: The Rise of Super-Statutes,” suggests that large statutory schemes that gain acceptance over time, like the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s, may *help* judges deal with complicated policy issues in our increasingly complex society, and thus be afforded “extra deference” over and above that given to ordinary legislation. The authors argue that the justification for such deference may lie in the strong normative force of their legislative purposes, which tend to increase over time as these “super-statutes” gain broad public acceptance.

Notwithstanding the problems with its organization, this collection presents a valuable contribution to the literature with its unique perspective on the role legislators play with respect to constitutional interpretation. Without question, many interesting research projects will be prompted by ideas set forth in this book. I, for one, look forward to seeing all of them.

**Redistricting in the New Millenium.** Edited by Peter F. Galderisi. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005. 368p. \$90.00 cloth.

**Gatekeepers to the Franchise: Shaping Election Administration in New York.** By Ronald Hayduk. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005. 282p. \$35.00.

— Daniel P. Tokaji, *The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law*

“The first instinct of power is the retention of power.” The words are Justice Antonin Scalia’s, but the core insight is one long acknowledged by commentators and advocates across the ideological spectrum. These two books examine the manifestations of this instinct, one on the drawing of district lines and the other on the running of elections. If neither book furnishes a definitive answer to the question of how power’s first instinct can be harnessed to promote a better democracy, that is mainly a function

of the intransigence and complexity of the problems they so successfully illuminate.

*Redistricting in the New Millenium* compiles essays from leading election scholars, providing an expansive perspective on how incumbent legislators’ self-interest dominates the drawing of district lines across the country. The book starts with an overview of redistricting since the 1960s, including assessments of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). It then offers case studies showing how the redistricting process actually works in different states (which turns out to be eerily similar to how sausages are made). It concludes by proposing some alternatives to single-member districts, ones designed to promote more fair and effective representation.

As Peter Galderisi and Bruce Cain note in their introduction, the fairness issues raised by redistricting are hardly new (p. 1). There can be no doubt, however, that the past four decades have witnessed enormous changes, much of it spurred by judicial intervention. Taken together, the book’s essays can be viewed as a comprehensive assessment of three major legal developments during this period.

The first is the Supreme Court’s articulation of the “one person, one vote” rule, most notably in *Reynolds v. Sims* (1964), which Chief Justice Earl Warren thought to be the Court’s most important opinion during his tenure. This line of cases held that legislative districts must be of equal size, requiring that district lines be drawn decennially to account for population shifts. Gary Cox’s essay “On the Systemic Consequences of Redistricting in the 1960s” (Chapter 2) summarizes the changes wrought by the one-person, one-vote rule. Cox finds that Democratic control of the judiciary abetted pro-Democratic redistricting during the 1960s, reversing the previous bias in favor of Republicans (p. 26). After that, however, there was little systemic partisan shift until the 1990s.

The second development is the application of racial equality norms to the reapportionment process. That includes the U.S. Department of Justice’s vigorous enforcement of the Voting Rights Act in the 1990s to increase the number of majority-minority legislative districts, a policy that had the side effect of “bleaching” surrounding districts and thereby allowing Republicans to pick up legislative seats. It also includes the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Shaw v. Reno* (1993) and its progeny, which held that the Constitution prohibits race from being used as the “predominant factor” in redistricting (pp. 92–100, 279) and led to the invalidation of majority-minority districts in several states. Part II includes opposing perspectives in the race and redistricting debate, particularly germane given that key provisions of the VRA will expire in 2007 unless renewed by Congress. Anthony Peacock questions whether expiring provisions of the VRA are still worth the burden they impose on the states (Chapter 6). David Canon, on the other hand, challenges *Shaw*’s premise that white voters suffer a cognizable injury from being placed in black



majority districts (Chapter 5). Richard Engstrom's chapter on district geography is also helpful in evaluating the *Shaw* doctrine, insofar as his findings suggest that the Court may have paid too much attention to compactness and conformity with county lines, and not enough attention to whether districts coincide with media markets (Chapter 4). Florence Adams adds a new wrinkle to the familiar black–white story, discussing the growing tension between increased Latino voting strength and the vested interests of Anglo incumbents (Chapter 7).

The third major development concerns partisan gerrymandering, a matter that the courts have mostly stayed out of, at least until now. Although *Davis v. Bandemer* (1986) held that excessive partisanship in gerrymandering could give rise to a constitutional claim, at least in theory, no reapportionment has ever been struck down on this ground (p. 315). Part III shows the consequences of the courts' laissez-faire approach. Chapters 8–12 describe the varied manifestations of incumbents' instinct to retain power—and in some instances to enhance it. For example, John Chamberlin describes how Republican control of Michigan's executive and legislative branches resulted in a redistricting plan that favored the GOP (Chapter 9). But such a strategy can backfire. Bernard Grofman and Thomas Brunell show how Democratic-controlled legislatures in some southern states created “dummymanders,” plans that seemed to benefit their party but in the long run helped Republicans (Chapter 8). Still another variant is California's post-2000 redistricting, in which the Democratic majority and Republican minority colluded to produce a bipartisan or “sweetheart” gerrymander (Chapter 10). Gary Jacobson explains how that plan virtually eliminated competitive districts, exacerbating the polarization of the state's legislature and congressional delegation (pp. 224–29).

*Redistricting in the New Millenium* is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the redistricting process, a subject likely to assume even greater prominence given the unsettled state of the law and the recent changes in the U.S. Supreme Court's personnel. The Court is now considering a case challenging the Texas redistricting plan engineered by Rep. Tom DeLay, the background to which is detailed by Seth McKee and Daron Shaw (Chapter 13). At stake in this case is whether courts will intervene when the party in command of the redistricting process redraws the lines mid-decade for the sole purpose of maximizing its partisan advantage. For those seeking guidance on whether judicial intervention is warranted, the essays in this volume are a great place to start.

Equally unsettled, and of no less importance, is the fate of race-conscious redistricting. The Supreme Court's last pronouncement on racial gerrymandering, *Easley v. Cromartie* (2001), let stand a plan in which partisan considerations were found to predominate over racial ones, but it is doubtful that this is more than a temporary resolution

of the competing norms of race consciousness (embodied in the VRA) and race blindness (embodied in the *Shaw* cases). While few racial gerrymandering challenges to post-2000 redistricting plans were successful (p. 99), this area is likely to be up for grabs in years to come. The issue of whether and how race should be considered in drawing district lines will also occupy Congress's attention, as it considers whether to reauthorize or amend the provisions of the VRA set to expire in 2007. And if these provisions are reauthorized, it is possible that the Roberts Court could find some of them unconstitutional. This book provides evidence that should be considered in assessing these issues, and in determining how to prevent the first instinct of power from denying fair representation to all citizens.

Ronald Hayduk's *Gatekeepers of the Franchise* scrutinizes the mechanics of election administration, a less commonly studied area than redistricting (at least in the last millennium) but one with a similarly turgid history of partisan gamesmanship. Since the 2000 election, there has been increasing attention to the administration of elections—including not only the “hanging chads” that gave rise to *Bush v. Gore* (2000) but also such matters as registration, provisional voting, and voter identification. The policy debate over legislation like the Help America Vote Act of 2002 has largely turned on the tension between access and integrity, with Democrats mainly pursuing the former goal and Republicans urging the latter.

This volume comes out decidedly on the side of greater access. Hayduk focuses on the state of New York, tracing the development of election practices from the days of Boss Tweed through the 2004 election. He maintains that allegations of voting fraud have often been exaggerated, and used to impede access to certain groups of voters—most often immigrants and racial minorities. For example, the author gives extended attention to the 1993 New York City mayoral election, in which Republican Rudy Giuliani defeated Democrat David Dinkins (Chapter 5). Hayduk argues that Republicans used claims of widespread voting fraud as a pretext to impose stringent ballot security measures that may have turned the election. Some may quibble with his liberal employment of the term “disenfranchisement” (he uses it to include any practice that has the effect of hindering voting, whether or not that is its intent). One might also question whether the policy recommendations he draws from New York's experience (Chapter 7) can readily be applied elsewhere, given that so much of the evidence on which he relies comes from New York City—an extraordinary electoral jurisdiction by almost any measure. Still, Hayduk's book makes a significant contribution to the emerging subfield of election administration, injecting some badly needed evidence into the access-versus-integrity debate, which all too often rests on intuitions rather than facts.

Whether or not one agrees with Hayduk's recommended reforms, *Gatekeepers of the Franchise* makes a

strong case that partisanship in the administration of the elections—which received so much attention in both Florida 2000 and Ohio 2004—is a long-standing problem that demands attention. Like *Redistricting in the New Millennium*, Hayduk's book does a more effective job of diagnosing the problem than in prescribing a remedy for it. But for those seeking to understand the profound challenges to our democracy posed by the “first instinct of power,” both books are of great value.

### Speak No Evil: The Triumph of Hate Speech

**Regulation.** By Jon B. Gould. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 241p. \$19.00.

— Donald A. Downs, *University of Wisconsin*

Beginning in the later 1980s, universities and colleges across the land adopted speech codes prohibiting expression that disparages individuals or groups based on their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and other characteristics. Because freedom of speech is central to the historic mission of higher education, the new “progressive” form of censorship encountered resistance, especially when it began to be misapplied to viewpoints that merely transgressed from reigning campus orthodoxies.

Between 1989 and 1995, several prominent court decisions struck down codes at such universities as Michigan, Wisconsin, Central Michigan, and Stanford for conflicting with First Amendment principles. And in *R.A.V. v. St. Paul* (1992), the Supreme Court ruled that basing codes on such categories as race and gender constituted improper viewpoint discrimination. Champions of open discourse applauded the decisions, assuming that the formal rejection of the new codes sounded the death knell of the code movement.

As Jon B. Gould reveals in his important and artful new book, these hopes were dashed. *Speak No Evil* is the first rigorously empirical analysis of the rise and perpetuation of the speech-code movement in America. Gould sets himself three tasks: to ascertain the politics and motivations behind the adoption of codes, to examine how institutions reacted to the wave of court invalidations, and to explore the implications of this reaction for legal theory.

To understand adoption, Gould combined painstaking quantitative and qualitative research (see Appendix, pp. 189–202). He conducted a random survey of 100 institutions, using factor analysis and other statistical methods, in an attempt to fathom which variables most likely contributed to the rise of codes. Qualitatively, he also performed interviews at eight schools (four pairs) and poured over college guides and other sources to determine the nature and extent of student activism. The “traditional story” claims that codes were wrought by a “vast movement of political correctness” (p. 3). Gould challenges this claim, concluding that administrators adopted codes for three seemingly nonpoliticized reasons based

on utilitarian calculations, the desire to follow the lead of more prestigious pioneering schools, and the wish to appease student service administrators.

Even more interesting is the author's analysis of the institutional response to *R.A.V.* and other decisions. On the basis of semistructured interviews and the examination of archival and press material at 32 institutions, Gould found what can only be described as massive resistance to courts' rulings. Only five of these schools removed questionable codes, whereas 22 kept theirs on the books. Meanwhile, five schools even enacted suspect codes in direct disregard of the constitutional holdings. Colleges and universities largely ignored the courts because “there arose an administrative constituency for the policies' preservation and enforcement” (p. 171).

Gould's finding should not shock students of judicial politics, who have long known that compliance with judicial decisions is not automatic (see, e.g., Gerald Rosenberg's 1999 book, *The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?*). Gould masterfully shows how such resistance points to an important jurisprudential theme: the dynamic tension between formal constitutional law (text and judicial decisions) and popular “mass constitutionalism,” which is the way constitutional law is envisioned and practiced by citizens and institutions in civil society. Often, formal law and mass constitutionalism's “social construction” of the First Amendment are in basic harmony. But resistance can arise when certain conditions prevail, such as when court decisions run counter to entrenched norms and interests (pp. 51–74): “Judicial rulings will be considered legitimate unless a critical mass of opposition arises to a decision” (p. 53).

Gould's analysis of legal theory and the institutional reaction to codes is as illuminating as it is well written. And his findings concerning the politics of codes presents a serious challenge to those who have entertained a considerably less sanguine view of the speech-code movement. The burden is on them to respond. Let me contribute to this response by maintaining that the author is too sanguine about the effect of codes on the climate for free expression on campus.

Even assuming that the origin of codes was less politicized nationwide than the “traditional story” assumes—a conclusion, I believe, that does not adequately portray the rise of codes at the schools that pioneered them, such as Wisconsin, Stanford, Penn, and Michigan—what matters in the end is how codes have been enforced, and whether students and faculty who endorse politically incorrect ideas feel in jeopardy. Gould does discuss enforcement, but his treatment of it is much less developed than his other analyses. There is no evidence that he sought out faculty and students who are the most likely to feel the brunt of codes—conservatives and libertarians who dissent from what Gould admits is liberal sentiment on campus. He writes that the “highest” level of enforcement he found on any single

campus was one case per year (p. 175). But as we have learned from the McCarthy and other eras, it only takes one or two prominent cases to spread a chill over an entire campus for a long time.

Furthermore, consistent with Gould's own terminology, one must consider informal as well as formal enforcement actions. I know of cases at my university and elsewhere in which constitutionally suspect codes were deployed by student services administrators to compel students into sensitivity training under the threat of eviction from dorms or expulsion from school. All of these cases took place beneath the radar screen, and were disclosed only by the students themselves. Yet Gould did not talk to any students about the impact of the codes. And he does not discuss another important domain that is a barometer of the status of free speech on campus: the public forum and student newspapers. Berkeley, for example, has not enforced a speech code in recent years, but activists have been busy obstructing conservative speakers and stealing conservative newspapers there with impunity because the administration had other priorities.

One important lesson of this thought-provoking book is that campus leaders have priorities other than intellectual freedom and diversity. Thus, it is incumbent on advocates of free speech to change the campus climate by organizing politically, as has happened at Wisconsin and Penn, to name two schools (see, e.g., Donald Alexander Downs, *Restoring Free Speech and Liberty on Campus*, 2005). "Although the courts help to establish legal meaning with their decisions," Gould concludes, "it is just as important to win the battle in civil society by influencing the public's construction of legal and constitutional norms" (p. 10).

### **Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S.**

**Supreme Court.** By Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 299p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— James R. Rogers, *Texas A&M University*

This book will almost certainly be a "must read" in classes on judicial politics and in seminars on American political institutions. The authors intentionally developed a very simple model, and so the book is accessible to, and appropriate for, undergraduates as well as graduate students without much formal-theoretic training. Despite the model's simplicity, the substantive topics that the authors engage with the model make it useful for graduate seminars, if only as a jumping-off point for motivating empirical tests or as a foil for the development of more sophisticated models.

Thomas Hammond, Chris Bonneau, and Reginald Sheehan focus on developing an integrated model of each stage of the Supreme Court's decision-making process. Their analysis includes the Court's certiorari decision, the initial conference vote, opinion assignment, and the final coal-

ition and vote. Justices understand not only that their decisions at each stage can affect outcomes at other stages of the decision-making process, but also that expectations about their decisions affect the decisions other justices take at each stage as well.

Formal models of decision-making processes with multiple stages can quickly become notationally dense, unfriendly to readers not trained in formal theory, and intractable for the analysts. The authors here avoid that problem by imposing strong assumptions to simplify their analysis. This permits them to integrate the several stages of the Court's decision-making process while keeping their analysis accessible to scholars and students untrained in formal theory. They explicitly note these assumptions and discuss how their conclusions might change when those assumptions are relaxed.

Perhaps the most provocative substantive result of the book is what I term the "strategy ineffectiveness result." Under two versions of the model—the "open-bidding version" and the "median-holdout version"—the legal policy endorsed by the Court in its final opinion always converges to the preference of the median voter. That means that strategic behavior in opinion assignment, the conference vote, and at the certiorari stage do not matter because the final outcome in the last stage of the decision-making process will always be the most-preferred legal policy of the median voter. In these versions of the model, Hammond, Bonneau, and Sheehan provide us a strategic account for why strategic behavior among the justices might not affect the final outcome of the cases they decide. This is a fun and provocative conclusion. (Under the "agenda-control version" of the model, in which the authors assume that justices will join a draft majority opinion if it is better than the status quo for those justices, strategic behavior would have some effect on outcomes. Nonetheless, as the authors point out, the agenda-control version of the model is inconsistent with the basic assumption that justices seek to maximize their policy payoffs.)

While I regard the simplicity of the model in this book as a virtue overall, the authors do occasionally exhibit a mild form of analytical schizophrenia in recognizing, on the one hand, that they need to make very strong assumptions in order to derive interesting results from a very simple model, yet, on the other hand, insisting that their results imply the necessity of a "substantial revision" of much of the scholarship in judicial politics (p. 231). I would have preferred more tentative assertion of the implications of some of the results derived in the book.

Some of the more important assumptions the authors make (and which they admit are strong) include the assumption that writing opinions is costless for the justices, that justices are not limited in the number of cases they can decide, and that justices do not consider the

impact of a decision in one case on decisions they make in other cases or future cases. Other important assumptions include perfect information and a unidimensional policy space.

Consider, for example, the assumption that justices do not face decision costs. Of particular concern in light of the substantive results derived from the model is, first, the implicit assumption that the justices face no opportunity costs in granting certiorari to a case and, secondly, that writing an opinion is costless to the justices (p. 94). (To be sure, the authors explicitly assume only that writing a majority opinion is costless, but there is no reason to assume that writing effort is costless only if four other justices agree with you.)

These strong assumptions, along with others, suggest that the results of the model in this book are likely to be sensitive to these assumptions, and that substantive conclusions drawn from these results should be asserted with some caution. For example, on the basis of the model, the authors write that notions of strategic certiorari granting—“aggressive granting” and “defensive denial”—could be “abandoned without any significant loss in our understanding of the Supreme Court’s decisions on certiorari” (p. 234). Well, maybe. But given that current cases set precedents for future cases and that only a limited number of cases can be reviewed by the Court, one can conceive of models in which those words continue to identify meaningful behavior. For example, in his 2000 book *Constitutional Process: A Social Choice Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Making*, Max Stearns argues that the order in which cases are decided can become a strategic variable in leading the Court to decisions different than they would make if they decided the cases in a different sequence. In situations when justices are maximizing payoffs over sets of current and future cases, they might oppose certiorari in a particular case for which, if considered in isolation from other cases and future cases, they would support the granting of certiorari.

More broadly, the need for “strategic behavior” disappears in a world without constraints. But impose limits on time, information, and resources, and the door opens to realizing positive payoffs for strategic behavior. And contrary to the “agenda-setting model” in this book, relaxing these assumptions accounts for strategic behavior in a way consistent with the model’s underlying postulates, rather than contrary to them.

None of these quibbles should be taken to minimize the many virtues of this book. The authors have developed a single simple, accessible model. From this model they have deduced behavioral and substantive implications that move from the beginning of official Supreme Court decision making to its conclusion. They provide scholars and students with an introduction to formal theorizing about the Supreme Court, and point the way to modeling more sophisticated theories.

### **The Greening of Pentagon Brownfields: Using Environmental Discourse to Redevelop Former Military Bases.**

By Kenneth N. Hansen. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004. 164p. \$60.00.

— Leslie R. Alm, *Boise State University*

In this book, Kenneth Hansen has produced an interesting assessment of how states and localities have increased their institutional capacities to deal with the unanticipated consequences of federal downsizing and pollution at military bases in the 1990s. Hansen uses survey data from 44 of the 115 military installations that were recommended for closure or realignment by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) between 1988 and 1995, as well as several case studies of military bases, to support his core proposition—that environmental factors are among the key intervening variables in the base redevelopment process. The topics discussed are especially timely, given the highly publicized and contentious battle over base closings this past year.

Hansen’s book is divided into six chapters. His opening chapter describes the base closure conundrum and the state of the study of defense policy as it relates to these closures. The next several chapters outline the theoretical underpinnings of the author’s work (focusing on environmental policy implementation), providing survey data analysis and a detailed descriptive analysis of his case studies, including discussions of policy outcomes, barriers to base conversion, environmental restoration solutions, and economic recovery.

In his concluding chapter, Hansen uses the results of his research to illustrate the importance of environmental variables at crucial stages of the development process. The idea that military base closures can be a positive sustainable development activity for communities is a prominent theme, with the author delineating what he believes are the most important learning points of his research. High on Hansen’s list are the promotion of intergovernmental cooperation and coordination, establishment of what he calls “situation-regarding discourse” (p. 130), and a criticism of the current Bush administration’s policies, which are “bent on gutting the very statutes that enable environmental restoration at military bases” and are being done “in the twin names of national security and the war on terror” (p. 131).

Hansen provides a rich, detailed, and comprehensive history of the base closing process during the 1990s, highlighted by specific information derived from personal experience, a working knowledge of the policymaking process, and in-depth interviews of key personnel. His illustrations are instructive. For instance, his finding that significant delays occur if communities do not effectively address the environmental problems inherent in most base closings should be a warning to all levels of government in planning for base closures. Furthermore, Hansen’s work



serves as a template to those who want to bring about the successful use of former military bases. His emphasis on strategic planning, writing environmental impact statements, and setting up BRAC cleanup teams provides clear and unambiguous guidance for future policymaking.

There do exist some concerns with the way Hansen presents his findings. First, he notes that his perspective is that of public administration (not American politics or international relations), but provides no detailed description of what this means, or exactly how public administration fits into his policy framework. For example, he refers to Graham Allison's (1971) *Essence of Decision* as a major influence in his work. Because Allison's work is a mainstay of political science-oriented international relations classes, it would have been nice to see a more thorough discussion of why Hansen believes Allison's work tends more toward a public administration emphasis. In addition, despite the (nearly) comprehensive listing and discussion of environmental orthodoxy and policy implementation, there is no reference to Deborah A. Stone's (1988, revised in 2002) *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*, considered by many to be one of the most important policy frameworks regarding the policy-making process.

Second, Hansen provides a plethora of data (e.g., personal interviews, comparative case studies, and surveys) to back up his basic propositions, but goes a bit too far in selling this as a rigorous scientific study. He surveyed the executive directors or their representatives from each community affected by BRAC decisions. The sample size ( $n = 44$ ) is not necessarily too small, but the return rate of 38% (44/115) is not particularly pleasing. While I would agree that "these descriptions shed a great deal of light on the base conversion process" (pp. 54–55), the statement "As far as I can tell, this sample is very representative of the total population of base transitions, and hence the findings should be generalizable to this same population" (p. 55) is weak at its best, and misleading at its worst. In the absence of evidence showing that those that did not return surveys (the vast majority of the respondents) have the same characteristics as those that did (and there is no such evidence provided), a 38% return rate is not sufficient to claim a truly representative sample. This does not mean that the findings are not of interest or not valuable; it simply means that one would be on shaky ground attempting to generalize to the larger population.

Third, there is no thorough explanation of causality for any of the variables used in the model. Stating associations and statistical significance is only part of establishing causality. Also, in many instances, Hansen talks about direction of relationships when it is clearly stated that the relationship was not statistically significant (e.g., see bottom of p. 84). If a relationship is not statistically significant, one cannot in good conscience talk about a direction. Not

reaching statistical significance means you cannot be confident that a relationship exists.

In the end, however, the strengths of *The Greening of Pentagon Brownfields* far outweigh its weaknesses. This book is an excellent read for both practitioners and those interested in the philosophical underpinnings of policy implementation. Hansen provides an excellent overview of many of the theoretical concepts that define policy implementation. Furthermore, the case studies of particular base closings provide critical information for improving the prospects of successful transition for communities going through such a procedure. Most important, Hansen provides empirical evidence that closed installations not only represent considerable economic development opportunities; they can transition successfully into engines of economic growth.

**Power, Knowledge, and Politics: Policy Analysis in the States.** By John A. Hird. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005. 256p. \$49.95 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

— Dianne N. Long, *Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo*

This is a book that needed to be written. It is the first systematic study of U. S. nonpartisan state-legislative policy research organizations. John Hird describes these policy institutions that inform policymakers in the 50 states, probes the uses of policy research in political decisions, and examines their relationship to the political culture of which they are a part. The inquiry makes a significant contribution to what is already known about state-level policy analysis and decision making. It fills a gap in the literature for those considering the relationship between the information needs of legislators and the policy research provided to them. The focus is on knowledge utilization at the institutional level in general, rather than with specific reports on issues.

The small volume is packed with information. The first chapter explores the literature on policy analysis, particularly focusing on its development and limitations. The literature discussion is extensive and would help a novice reader quickly join the conversation. Political scientists in particular will be sensitive to the author's concerns that analysis is but one input into the political environment. The text is riddled with laments centering on the analyst's desire to inform and, indeed, change policy directions, while the effects may be small or nonexistent. A second chapter considers utilization of research findings and other reports. Hird explores the behaviors of individual legislators who both use and fail to use nonpartisan policy analysis. He observes that legislators have other sources of information, too, and that partisanship is on the rise. The text looks at these choices and delves into strategic decisions such as program delay and rationalizing preexisting preferences.

The backbone of the text is a comparative survey that probes the effects of politics and political institutions on the nature and conduct of nonpartisan policy analysis. The analysis of two surveys tests theories of policy research use. It comprises the first comprehensive review and assessment of nonpartisan policy agencies serving state legislatures. A written survey of all research organizations identified by the Council of Governments was conducted to define staffing, budgets, workflow, time allocation, and the like. The 90% response rate is impressive, and the follow-up interviews with legislators and analysts fill in useful data. We learn that agencies vary, but most were developed in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of their work is descriptive and short term, providing analysis but leaving recommendations to the decision makers. Most agencies report to the legislature as a whole, to leaders, or to a joint committee. The mean agency budget is \$4.2 million for a staff of 19 and five clerical workers. A follow-up telephone survey of respondents queried directors on details of the analysis work undertaken and other policy analysis activities, both nonpartisan and partisan, within the legislature. Hird lays out the major functions: policy analysis, staff assistance, legal research, evaluation, bill drafting, and sometimes budget analysis. He discusses the issues surrounding the conduct of short-term and long-term research. While it is commonly expected that requests for studies come from individual legislators, he looks into the reasons that little analysis is self-initiated by the agency.

To explain variation in policy research organizations, the author considers distribution theory, principle agent theory, and information theory. The discussion considers arguments for the existence and persistence of these organizations. Information is power, and the uses of power have implications for policy organizations. Although legislatures are becoming increasingly more partisan, Hird tells us that they value nonpartisan research as a way to protect the legislature as a whole, to provide appearance of independent findings, and to establish credibility in reports. Another chapter reveals legislative preferences and attitudes toward information and policymaking. In his overview of 773 respondents, he considers a number of values in order to establish a matrix. States are organized by legislative professionalism (citizen, professional, hybrid) and culture (individualist, moralist, traditionalist). Legislator assessment of the importance of information sources is discussed against the backdrop of the matrix. Political leanings on economic and social issues are examined, as well as ideology. A multivariate assessment follows a look at associations between such factors as legislative assessments of performance and policy. The author controls for multiple independent economic, political, and individual characteristics to discern associations. The tables and figures clearly display the data.

In conclusion, Hird finds consistent impacts that nonpartisan research agencies have on influencing policy and

on legislator assessment organizational capability. Many implications come from the findings, including the nature of policy analysis itself and teaching analysis. The text is a good reference for practitioners and academics, as well as those training for the world of analysis and those expecting to use the results of nonpartisan research. In short, *Power, Knowledge, and Politics* is a good read, including the footnotes. Hird does not disappoint.

**James Madison: The Theory and Practice of Republican Government.** Edited by Samuel Kernell. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 400p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Alan Gibson, *CSU Chico*

This collection of essays illustrates both the problems and possibilities of turning to James Madison for illumination as if he were a contemporary political scientist. Conceived in a conference to celebrate the 250th anniversary of Madison's birth, this volume is written by public choice theorists, the latest group of political scientists who claim to be Madison's heirs. In particular, the authors explore his understanding of the relationship of institutional design to policy outcomes and his insights into the use of interests and incentives to influence the behavior of politicians, groups, and ordinary citizens. They also examine his observations about free-riding, collective action, the delegation of authority from citizens to representatives, and the problems of "agency" responsibility and loss that result from delegation. Yet another goal of these authors is to explore the intellectual sources and experiences that led to Madison's keen insights into some of the basic concepts that have become central to public choice theory.

As is almost always the case in such collections, the quality of contributions varies. Iain McLean's essay on the sources and influence of Madison's political science sets forth the strained claim that his defense of elections from expanded electoral districts was inspired by or even derived from the Marquis de Condorcet's jury theorem. McLean provides no proof that Madison read Condorcet or understood his jury theorem, let alone applied it. Theories about the effects of the size of the electorate on the kind of candidates elected and of the policies enacted abounded in revolutionary America and sprang directly from specific practices. These are far more likely candidates for the sources of Madison's ideas on representation. In contrast, Keith Dougherty's contention that Madison "was at the forefront of collective action theorists in early America"—seconded in a separate essay by Rick Wilson—is convincing because both scholars provide numerous examples of Madison's remarkable, if incipient, reflections on the free-rider problem (p. 57). These reflections arose, Dougherty and Wilson establish, in the Confederation Congress as Madison observed states spurning their obligations and delegates offering similar excuses for noncompliance.

The most challenging and provocative essay is by the volume's editor, Samuel Kernell. Recasting a familiar charge, Kernell argues that Madison's cases for pluralism in the tenth *Federalist* and for separation of powers in No. 51 are not only redundant—if extent of territory blocks majority factions, then why is separation of powers necessary?—but at their core contradictory. “One simply cannot,” Kernell argues, “design a constitution, that optimizes the performance of both factional competition and checks and balances. While the former prescribes essentially a majoritarian solution to the potential dilemma of majority tyranny, separation of powers—as implemented with the Constitution's strong checks and balances described in Number 51—succeeds only to the extent it frustrates this same majority control” (p. 94). Sure enough, Madison did not attempt what cannot be done. *The Federalist* No. 51, Kernell concludes, is a strategic argument to counter the antifederalists' contention that the system of separation of powers in the Constitution was inadequate to prevent governmental tyranny. The “true principles” of Madison's political science, according to Kernell, are presented in his defense of nationalism and pluralism and are found in the *The Federalist* No. 10.

Other essays in this volume also provide meaty interpretations that should prompt significant challenges and revisions. John Ferejohn argues sensibly that Madison's understanding of separation of powers was flexible and experimental and that it changed as his initial fears of legislative encroachments gave way to the threat of executive aggrandizement in the 1790s. Following Jack Rakove's lead, Daniel Wirl points out that Madison's goal to have the Senate serve as a select deliberative body that could control the House and also to be based on proportional representation resulted in tension. The Senate's role as a deliberative body did not depend upon a basis of proportional representation. Furthermore, any workable scheme of proportional representation required a relatively large number of senators. In championing these incompatible goals, Wirl contends, Madison strengthened the hand of small-state delegates who sought equal representation and thus helped bring about the very compromise that he vehemently opposed. Finally, contributions by David Brian Robertson and Jenna Bednar deal, respectively, with Madison's efforts to control state autonomy and the national government, while D. Roderick Kiewier and Norman Schofield interpret Madison's role as a political statesman during the 1790s.

Together, these essays establish that Madison articulated and thought seriously about several concepts that would later become central to public choice theory. Even more, they provide subtle explications and criticisms of Madison's theoretical rationale for the original constitutional design. But where does this leave Madison the political scientist? Are we called by these authors merely to appreciate his prescience, or did he make contribu-

tions to rational choice theory or political science in general that have not yet been outstripped by contemporary scholars?

Ironically, the essay in this volume that pursues the strongest case for Madison's contemporary relevance is also the only one that emphasizes the peculiarly eighteenth-century, republican roots of his political thought and his sharp differences with the rational choice approach. Madison, Randall Strahan reminds us, did not simply hope to design institutions to channel self-interest toward the public good. He also “devoted serious attention to the question of how constitutional forms could be designed to attract and develop political leaders who would be inclined to use public office to advance the public good” (p. 65). Unlike public choice theorists, Madison believed that both representatives and the electorate were capable of acting upon the basis of higher, public-regarding political motives. Also unlike public choice theorists, he did not believe that giving representatives a degree of slack or independence would necessarily lead them to pursue opportunistic and corrupt behavior.

Strahan's observations suggest that there was still considerable romance in Madison's republicanism and that he did not accept what is perhaps the foundational assumption of public choice theory, namely, that individuals act on the same basis in the political arena as in the marketplace. They also suggest that a systematic comparison of Madison's political science to public choice theory might raise additional questions about whether the similarities brought out in this book are foundational or surface, and whether public choice theorists are really the heirs of the man that they claim as the most modern of the ancients.

**Elusive Togetherness: Church Group's Trying to Bridge America's Divisions.**

By Paul Lichterman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 331p. \$65.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

**America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity.**

By Robert Wuthnow. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 391p. \$29.95.

— Mark E. Button, *University of Utah*

Robert Wuthnow's latest book is a wide-ranging and insightful study into how Americans are responding to dramatic increases in religious and cultural diversity. Wuthnow gives particular attention here to the ways in which Christians are addressing (or ignoring) the growing populations of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and other followers of non-Western religions in America. His aim is not only to understand the current terms by which American Christians are negotiating an increasingly complex and diverse religious setting but also to pointedly ask how pluralistic Americans are willing to be. The answers that are revealed throughout this book, drawing from hundreds

of in-depth interviews and a large cross-national survey, offer plenty of room for deep worry as well as guarded optimism. Moving beyond these caged responses, Wuthnow pulls together the ambivalent stands of America's present attitudes toward religious differences and offers suggestive ideas about how Americans might begin to move beyond their currently shallow responses to diversity and embrace a more active, self-conscious form of pluralism, what he calls "reflective pluralism" (p. 289).

Americans, Wuthnow tells us, are a people that have long believed and, by all signs, continue to believe that Christianity is "uniquely true" and that America holds special, divine meaning for the rest of the world. The idea of America as a Christian nation, both descriptively and normatively, will not be news to most readers, but to see, in impressive sociological detail, how contemporary American Christians are navigating the tensions between a "theology of exclusivism and a civic code of pluralism" (p. 10) is illuminating as a study of public beliefs and practices, and is of central importance for the future of American collective self-understanding. Thus, after providing a brisk historical overview of the formation and transmission of American Christian exclusivism, running from Christopher Columbus to the mid-twentieth century, Wuthnow gives critical consideration to what is at stake for many Americans with increasing religious diversity (Chapter 3). He shows how this diversity not only raises legal, civil, and cultural questions, but further poses important theological and moral questions as well. In this respect, his treatment of the antinomies surrounding Americans' abstract acceptance of diversity and the toleration of others, on the one hand (86% of the public agreed that "religious diversity has been good for America"), and their ongoing identification with Christianity as a "moral order," on the other (23% would make it illegal for Muslim groups to meet in the United States), not only speaks to the deep, troubled significance of religious diversity for a large number of Americans today but also reveals a social observer who is acutely attuned to these constraints in a way that is too often not the case.

At the heart of this book is a discussion of three, general strategies by which American Christians are adapting to religious diversity. Wuthnow identifies these broad modes of adaptation as: 1) the "spiritual shopper" who largely embraces religious diversity by virtue of seeing all religions as "equally true"; 2) the "Christian inclusivist" who privileges Christianity while believing that other religions "contain some truth"; and 3) the "Christian exclusivist" who holds that only Christianity is ultimately true, and who resists religious diversity by avoiding it. Each receives generous and critical treatment (Chapters 4–6), for each one of these strategies/identities within the Christian response to religious diversity reveals powerful institutions and cultural factors at work in American society, just as each also holds internal dilemmas that are often insuf-

ficiently recognized by those who strive to live within its terms. Overall, a pattern of coexistence rather than pluralism emerges, leaving most Christian Americans (including the spiritual shoppers and inclusivists) ignorant of non-Western religions, and keeping the members of non-Western religions feeling disrespected.

As a result of these findings, Wuthnow rightly acknowledges that the normative case for religious pluralism and for more interreligious cooperation still needs to be made, just as the specific contours of a meaningful embrace of pluralism still need to be imagined. Toward this end, his brief but engaging treatment of reflective pluralism and his critical discussion of interreligious associations throughout the country hold normative promise and are likely to have important practical value in the future. For these reasons, among others, *America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity* is a book that should find a deeply appreciative audience from students of religion, theology, sociology, organizations, public opinion, multiculturalism, and democratic theory.

If Robert Wuthnow's book provides a general portrait of how Americans are struggling to come to terms with religious diversity, ending in a chastened call for both more intrareligious critical reflection and interreligious cooperation, Paul Lichterman's *Elusive Togetherness* provides a fine-grained study of church-based community groups' practical efforts to build bridges across multiple lines of difference, and whose conclusions underscore the significance of "social reflexivity" for sustaining enduring civic ties amid diversity. In this book, Lichterman analyzes two networks of predominantly Protestant-based volunteer organizations (giving particular focus to eight distinct groups), all of whom were responding, in one way or another, to the charged circumstances created by the welfare reform policies enacted by Congress in 1996. While self-consciously restricted to predominantly middle-class, white, Protestant organizations in America's Midwest, his book is a valuable and timely study of how faith-based groups achieve, and more often fail to achieve, the goals they set for themselves. This is a work that manages to provide a welcome critical challenge to contemporary social theory, as well as arguments about the preconditions of American civil society, while offering keen insights that could (and one hopes will) make an important impact on the practical conduct of civic associations.

Drawing on classic arguments from Tocqueville, Dewey, and Jane Addams—as well as contemporary sociological work by Wuthnow, Robert Bellah, Theda Skocpol, and Robert Putnam—Lichterman is concerned with understanding the specific conditions under which civic groups are able to fashion stable bridges across lines of racial, class, or religious differences. All of the groups analyzed here held "reaching out to others" as a central part of their purpose. However, the majority of these efforts, as becomes painfully clear throughout the central case chapters of this



book (Chapters 3–6), resulted in aching, frustrating failure. There are, to be sure, some important, deeply instructive exceptions. Yet because Lichterman does not simply assume, first, the Tocquevillian argument about the power of civic associations to expand peoples' affective and cognitive attachments to others, second, the neo-Tocquevillian view that civic groups provide their members with "social capital" (Putnam, 2000), or third, that stocks of such "capital" necessarily facilitate outward-looking forms of public action, he is well positioned (theoretically and methodologically speaking) to assess how the beneficent "social spiral" that has excited so much of contemporary social and political theory is, or is not, set in motion. It is also worth pointing out that by not acceding to Durkheimian (or post-Durkheimian) approaches to religious culture, Lichterman offers a nuanced and highly instructive account of the diverse and often quiet ways that religion "goes public" (see Chapter 7).

The result of this theoretically driven, participant-observation study is an orientation to the study of groups and civic engagement that would have us attend, far more carefully than is usually the case, to the customs and messy internal communication patterns that constitute the meaning of membership in civic organizations. Of course, scholars have long recognized that not all civic groups are created equal in their desire, capacity, or institutional opportunities to affect positively the civic health of American society. Lichterman's study provides analytic precision to this general observation by highlighting the power that variable, group customs play in facilitating or constraining a virtuous social spiral, giving particular weight to the custom or practice of social reflexivity. By social reflexivity, Lichterman means the practice of talking reflectively and self-critically about a group's extant relationships to the wider social world of which they are a part (p. 15). With this concept in view, his central claim is that those organizations whose group culture appreciates and sustains an ongoing practice of social reflexivity are able to construct durable bridges across prominent social divisions; those groups whose customs and sense of collective identity/solidarity foster barriers to the (sometimes painful) process of relational-social imagining fail to "spiral" very far, if at all, beyond their own group. The former set of customs facilitates a cooperative, partnership model of "doing things together," while the latter results in the more familiar, loosely connected volunteer/network model of public work.

Why should this be so? Lichterman considers a wide range of possible alternative explanations for assessing the successes and failures of bridge-building groups (resources, opportunities, and organizational structure). At the same time, he offers his interactive account of civic customs, social reflexivity, and bridging relationships as a "tentative" if "grounded" set of generalizations (p. 214). This strikes me as an appropriately modest orientation to assume,

given the various constraints of this study. Still, *Elusive Togetherness* raises a host of interesting questions that beg for additional analysis. I offer the following not as critique but as a spur to future research. First, is it possible to unpack the interactive dynamic between social reflexivity and the heightened prospects for "bridging social capital" in a manner that could persuade social actors of its determinative role in cultivating pluralistic civic ties? In other words, what are the transferable dispositions or virtues that reflexivity provides individuals and groups that help to sustain cooperative relationships with social "others"? Second, how might groups cultivate these specific qualities without endangering either their sense of collective identity or the sources of their own agency? Finally, what are the specific religious (and perhaps theological) preconditions for cultivating social reflexivity among faith-based groups? Drawing on Wuthnow's work, for example, we might ask not only how religious identity influences bridge building (which Lichterman treats persuasively) but also how religious orientations toward truth (here in the case of mainline and Evangelical Protestants) constrain and facilitate the practice of relating self-critically to others. All of these are fertile questions, prompted by a deeply engaging work that one can only hope will influence and inspire future scholars.

On this last point, I should like to recommend the very useful appendices that Lichterman has included here. Students of civic groups (as well as students of the philosophy of social sciences) could learn a great deal from Lichterman's own critical reflexivity toward the wider field of social inquiry.

**Healthy, Wealthy and Fair.** Edited by James Morone and Lawrence Jacobs. New York: Oxford University Press, 382p. \$29.95.

— Charles Barrilleaux, *Florida State University*

The result of the United States system for providing health insurance and care is that some citizens receive an abundance of high-quality care while others receive care that is poor, hard to come by, or both. This state of affairs does not fairly reflect public opinion; when surveyed, the majority of citizens express support for the idea that access to care is a right of citizenship. In a nation in which public policies relate strongly to public opinions, the failure to solve the health insurance problem is puzzling. Some analysts describe the health policy problem as economic: Health insurance products, the nature of health care as a good, and the hegemonic roles of providers and payers combine to produce the distribution of health benefits that now exists. The editors and contributors in this volume reject that view and describe health inequality as a political problem solvable with political solutions.

*Healthy, Wealthy and Fair* is organized in six sections and contains 12 essays and a conclusion. The initial two

chapters establish the book's theme that "the health problem" is part of a larger income inequality problem. In one, the distribution of income, not wealth, is shown to be correlated with life expectancy among nations, leading the author to conclude that the distances between rich and poor in the United States result in poorly developed health policies. In the other, Lawrence Jacobs points to the link between income inequality and political inequality—business is privileged, poor people are disorganized, and labor has no coherent voice—as contributors to America's health policy problem. In a similar vein, the critiques of the market view of health care attack the market as an organizing principle for health policy. Deborah Stone argues that accepting a market view of the world means that market demand is used to replace the notion of egalitarian need, which removes from citizens, policymakers, providers, and bureaucrats the expectation that outcomes will be just, which leads to a variety of normatively bad. Mark Schlesinger argues that Americans are not as committed to the market view of health care as some might expect, marshaling evidence of opinion cleavages among groups that suggests the presence of differences of opinion on the topic.

Unions and the working class figure prominently in many nations' adoption of universal health coverage. Marie Gottschalk documents the erosion of U.S. labor's leadership in the demand for universal coverage in light of unions' having spent most of the past decade working to protect benefits of their own rank-and-file members. Constance Nathanson argues that issue framing and the politics that ensue stifle the voices of minority and other out-groups, which she contrasts to typical claims that such groups simply fail to participate due to inability to organize. She calls for government to more effectively represent those who do not demand representation, which she recognizes to be a salutary but unlikely occurrence.

The fourth section's chapters portray Congress and the courts as placing barriers to massive policy change. Mark Peterson describes a Congress that is beset by a fluid system of influential groups who need only ally with committee chairs to gain their preferred outcomes. He portrays the failures of sweeping health reforms championed by Presidents Harry Truman, Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton as casualties of this complex institutional setting. Peter Jacobson and Elizabeth Selvin paint a similar portrait of the role of the judiciary in health policymaking. They show courts to be an uncertain venue for would-be reformers, cautioning would-be reformers from seeking redress to inequality through the courts for the simple reason that they are too unpredictable.

Following the gloomy scenarios developed in the initial eight chapters of the book, the penultimate fifth section offers case studies of two recent policies that have met with success, Medicaid and school-based health centers (SBHCs). Colleen Grogan and Eric Patashnik de-

scribe the evolution of the Medicaid program, which grew from a small add-on to Medicare to the enormous health insurance coverage program it is today, and suggest that it may be the source from which broader health insurance coverage is to emerge. Current state actions designed to cut Medicaid spending notwithstanding, there is some validity to the argument that the variations seen in Medicaid—it is administered by the states with federal financial support—may provide information for future policy adjustments. However, it is unlikely that any state official would offer much praise to Medicaid, which consumes ever-growing portions of their budgets. The Elizabeth Kilbreth and James Morone essay on SBHCs suggests that an attractive target group, local constituent demand, bureaucratic involvement and support, and bipartisan political support are ingredients for successful policy changes. The SBHC success points to the value of grassroots policy organization and delivery as a basis for expanding health insurance coverage. Both Medicaid and SBHCs likewise show health coverage changes to emerge incrementally, rather than as the result of a "big bang."

Lawrence Brown, Benjamin Page, and the editors offer health policy recommendations in the book's final section. Brown identifies a need for bold thinking but identifies numerous barriers, leading him to embrace incrementalism as the means by which change will be achieved. Page's chapter, likewise, suggests that the decentralized design of U.S. government and persistent political inequality constitute enormous barriers to widespread change. Page argues that reformers must organize, engage in incremental policy change, develop the big ideas Brown calls for so as to be prepared to seize political opportunities as they arise, and work for political reform. Morone and Jacobs end the collection with a sort of progressive call for social reformation. Noting that current disparities in wealth, health, social standing, political power, and the like are being exacerbated by economic globalization, they call for a commitment to a good community that transcends party and ideology as a necessary step toward solving the problems of inequality that are discussed in this volume.

These are well-written and nicely integrated essays. They are written, in the editors' words, to "spread the alarm" about American's poor health, presumably for opinion leaders and other nonspecialists who are attentive to public policy. Whether the book succeeds in that mission remains to be seen, but it would serve well in a specialized undergraduate course on health policy or in a graduate-level class as an example of a particular type of research and analysis or as a statement of the progressive case for widespread political and policy reform in the United States. Because it is written to persuade, it should encourage lively criticism and debate.

**Women with a Mission: Religion, Gender, and the Politics of Women Clergy.** By Laura R. Olson, Sue E. S.

Crawford, and Melissa M. Deckman. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005. 190p. \$37.50.

— Susan B. Hansen, *University of Pittsburgh*

This book explores the role of women clergy in mainline Protestant churches and the rabbinate. It is based largely on 54 in-depth interviews conducted in 1998 in four U.S. cities (Indianapolis, Omaha, Milwaukee, and Washington, DC), but also includes considerable material from a much larger national survey of clergy. The authors are most interested in the “political” role of their subjects and in how their gender affects this role. They themselves define “politics” very broadly, as “actions taken to influence collective decision-making processes concerning resource distribution or the development and enforcement of shared values” (p. 14). But they do not impose this definition on their subjects. Instead, the clergywomen are asked about the issues and concerns that motivate them, what kinds of activities they consider most appropriate or helpful to address those concerns, and what their own involvement has been in such activities. In both the interviews and the national survey, around a third of the women indicated that gender “in some way” limited her ability to participate in politics. Three-quarters of the interviewees volunteered gender as a factor (either an asset or a liability) for political activity, or as a reason why particular issues were especially salient to them. But few mentioned either their denomination or its women’s caucuses as a factor linking their gender with political involvement.

Laura Olson, Sue Crawford, and Melissa Deckman want to know to what extent “principles” or normative incentives, as opposed to more utilitarian cost-benefit calculations, inform political involvement, and they have selected as their subjects women whose life focus is on the spiritual and ethical. The authors’ purpose is a commendable one in an era in which the boundaries between church and state are blurring and religiosity has emerged as a major predictor of opinions and voting choices. Previous research on the political role of clergy has often found examples of strong links between spiritual or theological principles and involvement in such issues as civil rights or peace. But clergywomen, until very recently a small minority even within Reform Judaism and liberal Protestantism, might have been expected to eschew an active political role. They have faced opposition from their male colleagues, denominational leadership, and congregations unwilling to have a woman in a leadership role. Under those circumstances, their best strategy might appear to be to lie low, avoid controversy, and concentrate on their jobs, and that is indeed the path followed by some of these clergywomen. The authors find little evidence of what they term a “politicized feminist vanguard on the move” (p. 140).

Yet these clergywomen are indeed “women with a mission,” as the title suggests. Their experiences in seminary and in these mostly urban settings have led to strong commitments to social justice and to civil rights. In part because of their own experiences with discrimination, most are strong advocates for women’s and gay rights (including ordination) and favor grassroots efforts to combat HIV and racism. Many of these women also act on their commitments. A very high proportion are involved in local agencies and denominational boards or commissions, although most respondents outside Washington, DC, indicate little awareness of the policies of their national denominations. The most common “political” issue articulated is that of help for the poor, the homeless, the elderly, immigrants, and minorities. Many clergywomen are active in what the authors term “gap-filling” activities, assisting those who are not eligible for government welfare programs; their congregations are highly supportive of these endeavors.

These women seldom raise direct challenges to capitalism or the limitations of the current U.S. welfare state. They mostly avoid partisan or electoral politics, although a few of their congregations apparently encourage or tolerate such explicitly political activism. The authors stress that in the traditions of Judaism and liberal Protestantism, the role of clergy is *not* to tell their congregations what to think (or how to vote). Rather, they are expected to raise ethical concerns, explore different aspects of social issues, and encourage congregants to make their own informed choices on these matters. And, of course, taking an overt stand could alienate a significant portion of one’s congregation. A few of these women opted for individual counseling, or a quiet activism unbeknownst to their parishioners, to articulate their values on controversial issues, such as abortion or gay rights. However, the authors express surprise at the high proportion of women in their sample who *do* take a strong public stand, despite the personal or professional risk involved. And the issues they choose to emphasize usually represent their own deeply held convictions, not the topics currently salient to the media or to election campaigns.

The clergywomen themselves attribute this courage to the imperatives of their theological traditions, which require ethical leadership and moral stands even if these entail personal sacrifice. However, only those currently in congregational positions were selected for the sample; they could at least have been asked if they knew of any clergy (male or female) who had lost their positions because of political or social activism. The authors do note that at least in years past, clergy heavily involved in political activism have “been shown to prefer” noncongregational positions; how much choice did they actually have? And does the increasing number of women clergy provide a “critical mass” that might make activism somewhat less of a risk? The authors do not address this directly, but a few examples suggest that activism within a denominational group

or caucus is more palatable to one's congregation than involvement with an outside group.

This work is evidently linked to a larger Cooperative Clergy Project, and a few tantalizing references are made to a comparable survey of male clergy. I wish the authors had been more explicit about the larger project and had offered a few more comparisons. I would especially like to see data on the political priorities of males and how clergymen perceived the role of clergywomen in their denominations. At several points, the authors allude to differences between clergywomen in these liberal denominations and the values of conservatives and evangelicals in the Religious Right. Direct comparisons are seldom possible, because few of these conservative traditions accept women in positions of religious leadership, but that may be changing. The authors do note that membership in mainline Protestant denominations is declining, while evangelical and conservative membership is growing. They might have given more consideration to the role of women's ordination, liberal viewpoints, and political activism in that trend.

*Woman with a Mission* presents a good argument for the utility of combining quantitative and qualitative techniques. But except for a log-linear regression of the national survey data to test for factors encouraging at least a minimum of political activism, the quantitative material receives only brief summaries. The book would be enlivened by more stories or detailed examples of "political" actions taken by women clergy, either within their own denominations or in the public square. Clearly, these women with a mission have the courage of their convictions, and I would like to know more about how they have dealt with the challenges of acting on their convictions.

### The Politics of Public Health in the United States.

By Kent Patel and Mark E. Rushefsky. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005. 346p. \$84.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Richard Himelfarb, *Hofstra University*

"It is clear," write the authors, "that the public health system in the U.S. has suffered from political neglect in the last 50 years or so, and the revitalization of the U.S. public health system will necessitate confronting many of the challenges facing it in the twenty-first century" (p. 7). Kent Patel and Mark Rushefsky's survey of the politics of American public health argues that our system emphasizes curative treatment of existing illnesses at the expense of activities aimed at preventing them. Although the United States spends more per capita on health care than any other country, public health activities account for only about 2% to 3% of such expenditures. The low priority given public health, they argue, accounts for America's poor performance relative to other industrialized countries on measures of life expectancy and infant mortality.

According to the authors, the sources of our nation's relative neglect of public health are largely those associ-

ated with conservatism. The medical profession resists measures, such as universal health insurance, that may infringe on its ability to treat patients and set fees. Corporations, particularly tobacco companies, resist environmental and health measures to protect profit margins. Religious groups oppose needle-exchange programs and underfund AIDS prevention programs on moral grounds. These groups are assisted by political allies in the White House, particularly the current Bush administration, which disregards true science in favor of ideology.

By contrast, proponents of a greater governmental role in public health are undermined by a fragmented governmental system where coordination and cooperation are difficult. Also culpable, say Patel and Rushefsky, are public health professionals themselves, who decline to become involved in political debates because they fear that such activities contradict their positions as objective, neutral scientists. The authors believe that these reservations must be set aside in favor of advocacy if public health is to attain a higher priority on the nation's political agenda.

Patel and Rushefsky are correct that public health is undervalued in the United States. Because the benefits of such programs are public goods, they will almost inevitably be underfunded in the absence of government intervention. This is particularly likely to occur in a country with a political culture that values individualism and private property while harboring a deep skepticism of government action. Further, the authors make sensible arguments that increased government action in a number of areas would benefit its citizens. One such area involves environmental regulation, where they argue for policies based on the *precautionary principle*: If threats of serious or irreversible damage exist, the absence of scientific certainty should not be used as a rationale for cost-saving measures that will not preserve the environment. Thus, for example, although the link between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming is "correlational or associational . . . so that causal linkages are not entirely clear" (p. 230), the authors argue that the evidence is strong enough and the potential hazards significant enough to make increased government regulation desirable.

By contrast, Patel and Rushefsky appear to be largely unaware of or unconcerned about the potential for government overregulation in the area of public health. While they mention threats to privacy posed by genetic research, they have little to say about the potential for too much government regulation undermining economic growth or personal choice. Where to draw the line in such instances is crucial, but the authors instead appear content to permit the public health profession to dominate the decision-making process. Although they mention the argument of two critics that public health officials, like government bureaucrats generally, seek to increase their budgets and political power, they do not take such concerns seriously. Nor do they worry that politically liberal interests, such as



the sizable environmental lobby, might push government too far in the direction of regulation.

Such concerns about burdensome, meddling government are increasingly plausible given that many of today's public health problems involve matters of personal behavior. As Rushefsky and Patel themselves point out, virtually half of all deaths in the United States are attributable to an "unhealthy lifestyle" (p. 7). Such vices as overeating and smoking increasingly constitute significant threats to societal health and well-being. Given the means, public health officials could significantly lower the prevalence of these activities. But at what cost? Cognizant of the threat posed by secondhand smoke, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg has successfully banned smoking in bars, establishments where, it might be argued, individuals expect to smoke. Fast-food chains increasingly fear lawsuits from obese customers while government officials contemplate junk-food taxes. One does not have to smoke or own a McDonald's franchise to be disturbed by the increasing propensity of government officials to behave as finger-wagging nannies in the name of public health. Unfortunately, Patel and Rushefsky appear too convinced of the desirability of increasing the power of public health officials to consider how much government intervention is too much.

**Scoring Points: Politicians, Activists, and the Lower Federal Court Appointment Process.** By Nancy Scherer.

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 288p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Jonathan R. Nash, *Tulane Law School, Columbia Law School*

The last several decades have witnessed increasing politicization of the selection and confirmation process for judges of the lower federal courts. Nancy Scherer argues that this phenomenon results from politicians engaging in "elite mobilization strategies" designed to placate, and motivate, elite party activists. Republican presidents tend to make ideologically driven appointments. Democratic presidents embrace affirmative action in selecting judicial nominees, both to signal powerful groups and also—insofar as Scherer's empirical analysis confirms that female and minority Democratic judicial appointees tend to be more liberal than other Democratic appointees—on ideological grounds. Senators on both sides of the aisle employ obstructionist tactics, and both parties have made judicial selection and confirmation a campaign issue.

In explaining the rise of mobilization strategies, Scherer relies upon two assumptions: Politicians act in self-interest to attain reelection, and politicians perceive that they attain reelection most likely when their party base gets out and votes. According to the author, what has changed over the course of the last several decades is the path to achieving the second goal. The old party system's political patrons were instrumental in "getting out the

vote." Politicians often repaid this service with judgeships: "[L]ocal party activists under the old party system viewed lower court judgeships as jobs to be distributed to friends and campaign contributors" (p. 18). Even if Scherer somewhat overstates matters by thus suggesting that lower federal court appointments were generally made without regard to qualifications, the underlying point remains.

Under the new party system, it is party activists who "get out the vote." Because modern activists care greatly about policy, the price they exact from politicians is different from that exacted by the old patrons. The greater leeway afforded by the Supreme Court to lower federal courts to vindicate individual constitutional rights makes federal courts a more attractive vista in which to pursue policy change, and in turn increases the importance to elite activists of lower federal court judges.

Scherer's undertaking differs from that of Sheldon Goldman in his comprehensive study of the lower federal court appointment process (*Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt through Reagan*, 1997). While Goldman focuses on the executive branch and seeks to place lower federal judge selection in historical context, Scherer offers a novel thesis to explain the evolution in the nomination and confirmation processes for lower federal judges. She places greater emphasis on the incentives for and action of the Senate, and also uses substantial empirical evidence of lower federal court voting patterns to show the success of the mobilization strategies.

The book's first part—its initial two chapters—locates judicial selection in historical context. First, Scherer presents a broad overview of the phenomenon and of her thesis. She then proceeds to demonstrate how, as the American political party system transformed from one based largely on patronage to one based largely on elite activism, the party affiliation of the president who appointed lower federal court judges played a larger and larger role in predicting the vote of judges in cases that raised controversial issues of the day.

The second part—the final seven chapters—presents elements of Scherer's argument in rewarding detail. Chapters 3 and 4 explain how mobilization strategies have overtaken presidential selection of judicial nominees. Chapter 5 details how interest groups on both sides responded by focusing on the Senate confirmation hearings. Chapter 6 explains how, in response, senators increasingly employed devices designed to delay or obstruct confirmation hearings and votes; it also provides a useful catalog of these devices and their use. Chapter 7 discusses and catalogs the use of lower court judicial selection on the campaign trail. Chapter 8 analyzes and rejects divided government as an alternative justification for the growing politicization of lower court judicial selection. Chapter 9 briefly concludes.

Scherer bolsters her claim about the party system's evolution and its effect upon lower federal court judges by

empirically measuring differences in votes on controversial issues of the day by judges appointed by presidents of different parties. Her analysis finds little disparity in voting under the old party system, a growing difference during the transition years, and a sizable disparity under the new party system. The only quibble is that the old party system period—1940 to 1947—predates (perhaps necessarily) the increase in policy-oriented litigation in the federal courts (e.g., on p. 14: “There is little doubt . . . that interest groups *intensified* their litigation strategy in the 1950s”). Even if Fair Labor Standards Act enforcement was “largely left to the lower federal courts” (p. 31), policy-oriented litigation that might have generated disagreement was not, on Scherer’s own account, then common. Thus, the data are consistent with the absence of disagreement among judges resulting from absence of litigation likely to have generated such differences. Still, the data strongly support her thesis.

One issue with Scherer’s methodology concerns the situation in which one president appoints a judge to the federal district court, and another president elevates the judge to the court of appeals. The choice of whether to count the judge as appointed by one president or the other will affect the final data, with the greatest impact where the presidents are of opposing parties. The latter situation, while not common, is also not unheard of: As the author acknowledges, “[H]ome state senators or other prominent local party leaders still play a role in the selection of district court judges” (p. 19).

Scherer’s treatment of such situations is ambiguous, although she appears to count the judge as appointed by the president who made the initial trial court appointment (e.g., on p. 201, explaining methodology as looking to the president who appointed the judge “to the federal bench”). (And, since in her study she includes votes cast by district judges “sitting by designation” on appellate panels, she necessarily counts for that purpose the trial-level appointing president.) Others have been similarly ambiguous (see Richard L. Revesz, “Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,” *Virginia Law Review* 83 [1997]: 1717–72, referring to “Republican and Democratic judges”; Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, “Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation,” *Virginia Law Review* 90 [2004]: 301–54, referring to “Republican and Democratic appointees”). At a minimum, commentators should be clear on the point. Further, given Scherer’s distinction between the appointment of district and circuit court judges, counting the appellate-level appointing president makes more sense (see Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman’s underlying data at [www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/judges/data.html](http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/judges/data.html), which seems to adopt this approach).

These minor points notwithstanding, *Scoring Points* is an important contribution to the literature on the selec-

tion of lower federal court judges, and more generally on the American political system.

**Diversity in Democracy: Minority Representation in the United States.** Edited by Gary M. Segura and Shaun Bowler. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005. 316p. \$45.00.

**Freedom Is Not Enough: Black Voters, Black Candidates, and American Presidential Politics.** By Ronald W. Walters. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. 239p. \$27.95.

— Claudine Gay, *Stanford University*

*Diversity in Democracy* is an ambitious book—even more ambitious than its subtitle suggests. Together with an impressive team of contributors, Gary Segura and Shaun Bowler set out to examine how minority Americans—blacks and Latinos, in particular—engage with the democratic political process, from how they align themselves within the existing party system to how they use the tools of democratic citizenship (namely, the vote) to advance their interests. In many ways Segura, Bowler, and their colleagues succeed and, in the process, reveal a number of important empirical phenomena and relationships, such as the value of descriptive representation in promoting both political trust and participation. Because of its contribution to basic knowledge about minority political behavior, this book would certainly be a valuable addition to any minority politics syllabus. However, its ambition is both a source of strength and a weakness.

For the reader, what begins as a rush of excitement about the sheer scope of research questions, examined by the nearly two dozen contributors, eventually gives way to frustration at the lack of a single, cohesive narrative uniting the disparate essays. While Segura and Bowler strive in their introduction to identify the common themes that unite the research, the effort requires that they define key concepts (e.g., “context”) in ways that are so broad and imprecise as to divest them of their meaning—and, hence, their ability to provide a framework for interpreting the cumulative significance of the many research findings. Moreover, the contributors are not consistently in dialogue with one another, as demonstrated by occasional failures to acknowledge points of conflict across essays. By choosing breadth or depth, and allowing their contributors considerable research discretion, Segura and Bowler have produced a book that is difficult to put down (because the research is so compelling), but that also leaves the reader asking, “What does it all add up to?”

This is, in some sense, two books. The first is concerned with the issue of minority representation—not only the mechanisms that insure the substantive representation of minority interests but also the psychological effects associated with the descriptive representation of minority Americans. In an essay that draws on more than two decades of polling data from California, Zoltan Hajnal, Elisabeth

Gerber, and Hugh Louch examine how direct democracy fares as a tool for advancing a public policy agenda favorable to and favored by minority groups. The authors ask whether the initiative process systematically enables “a white majority to tyrannize a non-white minority,” with blacks, Latinos, and Asians more often than not on the losing side of direct democracy contests (p. 123). As opposed to the conventional wisdom, what they find is that minorities in fact are often on the winning side, voting with the majority on most ballot initiatives. This holds even for those initiatives that touch on (nonracial) issues known to be of particular concern to minority groups (e.g., education, crime, poverty). Yet direct democracy is not without its pitfalls. The research shows, for example, that the initiative process works against minority interests—especially Latino interests—on issues in which minority groups themselves are explicitly targeted; Proposition 209, which dismantled affirmative action in California and which was strongly opposed by a majority of blacks, Latinos, and Asians, is a classic example.

But while direct votes on race-targeted legislation clearly represent the most severe threat to minority interests, it is unclear whether the initiative process is otherwise as benign as Hajnal and his colleagues suggest. Even if white Californians rarely succeed in passing initiatives that are opposed by minorities, a fact that contributes to the authors’ sanguine view of direct democracy, there is still the possibility that the policy outcomes (i.e., the status quo when the majority opposes the initiative, the new legislation when the initiative succeeds) are much closer to white Californians’ mean ideal point than to the mean ideal points of nonwhite Californians. This would be evident in disparities between the sizes of the white and nonwhite majorities on proposition votes, and would in part reflect unequal access to the initiative process. White Californians may be better able than nonwhites to use the initiative process as a tool for advancing their interests and, importantly, for circumventing state legislatures where minorities have gained access; nonwhites may be more reliant on state legislatures. Surely this is a factor that should be considered when assessing whether direct democracy endangers the substantive interests of minority Americans.

With the notable exception of racially targeted initiatives, Hajnal and his colleagues demonstrate that the key to minority success in the initiative process is cohesive voting. Similarly, Bowler and Todd Donovan, in the second of four essays concerned with minority representation, find that minority political behavior determines the efficacy of cumulative voting (CV) as a mechanism for ensuring the representation of minority interests, as measured by the election of minority officeholders. On the basis of a review of 100 local elections conducted under cumulative voting systems, the authors conclude that CV can be as effective as the (increasingly unpopular) district-

ing mechanisms typically used to promote greater minority representation. However, since the authors chose not to present any of the statistical analyses needed to support this conclusion—or to support their subsequent argument that an organized and cohesive minority vote accounts for the success of CV—it is impossible for the reader to assess the validity of their claims.

The remaining two essays on representation—one by Katherine Tate and Sarah Harsh, the second by Susan Banducci, Donovan, and Jeffrey Karp—consider how descriptive representation on the basis of race and, in the case of Tate and Harsh, gender influences the political beliefs and attitudes of constituents. Using data from the American National Election Study, the essays alternately show that when a constituent and his or her legislator are of the same race, not only is the legislator evaluated more favorably (e.g., higher approval ratings and viewed as more “in touch”), but at least some constituents also adopt a more positive orientation toward government in general and are more likely to vote. The authors succeed in highlighting a number of interesting empirical relationships—none of which are altogether new and most of which have been examined in greater depth in previous work, including in a recent book by Tate (*Black Faces in the Mirror*, 2003)—but they fail in offering much insight into the nature of these relationships. For example, Tate and Harsh never clarify whether the effect of descriptive representation on approval ratings reflects the operation of group stereotypes or the consequence of actual policy responsiveness. Had they attempted in their empirical analysis to address these competing hypotheses, the essay would have contributed substantially to our understanding of the significance of descriptive representation.

The latter two essays on descriptive representation, in their emphasis on how factors external to the individuals (e.g., the race or gender of their elected representative) shape their political attitudes and beliefs, touch on the second core theme contained within *Diversity in Democracy*: context. In four essays, Matt Barreto and Nathan Woods, Rodney Hero and Caroline Tolbert, Carol Uhlaner and Chris Garcia, and Martin Johnson and Stacy Gordon reveal the ways in which attitudes and beliefs are influenced by various aspects of the political and social environment in which individuals live. Hero and Tolbert examine how perceptions of political efficacy among whites and nonwhites vary with the racial and ethnic diversity and the frequency of ballot initiatives in a state. While the theoretical motivation for their expectations regarding the effects of diversity are never made entirely clear, Hero and Tolbert hypothesize that insofar as direct democracy is systematically biased in favor of a white majority over a nonwhite minority, in states that make frequent use of the initiative process nonwhites should exhibit lower political efficacy and whites a greater sense of political efficacy. In fact, they find no significant direct effects

associated with either diversity or direct democracy—the latter a result that Hajnal and his colleagues likely would find unsurprising given the frequency with which minorities are on the winning side of initiative outcomes. What Hero and Tolbert do not explore empirically, however, is how diversity and direct democracy interact to shape perceptions of efficacy, and to do so in ways that differ across racial and ethnic groups. Whether whites take comfort in direct democracy may depend on whether non-whites constitute a (voting) population large enough to determine initiative outcomes. Although Hero and Tolbert use the language of conditional effects throughout their essay, they ultimately test models that do not allow for such effects.

In contrast to Hero and Tolbert—as well as to Barreto and Woods, who link heightened Latino participation in Los Angeles County in the 1990s to the campaigns against three divisive ballot initiatives—Uhlaner and Garcia as well as Johnson and Gordon focus their attention on the social environment as an influence on political attitudes and orientations. In both essays, the racial and ethnic composition of individuals' social networks—the people with whom they live, work, and worship—is shown to have a significant influence on partisan identification among Latinos and blacks. Individuals who are more culturally integrated into their respective racial and ethnic communities—African Americans who socialize primarily with other African Americans, Latinos who socialize primarily with other members of their national origin group—are more likely to adopt their group's prevailing partisan norms, which are Democratic partisanship for blacks and Mexican Americans, Republican for Cubans. In their view of partisanship as a social identity, one whose salience depends in part on whether it is reinforced in everyday encounters, the essays are interesting. (And the perspective they offer differs markedly from that offered by Stephen Nicholson and Segura who, in their essay on the determinants of Latino partisanship, argue that it is the parties' records on the issues most salient to Latinos that is responsible for the persistence of Democratic identification among non-Cuban Latinos.) However, to the extent that the authors fail to take seriously issues of endogeneity, it is difficult to say what conclusions we can draw from the observed empirical relationships. Perhaps it is not that racially homogenous social networks reinforce partisanship, but rather that individuals with minority views (e.g., black Republicans) opt for more diverse networks, aware of the cool reception they can expect from most in-group members. Johnson and Gordon raise the possibility that selection effects may account for the correlation between partisanship and cultural integration among blacks, but then proceed with a statistical analysis that assumes such effects do not exist, a sure recipe for bias. More troubling still is the authors' use of causal language in discussing the results and in speculating on

their implications for long-term trends (e.g., declining residential segregation and its supposed effect on black partisanship).

The ambition that distinguishes *Diversity in Democracy* results inevitably from the collaborative efforts of a large, intellectually diverse and talented group of scholars. *Freedom Is Not Enough*, the new book by Ronald Walters, is ambitious by design. Walters takes the fortieth anniversary of the landmark Voting Rights Act (VRA) as an opportunity to reflect on how, and how successfully, African Americans have used the tools of the VRA—chief among them, the vote—to enhance their political power. Unlike many other scholarly treatments of post-VRA black politics, where attention so often is trained only on issues of minority districting and the election of black officeholders at the state and local level, Walters's book is focused instead on the ability of a cohesive and mobilized black electorate to influence national politics, presidential elections in particular. From the author's perspective, the significance of the VRA for black empowerment rests in its reaffirmation of the guarantees of the Fifteenth amendment and in its efforts to dismantle all obstacles to the free exercise of the vote. Across six presidential elections (from 1984 to 2004) and eight chapters, Walters describes how African Americans have made strategic use of the vote in their bid to move from mere freedom to full, meaningful citizenship.

Walters begins with a discussion of Jesse Jackson's presidential bids in 1984 and 1988, a discussion which will be familiar to anyone who has read his earlier accounts of these campaigns in *Black Presidential Politics in America* (1989). Walters's active involvement in the Jackson campaigns—particularly the 1984 bid—is evident in the anecdotes that add color to the chapter. The emphasis on the Jackson campaigns is an effort to illustrate the “leverage politics” model—defined by a mobilized and mobile black vote, organized and “controlled” by blacks themselves—that the author contends has been key to African Americans' success in advancing their political and policy interests. As evidence of the model's success in 1984 and 1988, he points to Jackson's influence on the final Democratic Party platform and the eventual integration of key members of Jackson's campaign staff into the leadership of the party. Sadly, what Walters does not discuss are actual policy outcomes. (He does observe that Bill Clinton later consulted with Jackson on affirmative action policy and that Jackson served as an adviser to the president on Africa, two facts that demonstrate only the success of leverage politics in advancing Jackson's own career.)

Walters's central argument is not simply that leverage politics is an effective strategy, but that it does not depend for its success on the presence of a black presidential candidate. (In fact, his case studies of the Carol Moseley Braun and Al Sharpton candidacies in 2004 demonstrate quite clearly that charismatic black presidential candidates are neither necessary nor sufficient.) In Chapters 3



through 7, Walters discusses the key role of the “black political infrastructure”—churches, advocacy groups, black media—in the mobilization of the black electorate. It is the ability of these organizations to register African Americans, to educate them about their choices and build consensus, and to get them to the polls that determines the bargaining power of the black vote. He chronicles, arguably in too much detail, the actions of these groups in the 1992–2004 elections. The discussion is a refreshing departure from journalistic accounts of black presidential politics that tend to overstate the importance of singular personalities or spokespersons. It is clear that the maintenance of this infrastructure will continue to be essential to the quest for meaningful citizenship.

But while Walters does not view the current absence of viable black presidential candidates as itself a threat to the ability of African Americans to use their vote to secure favorable political outcomes, he does see other threats to

black political power lurking on the horizon. The 2000 election debacle, as well as irregularities in 2004, exposed electoral practices that undermine the strength of the black vote. He points, for example, to felony disenfranchisement laws that have staggeringly disproportionate effects on African Americans (e.g., 31% of the black male population in Florida face lifetime voting bans). After an exhaustive review of practices, legal and illegal, that serve as barriers to effective black participation, and of proposed reforms that, he claims, fail to adequately address these barriers, Walters argues for the need for measures that will strengthen the VRA (as well as the recently passed Help America Vote Act). At stake are African Americans’ hard won political gains and their continuing ability to advance an agenda that meets the social and economic needs of their community. Freedom without power is not enough.

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## COMPARATIVE POLITICS

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**Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics.** By M. Steven Fish. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 313p. \$29.99.

— Paul Kubicek, *Oakland University*

In recent years, it has become abundantly clear that the democratic project in Russia has stalled. In 2004, Freedom House even moved Russia from the “partly free” to “not free” list of states. Russia’s democratic shortcomings are legion and well known: corruption, human rights abuses, electoral manipulation, use of the courts to silence regime opponents, and state control over the media. However, there has been little systemic attempt to explain why democracy has not been established in Russia.

M. Steven Fish’s book attempts to provide an answer to this question. He refuses to countenance claims that Russia is a (pseudo)democracy, documenting the fraud, abuse of power, restrictions on freedoms, and smothering of the opposition that has become more commonplace and more blatant under the administration of Vladimir Putin. While some of this is familiar ground, when it is put together, the case against the presence of democracy in Russia is damning. While acknowledging that Russia is freer than under Soviet rule, the author nonetheless classifies the current regime as an oligarchy, finding that it fails to meet the minimal conditions of democratic rule laid out by Robert Dahl and other scholars.

Why has this been the case? Fish attempts to answer this question by putting Russia in a broader global and postcommunist context. He first seeks to uncover through regression analysis on a variety of variables which factors

best explain (or fail to explain) the presence of democracy worldwide and in the postcommunist region. Those factors that he identifies as plausible general explanations are then examined more in depth in the Russian case. In this respect, he has broken important new ground by situating his case study of Russia within a very broad comparative framework. In so doing, he purposely eschews analysis that relies upon factors “unique” to Russia.

Fish finds that three factors best explain Russia’s democratic deficit: the country’s reliance on raw-material exports, continued state control over the economy, and the “superpresidential” constitutional framework. He thus dismisses arguments about supposed Russian underdevelopment (Russia underperforms on democracy given its level of development), political culture (which he finds does not seem to matter once economic development is controlled for), alleged problems of the Orthodox religion, ethnic diversity, or the country’s postcommunist heritage. On some of these scores one could argue with the analysis. Perhaps, for example, it is not absolute level of development but the lack of a middle class that matters, or maybe one needs to acknowledge that 70-plus years of communist rule in Russia (and, indeed, throughout the 12 post-Soviet successor states with democratic shortcomings) should count differently than the shorter and imposed communist experience in Hungary or Poland. Moreover, instead of considering the universe of virtually all states—some of which have had democratic governance for decades—the author might also have analyzed a subset of cases particular to the “Third Wave” of democratization (e.g., nondemocratic states from 1974 to the present).

That said, Fish’s conclusions are important, and no doubt some will be hotly contested. The presence of “resource

curse” in Russia should come as little surprise, although heretofore it has not received concerted attention. The perils of superpresidentialism are better known thanks to earlier works by Fish and others, but here he puts the case in comparative context and convincingly shows that a more powerful legislature bodes much better for democratization. It bears repeating that political culture—the cause célèbre of so much analysis in the 1990s—figures little in his analysis. Russians, in other words, are not to blame for their predicament.

The book’s most controversial arguments concern the presence of the state in the economy, which in turn gives the regime power to silence opponents (e.g., the takeover of Yukos) and prevent the emergence of groups (e.g., independent trade unions) that might challenge the status quo. Fish argues that the problem is not that Russia has seen too much reform (e.g., “shock therapy” is to blame for the problems) but that it has seen too little. Shock therapy stalled early, and opaque state–business relations, which led to the rise of “oligarchs” under Boris Yeltsin, continue to define the political economy and hinder the rise of an opposition. Although some may be loath to acknowledge the positive effects of rapid marketization, Fish convincingly demonstrates that more reform has been associated with more democracy, that economic reform laggards are undemocratic, and that the notion of a “gradual” reform path was a chimera. This will rankle many who have focused on the costs of market reforms, but on the big question of democracy, the evidence does show that economic reform goes together with democratization. Meanwhile, Fish demonstrates that despite some rhetoric of economic reform, little has been accomplished under Putin, while there has been significant backsliding. Discussing the political economy of Putinism, he contends: “The house that Putin is building bears a striking resemblance to the edifice that ran the Soviet system prior to Gorbachev’s rise to power. Its custodians might be even better fed” (p. 263).

Refreshingly, Fish anticipates and addresses some of his critics by noting that two of three of his explanations are proximate causes, and he does not try to explain their root causes (e.g., why economic reform lags in Russia), although his presentation of Russia’s course since the Gorbachev years often suggests some underlying causes. Ultimately, the author would note, Russia is not condemned to undemocratic rule, as policy choices (e.g., diversifying the economy, altering the constitution) could make a big difference. The problem is that the current elite has no incentive to undertake such change, and prospects for an “Orange Revolution” in Moscow appear very dim.

This is an important work, and should be read both by Russia specialists and those interested in comparative democratization. It is very well written and its presentation is easy to follow, making it amenable for undergrad-

uate course use as well. With this book, Fish has raised the bar for future work on Russian politics.

**Revolutionary Passage: From Soviet Union to Post-Soviet Russia, 1985–2000.** By Marc Garcelon. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005. 313p. \$23.95.

**How Russia Is Not Ruled: Reflections on Russian Political Development.** By Allen C. Lynch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 276p. \$70 cloth, \$24.99 paper.

— Venelin I. Ganey, *Miami University of Ohio*

Even a casual reader of the literature on postcommunist Russia will quickly realize that scholars who study that country face two main challenges. The first is doing research in a place where the course of events is hard to reconstruct, information is distorted or concealed, and relations of power are opaque. The second is to resist the temptation to make evidence from Russia fit preexisting intellectual agendas. Of these two challenges, the latter seems more formidable—even scholarly projects that enrich our factual knowledge may be led astray by the ambition to cast one’s findings as a confirmation of pet grand theories. Lamentably, Marc Garcelon’s book brings this quandary into sharp relief; reassuringly, Allen C. Lynch’s book proves that it may be avoided.

In *Revolutionary Passage*, Garcelon presents a detailed examination of an important story: the rise and fall of the Democratic Russia movement (DR). He demonstrates persuasively that the unleashing of *perestroika* precipitated the creation of an asymmetrical matrix of political opportunities that was advantageous to political entrepreneurs networking within the ranks of the Moscow-based intelligentsia. The term that Garcelon uses to describe the awakening of this constituency—“the specialist rebellion”—is rooted in his convincing analysis of, first, patterns of social stratification in the late Soviet period, and specifically the oversupply of university graduates, and, second, a solid general survey of the political and institutional dislocations triggered by Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms (Chapter 1). Deftly exploiting various openings into the hitherto monolithic façade of the communist regime—such as Andrei Sakharov’s electoral campaign in the Academy of Sciences and the controversy surrounding Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution—the cohort of “specialists” was able to transform the amorphous movement into a winning electoral coalition, which captured most of Moscow’s municipal councils, and to sustain the pro-reform political momentum, even as Gorbachev himself embraced the party’s hard-liners in late 1990 (Chapter 3). Thus, one of Garcelon’s major accomplishments is that his carefully crafted research, which illuminates the organizational genesis of DR and the social profile of its activists, provides a useful map of politically mobilized, late-Soviet Moscow.

The other accomplishment for which Garcelon should be commended is his cogent analysis of DR's heterogeneity. Since the very beginning, the movement was torn by internal conflicts pitting 1960s countercultural elites against 1970s dissidents, human rights activists against Russian nationalists, and party members against anti-party militants. The very process of transforming the movement into a potent political force aggravated these cleavages. The struggle of two groups in particular—"proceduralists" and "executive liberals"—proved to be crucial (Chapter 2). The former wanted to ensure "popular access to the democratic process" and valorized mass participation. The latter sought to streamline DR's organization with a view to ensuring its candidates access to power, and regarded the design of reforms and implementation of policies as the movement's ultimate *raison d'être*.

"Tragic" is how Garcelon describes the last phase of the story. When Boris Yeltsin emerged as Russia's undisputed leader in the aftermath of the failed August 1991 coup, he recruited some of the executive liberals in his team, disregarded the aspirations of the proceduralists, and generally spurned DR. The central trope in the last chapter of the book is therefore "abandonment": Political elites clustered around the presidency "abandoned" DR. Denied access to power, DR found itself relegated to the political fringes and soon unraveled—a development Garcelon implies, that hampered the progress of democracy in Russia.

What analytical perspectives can help us make sense of this drama? What are the broader implications of DR's fate? It is Garcelon's answers to these questions that are problematic. The analytical framework offered in the introductory chapter is unabashedly eclectic, a concoction of conceptual borrowings from the *Annales* school, Pierre Bourdieu's sociology, the comparative study of social movements, theories of revolution, and network analysis—but how these diverse vantage points are related to the DR story is not immediately clear. The relevance of certain approaches is undisputed, for example, Marc Garcelon's sociology of the late-Soviet period, or his account of how political openings galvanize anti-regime mobilization. The relevance of others is harder to grasp, for example, the invocations of the Russian *longue durée*. And still others are confusing, for example, the randomly repeated notions of "feudalization" and "habitus." Inexplicably, the one body of literature that seems directly related to the subject matter is omitted: classical writings on party building. It seems that Robert Michels's "iron law of oligarchy," Weber's explorations of "the routinization of charisma," and Moisei Ostrogorsky's analyses of "party machines" might shed ample light on phenomena like the split between executive liberals and proceduralists. Overall, then, Garcelon's project would have benefited from a more careful articulation of analytical assumptions and conceptual considerations.

But the most questionable message of the book is that Russia's crises stem from the fact that Yeltsin repudiated DR and embraced the "neo-liberal Washington consensus." To begin with, the passages where neoliberalism is singled out for anathematizing are utterly unoriginal—having offered a vivid empirically grounded narrative, Garcelon then succumbs to the temptation to become an undistinguishable voice in the huge choir denouncing this ideology. More importantly, the emphasis on neoliberalism as an overarching cause contradicts Garcelon's own findings. His study demonstrates that the fracturing of DR was well under way in September 1991—and therefore *preceded* the launching of Yeltsin's reforms. Moreover, Garcelon makes it clear that "neoliberalism" was a "causal" factor for a brief period of time, from late 1991 until early 1993, when, in his words, "the consolidation of [Victor] Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister brought an end to the attempt at revolution from above" (p. 196). Finally, this book yields ample evidence that Yeltsin was driven not by ideology but by power-struggle considerations (e.g., Garcelon convincingly explains that Yeltsin was indifferent to *the content* of the neoliberal "500-days plan" and endorsed it only because Gorbachev had rejected it). In light of the author's own analysis, then, to portray Yeltsin's strategy as the pursuit of an ideological project would be inexcusably simplistic. In sum, Garcelon's defense of a unilinear, unidimensional narrative of how neoliberalism triggered socio-economic collapse in Russia is at odds with the data presented in his study.

*How Russia Is Not Ruled* demonstrates that students of Russia who avoid the hot ideological debates of the day stand a better chance of offering theoretically engrossing and intellectually provocative ideas. Lynch's interpretation of recent Russian developments revolves around clearly delineated and compellingly developed analytical themes: the enduring impact of Soviet legacies, the weakness of the Russian state, the inescapable importance of Russian geography. This study should set the standard for what it means to take Russia's problems seriously.

To scholars like Garcelon who obsess about the vices of neoliberalism, Lynch points out that "many of the debates in the US and Western Europe about the responsibility for Russia's path of development in the 1990s are beside the point," because there is plentiful evidence that Yeltsin's governments "never pursued a policy of "shock therapy" as envisaged by Western advisors" (p. 94). But the author's more important point is that Russia's post-Soviet path was largely shaped not by ideological visions but by late-Soviet patterns of institutional decomposition and resource allocation. The key facet of this Soviet legacy is "the spontaneous seizure of the bulk of Soviet state economic assets by those who were also in control . . . of the emerging new national states"—a process that solidified Russian "crony capitalism" even "before the post-Soviet Russian political order was itself consolidated" (p. 50).

As Lynch shows, the crucial consequence of this pattern of strategic elite behavior was that “the Russian state that emerged in the 1990s was extraordinarily weak and unable to shape effectively much of its economic, social and political environment” (p. 75). It was the institutional restructuring, which occurred in the late-Soviet era, that accounts for the fact that postcommunist Russia had to confront the multiple challenges inherent in the political condition without possessing a viable infrastructure of governance. The dysfunctionality of the state is particularly damaging in the case of Russia, where, in addition to everything else, the state “must: a/ in effect find ways to compensate prospective investors for the higher degree of risk that they are likely to assume under Russian circumstances, and b/ redistribute a portion of the wealth from those few sectors of the economy that can be competitive . . . to the bulk of the country that cannot” (p. 205). Lynch amplifies this argument by surveying an array of infrastructural problems that are likely to derail any attempt to jump-start the Russian economy by means of injections of oil money (e.g., in 2001, 71% of the railroad system was considered obsolete by Russian standards, and the telecommunications grid is in need of \$40 billion in capital investment over the next decade). Reflecting on the undeniable enormity of these problems, the author points out that the claims of shock therapy’s critics that they had “a better plan . . . is a dubious proposition” (p. 94)—an observation whose cogency is hard to dispute.

Chapter 6 presents a masterful treatment of a key theme: the role of geography in Russia’s development. Lynch’s main insight is that if we “take geography seriously,” it would be easy to see “that there is an enormous difference between geologically existing resources and economically available resources” (p. 235). Russia has resources—but they are hard to get. Russia has productive units—but in most areas of the Russian economy, the intrinsic and irreducible costs of infrastructure as of production itself are two to three times that of almost any other country in the world. And attempts to expand resource “inputs” into the Russian economy would have to reckon with the fact that “market economics and Arctic development do not mesh well” (p. 233).

In his Conclusion, therefore, Lynch offers a somber assessment of Russia’s prospects. He predicts that it will remain an “enclave economy” in which both government and society are dangerously dependent on the price of oil and economic recoveries will remain tentative and fragile. He also argues that the political system will continue to be “superficially institutionalized” and chronically incapable of generating the “organizational efficiencies” enjoyed by accountable and therefore legitimate democracies. In short, what Lynch makes clear is that there may be no shortcuts to Russia’s post-Soviet prosperity. This message will certainly be ridiculed by experts who insist that they know “who is to blame” and “what is to be done.” For the rest of

us, it should become the cornerstone of any serious analysis of Russia’s predicament.

**The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks.** Edited by Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 432p. \$28.99.

— Consuelo Cruz, *Tufts University*

Representative democracies refuse to collapse in Latin America. They endure even in the face of challenges that, in the region’s past, have spelled democratic ruin. These include financial and economic crises, coup attempts, and persistent political and/or criminal violence. But if democracies stand, presidents fail with noticeable frequency. In the last 18 years, chief executives have resigned or been removed from office—without suspension of democratic rule—in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela. Interrupted presidencies, to borrow Arturo Valenzuela’s apposite description, may well become one of three interlinked regional democratic markers. The second potential marker is the ascendance of political outsiders and the return of outcasts: Obscure, improbable, and discredited candidates (re)emerge as viable, even formidable, electoral contenders. The third, though seemingly at odds with the other two, is in fact closely related: citizenries that waver between disenchantment and bitterness, apathy and mobilization.

Together, these traits may point to an underlying “reverse wave” effect, as democratization throws one country after another back into a kind of Huntingtonian void: a schism between growing political and socioeconomic pressures and declining or irrelevant political institutions. This gap has been bridged in the region’s history by a range of strategic adaptations—from intricate nets of oligarchic reciprocity to the hierarchically disciplined bargains that ultimately sustained long-lived authoritarian regimes. To varying degrees, political parties were instrumental in the execution of these and other strategies of governance and domination. By the second half of the twentieth century, political parties themselves were key strategic agents in most of the region’s countries. Today, however, parties, with a few notable exceptions, are again vulnerable to the caprice of personality and the manipulation of cliques, or have simply waned.

Democracy stands, yet nearly everything else is in flux, perhaps even at stake. Against this critical backdrop arrives the powerful anthology at hand. The shared virtues of its chapters are analytical lucidity and robust empirical knowledge. Indeed, all the chapters contribute to the volume’s general objective—to assess the quality of the region’s democratic regimes—yet commendably, none is a ledger disguised as analysis. Rather, each chapter seriously deals with old patterns *and* new deviations in order to make better sense of democratization processes and outcomes.



Like all successful edited volumes, this one underscores the plain fact that a good editor begins by selecting contributors who can grapple simultaneously with the collection's overarching theme and the complexities of their cases. Coeditors Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring easily deliver on this count. They also deliver a final product whose value exceeds the sum of its parts. Their introductory chapter is synthetic in the best sense of the term. Drawing on the contributors' analyses with refined intuition, Mainwaring and Hagopian extract a broad claim. Democratic advances and setbacks, as well as their distribution among countries, can be better understood by exploring the enmeshed ecologies in which politics' normative/attitudinal factors interact with the regional and international political environments.

Although this claim is inherently significant, it also points to the usefulness of a political-cultural complement to structural and institutional approaches. It matters, then, that the claim itself is well substantiated by Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán in their analysis of post-1978 democratization—an ambitious but nicely rendered chapter that is regional/international in scope and focuses on trends. And it matters, too, that the subsequent case studies add depth, in good measure because they too bring political culture back in to enhance the utility of alternative approaches.

Thus, Steven Levitsky and Kurt Weyland effectively contend with the long-standing, large-scale dilemmas of Argentina and Brazil—most notably, systemic instability in the former, and poverty and inequality in the latter. But in addition, these authors incorporate variables, such as value shifts, political imagination, organizational strength, and coalitional possibilities. In Argentina, Levitsky argues, an emergent elite democratic consensus and relatively strong civic and media organizations have increased democracy's resilience. And in Brazil, as Weyland shows, socioeconomic modernization certainly lends structural support to democracy, but its improved quality stems from a blend of growing elite acceptance of democracy, imaginative institutional experimentation, and more favorable conditions for coalition building.

Explaining patterns and deviations is also paramount for Michael Coppedge, whose excellent chapter on Venezuela demonstrates how citizens' interpretative frames, in combination with increasingly overbearing political parties, eroded the country's party-based democracy. The dynamic can be roughly sketched as follows. Significant numbers of Venezuelans—convinced of their nation's fundamental wealth and keenly aware of both public corruption and the dominant political parties' institutionalization of impunity—came to interpret economic decline as the handiwork of plundering politicians. Long the stewards and beneficiaries of the system, parties became the targets of the citizenry's moral indignation; and as they proved unable to respond effectively

to grievances, voters turned to an antiparty leader to set things right.

Another troubled democracy, Colombia, is skillfully examined by Ana María Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro. They identify and explain the perceptions and strategies of the institutional and extra-institutional players that have truncated the state's monopoly on coercive power. And they argue quite convincingly that one key result of such truncation is that while Colombia's democratic rights of representation and competition remain in effect, human and civil rights are repeatedly violated. Indeed, the assassination of candidates and journalists has become the bloody emblem of a political system in which the electoral game and the game of war are entwined.

In the chapter on Guatemala, Mitchell Seligson argues with characteristic insight that the peace accords strove ambitiously to establish an institutional foundation for democratic consolidation, but that the fulfillment of this grand project has been hampered by socioeconomic deficits and the absence of a corresponding democratic political culture. One important consequence: a list of unmet promises, plus the dangers they pose to democracy.

Writing on El Salvador, Elizabeth Wood deftly analyzes the interplay between the legacies of a tormented democratization and the *fuerzas vivas* of politics and society. Wood succeeds brilliantly at explaining the low quality of the country's new democracy. Specifically, political learning, institutional reform, and unprecedented freedoms bolster the odds for broader political inclusion and meaningful competition, while social exclusion, poverty, and rampant criminal violence undermine the citizenry's capacity and will for involvement in and support for the system. If, at last, the realistic options are exit, voice, and loyalty, it is still rational for most to choose the first, and if possible, go north.

The remaining chapters are also impressive. For Bolivia and Peru, respectively, René Mayorga and Martín Tanaka each argue with striking parsimony that political innovators can transcend historically entrenched obstacles and improve democracy's chances. Beatriz Magaloni convincingly demonstrates that Mexico's dominant party and its incumbents, seeking to legitimate electoral outcomes that they expected to be favorable, undertook a series of liberalizing electoral-institutional reforms. Spread over two decades, the reforms drove the system's stealth democratization.

Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica—arguably the region's most intriguing democracies—are conspicuously absent. The editors justify the trio's exclusion by pointing to their strong democratic traditions. No surprise if their democracies endure, or so goes the reasoning. But the strength of these same traditions did not preclude the breakdown of democracy in Chile and Uruguay in the 1970s. Equally important, why did it survive in Costa Rica? Further, should we ignore disturbing signs, such as the increasingly acute

political apathy among Chileans, or the diminishing identification with their political parties by Uruguayans and Costa Ricans? Perhaps the editors can be persuaded to undertake a second volume.

**The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist Societies.** By Rasma Karklins. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005. 219p. \$69.95 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

—Brendan Kiernan, *Sudbury, MA*

Comedian Flip Wilson headlined his first nationwide television special in September 1969. Risking his tentative hold on a new (white) audience, Wilson joked about a minister's wife who justified her latest shopping spree by claiming, "The Devil made me buy this dress." This declaration of self-indulgence later developed into "the Devil made me do it" and became a staple for one of the show's most popular recurring characters, Geraldine Jones. A comic genius, Flip Wilson understood the importance of a tag line that would resonate with his audience. Few fantasies can be more widespread than abdicating personal responsibility in the pursuit of a good time.

Political scientist Rasma Karklins points out a common excuse for corruption in postcommunist societies: "The system made me do it." Her book explores the foundations of this defense with the "ultimate goal" of "containing" postcommunist corruption and removing obstacles to democratic and economic progress (pp. 3, 37). She asks readers to accept three fundamental propositions: Postcommunist political corruption is a serious problem, some types of corruption are substantially worse than others, and corruption should be "controlled as much as possible." Karklins uses these propositions to provide the "main themes as well as the structural framework for the study" (p. 3). She marshals an impressive array of data to support her arguments: sociological surveys; surveys of firms, experts, and officials; case study data; ethnographic data; and reviews of the press.

As much as they might find it amusing or even time-saving, political scientists cannot rely for explanations on metaphysical characters like "the Devil." In Chapter 2, Karklins ties her adopted concept of "the system" to postcommunist reality through a comparative/situational analysis oriented around corrupt acts, perpetrators, and the costs imposed on victims, the state, and society. Her "Typology of Corrupt Acts" is aimed at showing "the nature, context, and political implications of post-communist corruption" (p. 37). The typology organizes corrupt acts around three levels: (I) "Everyday Interaction Between Officials and Citizens," (II) "Interaction within Public Institutions," and (III) "Influence over Political Institutions" (p. 25). Level I corruption, unsolicited bribery involving a police officer and a speeder at a traffic stop, for example, has little effect beyond the immediate act. The most hurtful type of corruption takes place at Level III, where self-serving action

by "collusive networks" of state officials can become "self-perpetuating," and lead to an "institutionalization of corruption and a change in the foundations of the political system" (p. 38). Karklins uses a variety of well-documented examples to illustrate key types of corruption at all levels. On the basis of the need to protect the "legitimacy and functioning of the state" (p. 21), she concludes that in the battle against corruption, "priority should be given to containing corrupt deals at the highest levels, especially in privatization and procurement" (pp. 16, 26–28).

Chapters 3 through 8 provide a plethora of background material intended largely to demonstrate the depth of the corruption problem and the need for action. Chapter 3, "The Experience of Corruption," relies on World Bank and other published surveys to summarize how corruption affects people living in postcommunist societies. Karklins argues here that the media have a special role in defining "what a society knows and does about corruption." Chapter 4, again using survey data, traces social and political patterns of thinking about corruption: "Attitudes determine whether people will participate in corrupt acts or will be active in trying to contain them" (p. 58). Chapter 5 discusses how the structures and processes of postcommunist states are influenced by the peculiar institutional legacy of preceding regimes. Chapter 6 starts from the assumption that corruption can be better understood by examining its opposite. Political theory is used to discuss the value of good citizenship and the "concrete benefits" of civic virtue. Chapter 7 explores existing anticorruption literature to find institutional configurations that have worked to contain corruption. The author argues for "an emphasis on countervailing powers, checks and balances, and monitoring by media and civil society." "The basic institutional formula for containing corruption," she maintains, "is to de-monopolize decision making, limit discretion, and enforce mechanisms of accountability" (p. 123). Chapter 8 explores the relationship between corruption and accountability "measured by electoral upsets, resignation of officials, the quality of media reporting and parliamentary hearings, reversals of corrupt deals, and investigations and convictions."

Karklins takes on the book's second major challenge in Chapter 9. Unlike Flip Wilson's sassy Geraldine Jones, Karklins cannot merely suggest corruption's power with a wink and a smile. She must explain how the system "makes them do it," that is, how incentive structures typical of postcommunism propagate a vicious cycle of corrupt behavior. Containing corruption involves showing how private interests can be harnessed for the public good, or at least kept from turning against it. Building on work done by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Robert Klitgaard, Karklins outlines "a framework for analyzing specific situations and thinking strategically about incentives and how to change them" (p. 161). She suggests that every corrupt act has three basic actors: "the person initiating the corrupt act, a

second person who participates actively or passively, and a third actor, an individual or group,” who pay the costs of the corruption, even though they may not be aware of it (p. 147). Identifying and specifying costs is the best way to get “third actors” involved and change the calculus for all participants: “The third actor is key in the containment of corruption” (p. 152). Successful containment, she argues, is based on increasing risk and uncertainty for all corrupt actors: “If potential victims and other third actors become galvanized to work to prevent corruption, it is possible to limit or even reverse the spiral of corruption” (p. 155).

Given the author’s ultimate goal of containing corruption, Chapters 2 and 9 are the heart of this book. Unfortunately, both chapters, and the book as a whole, are weakened by a lack of focus. There are two key drivers here, one related to goals, one to structure. First, Karklins never explicitly chooses a target audience. She fails to recognize and fully meet the needs of any one core constituency. Three are particularly important: 1) Policymakers will not find an easy-to-read, action-oriented, anticorruption primer. For all but the most bookish bureaucrat, this volume (with its beautiful cover art) is likely to remain (in a prominent place) on the shelf. 2) Comparative political analysts looking for new concepts and methods will find interesting assertions on targeting and battling corruption, but these assertions are unsupported through detailed and systematic analysis of comparative data over space and/or time. Anecdotal support of key assertions is certainly helpful, and Karklins does it well, but statements such as “corrupt networks tend to self-perpetuate” (p. 31) or “in the final analysis it all comes down to effective deterrence” (p. 160), beg for in-depth treatment. 3) Positive political theorists are likely to find their interest piqued—and later disappointed—when the author invokes “the basic notions of rational choice institutionalism” and the “interactive dynamics” (game theory?) involved in outlining “the calculus of people as they decide whether to engage in corruption or participate in its control” (p. 147). Unfortunately, Chapter 9 is neither detailed and rigorous enough to satisfy most formal modelers nor written in a way that would attract and keep a wider audience interested in an introduction to this approach.

A second reason for the book’s lack of focus is structural. Placing an unreasonable burden on her readers, Karklins splits key arguments between Chapters 2 and 9 and never shows how they can be tied together. Instead of building on the strengths of Chapter 2’s situational analysis and marshaling comparative data to provide the type of organized, detailed argumentation that would support her most provocative assertions, she marches readers through six chapters of materials that contribute only weakly to her most interesting arguments. To be fair, she employs this material, in part, to battle “strong popular and scholarly skepticism about the efficacy of institutional reforms”

(p. 146). Nevertheless, the author herself points out at the end of Chapter 2 that corruption “has political consequences that need to be spelled out and assessed” (p. 37). She does not follow through. For example, the entire cost side of the argument—Karklins rightly points to corruption’s economic, political, and social costs as underexplored territory—is left virtually untouched. Thus, her assertion in Chapter 9 that anticorruption messages for the all-important third actor will be compelling only if they identify concrete, short-term costs leaves the reader wondering how this might be done. Chapter 5’s discussion of the legacy of communist economic and political institutions, a vital part of the argument for a self-described neoinstitutionalist, is literally trapped in the middle, clearly informing neither Chapter 2 nor Chapter 9.

When weighing the contribution of a book with such compelling strengths and frustrating weaknesses, it may be helpful to return to comedian Flip Wilson for some words of advice. Another of his post popular lines is right on target here: “When you’re hot, you’re hot, when you’re not, you’re not.” This book, despite its weaknesses, is hot. It has a simple message that can and should motivate further research: “Citizens have a choice whether they will be accomplices and victims of corruption, or whether they become part of a counterforce” (p. 152). Karklins should continue to marshal the counterforce while making it easier for the troops to follow.

**The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies.** Edited by Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 361p. \$95.00.

— Ian Budge, *University of Essex*

This book, consisting of an introductory and concluding chapter by the editors and 13 case studies by country specialists, subjects the fashionable thesis of the growing presidentialization of the chief executive office to systematic comparative review. The countries studied are mainly in Western Europe but also include Israel, Canada, and the United States. Authors address a common set of questions within the context of each country, shaped by an initial conceptual examination of what constitutes presidentialization. This is distinguished from the simple existence of a presidential or semipresidential constitutional regime. While both favor presidentialism, in the sense of the power and autonomy of the head of government, this can fluctuate over time, as it can within the classic parliamentary systems. This distinction between presidentialization as a process and the constitutional provisions for a presidential or parliamentary system is a useful feature of the book. Given the potential confusion between these regime types and the dynamic process that is the book’s focus, it is perhaps unfortunate that another name could not have been found for the processes favoring executive autonomy and power. However, given that popular and

journalistic discussions have already found a name for them, it is perhaps inevitable that they should be termed presidentialization in spite of the potential ambiguities of the term.

In their illuminating and succinct introductory chapter, Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb make a clear distinction between process and regime, pointing out that the extent of effective presidentialization can fluctuate under presidential regimes as well as under parliamentary ones—though with institutional factors favoring it, it will always tend to be higher in the former than the latter. Their Figure 1.1 (p. 6) is particularly useful as a foundation for this discussion.

Three dimensions of presidentialization are identified: executive, party, and electoral. In all of these, the ability of heads of governments to free themselves from constraints on their actions and to accumulate more resources to support themselves is the key factor. The developments driving these processes are the internationalization of politics, the growth of the state, the emergence of television, and the erosion of the traditional social cleavages—freeing voters to respond to personal appeals.

With these bases for coordinated inquiry established, the country chapters examine such trends as increasingly centralized control of policymaking by the chief executive, claims to a personal rather than a party mandate from elections and also from the ordinary members of their party (over the heads of activists), and candidate-centred electoral processes. Generally they come to the conclusion that such trends are clearly apparent, even in so-called consensus democracies and even in systems where they have always been evident, such as the United States.

The design of the book—with quite detailed guidelines producing a common framework of discussion for the particular cases, but all of the specialists applying them with detailed knowledge of “their” country—is a considerable strength. It deflects any criticisms that might be made about facile generalizations or an “ideal type” approach. Each author struggles with the complexities of national politics under which general trends tend to get buried, but is obliged to uncover these trends under the remit from the editors. The result is a much clearer focus on what often comes out in such volumes as a fuzzy process, long on assertions but short on consistent evidence and riddled with inconsistencies. The book admirably seeks to avoid these weaknesses and, to a large extent, succeeds.

If this reviewer remains somewhat unconvinced of the long-term implications of the presidentialization argument, it is for two reasons that stem from the nature of the evidence, rather than from any particular weaknesses of the discussion. The first is the crucial question of how we know whether the trends the analyses uncover are not within the limits of normal fluctuation in these political systems, rather than constituting the kind of fundamental and inevitable change that the thesis of presidentialization

implies. Linked to this is the question of whether historical precedents for “presidential” behavior cannot be found before 1960, which is the general starting date for the inquiry. These points are strengthened by the stress in some of the country chapters, notably Spain, Sweden, and the UK, but also that of Mauro Calise on Italy, on the short-term contingent factors producing presidential behavior. Did not Andreotti or Moro, for example, make themselves largely independent of their factionalized party structure before modern developments took place? And is not dyarchy rather than sole leadership evident in some of the most recent governments (Andrea Fischer and Gerhard Schröder, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown), not to say a predominance of the Cabinet under figures like John Major in nineties Britain?

In terms of policy autonomy, too, one can think of major decisions—going into or waging war, developing the nuclear deterrent—made by past prime ministers or presidents on their own or with a small coterie of advisors, long before the 1960s. The development of a mass press around 1900 had similar effects to the emergence of television in midcentury, while Gladstone’s, de Valera’s or Bismarck’s election campaigns were dominated by a single personality. Is it not *all* situational? Or if structural changes are promoting chief executive power now, have they not been doing so for a long time?

This absence of a specific historical benchmark is a weakness, but as stressed above, it stems more from the general thesis being examined than from the book itself. Providing detailed analysis of other periods for comparison would have doubled its size. So the authors can certainly be forgiven and indeed praised for providing such detailed analyses of current trends. These certainly do make the point that general developments are for now strengthening the position of the chief executive in a variety of countries and under a diversity of formal constitutions. Along the way, the authors provide a wealth of detailed information on governmental developments in advanced industrial democracies, which will be useful to country specialists and comparativists alike. With its additional and very topical clarification of the presidentialization thesis itself, this book is a stimulating read and a very worthwhile purchase for libraries and specialized courses, as well as a distinguished contribution to its own field of research.

**Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa.** By Daniel N. Posner. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 337p. \$70.00 cloth, 26.99 paper.

— Sheldon Gellar, *Indiana University*

In the popular mind, ethnic conflict in Africa invariably revolves around deep-seated tribal identities and rivalries. Unfortunately, this perspective ignores the fact that Africans, like people everywhere, have multiple group identities. Although Daniel Posner singles out tribal affiliations



as an important source of ethnic cleavage in Africa, he sees ethnicity as also including group identities based on race, clan, region, language, and religion. While much of the book provides a meticulous examination of the evolution of ethnic cleavage structures and ethnic politics in one African country, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, as the title indicates, is far more than a detailed case study of Zambia, a former British colony known as Northern Rhodesia before independence. It is also a splendid primer as to how to systematically apply institutional analysis to explain political behavior.

In his introductory chapter, Posner argues that individuals have multiple and shifting group identities that are situational and strategic and affected by the institutional context in which they operate. His book strives to show how institutions—that is, rules, regulations, and policies—not only shape the repertoire of potentially mobilizable ethnic identities but also people's incentives to choose one group identity over another (p. 2). Unlike many studies that focus on the causes of ethnic conflict or why ethnicity is politically useful, Posner seeks to explain why ethnic conflicts and competition break out along one line of ethnic division rather than another.

Like Robert Bates, his former mentor, Posner analyzes ethnic groups as coalitions that have been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits. These coalitions are based on three propositions: (a) People want resources from the state; (b) they believe that having someone in their ethnic group in a position of power will facilitate their access to these resources; and (c) they believe that the best way to get one of their own in power is to build or join a coalition with their group members.

Using institutional analysis, the author shows how colonial institutions set up by the British created incentives for individuals in Northern Rhodesia to invest in tribal identities. Precolonial tribal identities thus became stronger in areas that had strong chiefs and "Native Authority" institutions, while they became weaker in areas where tribes had no Native Authority of their own. Colonial policies also determined the relative size and physical location of Zambia's more than 70 tribes by establishing fixed administrative boundaries for Native Authorities.

Colonial educational policies provided institutional incentives for Zambians to invest in four major regional linguistic groups, Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, and Lozi, down from the more than 50 tribal languages spoken before the advent of colonial rule. In selecting only four African languages to be used for instruction in primary schools, colonial educational institutions thus insured their dominant position in the areas where they were used and created new ethnic identities based on language.

By independence, tribal and linguistic identities had become the two most salient ones for most Zambians. Having demonstrated how these ethnic identities emerged, Posner then goes on to explain how regime changes and

electoral rules shaped ethnic politics, cleavages, and coalition building in postindependent Zambia. Marshaling impressive evidence, he argues that political conflict in competitive one-party regimes governed by single-member plurality (SMP) electoral rules will revolve primarily around constituency-level ethnic cleavages. On the other hand, in a competitive multiparty system, where the arena of political competition is the entire country and where voters select the president as well as their constituency-level representatives, political conflicts will revolve around the broader category of ethnic groups that divide the nation. In Zambia, constituency-level politics centered around smaller tribal identities, while at the national level, ethnic politics centered around larger linguistic identities as politicians played the linguistic card, rather than the tribal card, because of their need to build a larger coalition.

The last part of the book asks whether the modes of institutional analysis used in the Zambian case can be applied elsewhere in Africa and beyond Africa. Posner admits that institutional arrangements comparable to those found in Zambia—that is, SMP districts and regime shifts from competitive one-party to multiparty regimes—can be found only in Sierra Leone, Kenya, and Tanzania. The analysis works splendidly for Kenya, fairly well for Sierra Leone, but not so well for Tanzania where tribal identities are not terribly salient. Insufficient competitive elections, lack of regime changes, different electoral rules, high levels of urbanization, and federal systems all reflect different kinds of institutional arrangements that lead to different outcomes from those found in Zambia. These institutional differences, however, do not negate Posner's basic argument; they merely point to the need to see how institutional differences play out in different political settings and contexts.

The book's final chapter is a tour de force in its brilliant use of different examples drawn from India, Nigeria, Zaire, Ireland, Moldova, and the United States to show how different kinds of institutional arrangements shape identity choices and ethnic coalitions differently, and why the boundaries of political systems are one of the key determinants of context in which ethnic identities and coalitions are formed. Here, Posner goes beyond regime changes and provides short but telling cases studies that illustrate how federal regimes and changes in the franchise affect and shape the choice of ethnic identities.

One of the rare shortcomings in the book is the paucity of references to institutional arrangements in African countries not formerly under British colonial rule. Tribal identities do not mean much in highly urbanized countries like Senegal where religion, region, and language are far more important than tribe and clan and where urban neighborhoods and political parties are multiethnic. Posner also has little to say about class and under what conditions class becomes an important element of group identity. Despite these caveats, his book remains a splendid piece

of work that merits being widely read by political scientists of all stripes because of its successful integration of institutional analysis, area studies, and qualitative and quantitative methodologies.

**White Backlash and the Politics of Multiculturalism.**

By Hewitt Roger. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 172p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

**Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West.**

By Quintan Wiktorowicz. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. 248p. \$75.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

— Jillian Schwedler, *University of Maryland*

A book on the white backlash to multicultural politics and another on recruitment to a radical Islamist group seem odd choices to examine together, but the resulting dialogue emphasizes the extraordinary value of comparative methods in general and ethnographic research in particular. In *Radical Islam Rising*, Quintan Wiktorowicz asks why rational individuals would join a high-risk organization such as al-Muhajiroun, a radical Islamist movement based in the UK. Joining entails high risk because members are “targets of stigma, harassment, retaliation, and even more extreme sanctions such as loss of a job, injury, or death” (p. 206; also pp. 45–77). Rational-actor models, he argues, cannot explain why thousands of individuals were attracted to the movement. (The group was formally disbanded in late 2004 but likely continues underground.) Wiktorowicz offers a five-stage model, and the chapters are organized accordingly.

The initial stage is cognitive opening: when an individual is open to alternative belief systems. This may be facilitated by activists who establish relations with potential converts, but triggers also include deteriorating economic conditions, political repression, cultural alienation, identity crisis, generational gaps, experiences with racist or religious discrimination, or death in the family. Cognitive openings are necessary but insufficient for recruitment, as potential converts must also engage the second stage, religious seeking: when “affected individuals seek to address their grievances and concerns through a religious idiom” (p. 207). Religious seeking can be self-initiated, but the most common pattern is that “disaffected seekers are guided by someone already in the movement, particularly where the cognitive opening is facilitated by movement outreach in the first place” (pp. 206–7).

Even if the conditions for cognitive opening and religious seeking are satisfied, why do individuals choose to learn about Islam from al-Muhajiroun rather than from some other source? Here is the pivotal mechanism in Wiktorowicz’s model, when seekers accept the credibility and religious authority of al-Muhajiroun’s spiritual leader and founder, Omar Bakri Mohammed. Only if seekers trust Omar’s authority as an Islamic scholar can the final stages

of culturing and commitment be realized. The former entails deep socialization into the group’s ideology as a way of overcoming obstacles to high-risk activism; the latter reflects the establishment of a deep commitment to the movement’s objective of overthrowing non-Islamic regimes, even at great personal risk to members (including death).

Although Wiktorowicz employs a new vocabulary, his model will be familiar to scholars of social movements, cults, and terrorism—literatures he cites extensively and appropriately throughout this highly readable book. The analysis does an excellent job in locating al-Muhajiroun among a wide range of radical movements, rather than exclusively among Islamist groups. The author is also correct that there is nothing particular about Islam that encourages high-risk activism. For example, in early encounters between al-Muhajiroun activists and potential recruits, the activists frequently hide their affiliation and guide conversations to create cognitive openings and facilitate religious seeking; only later do activists introduce particular tenets of al-Muhajiroun ideology. These are common recruiting tactics for groups with extremist ideologies.

However, a significant problem emerges with the model. Wiktorowicz rightly notes that both cognitive openings and religious seeking are necessary but insufficient conditions for joining al-Muhajiroun; rather, the pivotal moment is the acceptance of Omar’s authority. But here the argument is tautological: The causal mechanism that explains joining al-Muhajiroun is acceptance of the authority of the leader of al-Muhajiroun; in effect, the mechanism of acceptance is itself the act of acceptance. Wiktorowicz thus *describes* joining rather than *explaining* it.

Nevertheless, the work remains valuable for its detailed description of the internal party workings of al-Muhajiroun. The author conducted nearly three months of fieldwork in 2002, and he combines in-depth interviews (including several fascinating dialogues with Omar), party documents, newspapers, and surveys to provide a close examination of the ideological commitments and recruiting practices of a group almost wholly overlooked in the literature on radical Islam.

Roger Hewitt’s *White Backlash and the Politics of Multiculturalism* focuses on the reactions to three racist murders in the white working-class neighborhood of Greenwich in the early 1990s. In this extraordinary book, he uses ethnographic research to produce a subtle analysis of the “white backlash” against the politics of multiculturalism. Unlike the white backlash of the 1960s when much of the focus of antiracist policies was on competition in the workplace, the backlash of the 1980s reflected a more complex response by local working-class whites at a time when middle-class concerns about multiculturalism and antiracism dominated national political agendas. Hewitt provides a nuanced view of how the complexities of racial, class, and multicultural politics play out locally.

Multiculturalism emerged in the late 1970s as a rearticulation of the antiracist narrative of the 1960s that had been particularly concerned with equal opportunities. Despite often producing similar policy outcomes, anti-racist narratives are often at odds with multicultural narratives: The former emphasize the structural nature of racism (and thus prescribe equal opportunities as a remedy), while the latter focus on diversity and mutual understanding. Multiculturalism itself is characterized by two distinct narratives: One is used specifically in domestic contexts and encompasses the moral and political vocabulary of the post-Holocaust period; the other is international in scope, tied to discourses of rights, migration, and settlement, and is thus less susceptible to changing local circumstances.

By exploring white backlash through the complex interplay of local and national narratives, Hewitt emphasizes that these political contests are as much about class as they are about race. A gulf began to emerge between the “sections of the middle class that had supported black progress and the white working-class groups who felt themselves materially threatened by the extension of racial equality in ways that the middle class were not” (p. 6). While broader national attention focused on the continued oppression of blacks, working-class whites often protested the new policies using racist language that led the middle class to portray them as backward, redneck-style bigots. This tension was exacerbated by silence in the media and among local government agencies about certain crimes against working-class whites (for example, against the elderly). The failure to address these and other grievances led to the emergence of a white-backlash narrative in Greenwich whereby “white-on-black” crimes were seen as unfairly and consistently characterized as racist, while “black-on-white” crimes were denied their racial dimension or ignored entirely. At the local level, then, a “core of violent racist adolescents and their adult mentors, plus a small supporting cast of racial bigots, were located within a wider pool of people who were at odds with the local political order in which, to them, minority concerns were given precedence” (p. 55). Ultimately in Greenwich, the official responses to the racist killings were understood as the promotion of a “special interest group” by a local authority “against the will of a victim white community” (p. 152). Hewitt argues that this line between unambiguous racism and the rejection of an equalities narrative by a broader white working-class community will continue to play out politically in coming years.

Hewitt’s theoretical apparatus is one of narratives and counternarratives functioning at various local, national, and international levels. This approach provides extraordinary analytic purchase for disentangling the political salience of race and for understanding how competing narratives are generated and connected to various sites of

power (local and national government agencies, tenants associations, branches of racist parties, schools, etc.). As local and national policies employ various multicultural frameworks to redress racial problems, the policies produce peculiar results that feed white backlash. For example, multiculturalism suggests that “cultures” should be treated on equal terms. One policy prescription is thus to “celebrate diversity,” a practice that entails identifying distinct and often national cultures and their caricatured symbols (native costumes, flags, cuisine, etc.). Working-class whites are then hard-pressed to identify symbols of their own culture. As a result, policies celebrating diversity can reinforce tensions surrounding complex issues of race and international migration. Indeed, migrant communities seldom find their own complex identities and experiences reflected in these performances of multiculturalism.

Although a close analysis of Greenwich anchors the analysis, Hewitt’s work is broadly comparative and includes sustained analysis of the politics of multiculturalism in the United States and a briefer examination of Canada and Australia. This is clearly a must-read for scholars of racism and British politics, but those exploring migration, urban politics, political culture, and contentious politics in general will find much here of exceptional value. Given Hewitt’s clear narrative and elegant prose, the book is also surprisingly accessible for advanced undergraduate courses in a manner atypical of many substantive theoretical contributions.

Putting the works of Wiktorowicz and Hewitt in dialogue raises questions about the racial politics surrounding al-Muhajiroun. While Wiktorowicz details how the movement primarily attracts followers of South Asian origin, he does not locate al-Muhajiroun among local narratives about immigration, race, and class, nor does he address the sort of spatial and temporal variations captured in Hewitt’s ethnographic research. One wonders, for example, when one al-Muhajiroun activist notes that his father “stands with the Union Jack” (p. 56), whether this really reflects an allegiance to a British identity over a Muslim identity, as Wiktorowicz suggests. Hewitt examines, however, how the racist British National Party (BNP) appropriated the Union Jack as a symbol of white Britain against the threat of “black” immigration, which suggests not an “identity crisis” but rather racist politics. Hewitt repeatedly encountered schoolchildren opposed to efforts to “put black in the Union Jack” (pp. 128–29)—a racist BNP phrase. Read in this light, one wonders whether the overwhelmingly immigrant al-Muhajiroun is directly responding to this racist narrative when it routinely issues statements that it will not rest until “the black flag of Islam is flying over Downing Street” (p. 78). Ethnographic research of the sort undertaken by Hewitt would be necessary to unpack these complexities surrounding al-Muhajiroun, but such work would substantially advance our understanding not only

of racist politics but also of the specific local circumstances that lead individuals to join radical organizations.

**Imagining Brazil.** Edited by Jessé Souza and Walter Sinder. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. 318p. \$95.00.

— Jamie Elizabeth Jacobs, *West Virginia University*

This book approaches the impact of globalization on peripheral societies by identifying the philosophical, cultural, and economic transformations that accompanied Brazil's modernization in the twentieth century. By emphasizing the foundations of national identity and searching for points of resonance between these foundations and the forces of globalization, the authors examine the conceptions of modernity and intersections of the global context with what it is—and what it means—to be Brazilian.

The editors set up the volume as a response to the processes associated with globalization. However, the real value lies in its diversity of views about a complex society and the multidisciplinary approach to understanding Brazil's political order. As such, it blends contributions from the disciplines of history, political science, and sociology with those of writers, critics, and "scholars of culture." These perspectives are divided into a two sections: the first, which approaches society and politics directly, and a second that explores the deeper political context of literature and culture. Each of these sections addresses the "uneasy juxtapositions" of opposites that are familiar to students of Brazilian society and politics, yet the authors manage to go beyond the familiar descriptions of social inequality to find the political, economic, social, and cultural forces that contribute to unequal citizenship.

The development of the argument about unequal citizenship relies on the idea that there are ambiguities and contradictions in the Brazilian "social imaginary" that obscure, rather than reduce, the persistence of unequal citizenship. Jessé Souza explores the Brazilian social imaginary, in particular, the idea that society is unified in its multiplicity though a common celebration of diversity within a unifying national frame. He argues, however, that the constructed idea of unity in difference masks an "intensely segmented" public sphere and obscures persistent inequality. As such, it perpetuates what he calls the "naturalization of inequality" and undermines the possibility that either social theory or the process of politics ultimately will offer tools to extend citizenship. Leonardo Avritzer argues that attempts to remedy the problem by deliberately constructing a more democratic public space are hampered by conflicting logics. Economic modernization—rather than encouragement of political modernization and accountability—instead reinforced tendencies toward privileging the private over the public. Social modernization, on the other hand, was the result of mobilization in opposition to authoritarianism but generated few lasting inroads for changing the

broader structure of politics. The result is a hybrid form of the democratic public space characterized by conflict between its institutional and popular elements. Neves zeroes in on the argument that political institutions—specifically the judiciary—can be the custodian of citizenship and emphasizes that this strategy is unlikely to deepen democratic citizenship. His consideration of the difficulties of relying on the judiciary to guarantee citizenship underscores the inherent inequality of judicial access, especially the overintegration of the privileged and underintegration of the vast majority of the population (pp. 68–69).

The second half of the volume offers what few edited volumes on politics attempt: a deeper view of the cultural context that underlies the political and social developments of the first half of the book. This broadened scope is both a strength for its ambition to provide ample cultural grounding for political forces and a hurdle for the more general reader unfamiliar with cultural traditions. For the reader strictly interested in politics and governance, the importance of the latter half of the volume could be, at times, tangential even as it provides a necessary counterpart for the social and political phenomena described in the first half. That is, while the latter half continues to explore the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion—this time from the literary and cultural perspectives—a direct connection to theories in the first half is not always immediately apparent. Some of the chapters do draw direct links between culture and the political climate. For example, Walter Sinder and Paul Jorge Ribeiro discuss the way in which literary and cultural criticism became "increasingly allegorical and dissimulated" (p. 175) during the most intense periods of political oppression in the 1960s, and as democracy returned, shifted to a "pragmatism" enabled by greater political openness (p. 184). Heloisa Maria Starling explores the construction of the *sertão* region in the writings of Machado de Assis and others as a way of developing "themes and aspects of republican thought" (p. 205). Sento-Sé offers insight into the way the imagination of a future Brazil functions as an obstacle to real political change, leading to a series of "wasted opportunities to institute an autonomous, prosperous, and democratic national state" (p. 231).

The organizers frame this collection as an exploration of the "liberating aspects of art and politics in a country and in a region in which economic inequality, violence and social alienation are defining traits of the social order" (p. 5). If the diverse viewpoints offered are not uniformly consistent in immediate relevance to the intersection of globalization and Brazilian political identity, they are unified in the aim of shining new and multidisciplinary light on the problem of inequality read broadly, and how it perpetuates profound contradictions within the democratic system. While the chapters in the latter half of the



book may be less accessible to a reader who has neither the disciplinary background nor the goal to explore the cultural side of Brazilian identity, the target audience of those desiring a more holistic view of Brazilian politics and culture will be more receptive to the collection's approach. A structured conclusion would have been useful as a way to bridge this gap and offer a more complete integration of the two halves of the volume. On balance, however, *Imagining Brazil* offers a wide-ranging and inclusive multidisciplinary analysis of Brazil's complex social and political identity.

### **The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany.**

By Georg Vanberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 208p. \$70.00.

— Donald P. Kommers, *University of Notre Dame*

The judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws was a unique feature of American constitutionalism well into the twentieth century. The perceived success of this experiment in limited democracy prompted several nations, among them West Germany, to create courts of constitutional review in the aftermath of World War II. Now several decades later, as the author of this book writes, constitutional review "has emerged as an almost universal feature of western-style democracy" (p. 1). In most of the world's advanced liberal democracies, the power to review the constitutionality of laws has been lodged in specialized courts of constitutional review, meaning that only these courts are empowered to nullify laws on constitutional grounds. Germany's Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is one of the most notable and powerful of these specialized tribunals. It is notable for the frequency with which it has invalidated national and local laws and also for the extensive reach of its jurisdiction. Owing to the German court's rejection of any political question doctrine, together with its authority to decide with finality abstract questions of constitutional law—that is, questions raised by legislators outside the normal framework of an actual law suit—its powers of review actually exceed those of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the FCC has begun to challenge the Supreme Court as the leading model of constitutional review around the world.

For this reason, Georg Vanberg's book is a welcome addition to the literature on Germany's Federal Constitutional Court. Apart from its treatment of the FCC's founding, organization, jurisdiction, and decision-making procedures, along with a description of the judicial appointment process, this concisely written book highlights the tribunal's political role within Germany's system of separated powers. But as informed as these particular accounts are, Vandberg's main purpose is to sketch out a formal model of constitutional review. Using the experience of the FCC as the basis for developing the model, the author advances a series of hypotheses designed

empirically to explain when and under what circumstances high courts of judicial review secure compliance with their decisions, especially when they nullify or qualify majoritarian public policies and likewise when legislatures are likely to reverse, modify, or evade judicial rulings on constitutionality. In short, the theory specifies the conditions under which constitutional courts influence the making of legislation and those under which legislatures influence judicial policymaking.

Reduced to its essentials, the theory postulates that constitutional judges, like other political actors, are rational calculators sensitive to the interests of governing majorities and concerned with maintaining public support for their decisions. The notion of "transparency" plays a key role in the theory, for legislative compliance with judicial decisions is said to depend on the openness of the legislative process and the clarity with which constitutional issues are understood by the public. For their part, legislators consider the "potential for a public backlash in deciding how to respond" (p. 57) to judicial rulings overturning their policies. And when they seek to evade a judicial decision, as they often do, their response will be governed by what they think the public thinks, and if they think public opinion on the matter is less than clear, they will often seek to "hide [their] evasion [of a decision] by reducing [the] transparency" of their reaction (p. 57).

Vanberg tests these hypotheses by examining the German parliament's efforts to circumvent the FCC's *Classroom Crucifix* and *Party Finance* decisions, as well as the judicial response to these parliamentary countermeasures. Brief comparative references along the way to legislative-judicial relations in other countries, including Congress's reaction to the *Item Veto Case* in the United States, help, he believes, to support his thesis. In short, the author sets out to build a predictive model of constitutional review that stipulates when courts are likely to veto legislative policies and when legislatures are likely to comply or evade judicial decisions. The model is designed as a general theory applicable to any study of constitutional courts and their political impact.

The sophisticated mathematical formulae advanced in this book may not be every judicial scholar's cup of tea. Yet scholars with limited mathematical literacy should nevertheless appreciate the significance of this study's basic research design and its potential for a more systematic understanding of the larger role that constitutional courts play in their respective *political* systems. Up to now, the comparative study of constitutional courts has fallen into three categories: freestanding single-country studies of judicial organization and constitutional review, normative studies of constitutional case law, and largely descriptive studies of cross-national influences in constitutional doctrine and policy. Legal academics, most of whom are resistant to quantitative research methods, dominate the work in all three categories. The virtue of this book is that it builds

on the empirical work of comparative judicial scholars, such as Neal Tate and Alec Stone Sweet, and mainly for the purpose of offering the discipline a more systematic means of measuring the political impact of constitutional courts in both mature and transitional democracies.

Two concluding remarks will suffice, although neither should undermine the importance of this book. First, the FCC's decisions have been greeted with an extraordinary degree of compliance on the part of Germany's political establishment. In short, convergence rather than conflict has been the norm in the nation's judicial-legislative relations. Even in the crucifix and party finance cases—the decisions at the heart of this study—the relation between court and parliament was one more of dialogue than of defiance or evasion. The party finance decisions, in particular, can easily be seen as a legislative-judicial partnership in the making of constitutional policy. The German as well as the American experience shows that legislative responses to judicial decisions are less often acts of defiance than efforts to encourage a rethinking of constitutional policies. Second, and relatedly, the present analysis might have drawn more heavily from Walter Murphy's *Elements of Judicial Strategy* (1964) and *Congress and the Court* (1962). *Elements* is mentioned in a footnote; the latter is not mentioned at all. Both books, however, are “must” reads for any political scientist engaged in the study of judicial-legislative relationships.

**Federalism and the Market: Intergovernmental Conflict and Economic Reform in the Developing World.** By Erik Wibbels. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 276p. \$85.00.

—Tulia G. Falleti, *University of Pennsylvania*

In this book, Erik Wibbels explores the “federal collective action problem” (pp. 47, 62). Because in federal countries national and regional leaders answer to different constituencies, their electoral interests and preferences toward socially costly reforms might conflict. Market economic reforms constitute one type of such measures. As Wibbels argues, in crisis-ridden federations, “economic reforms takes [*sic*] on the quality of a public good requiring the individual regions to cooperate, whereas it is more rational for each career-oriented politician to avoid the costs associated with austerity” (p. 27). National leaders concerned with macroeconomic stability want market economic reforms implemented in the regions, but regional leaders have an incentive to free-ride and adopt fiscally expansionary policies. The book suggests that “many market reform policies are a function of a constant process of bargaining between national and regional leaders struggling for political survival” (p. 5). Moreover, it argues that “[t]he degree to which the two sets of actors [national and regional leaders] conflict depends on four crucial factors: the electoral interests that each brings to the game, a shared inter-

governmental fiscal system, the manner in which regional interests are represented in national policy making, and the levers of partisan influence national leaders have over subnational politicians” (pp. 5–6). The author proposes that fiscally autonomous regions with competitive party systems are more likely to converge with the national government's interests on market economic reforms; and that national electoral coattails are a more effective means for disciplining regional leaders than partisan harmony through centrally dispensed carrots and sticks (pp. 38–39).

After laying a groundbreaking theoretical framework in Chapters 1 and 2, *Federalism and the Market* presents cross-sectional time-series statistical models of macroeconomic outcomes in non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries in Chapter 3 and in developing federal countries in Chapter 4. A single country-case in-depth statistical and qualitative analysis is made of intergovernmental bargaining dynamics in Argentina in Chapters 5 and 6, and a small-n Comparison of three Argentine provinces, Córdoba, Mendoza, and Río Negro, is included in Chapter 7. The combination of methodologies and the shifting in levels of analysis (from macro to micro comparisons) is used very effectively to test different parts of the main argument. The research design, in this regard, is ingenious and exemplary.

In fact, it is hard to find flaws (other than editorial) in this carefully crafted and well-argued book. The shortcomings, therefore, are related to what is missing or inconclusive, rather than faulty. Three elements bear mention. First, given the ongoing debate in the literature about the effects of federalism on ethnic conflict and civil war, it is surprising that no measure of such a dimension was added to the statistical models that compare macroeconomic outcomes across developing countries and across developing federations. What is the effect of federalism on fiscal balance, inflation, and debt once ethnic conflict is included in the equation? Wibbels recognizes that there has been a “spike in ethnic conflict common to many nations across the globe” (p. 240) and that one of the crucial aspects in studying federations is to determine whom they represent and how they represent them (p. 244). Hence, it is not clear why no measure of ethnic conflict or diversity was included in the statistical models in Chapters 3 and 4.

Second, while the book persuasively reveals the problems associated with the achievement of partisan harmony via hierarchical carrots and sticks, the claim that national electoral “coattails generate intergovernmental policy coordination via incentive compatibility” (p. 39) remains untested. Argentina's national leaders only used carrots and sticks in aligning subnational politicians, and the book does not provide evidence of how national coattails work in other federations of the developing world.

Third, the argument that competitive regional politics leads to better macroeconomic outcomes is not fully

supported by the evidence provided. This claim is supported by the analysis of the Mendoza case, in Chapter 7. However, the descriptive data regarding average current deficits of Argentine provinces (p. 181) shows that only San Luis, La Pampa, and Neuquén had fiscal surpluses in the period under consideration (1984 to 1998). Paradoxically, these provinces (San Luis and La Pampa, in particular) are among the least politically competitive of Argentina. In each of them, the same party (and in the case of San Luis the same governor) ruled during the entire 15-year period. Furthermore, part of the statistical analysis (p. 186) shows that political competitiveness increased wage spending between 1984 and 1988. This could reflect on the poor quality of Argentina's fiscal data for that period.

Yet the author's interpretation, that this might have been due to the national executive's attempt to selectively target the politically competitive provinces by transferring more resources to them (p. 187), runs counter to the claim made earlier in the book (and in other works) that federal transfers at the time were mostly directed to Peronist provinces (which already had expansionary spending) as bailouts and for gathering political support in a divided legislature (pp. 138–41).

In all, the book's strengths and crucial contributions far outweigh the occasional missing or inconclusive piece of evidence. It contributes to the literature on market reforms by stressing the important role that subnational governments play in negotiating, implementing, or halting market reforms. It also makes important contributions to the literature on fiscal federalism, by showing that there is a continuum from market-preserving to market-distorting federations, dependent on intergovernmental fiscal and political institutions. It also analyzes federations of the developing world, which have until now earned less scholarly attention than they deserve. Finally, the book also contributes to the broader political science literature by unpacking the preferences of bargaining actors and showing how the divergence or convergence of interests can shape crucial political and economic institutions, which in turn have a significant impact on economic outcomes. *Federalism and the Market* is bound to leave a lasting imprint.

Wibbels concludes with a rather pessimistic prognosis about the economic and political future of federations in the developing world (Chapter 8). He also recommends increasing the regions' own-revenues, instead of tightening budget constraints. However, if, as he writes, "[i]t is difficult to imagine the survival of ethnically and religiously divided India or Nigeria as we currently know them absent the institutions of federalism" (p. 243), then despite its fiscal shortcomings, federalism, as well as the horizontal redistribution from rich to poor regions, may be as good institutional arrangements as can be hoped for to keep ethnically divided countries together and economically poor regions afloat.

### **The Information Revolution and Developing**

**Countries.** By Ernest J. Wilson, III. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 431p. \$49.95.

— Stephen D. McDowell, *Florida State University*

This book provides a comprehensive theoretic framework explaining the "strategic restructuring" of government policies and institutions associated with policies promoting the adoption of new information and communications technologies (ICTs). It also provides detailed case study chapters on Brazil, Ghana, and China, concluding with two chapters placing ICTs in a global perspective. The Chinese case study should be of interest to many readers, given China's political and economic importance. Brazil has a long history of state-guided and supported development strategies in this sector, combining import substitution and partnerships with transnational corporations. Ghana occupies a more peripheral position in global political economy, lacking the size and industrialization of the other countries examined.

Ernest Wilson has produced an exemplary piece of scholarship in a number of ways. The book builds from a thoughtful theoretic discussion, extending existing research and theories of technical change and implementation, and combining a focus on the agency of groups and individuals with a careful and historical approach to institutional change. Although it focuses mainly on elite decision making and action, the framework provides a view of the wider context that would also be useful in research on community based network initiatives. The political and institutional model of technology policy change is a welcome corrective to the sometimes deterministic public and policy discourse on new technologies and the digital divide. In many popular and scholarly accounts, the lack of access to and use of new technologies is presented as the problem, and higher levels of access are presented as the solution. What is missing in these simple formulations are the cultural, social, political, and institutional elements of the use or nonuse of communications technologies, and the complex and multifaceted struggles that accompany attempts to introduce new technologies, policies, and practices.

Wilson's work here provides a sense of these complexities, working in a political and institutional scope, rather than the programmatic level of analysis alone. Empirically, it is built from careful and detailed research on cases of policy innovations and new technical implementation. What is unique about the national studies is that they are not reports on one project focusing on the implementation of new technology in one specific organization over a short period of time, as is often the case. Rather, these are case examinations of the introduction of new approaches to technology policy and programs in governments and throughout societies over time. This wider institutional and temporal scope requires at once an account of what

individuals and groups of leaders are trying to do, but also a fairly high level of abstraction to provide a treatment of the larger picture in a short book chapter. While the country case chapters are brief for the material they cover, they are very useful in providing guides for the elements that must be included, or that the researcher must be open to, in trying to understand new technology adoption and use in differing national institutional contexts.

The necessities of a brief coverage of each country are offset by the strengths of the comparative consideration of national cases. Specific conflicts in politics and institutions may be so important in a single country case study that researchers, or more probably readers, may be tempted implicitly to draw general lessons from a single instance. By including three case studies here, with widely differing outcomes, Wilson provides an important caution to those who would try to jump to quick and easy generalizations about ICT leadership and institutions.

The agency-institution paradox at the core of these cases raises a number of theoretic and research quandaries. As Wilson notes (p. 47), the modified structural approach “requires considerable commitment by the analyst to conduct complementary research at the macro, meso, and micro levels.” Individual and group action does make a difference, given the set of resources and institutions in which these national leaders try to make history. The author focuses upon groups of leaders working in institutional and political contexts who advocated and effectively shepherded the introduction of new policies and institutional reform. The stories are not just about individual heroes or short-term success. Rather, policy and technology initiatives depended upon building political support and tenuously and skillfully constructing alliances. While some argue that every change has a changer, this approach may tend to shift the analytic focus away from the contextual parameters in international institutions that restrict the range of possibilities available to policymakers in developing world contexts, and more toward the qualities of domestic political agents working with limited resources.

The chapter on the digital divide provides a similarly well-informed and nuanced analysis. Wilson points to the multiple dimensions of the widely discussed idea of “access” to ICTs, including physical, financial, cognitive, design, content, production, institutional, and political access, both among and within countries. He proposes moving beyond the term “access” to focusing upon participation and engagement in each of these dimensions as a strategy to understand and address the digital divide. Demographic factors, such as gender, geographic location, income, education, occupation, and ethnicity, are the “most determinative features” (p. 307) of digital divides. In discussing patterns of diffusion and adoption of ICTs, he cites optimistic, pessimistic, and structuralist perspectives on whether future levels of ICT access among different populations will diverge (a deepening digital divide) or converge (more

equal digital participation). On the basis of his research conducted along with Francisco Rodriguez, Wilson concludes that the “ICT gap is bad and getting worse” (p. 321), in part due to the accelerated growth of ICT services in the developed world. To set the priorities for the importance of future research on this question, “Wilson’s Law” is proposed: “The actual and opportunity costs of exclusion from an interactive communications network are multidimensional (economic, political, and social), increase over time, and are borne by both the excluded and society” (pp. 329–30).

At the international level, Wilson argues that in the last decade, decision elites focused mainly upon defining property rights, efficiency (market forms), and the private sector role in the emerging global ICT governance regime. Only then have distributional concerns been considered. As noted (p. 339), “This pinched conception of equity subsequently hampered more ambitious efforts to redress the digital divide.” The chapter “Strategic Restructuring in the Global System” recounts a number of proposals by various organizations and task forces in the late 1990s, some of which partnered public leaders and private groups, to address issues of the digital divide. While open trade and initiatives to strengthen intellectual property rights led to significant institutional reform in the World Trade Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (among other sites), international public–private partnerships and private-sector initiatives addressing distribution and access issues made less headway. However, Wilson sees in these elite efforts models of new forms of international cooperation and action, what he calls “netstitutions,” operating alongside and outside of established international organizations with broader memberships.

The thoughtful presentation in this book points to some limits of policy research and public action to further ICT use and national development in national institutions and global markets typified by dynamic and rapid technical change, and should be included in the reading list of those undertaking work in this field.

**Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge.** By Deborah J. Yashar. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 365p. \$37.99.

— Waltraud Queiser Morales, *University of Central Florida*

This is an excellent book and a worthy addition to the series of volumes on collective violence and political movements in the Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. Building on Deborah Yashar’s earlier work with indigenous groups in Mexico and Guatemala and the strategies they have devised in “a global fight for democracy and justice” (p. xiii), the book uncovers a powerful and common theme in the indigenous voices of the region: a



demand for inclusion, equality, local autonomy, and authentic citizenship. In short, it is about identity and rights and how and why indigenous movements arise, develop, and succeed in this struggle to attain them.

This study in comparative historical analysis addresses the important phenomenon of indigenous mobilization in Latin America, particularly in three critical and volatile Andean countries: Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. Employing a well-thought-out comparative research design and based on field research, Yashar's investigation serves to isolate the factors that were, and potentially are, most significant in the development of strong indigenous activism and mobilization in Latin America: motive, opportunity and capacity realized through politicized identities, political associational space, and transcommunity networks (p. 8).

Generally, ethnic movements around the world today challenge the "prevailing ideas about citizenship and the nation-state" regarding whether the state can serve effectively as "the legitimate basis for extending and defining democratic citizenship rights and responsibilities," especially "group rights and ethnic self-determination" (p. 3). In Latin America, it was assumed that such ethnic mobilization did not entail contestation and conflict; but this may no longer be the case, if it ever held true. Yashar asserts that indigenous organization is not new, but what is new is that in the past, Indians "have not organized along ethnic lines to promote an explicitly indigenous agenda" (p. 5). Their goal no longer centers on assimilation and equal rights within a multicultural nation-state, but on "special rights as native peoples" (p. 5). The overall purpose of her book, therefore, is to explain "the uneven emergence, timing, and location of indigenous protest in contemporary Latin America: why indigenous movements have emerged now and not before; and why they have emerged in some places and not others" (p. 5). In the process, her research addresses several ongoing debates, perhaps the most important of which is the relationship among state formation, democracy, and ethnicity.

In Part I, Yashar draws out the conceptual and analytical foundations of the book and tests these against a subset of five countries. Theoretically, she emphasizes that the popular identity politics approach, which emphasizes culture, must be combined with structural and institutional analysis. Social movements develop and succeed in relationship to the structures and institutions of the state. And ethnic political identities are institutionally and historically bounded; that is, important institutional changes may serve to politicize identities, often in new and unintended ways, providing the key motive for mobilization. Specifically, she argues that "changes in citizenship regimes" served to politicize indigenous identities because they challenged centers of local autonomy that had been basically ignored by the state (p. 8).

Yashar's selection of cases for broad comparative analysis represents a clear logic: five of the most populous

Indian countries in Latin America—Bolivia (60%–70%), Guatemala (45%–60%), Peru (38%–40%), Ecuador (30%–38%), and Mexico (12%–14%) (pp. 19–20). Her methodology is a mix between "most similar and most different systems" models, which allow both longitudinal comparisons and variation across the cases. On the one hand, Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Mexico are four very different systems where indigenous movements emerged. On the other hand, in Peru, which shares certain historical and demographic similarities with Bolivia and Ecuador, and a history of civil war with Guatemala, an effective indigenous movement did not emerge. A careful comparison of these five cases, complemented by useful tables and charts, lends support to her overall thesis that the contemporary and uneven emergence of indigenous movements in the region can be explained by the variation in three key factors: "changing citizenship regimes, trans-community social networks, and political associational space" (p. 29).

Part II explores in great detail the three case studies most alike in geography, history, and demographics: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Significant differences in the aforementioned three key factors explain why Ecuador developed a powerful, national indigenous movement—the strongest in Latin America. In turn, Bolivia developed two strong regional movements in the Andes and Oriente of the country. Peru, on the other hand, achieved only weak national movements. However, a significant subnational indigenous movement emerged in the Puno region where "political associational space and trans-community networks" remained strong, in contrast to the rest of Peru where these were destroyed by the civil war between the state and the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla insurgency (p. 267). Both the Sendero and the Tupak Amaru Revolutionary Movement in Peru, while ostensibly mobilizing indigenous communities, did so along class lines and for Marxist political ends—often at the expense of indigenous goals. Consequently, Yashar describes the Peruvian case as an anomaly; for despite two centuries of indigenous organization and activism, Peru failed to develop "widespread indigenous movement organizing in the contemporary period" (p. 224).

The concluding chapter and Part III is especially relevant to an understanding of the relationship between democracy and the challenge of postliberalism in Latin America. Here, Yashar concludes that "the politicization of ethnic identities" occurs "where state policies challenge the material and political foundations" of local community autonomy (p. 283). Changes in citizenship regimes, which include both state institutions and policies, directly affected and often instigated this politicization. Contemporary indigenous movements have had both beneficial and detrimental effects for third-wave democracies in the region. At the same time that second-generation indigenous movements have managed to redefine the terms of

democratic citizenship to their benefit, the very opportunities that new democracies have provided have also challenged the unity and integrity of national indigenous movements (p. 282). In short, greater opportunities for Indian political inclusion and partisan mobilization have tended to divide and fragment indigenous movements and their agendas.

In the final analysis, however, the indigenous challenge that modern states “incorporate *heterogeneous* notions of *who* is a citizen, *how* citizenship is mediated, and where authority is vested,” is intended to deepen the region’s democratic development (p. 285; Yashar’s emphasis). To date, Indian movements have discussed and even demanded constitutional reforms and innovative democratic institutions that may better accommodate a multiethnic and plurinational view of nation and state. This indigenist

agenda is also revolutionary and potentially dangerous; it may be viewed as a threat to the power and homogeneity of the traditional nation-state. In countries such as Bolivia, demands for local autonomy and institutional pluralism may further encourage secessionist tendencies. Moreover, Yashar warns that one cannot predict indigenous electoral success based on the success of indigenous movements. Whatever the future portends, she concludes that the mobilization of indigenous groups has “solidified indigenous peoples as political actors whose interests are now part of the national dialogue” (p. 307). Bolivia especially, among the three in-depth cases of indigenous movements in *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America*, will provide further opportunities to assess the meaning and practice of democracy.

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## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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### **The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security.**

By Deborah D. Avant. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 310p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

— K. J. Holsti, *University of British Columbia*

Next to the United States, which entity controls the largest number of personnel operating, mostly with arms, in Iraq? Great Britain? Think again. Following the 150,000 American troops in that conflict-plagued “liberated” country are about 20,000 employees of more than 60 private security companies (PSCs). They come from around the world: the United States, South Africa, Fiji, Chile, Israel, and Nepal, to mention just a few. Most are former military or police officials, now under contracts issued to PSCs by the United States, Great Britain, and even the United Nations.

PSCs have emerged on the international scene in recent years as a response to increased demands for security and protection by strong and weak states, international organizations, private firms, and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). These actors face rising problems of insurrection, transnational criminal activity, wildlife and resource poaching, assassination, terror, and systematic theft and looting. PSCs provide a number of services, including protection of assets and lives, logistical support for regular and irregular armies and militias, training, interrogation, cooking, and armed battle, all activities formerly monopolized by state-controlled armies, navies, and air forces. PSCs command a market with revenues well above \$100 billion (U.S. billion) annually. They are the twenty-first century versions of the private armed forces ubiquitous in fourteenth- to seventeenth-

century Europe. Whether they are “mercenaries” is an issue under vigorous debate.

As in most scientific enterprises confronting new social phenomena, the first scholarly stage is primarily empirical: identifying agents and actors, and locating trends. Peter Singer’s *Corporate Warriors* (2004) did this job admirably. In the present volume, Deborah Avant launches a more theoretical inquiry. Her task is not primarily etiological—explaining origins—but examining consequences. The normative issue is *control*: functional, political, and sociological. In an ideal situation, hiring of or outsourcing to PSCs should simultaneously 1) increase military effectiveness, 2) sustain or enhance state control over organized violence, and 3) promote military professionalism, human rights, and adherence to the laws of war. Avant trolls through the sociological and economic institutionalist literatures for hypotheses on these dimensions of control. She then uses case studies involving both state-financed (Croatia and Sierra Leone) and privately financed operations (Royal Dutch/Shell in Nigeria, INGO relief operations in the refugee camps of Goma, and various wildlife protection INGOs operating in the Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo) for answers. She also cites numerous issues raised by the “second” army of PSCs operating in Iraq.

Avant develops few generalizations that can cut across all types of PSC activities funded by different types of actors. The United States achieved a good deal that was consistent with her ideal model through its sponsorship of MPRI (Military Professional Resources Inc.) in Croatia prior to the Dayton Accords. This firm helped professionalize the Croatian military, thus reducing potential war crimes, and was arguably instrumental in getting the Serbs to Dayton. MPRI constituted an important new policy tool for achieving foreign policy goals that could not be promoted by direct American military intervention in

ex-Yugoslavia. In contrast, the government in Sierra Leone, which originally hired Executive Outcomes (EOS) to train its forces, eventually used it for armed action and paid the price: EOS became embroiled in the politics of the country (loss of government control) and in effect supported a coup against the government that had hired it. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we have seen American-outsourced interrogators abuse and kill detainees, thus diluting the effectiveness of international norms against torture. In most of the cases examined in this study, whether state, INGO, or privately funded, security firms came to achieve some measure of influence over state or other institutional policy-making, throwing into question those agents' control over organized violence.

The case study analysis makes for fascinating reading, but Avant is too meticulous a scholar to conclude either that PSCs have generally enhanced the various dimensions of state control and promotion of international norms of human rights and the laws of war (the "optimists") or that they constitute a pervasive, malevolent, and noxious development in contemporary security politics (the "pessimists"). The result is that instead of firm conclusions or generalizations, we end up with "it all depends." The text is littered with "may," "perhaps," "might," "could," "would," "dilemmas," and other qualifications. There are all sorts of costs, benefits, and tradeoffs to be noted (p. 251): "The fact that market mechanisms for controlling violence suggest different routes of action and the diffusion of control pulls actors in different directions has complicated the operation of existing institutions. It has exacerbated disagreement among committed multilateralists—over whether to call PSCs [illegal] mercenaries or regulate them; among governments—over the propriety of using PSCs; among . . . activists—over the proper behavior of INGOs in conflict zones; and among allies—over the role of PSCs in peace building. It has also generated strange bedfellows—between human rights activists and PSCs to facilitate humanitarian intervention, between TNCs [transnational corporations] and INGOs to promote development plans that avoid violent repercussions." These dilemmas and contradictions underlie the meticulous and sensitive investigation of a highly ambiguous modern development. Given the broad range of possible outcomes of their use by both governments and private institutions, Avant's insights and nuance have to replace firm generalizations.

Avant also provides a broader theoretical bonus: early explorations into the impact of PSCs on international law and, more generally, on what this phenomenon means for the state and state authority in international relations. She concludes (p. 261) that the dramatic increase in the use of PSCs by a variety of actors and agents leads to a diffusion and fragmentation of power and authority, as well as to the development of institutions with overlapping jurisdictions, all of which constitute another step leading us toward a neomedieval international order.

This fine study—rigorous in methodology, sweeping in its empirical domain and variety of data sources, and theoretically inspired to transcend the events of the day—does what all good scholarship should do: It informs, casts into doubt sweeping generalizations and conventional wisdom, and will promote and sometimes correct the next wave of security studies and international relations theory.

**The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism.** By Clifford Bob. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 237p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.99 paper.

— Stephen M. Saideman, *McGill University*

Clifford Bob seeks to understand why some rebels receive more attention and support from the international community than others. Rather than arguing that some groups are inherently more deserving, Bob takes a novel and very insightful perspective on the international relations of contention by applying the dynamics of marketing. "Despite its promise, today's 'global civil society' is for many a Darwinian arena in which the successful prosper but the weak wither" (p. 8). His answer focuses on how well groups market themselves in a competitive realm where large numbers of movements are seeking support from nongovernmental organizations with limited resources. He focuses on this key inequality—that the rebels around the world need help from the NGOs far more than any NGO needs to support any one group of dissidents—insisting that it is a buyer's market.

To be clear, Bob is not suggesting that altruism and humanitarianism play no role, but that there are many groups deserving of attention. Therefore, the NGOs have to do triage—they have to make decisions before they invest much time and money about which groups should receive assistance. "In deciding whether to support an insurgent group, NGOs often attempt to evaluate both the group's predicament and the utility of adopting it" (p. 20). While the author's argument seems cynical, an examination of the decision making made by NGOs is necessary, and his interviews of NGO workers provide key insights. As a result, this book is part of a larger trend to consider NGOs and global civil society with less idealism (e.g., Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*, 2002).

Bob considers the various attributes groups might possess that would give them an advantage in this competitive marketplace, particularly organizational cohesion, good contacts, leadership, and, most surprisingly, good writing skills. The groups that do best in his case studies have, as leaders and spokespeople, individuals who are articulate and use humor effectively. A key necessary trait is flexibility, as groups must adapt and sell themselves to NGOs. Because all groups have multiple goals, grievances, and even identities, they have some room to define themselves in ways that are most appealing to NGOs. Thus, the title

of the book is quite apt, as movements very much need to market themselves.

The author applies his approach to two cases: the Ogoni of Nigeria and the Zapatistas of Mexico. These cases serve him well as he also considers less successful movements in each state, juxtaposing the relative successes of certain movements against others, holding constant many potentially relevant variables. He gains insight and leverage, for instance, in comparing the Zapatistas to the Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR), which emerged at roughly the same time. The Zapatistas used violence at the outset, taking several cities to gain attention in Mexican and international media, but quickly changed tactics, focusing mostly on communiqués, interviews, and other forms of communication. Their wit played much better than the EPR's consistent use of violence. The Zapatista story is largely one of managing public attention and fostering it after their initial military foray. This contrasts rather interestingly with the Ogoni's efforts to attract NGO support, which preceded domestic mobilization.

In both cases, the groups found that certain appeals resonated further and more powerfully than others. The Ogoni, residing in an oil-rich part of Nigeria, were motivated more by complaints of resource distribution among minority ethnic groups, but ultimately framed their complaint as an environmental one. By criticizing Shell Oil's damaging oil drilling, the Ogoni appealed to environmental NGOs, leading to publicity by CNN, *Time*, and television documentaries. While the Zapatistas had a litany of complaints against the Mexican government, particularly its treatment of indigenous peoples, they found that the critique of NAFTA and globalization seemed to play better. Consequently, the focus moved toward these issues and away from indigenous rights.

Bob does an excellent job of defining his concepts, providing clear examples, and organizing his argument. The case studies are well researched, with good use of interviews, particularly with NGOs in the Nigerian case. He is also clear about the limitations of the project, as the ingredients for a successful appeal are many, and it is hard to tell which conditions might be necessary or sufficient. Still, this is not so problematic, as his book is more about the process by which groups seek support and by which NGOs make decisions about whom to support than a definitive test of which groups receive assistance.

One of the key questions, both in this book and for politicians on both sides of conflicts, is whether violence works. Bob tries hard to show that using violence is a turnoff—that the Zapatistas negotiated and communicated after an initial and “spectacular” use of force, while the EPR lost support through violence. The problem is that both the Zapatistas and Ogoni gained momentum after the conflict escalated. While the frame of Ogoni as environmental movement may have mattered, so did Nigerian repression. The author raises the point that reach-

ing out for external support may frequently antagonize the host country—and this is exactly what happened in the Nigerian case. In Mexico, it was the use of force by the Zapatistas, holding several cities for a day or more, that gained attention. So it is not clear that violence does not work. Indeed, the quantitative literature on the international relations of ethnic conflict consistently shows a relationship between violence and external assistance, although it is unclear which way the arrow goes.

Bob makes an important contribution to several literatures, including contentious politics, civil war, and globalization, as well as ethnic conflict and its international relations. *The Marketing of Rebellion* is quite useful for both undergraduate and graduate courses in comparative politics and international relations. In sum, he provides significant insights into an overlooked but increasingly relevant aspect of civil war.

**Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict.**

By Stephen G. Brooks. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 316p. \$35.00.

— Brian M. Pollins, *The Ohio State University*

If commerce among nations truly undermines their proclivity to settle differences by resort to arms—as philosophers like Montesquieu and Kant believed so ardently—then globalization should portend a new era of world peace. More than a few overly optimistic liberals like Thomas Friedman in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (2000) have made just such a claim. But the world is hardly such a simple place, as we learn in Stephen Brooks's carefully crafted book. Brooks begins by unpacking the multifaceted nature of economic globalization itself, and through the main body of the book he closely examines how individual threads of this phenomenon may pull some nations toward more pacific relations while tugging others in more dangerous directions. A great deal of case-based and anecdotal evidence is marshaled along the way, and some of his arguments are made more convincingly than others. But in the end, he has given us a clear, comprehensive, and forward-looking treatment of a question that has heretofore been dismissed with oversimplified answers.

A central contribution of this book is Brooks's focus on the growth in transnational production above that of international trade or finance. While trade and finance are important aspects of globalization, it is transnational production that is reorganizing economic life so that fewer and fewer items are being manufactured, start to finish, in a single country. Production lines now routinely cross national boundaries, and the associated “international” trade that actually takes place *within* individual firms already represents an amazingly large share of world commerce. This is the dimension that is missed by old-school realists who are so quick to dismiss the significance of



globalization by pointing out that trade and financial flows were comparably large in an earlier period of high interdependence, 1870–1914. How, then, does transnational production affect the likelihood of armed conflict among nations today and in the future?

Brooks tells us that economic interdependence may change the capabilities of actors, the incentives that actors have to resort to armed force, or it may change the nature of the actors themselves. Chapters 4–6 lay out ways in which transnational production affects each of these, and the main claim in each case would seem to reaffirm the dreams of Kant and his modern disciples. Transnational production, Brooks tells us, undermines the war-making capability of nations by ending all hope of autarky in the arms industry. Incentives for conflict are likewise eroded because the rewards of conquest have been powerfully diminished, and the nature of actors is changed in a pacific direction because the drive to attract foreign direct investment leads nations to form supranational economic organizations. Each of these developments makes war more difficult, less profitable, or both. Is this the final triumph of liberalism? Alas, no.

As always, the devil is very much in the details. The impact on future conflict brought about by each of these grand trends contains important limits and boundary conditions. The benefits of conquest, the author shows us, only disappear in target nations that possess knowledge-based economies. The Kuwaits of the world, therefore, will not be protected by the economic forces of globalization. And while organizations like Mercosur just might create the ground in which a security community could bloom in the Southern Cone, there are too few regions on earth with similar conditions that permit this hopeful model to become commonplace. Taking his final stand, Brooks concludes that globalization, in general, and transnational production, in particular, will reinforce pacific relations among the great powers, have little effect (or even exacerbate conflict) among developing nations, and produce mixed results in security relations between rich nations and those who aspire to be. We must applaud this author for tracing out his arguments in such full length and tempering his claims so thoroughly. At the same time, a reader can wonder why the liberal line shapes the book's main claims so strongly when the results of the study show the boundaries and limitations of those claims so effectively (see esp. Chapter 7). Identification of these boundaries and limits is as important as the tracing of claimed effects. Both are found in this book, but the former are somewhat downplayed in the presentation.

I cannot agree with certain claims made by Brooks. He documents the erosion of autarky in arms production quite impressively. But does this hinder any nation's war-making capability decisively? Partial if not complete dependence on foreign sources for armaments is more the rule than the exception. Think of lend-lease in 1940, or of

Argentina's French-made Exocet missiles in 1982, or NATO coproduction schemes. National self-sufficiency in arms manufacture is neither necessary nor sufficient to make war. I also note that globalization has growth effects as well as interdependence effects. There is a large literature, including theorists like A. F. K. Organski, Robert Gilpin, Charles Doran, Nazli Choucri, and Robert North who show that uneven growth has major destabilizing effects on global security. Brooks—and nearly every author who writes about globalization—focuses only on the interdependence effects, and thus may overestimate the pacifying force of this grand trend. Finally, the case study Chapters 4–6 are offered as tests of specific hypotheses derived in Chapter 3. I take each more as a thoroughly documented “proof of concept” than as a hypothesis test, but this does not void them of value. Brooks is breaking a great deal of new ground here, and new ideas should be given *prima facie* validity before they can be tested more rigorously.

Such criticisms notwithstanding, *Producing Security* remains an original and important work that all researchers concerned with the security implications of economic trends will want to read. Brooks's careful craftsmanship is evident from start to finish. Importantly, he forces our attention away from simple trade flows to the underlying forces of transnational production that will continue to have central consequences for global security in our age.

**The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century.** By Barry Buzan. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004. 222p. \$69.95.

**American Foreign Policy in a New Era.** By Robert Jervis. New York: Routledge, 2005. 184p. \$22.95.

— Glenn Hastedt, *James Madison University*

While Barry Buzan and Robert Jervis share similar starting points but take us down different paths in their respective analyses, they reach a largely similar conclusion. The common point of departure is the present standing of the United States as the sole remaining superpower and the absence of Great Power challengers. Both authors note that this condition is significant because war among the Great Powers has been the driving force in world politics. Their common end point is the expectation that this condition may well endure and general agreement on the appropriate response strategies that should be followed by the Great Powers.

The core of Jervis's work consists of a series of articles published in 2002 and 2003 that have undergone only minor changes. New is the final chapter, “Where Do We Go from Here?” In it Jervis takes up the question “can the Bush Doctrine be sustained?” In presenting his answer, he engages in a discussion of its internal contradictions, the nature of American domestic politics as it relates to foreign policy, and the operation of the

American intelligence system. His first chapter, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace," has as its core the construction of a synthetic explanation blending constructionist, liberal, and realist insights of how the current Security Community among the Great Powers came into existence. He ends with a brief examination of four possible futures, all of which are cast against what he sees as the need for Europe and Japan to restrain the United States.

From here on, Jervis concerns himself more with questions of foreign policy than international politics theory. Central to Chapter 2, "September 11: How Has It Changed the World?" is the assertion that the 9/11 terrorist attacks have triggered a more assertive U.S. foreign policy. A principal motivating force behind this change was fear (p. 55). Jervis holds that the structural features for American hegemony were in place. They were the size and vitality of the American economy, the lack of unity within Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union (p. 58). He also expresses doubts that this more assertive foreign policy can be maintained, and holds that regardless of its staying power, it takes the United States "into dangerous and new territory" (p. 58). The following chapter, "The Confrontation between Iraq and the United States," focuses largely on the logic of deterrence theory, especially as it relates to extended deterrence and the Bush administration's rejection of deterrence as a foreign policy strategy. With regard to the former, the author argues that "even if Saddam had gained nuclear weapons, it is hard to believe that the stability-instability paradox would have strongly inhibited the United States, but not Iraq. . . . At the worst mutual deterrence at the level of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] would have prevailed" (p. 67). With regard to the latter, he argues that coercion and deterrence strategies did not fit well with the more expansive goals of the newly assertive U.S. foreign policy agenda. In his chapter "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," he brings together idiosyncratic and structural factors to construct his explanation. He concludes that under the Bush Doctrine, the United States is "acting like a normal state that has gained a position of dominance" (p. 92) and that "in a process akin to the deep security dilemma, in order to protect itself, the United States is impelled to act in a way that will increase, or at least bring to the surface, conflicts with others" (p. 95).

Where Jervis begins with a discussion of international politics theory and then moves into the realm of foreign policy strategy, Buzan's study remains at this level of analysis for much longer before exploring the dynamics of U.S. foreign policymaking. Consequently Buzan investigates, dissects, and analyzes ideas that Jervis presents with little exploration. Buzan shares with Jervis a commitment to theoretical pluralism. For Buzan, the key conceptual pieces to fit together are polarity and identity. His is "a conscious attempt to combine material and social approaches . . . to locate polarity within a social context" (p. 3). Such an

integration is necessary because "polarity does not determine outcomes" (p. 43); rather, "how the structural logic of polarity works in a system of enemies will be different from how it works in a system of rivals or one of friends" (p. 78).

The distinction among friends, rivals, and enemies is central to Buzan's analysis of U.S. foreign policy. From his perspective, a significant disjuncture exists in the outlook underlying U.S. foreign policy and that guiding the foreign policy of the Great Powers. U.S. foreign policy is based on the premise that the world is comprised of enemies and rivals, whereas contemporary Great Power foreign policies assume a world of rivals and friends. As one might expect given the title of his work, Buzan also directs considerable attention to what it means to be a Great Power. His examination of the historical evolution of the term and the contemporary social context within which it is used leads him to argue for a tripartite division of leading states: superpowers and great powers at the international-system level and regional powers at the regional level. This framework provides the basis for an extended investigation of the polarity of the international system and the basis for generating three future scenarios. Buzan characterizes the Cold War international system as 3 + 3 (three superpowers and three Great Powers). His future possibilities are a 1 + 4 system, a 2 + 3 or 4 system, and a 0 + 4, 5, or 6 system. He concludes his analysis of these three scenarios by observing that for the next 20 years, it is unlikely that the United States will face other powers actively seeking superpower status and that the most likely scenario for the future is a continuation of one superpower and several great powers. This is also the outcome that Jervis sees as being most likely.

In presenting an explanation for why U.S. foreign policy has begun to move away from a strategy that projects American values by persuasion to one that emphasizes coercion, Buzan, like Jervis, puts forward a multifaceted argument. He emphasizes three broad forces (American exceptionalism, unipolarity, and 9/11) that generate a powerful momentum behind unilateralism, Manicheism, and hypersecuritization (p. 185). For Jervis, the proper response of the other Great Powers, most notably Europe and Japan, is to restrain the United States while keeping close ties with it (p. 32). For Buzan, the Great Powers must "save the United States from itself" (p. 187) by accepting U.S. leadership but rejecting its more imperial tendencies. Simply put, the Great Powers must play the role of loyal opposition and friendly critic (p. 9).

Valuable in their own right, both works reviewed here provide windows into two very different contemporary international politics concerns. The first concern is with the inner logic and practical relevance of balancing theory. As discussed in a recent issue of *International Security* (Summer 2005), the value of thinking about a new form of balancing, one that emphasizes "soft" balancing rather than

balancing out of fear of war and invasion, is unsettled. A key issue is distinguishing between moves intended to balance the superpower and those that are simply at variance with its wishes. With their emphasis on the relationship between the United States and Great Powers and their analyses of strategic options and system dynamics, both Jervis and Buzan speak to this debate. The second concern is with the very relevance of focusing on Great Power relations as the driving force in international politics today. Both authors speak to the existence of a security community among the Great Powers. And they would both acknowledge that such a security community does not mean an end to international conflict, imperial temptations, or the spread of war. It would seem, then, that a vital question to ask is whether destabilizing wars and perhaps international system change might now have their roots not in Great Power conflict or rivalry but in peripheral wars that entrap states as a result of globalization or other factors, as has been suggested by Thomas Barnett in *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (2004). Neither author speaks to this possibility, and Buzan tends to be dismissive of the impact of globalization on international politics. While it runs counter to their analysis, it nonetheless is a logical next area of inquiry.

**Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations.** By William A. Callahan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004. 297p. \$68.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Amy L. Freedman, *Franklin & Marshall College*

International relations scholarship has moved beyond debates between realists and liberals, yet much of the literature on the growth of Chinese power, or on China's regional and global interests, reflects theories of balance of power or peace through trade and engagement. Many of the most popular and well-known works on China (for example, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro's 1998 book *The Coming Conflict with China*) view the economic success and modernization of China as a threat to U.S. interests and to the larger international order. William Callahan's *Contingent States* not only avoids this standard refrain but actively rejects and criticizes it. Callahan accomplishes two important goals in his book. First, he shows how conventional international relations paradigms can mislead us about the "true" aims of Chinese foreign policy; and secondly, he uses "Greater China" as a theoretical framework to examine four issues in Asia: the South China Sea dispute, Sino-Korean relations, the return of Hong Kong, and cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. In addition to an introduction, theoretical chapter, and conclusion, one chapter is devoted to each of these issues.

Callahan criticizes both IR theory and most studies of Greater China as being too state-centered (pp. xxvii, xxix), or just simply focused on economic and cultural cohesion

(p. 7). He argues that the phrase "Greater China" is generally used to describe territory or sets of relationships, when it can be more productively used to shed light on transnational relations of power and influence. His theory of Greater China looks at concepts such as civilization, crisis, empire, Confucianism, harmony, national humiliation, friendship, and culture (p. xxi) to explain the four case studies.

Greater China is a useful focal point for the sort of Foucaultian analysis Callahan engages in here. Greater China may be absent from geopolitical maps and international law, but it does exist as economic and cultural ties among peoples, corporations, and cultures, thus, as he demonstrates, it exemplifies the "contingent" state of international politics. By looking at Greater China in this way, he is able to demonstrate how civilization is an important part of politics in East Asia, and that civilization is not a coherent "thing" but a multicode set of relations (such as nativism, conquest, conversion, and diaspora).

However, Callahan's criticism of the literature on Greater China is too simplistic. Much of this scholarship begins with the idea that definitions, boundaries, and understandings of Greater China, are problematic. The term is sometimes used in reference to an economic entity comprised of coastal and southern mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, often including Chinese business networks from Southeast Asia (Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia). Sometimes it is also used to refer to an ethnic grouping of culturally similar communities, again in coastal and southern China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and including the ethnic Chinese of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.

Callahan succeeds in pointing out the flaws in traditional IR perspectives on the growth of Chinese power. But there are several points on which he falls short. In Chapter 4 (p. 58), he writes that traditional Chinese concepts of sovereignty are more symbolic than legal-territorial. Yet I doubt that the two can be distinguished so neatly, as in China, the issue of sovereignty and the issue of territorial integrity are unquestionably tied together. The Chinese regime bases its legitimacy *not* on idealism and the future utopia of communism, as it once did, but on continued economic growth and on the idea that the Chinese Communist Party is the only force capable of continuing to hold the nation together, regain lost pieces of territory, and return China to the great power it once was. Thus, sovereignty and territorial integrity are linked, both because of party statements and propaganda and because many Chinese have come to internalize this view of their nation's goals and identity.

Callahan's case studies are also flawed. The importance of an issue varies over time, and in 2005, Sino-Korean relations and the Spratly dispute seem less problematic than perhaps they were when he first drafted the book. While it is true that conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands have not been resolved, Chinese diplomatic efforts at winning friends and allies in Southeast Asia have been

so successful that it is hard to imagine a military conflict arising among claimants in the South China Seas. It is reasonable to argue, as Callahan does, that using norms of sovereignty and international law has complicated or maybe even perpetuated the disputes over the Spratly outcroppings; however, it is littoral states themselves (China, Vietnam, and others) who have pointed to maps, historical documents, and particular clauses of international treaties to stake their claims. Given China's enormous energy needs for the twenty-first century, and its recent charm offensive with its Asian neighbors, it seems more likely than not that a deal will be brokered among the claimants that works in China's favor. My optimism stems from understanding the interests and foreign policy of the states involved, not just from deconstructing the problem to view it another way.

Ultimately, this is a useful book for what it tries to do— to criticize traditional IR theories and perceptions of Chinese foreign policy. However, its ability to shed light on China's "real" intentions in regional or international relations is quite limited. A better way of understanding China's rising power and influence in Asia is to acknowledge the importance of sovereignty to Asian countries and to understand the importance of culture and civilization in policymaking. Callahan may be correct in questioning and problematizing notions of sovereignty, yet in Asia, states see their territorial integrity and independence as inviolate. This is a key factor in understanding both a country's foreign policy and the limited success of regional organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation).

*Contingent States* is a worthwhile book for critical theorists of mainstream international relations, but I do not believe it will convert scholars who take a more traditional view of the role and interests of states in the international arena.

**Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class.** Edited by Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair. London: Routledge, 2004. 324p. \$125.00 cloth, \$34.95 paper.

— Karen M. Booth, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

What do a French-educated Algerian revolutionary, a Lakota traditionalist, Kim Dae Jung, a Romanian sex worker in Cyprus, a Guyanese cricket star of South Asian origin and his Afro-Guyanese fans, a Muslim living in Europe, a Tibetan nationalist, a child rug maker in India, and Aung San Suu Kyi have in common? Mainstream theorists of international relations would say: nothing. According to Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair, however, the members of this unlikely crowd expose the incapacity of IR to explain or usefully contribute to some of the most important debates taking place within and between countries and regions. The stories they compile also reveal the

complicity of IR in the justification and reproduction of the class, race, and gender inequalities constitutive of European and U.S. domination from the fifteenth century to today. *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations* argues that although the last decade has seen much criticism of the ahistorical gender- and race-neutral rational actor model that dominates IR scholarship, its critics have neither adequately explained why this model persists nor analyzed its effects on both the participants in and the objects of international conflicts.

In his essay "Beyond Hegemonic State(ments) of Nature," J. Marshall Beier offers one of the book's clearest examples of how postcolonial theory productively disturbs mainstream IR. Beier demonstrates convincingly that early European travelers' fascination with what they called anarchy and chaos among the Plains Indians "has underwritten not only orthodox international relations theory, but the project of state-making and construction(s) of the modern Western 'self' as well" (p. 83). IR scholars justify their subsequent "near total neglect" of indigenous Americans' political institutions by reaffirming these early interpretations of what were actually highly ordered and complex political institutions. Beier deftly weaves together Lakota accounts of their political system and of how contact with Europeans produced the chaos wrongly attributed to Lakota "tradition"; Europeans' gendered and racialized dismissals of the Lakota as inherently war-obsessed savages; and nineteenth- and twentieth-century political science. In the process, he reveals the dependence of European and U.S. conceptions of the state on the imperialist project of misreading, disrupting, marginalizing, and virtually erasing the aboriginal presence.

The other nine substantive essays take up mainstream IR's complicity in maintaining U.S. and European domination of global capital and of definitions of democracy, human rights, secularism, and citizenship. Each demonstrates how what Michel Foucault calls the "will to power" is served by the way IR represents or ignores specific international problems. For example, Shampa Biswas shows us that popular and academic defenses of Western secularism in response to the increased visibility of Muslims in Great Britain deploy a construction of Britishness as white and Christian. Anna M. Agathangelou finds that the internationalization of production and finance and the activities of the predominantly male jet-setting transnational economic elite so central to analyses of globalization found in *The Economist* and IR textbooks alike depend on equally internationalized sexual and domestic service industries whose workers are largely migrant women. The invisibility as well as the femininity of workers in what Agathangelou calls the global "desire economy" make possible the existence, comfort, and pleasure of the visible global class and simultaneously allow IR scholars not to see or take seriously workers' new challenges to that gendered invisibility. The volume argues that deconstructing IR's



claims to objectivity, rationality, and universality in a way that is sensitive to the power of representation, to the benefits that the powerful gain by silencing alternative explanations of the world, and to the persistence of imperial practices is necessary to make political science relevant and to contribute to struggles against global inequality and injustice.

This is an engaging read, and both the well-written and accessible introduction and the generally well-chosen essays make an important contribution to the critical literature on globalization. The book suffers from several problems, however. The essays are not equally successful at reaching the editors' main goal, that is, to follow their deconstruction of IR with a reconstruction of a "counternarrative" that actively resists domination. Siba Grovogui's essay comparing IR scholars' current dismissal of postcolonial theory to French elites' dismissal of leftist Algerian claims in the aftermath of Algeria's war for independence, and Sankaran Krishna's use of a Guyanese cricketer to analyze tensions between ethnic and national identities, are particularly unsatisfying in this regard.

The contributions are also uneven with respect to their attention to race, gender, and class. Only Agathangelou's study of migrant sex and domestic workers, L. H. M. Ling's analysis of attempts by Europe and the United States to recolonize Asian economies in the late 1990s, and Chowdhry's critique of human rights discourse on child labor adequately address the editors' concern with how race, class, and gender simultaneously determine global processes. In most of the other essays, discussions, particularly of gender, seem tacked on and marginal. For example, in an otherwise excellent critique of Western claims to a long tradition of secularism, Biswas mentions gender briefly and only in relation to controversies over the veil. She bypasses a perfect opportunity to dissect the paradox that while fundamentalist Christians and Muslims forge a powerful alliance in opposition to reproductive and sexual freedom, each continues to use the other's "treatment of women" to prove its difference and superiority.

The essays in *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations*, while collectively promising somewhat more than they deliver, nevertheless can and should serve as theoretical and methodological models for future anti-imperialist and feminist readings and reconfigurations of the world and as the basis for a much-needed rethinking of the field of international relations.

**Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment.** By Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. 327p. \$62.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Marc Williams, *University of New South Wales*

This book is a welcome addition to the literature on global environmental politics. Research on global environmental

politics is well established, and within this branch of political science a number of excellent overview texts have been written on the politics of the global environment. However, students of the global political economy of the environment have lacked a comprehensive and accessible text until the publication of this book. Furthermore, many chapters on this subject in textbooks have narrowed the field to discussion of regime formation and the salience of institutional structures. While Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne recognize the importance of institutional arrangements, their focus is on the intersection between economic process and environmental problems. The book consists essentially of three main sections. The first section provides the theoretical framework, the second investigates the relationship between globalization and the environment, and the final section provides a number of case studies of the political economy of environmental change.

The first section is perhaps the most innovative part of the text. Clapp and Dauvergne begin from the recognition that environmental problems are complex (and contested) and are shaped by technical, scientific, socioeconomic, and political forces. They argue that answers to key questions concerning the political economy of the environment often reveal "an almost endless stream of contradictory explanations and evidence" (p. 3). In order to provide the reader with a pathway through this maze of contradictions, the authors proffer four "worldviews" on the relationship between the global political economy and global environmental change. These worldviews constitute the core of the theoretical framework of the book. Faced with such a typology, the reader has to ask whether such classifications are helpful and to what extent they are utilized in a manner that enhances the analysis of the text. I think that the answers to both questions are positive.

We are aware that in the academic literature and in policy debates, contrasting positions are frequently outlined and supported with a plethora of "scientific" support and passionate argumentation. In the contemporary world, no serious analyst or policymaker is against sustainable development. And if we accept that these views are held sincerely, it is important to distinguish among competing perspectives and to understand their key assumptions and values. The four competing worldviews outlined—market liberals, institutionalists, bioenvironmentalists, and social greens—provide an account of the key assumptions and values of competing positions and take us beyond conventional classifications, which make distinctions between technocentric and ecocentric approaches, and/or between environmental and ecological perspectives on political economy. Arguably, the authors' decision to include or exclude certain thinkers (academics, policymakers, and activists) is likely to provoke debate, but the important issue is not whether specific individuals have been included or excluded but rather whether the

categories themselves are sufficiently comprehensive. I think that the four worldviews do serve to illuminate and clarify an understanding of the political economy of global environmental politics. This feat is achieved through the comprehensive nature of the worldviews and the subtle and nuanced manner with which they are deployed in the text. Clapp and Dauvergne recognize that these worldviews are heuristic devices and that in the real world, there are elements of overlap among the categories as well as divergences within each worldview.

In Chapters 2 and 3, the authors explore the relationship between globalization and environmental change. First, they begin with a clear statement of the “globalization is real” thesis. Second, they then proceed to investigate the myriad ways in which globalizing processes intersect with environmental change through the theoretical lens outlined in the previous chapter. That is, they show how market liberals, institutionalists, bioenvironmentalists, and social greens approach these issues. Thirdly, the authors focus on the globalization of environmentalism, describing the evolution of global concern with environmental issues. Historically, international attention to environmental issues is a reflection of humanity’s impact on natural resources and the environment, and ideas concerning human-societal and human-environmental linkages. This discussion highlights the role of agency, notably the input of states, corporations, and civic associations in contributing to global environmental governance. It was surprising that the authors ignored the importance of environmental crises and catastrophes in fostering the globalization of environmentalism.

The final and major section of the book examines the relationship between four structures of the global political economy—inequality, trade, investment and finance—and global environmental change. The authors investigate the complex linkages between global wealth distribution, patterns and organization of trade, location of production, and flows of financial transfers and global environmental change. One of the strengths of the text is the careful manner with which the authors discuss competing claims and manage to achieve sufficient breadth of treatment without sacrificing depth. The discussions in these chapters are clear, accurate, and balanced. Each chapter adeptly summarizes the main issues for debate, the roles of various actors, and the ways in which the four worldviews interrogate the key issues. Moreover, the authors are skilled in showing some of the limitations of the worldviews when applied to concrete issues. This synthesis of competing perspectives on the impact of poverty, the trading system, global investment, and international finance on the global environment forces the reader to question his or her assumptions and to recognize the complexity of the issues under scrutiny.

This is an excellent general introduction to the political economy of the global environment. Its organization is

clear, the writing is lucid, and its coverage is wide-ranging. Clapp and Dauvergne have made a valuable contribution to the study of the political economy of the environment through their articulation and development of the four worldviews, and their recognition and intelligent analysis of diversity. *Paths to a Green World* is a bold, imaginative, and thoughtful book that should become a standard introduction to the political economy of global environmental change.

**Legitimacy in International Society.** By Ian Clark. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 288p. \$55.00.

—Mlada Bukovansky, *Smith College*

Ian Clark’s book offers the most comprehensive analysis of legitimacy in international relations available today, in the process breathing new life into the concept of international society. Organized into two main sections—a historical review of major peace settlements and an analysis of contemporary international society—the book develops a framework designed to disentangle the complex threads of discourse that make up both scholarly and public discussions of international legitimacy. The author refines and brings the tradition of the English School into direct dialogue with mainstream U.S. international relations discourse, to productive effect.

Clark treats legitimacy as an irreducibly political concept, subject to historical changes in consensual norms and balances of power. He argues that legitimacy is related, but not reducible to, other norms. Commentators and political actors draw on norms such as justice, rights, or balance of power to give substance to their legitimacy claims, but “legitimacy possesses no independent normative content of its own” (p. 207). International legitimacy is, according to Clark, both a political practice and a property of international society (p. 30). As a *practice*, it entails negotiation by political actors seeking a working consensus in the context of competing norms and interests. As a *property*, international legitimacy belongs to international society. International society is constituted by two core sets of legitimacy principles: one set pertaining to who the rightful members are, the other pertaining to how they should conduct themselves. The meaning and content of these core sets of principles vary historically (p. 5).

This variation is skillfully detailed in the historical sections of the book, which cover familiar ground: the Peace of Westphalia, Utrecht, Versailles (where legitimacy proved elusive), and the post–World War II settlement. Clark admirably manages the dual task of synthesizing vast bodies of scholarship on these cases and providing fresh insights based on his analytical framework. For example, he situates the birth of international society, and hence the notion of international legitimacy itself, in the Peace of Westphalia (p. 61). His related argument that Westphalia was not primarily about sovereignty but rather about

internationally sanctioned legality is elegantly rendered and might productively mediate the debate about whether or not Westphalia deserves its iconic status in international relations scholarship.

In his treatment of the interplay among norms, interests, and the balance of power in the Vienna Congress, Clark draws on Hans Morgenthau and Paul Schroeder to show how the notion of balance of power was given normative content in the idea of a “just equilibrium.” He thus avoids reducing norms to a distribution of power, and analyzes instead the interplay among power, self-interest, and societal norms, an interplay that makes up the political practice of legitimacy (p. 107). The author deftly avoids reductionism throughout the book, and he never gets bogged down in the rhetoric of constructivist-realist-liberal paradigm wars, though his analysis has much to offer in that vein. The book is free of the methodological self-consciousness characteristic of much IR scholarship in the United States, and adopts instead a pragmatic, interpretive approach disciplined by careful delineation and consistent application of core concepts, and a willingness to systematically engage alternative interpretations of his cases.

In the second half of the book, readers will encounter a broad, nuanced, and open-ended exploration of claims about the meaning and substance of international legitimacy today. Two arguments nested therein will surely invite further debate. With respect to rightful membership, Clark argues that international society has become increasingly stratified and exclusive since the end of the Cold War. This is evident in the robust assertion of liberal democracy as a criterion for membership in the “civilized” society of states, and the simultaneous willingness to categorize certain states (such as Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and North Korea) as rogues or outlaws. The scope of international society, which has undergone periods of both expansion and contraction since Westphalia, now seems to be contracting (Chapter 9).

Clark leaves us wondering about the status of those states in the world, such as China and Saudi Arabia, that are neither “rogues” nor liberal democracies. Does the fact that international society has not openly deemed these states illegitimate merely represent the dying residue of a once-robust pluralism? He examines armed interventions in the Gulf War of 1991, Kosovo, and the Iraq war of 2003 to demonstrate the increasing willingness of international society to penetrate the internal affairs of states. But these cases could just as easily be taken as the exception rather than the rule, since “failed” states are as often neglected as subject to intervention (though this fact could be used to obliquely support his core argument). A more bothersome oversight is Clark’s failure to discuss the pressures for market liberalization that surely constitute a core component of today’s model of legitimate statehood, and may be in tension with the pressure to democratize.

U.S. hegemony is another core preoccupation. International society, Clark points out, has historically shown an antihegemonial bias, a commitment to “just equilibrium” rooted in a balance of power. Does the fact of U.S. preponderance undercut the processes of consensus-seeking diplomacy and bargaining that have characterized the workings of international society to date? Is the quest for international legitimacy doomed in the face of unipolarity? Clark has not given up on international society (nor on the United Nations). The problem today, as he sees it, is how to craft consensus on a “just *disequilibrium*”—a constitutional order based not on balance of power but on U.S. hegemony, constrained by an international society whose members accept the special responsibilities and rights of the hegemon.

Whatever one makes of this less-than-radical conclusion, the notable achievement of this book is to formulate a working conception of international legitimacy and consistently apply it to shed light on both historical cases and contemporary issues. Few international relations scholars today can demonstrate such range and relevance; *Legitimacy in International Society* will pay substantial dividends to the attentive reader.

**The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy.** By Patrick J. Haney and Walt

Vanderbush. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 240p. \$24.95.

— Javier Corrales, *Amherst College*

There are two commonly held beliefs among Cuba specialists about the United States embargo on Cuba. The first is that the embargo is a frozen relic of the Cold War that has hardly changed over the years. The second is that the strongest lobbying group among Cuban Americans, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), is responsible for the endurance of this relic. This book’s mission is to dispel these beliefs, and for the most part, it succeeds.

The authors’ main argument is that the embargo has “changed greatly,” especially since the late 1980s. What began in 1960 as a coherent, executive-dominated policy has become today a fragmented law, characterized by loopholes, waivers, and inconsistent compliance. Further, Cuban Americans are not the main actors driving this evolution. By conducting a thorough review of sources, including government records, Patrick Haney and Walt Vanderbush marshal formidable evidence on their behalf. The result is an eloquently written book that, despite its brevity, is the most authoritative account to date of the history of the embargo since the 1980s.

The most compelling part is the compilation of the evidence on behalf of policy change. The embargo was designed to remain under the control of the executive branch, and for most of the Cold War, it stayed that way. However, after the 1980s, Congress began to play a more

“activist” role and, with the 1996 Helms-Burton Bill, which codified the embargo into law, Congress achieved dominance. Furthermore, despite its reputation, the embargo has not stayed coherently hard-line. Although the Helms-Burton Bill toughened key provisions, Congress has nonetheless tolerated executive-branch efforts to waive most of them. Even under George W. Bush there is evidence of porosity—many Americans visit Cuba legally, U.S. companies are selling annually more than \$150 million worth of food and medicine to the island, and few violators of the embargo actually get prosecuted. CANF might have been able to prevent the demise of the embargo, which is clearly a victory, but not its fragmentation and incoherence. For the authors, therefore, the intellectual task is to explain not policy endurance but policy change in the direction of porosity, inconsistency, and, more important, congressional domination.

Once the authors prove that the embargo became porous and inconsistent, they essentially won half the battle on behalf of their second thesis—that the influence of Cuban Americans has been secondary. Logically, if the embargo has lost much of its coherence, then CANF cannot be the main driver inasmuch as CANF advocates a hard-line policy. Something else must be driving the politics of the embargo.

That “something else” is Congress. The authors show how congressional forces—from both sides of the aisle—have become the main drivers of embargo politics since Ronald Reagan. But this part of the book, although rich in evidence, is conspicuously poor in theory. The story of the rise of Congress proceeds without an examination of (alternative) theories: A president emerges with an interest in promoting a policy change that is politically unpopular (Reagan’s interest in hardening policy toward Cuba in the early 1980s). He “privatizes” policy, that is, helping to create an interest group to assist him politically (Reagan’s involvement in launching CANF). At first, the president and the group collaborate, but over time, the group becomes more autonomous and begins to confront competition from other interest groups that hold opposite preferences (e.g., agricultural exporters interested in trade with Cuba). Congress becomes the favorite arena for this intergroup competition since the Constitution grants Congress primary powers on issues of foreign trade. This competition thus explains the rise of Congress and the fragmentation of policy.

This may be an accurate story, but theoretically, no new ground is broken, and herein lies my main frustration with the book: It is too complacent with a framework that amounts to a restatement of traditional pluralism. I could not help thinking about how the argument would differ, and acquire more sophistication, if the authors had employed standard comparative methods other than merely relying on archival research to develop alternative theories.

For instance, Haney and Vanderbush could have compared more carefully the range of political opinions among Cuban Americans, increasingly divided over policy toward Cuba. This would have allowed the authors to incorporate sociological theories of interest formation by immigrants, based on timing and circumstances of arrival. Alternatively, they could have compared CANF not just with another successful lobbying group, like the Israeli lobby, as the authors do, but also with less influential groups, such as Vietnamese Americans. Why were Vietnamese Americans even less influential than CANF? Even more intriguing, why do we see a bipartisan congressional team, led by Senators John Kerry and John McCain, both Vietnam veterans, cooperate with Bill Clinton to normalize relations with Vietnam, but not with Cuba? Does this have to do with differences among constituencies, differences between the target countries, or the fact that Cuba has produced no major American veteran of war and thus no sentiment by leading politicians to make amends with a former enemy? A comparison with Vietnam would have allowed the authors to probe theories about the psychology of making peace and about the strategic complexities of executive-legislative cooperation. Another possibility would have been a comparison with another country, such as Spain, which is also a democracy with a strong (pro-engagement) Cuba policy and a long-standing community of expatriate Cubans. Why have Cuban Spaniards been far less influential than Cuban Americans in shaping host-country policy? This cross-country comparison would have allowed the authors to assess whether differences in democratic institutions impact constituency influence on foreign policy.

Despite this wish list for more theory-testing comparisons, I remain impressed by the research in this book. And as with all good research, the angels are in the details, and one of the most precious details is that many U.S. presidents (except John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Reagan) have tried at some point to soften policy toward Cuba, even normalize relations—to no avail. That these efforts failed prior to the rise of CANF and continued after the rise of CANF supports the authors’ contention about the secondary role played by CANF. Yet this begs a new question—why has normalization failed repeatedly?

Most of the scholarship on this question has looked at two culprits: Americans (have U.S. administrations been genuinely committed to improving relations with Cuba?) and Cuban Americans (do they have that much leverage?). *The Cuban Embargo* shows that the answer to the latter question is no and suggests that the answer to the former is yes. One other culprit remains unexamined—the Cuban government itself. Cuba claims to be interested in ending the embargo, yet every effort launched by the United States to normalize relations seems to be followed by a Cuban policy decision that essentially kills the initiative. Coincidence? Or is Cuba secretly uninterested in



peace? Since most scholars on Cuba agree that the embargo serves the Cuban government well by helping the regime rationalize its rule, the thesis that Cuba might have an unspoken interest in prolonging the embargo is hardly preposterous. We have the theory; what we lack is a systematic review of evidence. One day, if Cuban government records ever become public, scholars ought to emulate the archival research carried out by these authors to probe the hypothesis that the longevity of the embargo is the result not of preferences by Americans or even Cuban Americans, but of Cubans themselves.

**Environmental Policymaking: Assessing the Use of Alternative Policy Instruments.** Edited by Michael T. Hatch.

Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. 265p. \$85.00 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

— Roger D. Congleton, *George Mason University*

There is by now a sizable collection of books that compare the environmental politics and policies of different countries. Some approach environmental policymaking as an exercise in political theory and examine how local political and economic considerations drive local and international environmental regulations (*The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence*, R. D. Congleton, 1995). Others examine the determinants of such policies or address international questions of negotiation, regulation, and compliance (*Globalization and the Environment*, Schulze and Ursprung, 2001; *The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation*, Stavins, 2004). This book focuses on contemporary policies and policy tools themselves, broadly interpreted. What kinds of policies do we see adopted? How were those policies justified, and how well have they succeeded in advancing environmental ends?

Michael Hatch's volume analyzes the full spectrum of policies that have been adopted, albeit mostly in the developed countries of the United States, Germany, and Japan. What is nearly unique about this book is that it provides considerable coverage of nongovernmental environmental policies, such as labeling and voluntary emissions targets, as well as conventional regulatory policies. Coverage includes mainstream tax and regulatory policies, joint private-government enterprises such as effluent markets, and entirely voluntary programs. By analyzing the full spectrum of possible policies, the book provides a very nice casebook for a variety of environmental politics, policy, and economic courses.

Several authors point out that the use of voluntary agreements and environmental labeling to address contemporary environmental concerns began at about the same time as command-and-control methods of environmental protection, but have been neglected in most work on environmental regulation. Voluntary regulation schemes involving labeling and certification are discussed for for-

estry in particular (Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Chapter 3), and for a broad range of other industrial, commercial, and consumer products (Edda Müller, Chapter 2, Eric Welch and Miranda A. Shreurs, Chapter 4, and Hatch, Chapter 5). Policies that combine private and governmental institutions are discussed in some of the labeling programs, where governments often are significant purchasers of labeled products. Voluntary agreements between firms and government are discussed for Japan and Germany (Chapters 4 and 5) and also in the chapter on emissions trading between and within firms (Gary C. Bryner, Chapter 8). The existence of voluntary programs implies that government is not always necessary for solving public goods problems, although in many cases the programs put in place were encouraged and helped along by governmental decisions. For example, many governments purchase "labeled products" for their own use or require others that contract with the government to do so.

The more studied command-and-control and tax methods of governmental regulation are analyzed in Chapters 6, 8, and 9, with emphasis on specific environmental taxes in Germany, and the effects of environmental impact statements and the Clean Air Acts in the United States. The analyses are very accessible, moderate in tone, balanced, and carefully done.

The individual policy overviews are, for the most part, inductive rather than theoretical. The chapters summarize various negotiations among interest groups and government agencies that "caused" various programs to be adopted and note some general results of policy. Electoral pressures are mentioned, if at all, only in passing. Some of these details will already be known to readers, but many of them will not. Many of the cases are quite interesting and provide puzzles for future theoretical research and class discussions. For example, the chapter on emissions trading notes that the remediation costs associated with sulfur trading turned out to be far lower than early estimates had indicated. Estimated compliance costs have fallen from \$4.9 billion to less than \$2 billion per year (p. 178). As it turns out, compliance costs fell for a variety of reasons—some of which might have been predicted at the onset. For example, other regulations were subsequently modified to reduce legal barriers to using low-sulfur coal. This suggests that policy decisions are not entirely independent of one another, as new incentives can induce further consideration of regulations that discourage the use of cost-effective methods for reducing emissions. In principle, more formal efforts to model and forecast compliance costs should take such interdependencies into account, although this is rarely, if ever, done.

My main complaints about *Environmental Policymaking* is that it focuses a bit too narrowly on recent environmental regulations in developed countries, and that too little quantitative work on the effectiveness of the voluntary and coercive policies is included. The latter might

have been intentional, insofar as it allows the authors to avoid raising the ideological hackles that plague most post mortems of environmental policy, but it also reduces the book's ability to assess the relative merits of the broad cross section of contemporary policy instruments analyzed in the volume. Another complaint is that the book's title reveals relatively little about the volume's focus. The book is far less about environmental policymaking than it is about environmental policy, *per se*. The individual chapters provide only fairly cursory analyses of how specific environmental policies actually came to be adopted and implemented, and the short concluding chapter provides little in the way of assessment. Generally, all the authors assume that a policy that claims to improve environmental quality does so, although this has not always been the case in international policy areas (Murdoch and Sandler, 1997, *Journal of Public Economics* 63(2), 331–49).

Overall, however, the book is a very useful contribution to the literature on environmental policy, and a valuable collection of case studies that will be of interest to policymakers and teachers of political science and economic courses on environmental issues.

**The Remains of War: Bodies, Politics, and the Search for American Soldiers Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.** By Thomas M. Hawley. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. 282p. \$22.95.

— Timothy J. Lomperis, *Saint Louis University*

The central thesis of this book is that *the* unresolved issue fueling the continued divisiveness of the Vietnam War is the key legacy of the unaccounted-for remains of America's missing in action (MIAs) in Indochina. It is a thesis that Thomas Hawley propounds at several levels. His argument is empirical in its depiction of the investigative processes and results of the actual searches for these men. It is semiotic in its focus on the symbol of their bodies as "signing" for the larger issues still surrounding the war. It is an investigation into the impact on the American popular and political culture of these bodies—those of the visible veterans and of the invisible, fragmented missing soldiers—in terms of how they are depicted in the arts (Hollywood mostly) and in memorials. Finally, it aspires to a more profound philosophical level in assessing the moral and political implications of this thesis for our larger understanding of the Vietnam War itself. Although this book is well worth reading, its success at all these levels is only intermittent.

Scholarship in the social sciences has to be judged on its validity and reliability, that is, on the soundness of the thesis in the empirical and external world from which it was formulated and on the rational clarity with which the thesis is then presented in its own terms. The validity of Hawley's thesis—that "the remains of war" form the heart of the continued divisiveness over Vietnam—is hard to

accept. Though America's MIAs are certainly in the mix of Vietnam's unfinished business, so also are continued controversies over the wisdom of the Containment Doctrine, the issue of the nationalism versus the communism of our Vietnamese adversaries, the still-raging battles over strategy, the question of the centrality of the Tet Offensive in 1968, the "Big Story" of media hype versus its manipulation, the ambiguous *casus belli* of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident of 1964, and the persons responsible for the humiliating helicopter liftoffs from the embassy rooftop in 1975. How America's two thousand MIAs rise above all this to command center stage is only asserted and not demonstrated by the author.

But if we give him this assertion, in his own terms, Hawley comes up with a mix of provocative insights and utterly obtuse explanations. In my opinion, he is at his best in his empirical account of the search for the missing. Here, his meticulous research and systematic presentation of the process whereby bodies are located, identified, formally accounted for, and repatriated amount to a definitive work on this subject. He makes clear in great detail how painstaking this effort has been. He shows how a full accounting of all of the missing will be impossible, but praises the U.S. government for the significant number of resolutions and repatriations that have been made (some 734, p. 69). He is also convincing, however, in his insistence that there probably were some left behind in 1973, and that President Richard Nixon's assertion that the 591 prisoners of war (POWs) who returned in Operation Homecoming in 1973 closed the books on this issue was ill-advised and almost certainly not accurate (pp. 65–67).

Despite the book's overdrawn thesis, Hawley's semiotics on the bodies of the missing is insightful. After calling attention to the importance given to the bodies of the fallen in Western Christendom, he lays out how this importance is enhanced in the United States with its far higher rates of bodily burials than in other Western countries. Further, although Americans have shown tolerance for larger numbers of missing in other wars—78,000 in World War II and 8,000 in Korea (p. 4)—their obsession over the missing in Vietnam is convincingly laid at the feet of its unique defeat. The author's additional arguments, that this obsession can be interpreted as a drive to remasculinize these fragmented bodies of defeat and as a ploy to manipulate them into an image of America as a victim of evil Vietnamese, rather than as a perpetrator of the immoral war itself, are more interesting than they are convincing.

The most provocative part of this book lies in its discussion of the symbols of this movement: the returned veterans themselves as the "culturally missing," the Vietnam Veterans War Memorial, the Tomb of the Unknown Vietnam War Soldier, and the POW/MIA flag. Taking the veterans first, he points to the disparity between the actual success of Vietnam veterans in their social reintegration and their depiction as "crazies" in the popular culture.

Keeping the MIA issue alive with its images of the heroically fallen served as a noble antidote to these presently returned “deviants.” Hawley’s brief essay on the Tomb of the Unknown Vietnam War Soldier is illuminating, if only because to most of us the existence of such a tomb itself was unknown. His lengthy treatise on the Vietnam Veterans War Memorial is complex, both in its political and artistic analysis of the memorial itself and in its symbolic placement. He argues that the central location of the memorial between the Washington and Lincoln Memorials, but still in a pit, is atonement for defeat as well as a welcoming home for all of the Vietnam War’s participants, back into the bosom of the American body politic. Whether these meanings of the memorial were as self-consciously promoted by the designers as he seems to assume is almost beside the point. These ideas are well worth considering on their own terms.

It is on the philosophical level where Hawley falls on his sword. His explanation of “the materiality of the body” as a way to understand the ethics of the Vietnam War ontologically in terms of some distinction between the *said* and the *saying* simply could not be penetrated by this reviewer. His concluding discussion on the politics of the war as the government’s use of the POW/MIA issue to shift the blame for the war onto the Vietnamese suffers from Hawley’s almost willful ignorance of the extensive literature on the war itself with its host of alternative explanations.

Thus, though certainly not without its flaws, *The Remains of War* deserves an important place on the Vietnam War shelf of any library. It is probably the definitive empirical work on the accounting of America’s Vietnam POWs and MIAs. It also offers some provocative insights on the role of this issue in our culture and on the continued irresolution about what has been the great agony of the Baby Boom generation: the Vietnam War.

**American Power in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.** Edited by David Held and Matthias Koenig-Archibugi. Cambridge, UK, and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004. 299p. \$64.95 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

— William C. Wohlforth, *Dartmouth College*

American primacy is destined to be one of the defining features of international politics for years to come. David Held and Matthias Koenig-Archibugi have assembled essays on the topic by a high-powered stable of scholars. Michael Cox, one of the most prolific and penetrating analysts of American power today, kicks off the volume with a learned *tour d’horizon* of scholarly debates on whether empire is a useful concept to apply today, whether the United States is one, and whether its primacy will endure. Michael Mann and Mary Kaldor present skeptical views on the latter issue. Mann briskly makes his case that as strong as it is militarily, the United States lacks the other wellsprings of power any self-respecting empire needs. And Kaldor goes

on to disparage the real utility of the one kind of power that everyone in the book agrees the United States possesses in abundance. High-technology military force, she argues, “rarely confers a decisive advantage in conflicts between armed opponents” (p. 187).

Zhiyuan Cui offers a Chinese perspective on the Bush Doctrine that is in keeping with the critical tone of the other contributors. He also chronicles China’s tentative “balancing” efforts in international institutions and financial affairs. Abdelwahab El-Affendi reinforces Mann’s and Kaldor’s skepticism about the utility of U.S. military power, stressing its “amazing ineffectiveness” in the Middle East (p. 253). Joseph Nye and Robert Cooper consider the relationship between hard and soft power, together providing a counterpoint to Robert Kagan’s famous essay on “Power and Weakness,” also included in the volume. Nye’s main point is that the struggle against terrorism takes place mainly on the “transnational chessboard” of international politics, where traditional military power is least useful and soft power—preference shaping, agenda setting, legitimacy—is most important. Cooper reminds readers that “hard power begets soft power” (p. 176). “If you want to exercise soft power,” he notes (perhaps having in mind those Europeans who want to do just that), “you must have something to offer—a recipe for success, resources to help others get there, and probably armed force to protect them on the way.”

G. John Ikenberry and Thomas Risse set forth liberal perspectives on American primacy, highlighting what Risse calls the “three I’s”: multilateral institutions, deep economic interdependence, and broadly shared liberal identities. According to Ikenberry, these three features of the Western order, together with the democratic domestic institutions of the United States, will work to “reinforce restraint in the exercise of American unipolar power” (p. 107). Risse makes a conditionally optimistic argument that the United States and its chief European allies can strike a new transatlantic bargain that will see them through the challenges of American unilateralism, diverging domestic political dynamics, and transnational terrorism. What is needed, he claims, is not a European counterweight to U.S. power but merely a Europe with a clear liberal voice, a plausible strategy for how to deal with new security threats, and the willingness to bring both to bear in U.S. domestic deliberations on foreign policy.

The editors stress the diversity of the views they assembled, and the claim is surely warranted as far as scholarly assessments are concerned. Neither they nor any of the contributors, however, note the remarkable fact that notwithstanding this diversity in approach, the fundamental conclusion is the same: that U.S. power is either relatively ineffectual or tightly constrained, or both. This is clearest for Mann, Kaldor, and El-Affendi, who dwell on America’s obvious difficulty in translating its military prowess into preferred outcomes. But even Ikenberry and Nye,

seemingly the most bullish, end up stressing constraints. For Nye, the problem is that the chief challenges of the day cannot be settled with the kind of capabilities in which the United States excels. Ikenberry insists that U.S. unipolar power can only be effective if it is bound by constraining multilateral rules.

Events since these essays were written in late 2003 or early 2004 appear to buttress the consensus. The United States remains bogged down in Iraq and seems to be experiencing fiscal overstretch, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is busily seeking to reestablish Washington's multilateral credentials. It is nonetheless worth asking whether this turn of events actually vindicates the shared scholarly assessments contained in this book. Counterinsurgency has never been easy—neither for Russia in the nineteenth century, when it fought in the Caucasus for two generations, nor for the British in the Boer War, nor for all the other great powers, including the United States itself in the Philippines or Vietnam. America's difficulties in Iraq are important, but they hardly constitute evidence of something new about international relations that makes power especially powerless. Washington's fiscal overstretch, moreover, is fundamentally the result of domestic, not international, priorities, and the Bush administration's new multilateralism may tell us more about its troubles in Iraq than the binding power of multilateral rules.

Are old-fashioned state-centric capabilities really as “powerless” as these authors suggest? They might be, but there are grounds for skepticism. The authors here generally follow the common practice of determining the utility of power by assessing active attempts by the United States to use it. This inevitably leads to selection bias against evidence of the indirect, “structural” effects that U.S. power may have on international affairs that are not dependent upon active management. Things that do not happen—counterbalancing, great-power arms racing, hegemonic rivalry, security dilemmas among Asian powers, decisions by Japan and others to nuclearize, and so on—are as important as those that do. Not only are nonevents downplayed in comparison to salient events that appear to demonstrate the powerlessness of power, but patterns of events that do go the unipole's way are often missed. Washington's failure to have its way in the United Nations is featured; its quite different experience in the International Monetary Fund is not. And even in the United Nations, the focus on highly contested issues, such as the attempt at a second resolution authorizing the invasion of Iraq, fails to note how the institution's whole agenda has shifted to address concerns (e.g., terrorism) that the United States particularly cares about.

This is fine collection of essays that exemplifies the many different intellectual pathways to the conventional scholarly wisdom about constraints on American power. Readers seeking a challenge to their views will likely have to look elsewhere.

**Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States.** By Jeremy A. Rabkin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 350p. \$29.95.

— Eric Posner, *University of Chicago*

Many people complain that American foreign policy is self-interested, unilateralist, and brutish, and wish that the United States would participate more enthusiastically in multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Treaty. Defenders of American foreign policy argue that these institutions just do not serve America's interest. Jeremy Rabkin offers an alternative version of this argument: He says that yielding sovereignty to global institutions violates America's constitutional traditions, and the attractive mixture of freedom and security that these traditions support. Global governance is bureaucratic, insensitive to democratic pressures, and indifferent to local variation in values and interests. Further, liberty requires the rule of law, and the rule of law can prevail only in a sovereign state. Global governance undermines sovereignty and thus undermines the rule of law and freedom as well.

Rabkin has no objection to international law per se. So long as international law is created by the governments of sovereign states, which retain the option to violate or withdraw from treaties, it can do much good. What he objects to is the transfer of loyalty of the general public, and important domestic institutions such as courts, from the constitutional government of the state to international institutions or vague international norms or standards that are advanced by busybody nongovernmental organizations: “If the United States can be subject to the will of outside powers, it cannot be governed by the schemes ordained in the Constitution” (p. 266). Rabkin fears that Americans will be tempted to succumb to rule by the mainly foreign employees of international institutions because it promises security, prosperity, and promotion of human rights; will become accustomed to such rule; and then will not realize until too late that they have lost the capacity to engage in self-government. And given that international institutions coddle tyrants, appease aggressors, and impose elite values on the common people, Americans will realize too late that they have lost more than they have gained.

Rabkin's *bête noir* is the European Union, which is itself a quasi-international institution to which constituent states have yielded some sovereignty. He attributes the viability of the EU to the dirigiste, bureaucratic, and aristocratic traditions of the Continent, and argues that the Europeans want to foist their idealistic commitment to global governance on the Americans as well, whatever damage it might do to American democratic and constitutional values. Europeans might like the EU but that is because they discount the values of self-governance and freedom. For Americans, the EU shows what happens



when state sovereignty gives way to supranational institutions.

The author raises important questions. Although some American legal scholars have raised constitutional concerns about American participation in certain international institutions, their objections are narrowly legalistic, and could be silenced through constitutional amendment or (more likely) narrow interpretation of troublesome constitutional provisions by courts that tend to defer to the political branches' foreign policy. Rabkin, by contrast, appeals to American traditions and ideals that the Constitution, as currently understood, embodies.

Ironically, Rabkin's argument echoes the worries of the early critics of the U.S. Constitution. These critics feared that the sovereignty of the former colonies would be lost to a distant, imperial national government, and with the loss of sovereignty would come the loss of prized traditions of self-governance. These critics lost the battle in the 1780s and were forever silenced by the Civil War. American constitutional traditions celebrate freedom but they also embrace empire. Power, prosperity, and prestige were the benefits gained in return for yielding local self-government to a remote national elite. To be sure, the federalist system preserves local autonomy to some extent, but the final product is very much a compromise, and certainly permits further expansion if warranted by the gains. Advocates of global governance, as well as critics like Rabkin, can find ammunition for their views in American constitutional traditions.

Rabkin's argument thus depends less on American constitutional ideals than on a theory about the limits of lawmaking. The author thinks that only sovereign states can make and enforce laws that serve the interests of the people, and he appears to think that the size of sovereign states has a natural limit. When states become too large—at the extreme, a world state—they lose the power to enforce the law, and to the extent that they can, they become imperial, bureaucratic, remote, soulless. But nobody today equates “global governance” and a world state. Rabkin argues, rather, that the intermediate institutions advocated by supporters of global governance create, or are likely to lead to, global institutions that fall short of a world state but nonetheless are harmful in similar ways.

The argument seems too extreme. Not even the Europeans want to extend the EU to the United States, China, and Indonesia. The international criminal court, the Kyoto Treaty, and the World Trade Organization do not impinge on sovereignty in the way that the EU does. Rabkin fears that if Americans acquiesce in these forms of global governance today, they will acquiesce in an EU-like system tomorrow, but the idea that we should reject valuable international institutions, if they are valuable, because of the remote chance that Americans will become complacent about global governance, in general, is not plausible.

These criticisms aside, *Law Without Nations?* has much value. Advocates of global governance often talk as though international institutions have only benefits and no costs, and opposition to them is irrational or purely self-interested. Rabkin draws attention to the moral and political costs of these institutions, and convincingly argues that more is at stake than their immediate consequences for foreign policy. He is right that there are natural limits on the size of states, and that people who transfer their loyalties from national institutions to international institutions take grave risks with their freedom and well-being. Even if the American and the European systems have worked well for their own citizens, it does not follow that these systems can be expanded beyond their current boundaries.

**Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans.** By Brian Rathbun.

Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004. 242p. \$39.95.

— Alexandra Gheciu, *University of Oxford*

Brian Rathbun's book is an important contribution at the interface of international relations and comparative politics, providing a fascinating, well-researched analysis of the impact of domestic politics on the formulation of foreign and defense policy in three major European states: Great Britain, Germany, and France. Rathbun makes two key claims: Parties articulate and implement different policies in the area of peace enforcement and European defense cooperation due to their different ideologies. Second, contrary to the view that parties formulate policies to win elections, he argues that, in general, parties win elections to formulate policies. In an empirically rich account of the effects of partisan politics, Rathbun analyses the views of—and disagreements among—the main parties in the UK, France, and Germany regarding peace enforcement in Bosnia and Kosovo, and regarding the establishment of an European Union capacity for carrying out peace enforcement operations.

Rathbun argues that in contrast to parties on the right of the political spectrum, leftist parties believe less in the use of force, particularly for strategic purposes; have a more inclusive definition of national interest; and are more willing to rely on multilateral cooperation in pursuit of their goals. He notes that peace enforcement generates values conflicts, especially for leftist parties that are forced to choose between the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the protection of basic human rights abroad. When faced with such conflicts, he seeks to demonstrate, politicians support different policies depending on their positions on the ideological spectrum and their country's historical legacies in the area of armed conflict.

*Partisan Interventions* successfully challenges the argument, which for many years was seen as conventional wisdom in the field of international relations, that the national interest is an objective datum, unaffected by

domestic politics. Moreover, Rathbun demonstrates the weakness of the argument that politicians are no more than instrumental vote seekers. Indeed, contrary to the argument that parties are primarily guided by electoral considerations, his empirical cases clearly demonstrate that in the important area of peace enforcement, parties were largely motivated by principles. His book is important from yet another point of view: It captures the dynamic nature of foreign policy, showing that foreign policy positions change not just as a result of government turnover, but also as a result of learning within a given party. Particularly instructive in this sense is the author's analysis of the way in which the Bosnian experience led to a reassessment of positions on the question of peace enforcement, especially for leftist parties, leading them to question antimilitarism and to become stronger supporters of humanitarian intervention.

While Rathbun is extremely persuasive in showing the limits of the approach that regards parties as no more than office seekers, his critique of cultural theories is a little less convincing. Indeed, in several instances, he seems to underestimate the explanatory power of the argument—put forward by scholars within the “culturalist” camp—that prevailing definitions of national identity generate unique national approaches to international relations.

To take a concrete example, let us briefly examine the British Labour Party's position on European defense. Rathbun takes issue with the culturalist claim that a sense of national identity that is incompatible with federalist visions of European political order explains why British governments, be they Labour or Conservative, have opposed a deepening of European integration (p. 154). His argument is that due to its ideology, Labour was not inhibited by concerns that “adding a competency in security to the EU” would contribute to the union's evolution into an “organization that threatens national decision-making autonomy” (p. 155). Rathbun is right that the Labour Party is, in general, more supportive of the idea of enhancing the EU's security role than the Tories, and that Tony Blair's government played a key role in establishing the structures for EU intergovernmental cooperation in crisis management. In that respect, the shift from a Tory to a Labour government in Britain had significant foreign policy implications. At the same time, however, the transformation in the British approach to the EU should not be overstated. In fact, consistent with a definition of national identity that is incompatible with a supranational vision of Europe, the British Labour government has been keen to stress that the EU it supports is a union of sovereign states. For example, during recent negotiations for an EU Constitutional Treaty, the British government insisted on the need to safeguard unanimity—versus qualified majority voting—on issues such as defense and foreign policy. Linked to its concern to preserve national veto power in the key areas of defense and foreign policy, the British

Labour government objected to any measures seen as a threat to NATO, traditionally regarded by Britain as the foundation of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

In a broader perspective, it is also worth noting that some aspects of the book are a little undertheorized. For example, Rathbun argues in Chapter 1 that he seeks to address a limitation in the existing constructivist literature in international relations, that is, the relative neglect of the domestic level of analysis. His claim is that international norms are more likely to take root when they land on fertile ground; in his words, political parties “become the domestic vehicles of international norms” (p. 7). The attention to domestic politics is very important, but the rich empirical account provided in the book actually tells a dialectical story, linking domestic and international levels in multiple ways. Unfortunately, this dialectical relationship is not fully analyzed by the author.

Particularly relevant are the cases in which, in addition to acting as domestic vehicles of international norms, parties, and sometimes particular individuals within parties, played important roles in the promotion of particular international norms. Consider, for example, the evolution of leftist thinking in France on the question of humanitarian intervention. Rathbun argues that in the 1990s, France's “Second Left” was “primarily responsible for defining humanitarian intervention as an issue for the left, not only in France but internationally” (p. 131). This empirical material is extremely interesting, and the account would have been even stronger if he had taken this opportunity to provide a deeper analysis of the types of processes and techniques through which a particular problem, such as humanitarian intervention, was articulated—and accepted by the relevant parties—as an “issue for the left.” Linked to this, the book would have been even richer if Rathbun had explored the extent and way in which the evolution of thinking among leftist parties on the issue of humanitarian intervention had a broader impact on domestic and international debates that occurred in the 1990s regarding the nature and desirable limits of state sovereignty in the post-Cold War period.

**War and Human Nature.** By Stephen Peter Rosen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 211p. \$29.95.

**Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict.**

By Bradley A. Thayer. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004. 425p. \$40.00.

— Larry Amhart, *Northern Illinois University*

Any general theory of politics assumes a theory of human nature. A small but growing number of political scientists have been applying a Darwinian theory of human biological nature to various topics in political science. The final aim of such work would be to turn political science into a

biopolitical science. These two books contribute to that end by showing how research in human biology and Darwinian theory can illuminate the study of international relations.

Although they agree on many points, Stephen Peter Rosen and Bradley Thayer disagree on the implications of a biological approach to international relations for assessing rational choice theory. Rational choice theorists assume that human beings are egoists who rationally maximize their interests. Applying rational choice theory to international relations means that decisions of war and peace are explained as rational calculations of interests by states competing with one another. Thayer believes that a Darwinian view of international relations confirms rational choice theory by explaining the human nature of rational egoism as ultimately caused by natural selection in the evolutionary competition of human beings for scarce resources. Rosen believes, however, that a biological understanding of human nature shows that rational choice theory is only partially true, because in stressing rational calculations of interest, it ignores the emotional dispositions of fear and honor as factors shaping human decisions in international relations.

In his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides has some Athenian envoys in Sparta say that the imperial policies of Athens are motivated by fear, interest, and honor. Rosen says that the aim of *War and Human Nature* is to show “that there is a biological argument that Thucydides was right, that fear and honor play a role in human politics along with calculations of interest, but also that the other issues he analyzed, such as the nature of the political systems present in the ancient Greek world, matter as well” (p. 2). Human beings are inclined by their biological nature to be rational egoists, and so the rational choice theorists are right about this. But that same biological nature also inclines human beings to feel social emotions that make them care about others and about their status in relation to others. And so, for example, their emotional desire for honor and fear of being dishonored might move them to act contrary to their material interests. Moreover, Rosen argues, these complex motivations of human biological nature are manifested in the military and political behavior of states in international relations.

Rosen applies research in neuroscience on the complex interplay of reason and emotion in the brain and endocrine system to explain the decision making of leaders in times of international crises. Through case studies, he argues that American presidents have had to make quick decisions in complex international circumstances through emotional pattern recognition shaped by memories of emotionally charged experiences from the past. They thus employed neural pathways of information gathering and decision making shaped by natural selection in human evolutionary history.

Rosen argues that while the termination of war can result from calculated decisions about material interests, this can also result from a collapse of the will to fight among the losers, which arises from emotional distress with a neurophysiological basis. Again, his general point is that decisions about war and peace arise from the complex interaction of reason and emotion as shaped by the evolved nature of the human brain.

One prominent manifestation of evolved human nature in international relations is the natural desire for status and dominance. Those who fill the highest offices for deciding issues of war and peace tend to be ambitious people who desire dominance over others. Rosen identifies such people as mostly high-testosterone men who manifest a desire for dominance shaped in evolutionary history where men competed with one another for preeminence. People like Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill are moved by a desire for distinction—for honor and glory—that goes beyond any selfish calculation of material interests.

Tyrants show a similar desire for dominance. But Rosen argues that ambitious leaders like Lincoln, FDR, and Churchill do not have the tyrannical souls of people like Hitler, Stalin, and Mao. He claims that tyrannical behavior emerges from “the personal character of tyrants combined with the institutional character of tyrannies” (p. 178). Rosen’s point here is somewhat unclear. But the idea seems to be that those of tyrannical temperaments will rise to the top in turbulent circumstances where there are few institutional checks or limits on the ruthless and opportunistic pursuit of power. This shows the need to channel the rivalry of politically ambitious people through an institutional structure of checks and balances so that ambition counteracts ambition.

Although he agrees with Rosen in using biological science to explain international relations, Thayer sees biological explanations as applying only to the level of ultimate causes in the genes, as distinguished from social and cultural explanations as applying to the level of proximate causes in the environment. Human behavior arises from a complex interaction of ultimate and proximate causes.

According to Thayer, evolutionary biology contributes to international relations theory by explaining the ultimate causes of war and ethnic conflict. Human beings wage war to acquire and defend resources, because this was favored by natural selection in evolutionary conditions where competing for scarce resources enhanced fitness. Human beings are inclined to ethnic conflict because in-group/out-group distinctions, xenophobia, and ethnocentrism conferred competitive advantages in human evolutionary history.

In *Darwin and International Relations*, Thayer repeatedly acknowledges the power of emotions in human social behavior. He speaks of the “profound emotions” of war, which include “profound love of comrades, the deepest

hatred of the enemy, fear of death, and fear of disappointing the other men" (p. 191). He also refers to the "emotional depth of national identity" (p. 232). And yet he never considers how such emotions—deeply rooted in the brain and endocrine systems of human nature—might go beyond "rational choice."

Nor does Thayer consider the moral emotions as expressions of human biological nature. He quotes Adam Smith as describing the egoism of *Homo economicus*, and he claims that evolutionary theory confirms this economic understanding of human nature. But he says nothing about Smith's account of the "moral sentiments" as the natural ground of moral judgment. Nor does he mention the influence of Smith over Charles Darwin's theory of the "moral sense" as rooted in human biological nature.

This is an important point because many social scientists have recently been employing experiments in evolutionary game theory that confirm the importance of moral sentiments for instilling a sense of right and wrong that motivates people to punish wrongdoers, even when this punishment requires some sacrifice of material interests. Moreover, neuroscientists are now uncovering the neural roots of these moral sentiments in the emotional-control pathways of the brain. This natural moral sense manifests itself in international relations when individuals and nations act out of a sense of justice to aid the victims of injustice and to punish those who have injured them. The tradition of "just war" arises out of such moral sentiments.

Thayer assumes that biological science cannot explain moral experience because science is concerned with factual claims rather than value judgments, and he attributes this fact/value distinction to David Hume. But Thayer misses Hume's point. Hume distinguishes *is* and *ought* in order to show that moral assessments are derived not from pure reason alone but from moral emotions. Hume believes that correct moral judgments are factual statements about the species-typical pattern of moral sentiments in specified circumstances.

Darwin saw that the ethical naturalism of Smith and Hume allowed morality to become an object of scientific study, because scientists could study the natural roots of moral judgment in the evolved moral emotions of the human animal. Recently, biologists such as Edward O. Wilson and economists such as Robert Frank have renewed Darwin's project for a scientific study of morality as founded on natural moral emotions. Thayer says that the question of whether rational choice theorists should include "moral commitment" as a factor in human behavior constraining egoism is "beyond the scope of this book" (p. 86). But a complete political science would need to explain the moral passions that drive political controversy. A biopolitical science would explain morality in politics as expressing the natural moral desires of evolved human nature.

Such a science would study not only the genetic evolution but also the behavioral and cultural evolution of human beings and other political animals. Thayer tends to reduce human biology to genetics. But biology is much more than genetics. And a purely genetic science will not explain much about politics, which depends on higher levels of complexity far beyond the genes.

DNA by itself does nothing. DNA acts through interactions at many levels of biological complexity—interactions within a cell, between cells, between organisms, and within ecological and social communities. These interactions determine the expression of genes, and the patterns of gene expression can evolve in response to behavioral and cultural evolution.

Studying the genes by themselves would tell us almost nothing about politics. But studying the genetic interaction with behavioral and cultural evolution would tell us quite a lot about politics. For example, Thayer stresses that warfare is not unique to human beings, because other animals (such as ants and chimpanzees) wage war in ways that resemble human warfare. But he does not indicate that the patterns in animal warfare show behavioral and cultural evolution. Primatologists have reported diverse behavioral traditions among various chimpanzee groups, not only in war but in other activities, and so it seems that each chimpanzee community has its own repertoire of cultural traditions. Thayer does emphasize the importance of environment or culture as "proximate causes." But he does not clearly indicate that cultural evolution is just as much a part of biology as genetic evolution.

For a science of politics, we need a science of human nature that studies the coevolution of many causes at many levels of complexity—from genes to brains, then to behavior and culture, and finally to symbolic communication as the uniquely human adaptation. In that way, political science could become a true science by becoming a biopolitical science.

### **The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.**

Edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 256p. \$22.50.

— Alexandru Grigorescu, *Loyola University Chicago*

The postcommunist transformations in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have generated a rich body of literature over the past 15 years. Most works on CEE transitions have drawn from the comparative politics literature and treated international factors, at best, as secondary. Yet with the recent eastern expansion of the Council of Europe, NATO, and the European Union, there has been a growing scholarly interest in the impact of international institutions on domestic changes in this region.

This volume focuses on the role played in CEE by the EU—arguably the most complex and influential



international institution in the region. It offers an in-depth, coherent account of the process through which CEE countries have adopted EU rules, defined as the process of “Europeanization.” As eight CEE countries joined the EU in 2004 and two more will soon join, the book is a timely and welcome contribution to at least three important bodies of literature: on transitions, on the EU, and, more broadly, on the role of international institutions.

The 12 authors are known for their previous work on the transitions in CEE and on the role of European institutions. Yet the contributions to the book are composed expressly for this project. They all address the same principal question: How does the EU exercise its influence on accession countries? Moreover, they test the same hypotheses. This makes the chapters unusually well integrated and allows for a set of coherent conclusions.

In the introductory chapter, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier offer three possible models for explaining Europeanization in CEE. The external incentives model deals with conditionality mechanisms involved in EU accession. The social-learning model emphasizes rule adoption through persuasion. The lesson-drawing model focuses on processes induced by CEE countries rather than the EU. Each of the three models generates multiple hypotheses. The following eight chapters proceed to test these hypotheses across different issue areas, countries, and moments in the accession process.

Some of the chapters compare the adoption of EU rules in a single issue area in all CEE candidate countries (such as the chapter on administrative reform by Antoaneta L. Dimitrova and the one discussing policies on the movement of persons by Heather Grabbe). Others compare developments across two or three countries. Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel discuss the EU’s role in promoting liberal democracy in Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey. Guido Schweltnus focuses on the question of minority rights in Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Liliana B. Andonova addresses the role of the EU in the adoption of environmental policy in the Czech Republic and Poland. Beate Sissenich discusses the changes in social policy in Hungary and Poland. Many of the contributions further divide what may initially appear as unitary issues into two or more “subissues” that are then compared (e.g., Schweltnus discusses the adoption of rules of nondiscrimination as well as those referring to minority rights; similarly, Grabbe compares the free movement of workers and the control of movement of persons across EU borders).

Two chapters offer especially interesting insights regarding the applicability of the hypotheses by each comparing dynamics in two very different realms. Wade Jacoby compares the adoption of regional policy and health policy in the Czech Republic and Hungary. He finds that while the former process was primarily driven by EU actions, the latter was induced more by CEE countries. By focusing

on two different issues, Jacoby is able to refine his analysis by adding two more variables to the ones that are tested in the other chapters: the degree of availability of alternative models of organization and the structure of the interest representation.

Rachel Epstein compares the acceptance of EU rules on central banking independence and agricultural reform in Poland. She finds that due to the different role that social learning played in the two processes, central banking rules were accepted by Poland at multiple levels, while agricultural reform was accepted only at the elite level. Like other authors in the volume, Epstein finds that CEE countries accepted EU rules even when they were not perceived as legitimate. Yet she recognizes that the lack of legitimacy in the agricultural realm eventually reduced the EU’s bargaining power in other issue areas.

The chapters are not only coherent in their research design but also surprisingly similar in terms of their conclusions. Virtually all authors find that the “external incentives” model can best explain EU rule adoption. In other words, the changes in policies in CEE were primarily EU driven and based on the logic of expected consequences (and far less on the logic of appropriateness). While this finding may seem, at first sight, predictable, what makes the results truly surprising is their lack of support for many of the initial hypotheses, especially those deriving from the two alternative models: social learning and lesson drawing.

The authors also find that, so far, the EU has been more successful in promoting the formal, legislative, and institutional adoption of its rules in CEE and far less in the actual implementation of the rules. This observation raises the question of the long-term impact of these changes. The question is especially significant considering that the EU has now lost much of its bargaining power with CEE governments, as most of these countries have become members.

In a laudable effort to frame the findings within the broader Europeanization literature, the volume includes a thought-provoking chapter, by Adrienne Héritier, comparing the process of Europeanization in CEE with the one in Western Europe. Not surprisingly, Héritier, as well as the editors in their concluding chapter, find that the two processes have been very different because Europeanization in CEE took place while the accession countries had weak negotiating positions and because requirements on CEE countries were broader and more “institutional” than in Western Europe. These observations suggest that the existing literature on “Europeanization West” would benefit from future comparisons with the EU’s role in CEE *after* the postcommunist countries became members. In this context, the volume represents an important contribution toward the slow, yet inevitable, blurring of the long-standing divide between the academic fields of East and West European politics.

**Political Parties and Terrorist Groups.** By Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur. New York and London: Routledge, 2003. 179p. \$125.

**Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism.** Edited by Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004. 178p. \$115 cloth, \$37.79 paper.

— Peter C. Sederberg, *University of South Carolina*

Two decades ago, Christopher Hitchens denounced the use of the label “terrorist” as a Medusa’s head, which unveiled would “turn all discussion into stone. . . . Whisk, whisk . . . and there goes history, there goes inquiry, there goes proportion” (“Wanton Acts of Usage,” *Harper’s*, September 1986, p. 68). Perhaps most social concepts, embedded as they are in wider communities of shared meaning beyond the arena of scholarly discourse, prove susceptible to rhetorical corruption as they become weapons of political denigration. The degradation of the concept of terrorism, however, seems especially severe. Add religious fundamentalism into the discourse, and our expectations sink even further.

How refreshing, then, to encounter two works that do not further flatten our view of the world, but add three, even four, dimensions to our understanding of the problems of terrorism and fundamentalism. Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur have teamed to produce an authored monograph, *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* and an edited collection, *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism*. The former represents the more significant contribution not only to the study of terrorism but also to the literature on comparative political parties. The latter book suffers from the usual weaknesses of edited volumes—varying quality and some lack of coherence.

The basic assumption informing *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* is that the former are political organizations and terrorism is a type of activity. Consequently, political parties can pick up or put down terrorist tactics as circumstances warrant (p. 26). This insight may strike one as obvious, but it is the obvious that often eludes us.

If we consider terrorism as a tactic that emerges under certain circumstances and conditions that can change over time, we then add back into our discourse precisely those elements Hitchens fears we lose: history, inquiry, and proportion. Weinberg and Pedahzur lay out some possible conditions that promote the entry and exit of political groups from terrorist activities. They also examine how emerging social movements can give rise to both political parties and terrorist groups. Finally, they examine how pathways from terrorism to peaceful party competition might be reinforced or reversed.

They proceed to investigate these patterns and possibilities through the analysis of cross-national data and historical case studies. This combination of methodologies exploits the strength of each. The former provides an overview of trends, while the latter gives a sense of the partic-

ular context of specific transformations. Of particular interest here are their examination of the yet-to-be-completed transition of radical groups like Fatah, Hamas, and Hizballah toward normal politics, as well as the nearly completed transition of the Irish Republican Army.

Their analysis of data on 400 terrorist groups identifies 124 that had some established ties to political parties at some point in their history. Of this number, the most common patterns were for the party to create a terrorist group (71) or a party faction to break away and create a terrorist group (28). Other, less frequent, patterns include when the party supports a terrorist group (8) or a terrorist group creates a party (7). They also classify the ideological associations of the parties/terrorist factions, the most prominent of which were left wing (50) or nationalist/separatist (36). Only 12 of their cases were characterized as religious in orientation.

This last point underlines two limitations of their analysis, both essentially acknowledged by the authors. First, if 124 terrorist groups have some type of party affiliation, then over twice those numbers do not. Second, their focus on the twentieth century means that they capture the wave of nationalist and left-wing terrorism, but perhaps underrepresent the emergence of religiously inspired terrorism. Both limitations mean that their analysis does not address the transnational, religiously driven, terrorist franchises currently dominating our consciousness. In addition, the concentration in both their data analysis and case studies on dissident groups means that patterns of regime terrorism essentially go unmentioned. This terrorism, too, often exhibits party connections, as in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

Despite these limitations, their investigation of political parties and terrorism underlines some lessons that carry over to our understanding of other groups that resort to terrorism in pursuit of their political objectives. First, by making explicit the ties between normal politics and terrorist activities, they remind us that terrorism cannot be understood without placing it in its context. We had better understand the dynamics of its origins, the complexity of its organization, and the bases of its appeal if we hope to devise an adequate response.

Moreover, their discussion of the emergence of discontent, the development of social movements, the organization of political parties, and the transformation of their strategies and tactics over time all serve to emphasize another obvious, though neglected, insight. Things change: “Neither terrorist groups nor terrorist campaigns need go on forever” (p. 105). This basic observation is relevant to all forms of terrorist phenomena. These groups can be defeated, they can burn out, they can alienate the base they purport to represent, and they can be encouraged to make a “strategic shift.”

The appropriate mix of strategies to follow depends on the nature of the group confronted and the dynamics over

time. War-war, as Churchill observed, deserves no automatic preference over jaw-jaw. The otiose maxim “Never negotiate with terrorists” is mainly honored in the breach by any government confronting a strongly embedded dissident group that includes terrorism in its tactical repertoire. As Weinberg and Pedahzur observe, if peace is going to be achieved, negotiations have to include the parties making war (p. 112).

It takes two to talk, and that is where the new wave of transnational terrorism, fueled by a commitment to an extreme version of Islamic fundamentalism, poses a challenge. Weinberg and Pedahzur’s edited volume, *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism*, makes a further contribution to the understanding of contemporary forms of political extremism and violence. The seven essays collectively reflect some of the same strengths of conceptual sophistication and historical understanding. The contributions, however, are not of equal quality, and their disparate character leads to an overall disjointedness. Such shortcomings, of course, commonly afflict such collections.

The disjointedness perhaps was inevitable, as so few authors are writing on such a broad theme. The collection’s focus is not simply on religious fundamentalism and terrorism or even violence in general, but the even broader category of political extremism. Moreover, the authors disagree on the character of fundamentalism. The articles define different problems and approach them in significantly different ways. I suspect, though, that readers with sufficiently catholic taste will find something of value in each essay.

Perhaps the greatest contrast exists between Arie Perliger and Leonard Weinberg’s historical essay “Jewish Self-Defence Groups prior to the Establishment of the State of Israel” and “Counting the Causes and Dynamics of Ethnoreligious Violence” by Jonathan Fox. The former essay investigates “Jews not as victims but as perpetrators of terrorism” (p. 91). Most readers probably know about the involvement of individuals like Menachem Begin in the occasionally terrorist resistance to the British Mandate in Palestine. Fewer probably may be aware of the mine planted in an Arab market in Haifa by the extremist group Etzel in July of 1938 that killed more than 70 Arabs. Further back, Jewish Zealots used terrorism “to provoke Roman repression and Jewish rebellion” in the first century C.E. (p. 92). It worked; unfortunately, the rebellion was crushed and the Second Temple was destroyed, beginning the 1,900-year second Jewish Diaspora. History matters, especially in the Middle East where, it seems, nothing is forgotten.

The essay by Fox stands in radical methodological contrast to this preindependence history of Jewish radicalism. Drawing on the Minorities at Risk database, he progressively constructs a model of the dynamics of ethnoreligious conflict that ultimately combines 18 elements related by 28 arrows of influence. While this might strike some as

a bit baroque, the conclusions he draws are straightforward: “The main cause of ethnic rebellion is not religion. Rather it is the desire for self-determination” (p. 137). Religion, though, can intensify a rebellion.

Three of the essays stress the tensions between religion and secular ideals. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi argues, “Religion, any religion, is the enemy of liberal democracy as long as it has not been defanged and privatized” (p. 33). Daphna Canetti-Nisim basically concurs that both Orthodox and alternative religious belief systems attract authoritarian personalities. Finally, Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ami Pedahzur go further and argue that the activist and totalistic character of Islam makes its adherents more susceptible to the temptations of terrorism. In contrast, Michael Barkun’s essay casts doubt on the utility of both the category of “fundamentalism” and overly simplistic arguments that connect religious belief with violence. Finally, Roger Eatwell reviews the religious character of fascism, concluding that despite certain affective parallels, fascism’s appeal rested more on its pseudoscientific and rational claims than on pseudoreligious ones.

Readers accepting poet William Carlos Williams’s assertion that “Dissonance/ (if you are interested)/ leads to discovery” will find this collection of interest. Those looking for a sophisticated and systematic examination of the relation between fundamentalism and extremism like that on political parties and terrorism will need to look elsewhere.

**Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public.** By Jon Western. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 320p. \$48.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

— Miroslav Nincic, *University of California, Davis*

Jon Western’s book joins an expanding list of studies on the sociopolitical context that shapes U.S. decisions to resort to force abroad. Most such studies reflect an appreciation that, core assumptions of realpolitik aside, these decisions are the resultant of various vectors of domestic power and preference, vectors that often point in different directions. Some of these studies directly address the incentives and constraints that public opinion places in the path of democratic leadership. Others analyze the manner in which actors within the higher echelons of the power structure interact to produce national policies. Western’s study encompasses both levels of analysis, examining how the interaction of elites and public affect the likelihood that the United States would intervene militarily in other nations.

At their best, such studies display several attributes. One is originality, asking novel and productive questions and directing our gaze toward areas that had previously not been illuminated. The best studies are analytically powerful, providing a range of explanations and predictions from

a compact foundation of assumptions and propositions. The research presented in such studies (whether qualitative or quantitative) adequately reflects the hypotheses that are being tested and supports, as fully as possible, the conclusions that are drawn. Falling short of the best studies, but nevertheless proving useful, is work that organizes and interprets a large body of information on a substantively or theoretically interesting topic, while not rising to the qualities outlined here. This book is of the second sort.

The theoretical framework departs from the entirely reasonable premise that decisions to use military force are not autonomously taken by those at the very pinnacle of political authority, that they result from the push and pull of various elites with often divergent views on the desirability of the military option. These elites engage in a process of advocacy, the outcome of which is largely determined by the beliefs of the president, the degree of cohesion within the executive branch, the distribution of information and resources among the advocacy groups, the role of the news media, and the duration of the crisis (shorter durations favoring the presidency). The principal advocacy groups are identified as selective engagers (who adopt a view of international politics steeped in *realpolitik*, while believing that the use of force should be prudently selective), hard-liners (proponents of a very assertive military presence in the world), reluctant warriors (who dislike involvement in limited wars and are mainly to be found within the military establishment), and liberals (who believe in the primacy of international organizations and welfare interests, and who generally are anti-interventionist). Much of the relative success of these groups will depend on the credibility of the external threat and the presence of a compelling theory of victory, both of which increase public susceptibility to the group's arguments.

I doubt that many readers would quarrel with the view that all of these considerations matter. From a theoretical standpoint, though, one is entitled to complain on a number of grounds. To begin with, there is little in the aforementioned framework that is not fairly self-evident, meaning that the net contribution to our explanatory ability must remain modest, limited to the way in which information is organized while providing no breakthroughs. In any case, we are given no clues as to the relative causal impact of the various proposed categories; unable to discriminate between them, we have no basis for knowing what the precise causal assumptions are. Moreover, as no competing hypotheses are seriously offered, we have no grounds for estimating how well this framework performs

compared to others, whereas if there are no serious rivals, then it is not obvious what the precise analytical contribution is.

The empirical research is comparative-historical, and information is grouped into the various categories that comprise the theoretical framework: The position of the four advocacy groups are scrutinized, and their impact is viewed within the context of their information and resources, presidential beliefs, and cohesion within the administration. The role of the media is examined and the consequences of crisis duration considered. The framework is applied to the decision not to intervene alongside of France in Vietnam, the 1958 intervention in Lebanon, President Ronald Reagan's decision to use military force in Grenada, the Somalia and Bosnian actions of the mid-1990s, and, finally, the decision to invade Iraq. Each case produces a summary on the domestic context of the intervention, while a concluding chapter pulls the various threads together. The overall conclusion is that competing beliefs by policy elites matter, as does the role of the presidency, the degree of cohesion within the executive branch, and the impact of the media.

One complaint is that these are statements that very few would have chosen to doubt; another is that there is no compelling reason why the conclusions must follow from the information provided—the two are compatible, but the conclusions could also be compatible with other assumptions. The issue is that in the absence of a) a statement of competing explanations and b) a set of clearly justified criteria that would cause propositions to be either confirmed or disconfirmed, we remain uncertain that the author's hypotheses have, in fact, been tested. It is not surprising to learn that domestic circumstances affect decisions on military intervention. What we really desire to know is how much they matter compared to objective international conditions and, also, how important the various domestic influences are relative to one another, but this is not the sort of information that this research design could provide.

One of the most interesting hypotheses concerns the link between the duration of a crisis and the relative power of the advocacy groups—the balance shifting away from those associated with the presidency as the length of the crisis increases—mainly because the president's initial informational advantage soon is lost. This book must mainly be read for the comparative history of intervention decisions that it provides. These are carefully described using a common organizational framework, and they convey, in an interesting manner, the various political complexities associated with decisions to use military force.