he maintains a fearsome presence through his victory at Cannae in Book 10 (chs 5–6). But after Cannae, Hannibal's effectiveness as a general wanes, and his physical presence in the narrative diminishes, as Roman generals such as Marcellus and Scipio emerge and lead Rome toward final victory in the war; Hannibal the man thus becomes detached from Hannibal the myth, which, nevertheless, abides in the form of his reputation (*nomen*) and continues to instill fear and awe in the Romans (chs 7–10). S.'s reading accounts well for Hannibal's absent 'presence' late in the epic and, further, shows how influential on Silius the Roman mythologization of Hannibal was; after all, over the course of the epic, he morphs into his most recognizable form in the Roman literary tradition, not as a flesh-and-blood historical figure, but as a powerful, threatening idea, as Rome's ultimate bogeyman. S. concludes her study (ch. 11) with analyses of four episodes in which Hannibal addresses and defines his own legacy. Especially compelling is the discussion of his final speech in the epic (17.605–15), which, for S., is a moment of intense metapoetic self-reflection. This is evident not only in Hannibal's awareness of the Roman literary traditions that have constructed him, but in the way in which his fortunes and the poet's are linked: 'In his final speech Hannibal states his identity as a Silian hero and with the verb *sileant* (17.610) — a possible silent play on Silius and a *sphragis* — reiterates that it is the *Silian* conceived myth, a myth now sanctioned by the Carthaginian himself, that will survive to define Rome's Hannibals hereafter' (130). In my own work, I have read Scipio's triumph at the end of the epic as testifying to his Jovian paternity and proto-imperial status. But as S. has taught me, that is only part of the picture; in the end, Silius, Hannibal and Scipio are all in it together.

S. is a congenial, helpful and reliable guide: her prose is clear, unaffected and often delightfully conversational; chapters are of a reasonable length and are further divided into digestible subsections. S. eases us into her study in the introduction and ch. 1, and eases us out of it with a clear restatement of her principal arguments in the Conclusion. S. does a good job of staying on topic throughout; and Latin and Greek passages are translated into English for a wider audience. Classicists and Silianists, furthermore, will appreciate S.'s solid grasp of the ancient texts and extensive knowledge of secondary materials. In the final analysis, S.'s contribution is significant: this is not simply a character-study of Hannibal in the *Punica*, but a reading of the epic as a whole and of the literary traditions that shape the work.

University of Missouri RAYMOND MARKS
marksr@missouri.edu
doi:10.1017/S0075435815001148

G. K. GOLDEN, *CRISIS MANAGEMENT DURING THE ROMAN REPUBLIC: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN EMERGENCIES*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xvii + 245. ISBN 9781107032859. £60.00/US$95.00.

Gregory Golden introduces his study with a brief prologue describing the steps the Senate took in the winter of 44/43 B.C. to meet its growing conflict with Mark Antony before outlining the contents of the chapters that follow. The first of these defines a crisis as G. will use the term: an imminent threat that must be immediately addressed to a decision-maker (or makers) and/or something he (or they) value highly. So for G. the 'crisis of the Republic' was no such thing, if by the Republic one means the Roman people or even the institutions of government. Rather, the crisis involved a threat to the hold on power enjoyed by a small group of aristocrats and aristocratic families. The second chapter examines the dictatorship as a response to crises. G., while acknowledging that Cincinnatus is legendary, takes Livy's account of his appointment as paradigmatic for the steps taken when the decision was made to meet an external crisis by appointing a dictator. The Gallic Sack by contrast stands as an example of what happened when the Senate chose not to respond to a crisis in this way. Ch. 3 discusses the *tumultus*, a state of emergency that also involved a *iustitium* suspending all public business in order to focus on meeting the crisis. A *tumultus* was more serious than a normal war in G.'s view because it permitted no exemptions when the consuls levied an army. Also, the senators signalled a crisis existed by putting on the *sagum*, a military cloak. G. then proceeds to discuss the several different types of *tumultus*. The following chapter takes up those *iustitia* not connected with declarations of *tumultus*, of which only two are attested. He suggests these, too, were declared to further efforts to prepare for wars.

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In ch. 5, G. argues that the *senatus consultus ultimum* simply indicated that a state of emergency existed. Unlike *tumultus* or *iustitia*, however, it did not suspend the normal operation of statute law. In particular, it did not provide a defence against prosecution for acts committed to meet the crisis, as the trial of Opimius and the threat to try Cicero demonstrate. G. concludes that the SCU was essentially superfluous since the Senate already had all the powers it needed to deal with a crisis in the *tumultus* and *iustitium* decrees. 'The senate could not grant an executive official any further powers outside of those that were already sanctioned by statute law' (148). All the SCU did was to signal that a 'state of high alert' (150) existed.

Ch. 6 surveys those crises in which the Senate did not resort to one of the measures G. identifies in the preceding chapters: for example, Saguntum; Hannibal's march on Rome; the Bacchanalian affair; the Cimbri and Teutones; Sulla's march on Rome. G. places these in three broad categories: crises that were not emergencies; emergencies that nonetheless did not call forth the usual measures; and crises in which the state proved incapable of a coherent response. In the seventh chapter, G. returns to the crisis of the winter of 44/43 and its sequel the following summer and discusses the steps the Senate took to meet it. The final chapter offers a survey of Roman crisis management over the course of the Republic. G. argues that with Ti. Gracchus, the locus of crisis management shifted from the Senate to the consuls, formalized in 121 B.C. with the introduction of the SCU. For G., the real problem that Rome confronted in the late Republic was its failure to find some impartial means of resolving political conflict short of violence. That solution would come only with the establishment of the monarchy. A brief 'Final Thoughts' develops this point by posing the question why the Romans never developed such an arbiter during the Republic. The answer for G. is that they did not need one, since 'the true nature of the Roman Republic was really nothing more than a "gentleman's agreement"' (223).

Knowledgeable readers will find this book slow going for having to plough repeatedly through lengthy narrative passages describing the background to the events that led to the crises and responses that G. examines. To assess how the Senate handled the emergency Hannibal's march on Rome created in 211 B.C. for example, G. offers an extended recapitulation of Livy's account of the war in Italy beginning with the revolts following Cannae (154–6) — yet here he strangely neglects entirely Polybius' quite different — and likely more accurate — account of Hannibal's route and the Roman response (9.3.1–7.10). That decision-makers at Rome could meet an emergency abroad or at home by appointing a dictator, declaring a *tumultus* and/or *iustitium*, or passing an SCU will come as news to few, and anyone familiar with the Republic's tumultuous final century will already understand that the lack of any means to resolve political conflicts short of violence posed a serious and continuing problem. And while G. is certainly right to stress the limitations of the SCU and the central rôle of magistrates in undertaking measures to meet crises, these points seem fairly obvious.

The Ohio State University NATHAN ROSENSTEIN
rosenstein.1@osu.edu
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J. TONER, *ROMAN DISASTERS*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 220, illus. ISBN 9780745651026. £20.00.

This is a really excellent idea for a book, the sort of topic where it suddenly seems remarkable that no one has previously thought of doing it. The modern image of Roman history is dominated by ideas of catastrophe, as Toner briefly discusses in his closing chapter: shocking military defeats at Cannae and in the Teutoburg Forest, the destruction of Pompeii and Herculaneum by Vesuvius and — much more drawn out in reality, but often conceived as a dramatic calamity — the fall of the Empire as a whole, overwhelmed by hordes of barbarians. Alongside such events, which at least in the case of the military disasters haunted the Roman as well as the modern imagination, recent research on ancient environmental and economic history has emphasized the continual threat of other forms of 'natural' catastrophe — flood, drought, famine, plague — that appear more mundane (not least because disease and food shortage were endemic in antiquity) but had the potential to affect far more people, over a larger area and with greater consequences.

This immediately raises a whole range of questions about the actual frequency of crisis and disaster, their causes, and their consequences, both in material terms and in their impact on

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