

especially gun carrying vest them with a feeling of personal sovereignty. And thanks to the combined recent spread of relaxed concealed carry laws and heightened “stand your ground” laws, individuals at times have exercised such semi-autonomous power, as George Zimmerman’s 2012 killing of Trayvon Martin in Florida dramatized. Unfortunately, Anker gets two important things wrong: Zimmerman did not mount a “stand your ground” defense at his trial, although the recently changed Florida law was important for the way it constrained or altered the behavior of police and prosecutors and even the jury instructions, all to Zimmerman’s benefit. Second, it is not true that “more people than ever own guns” (p. 21). Gun ownership in the United States has been gradually declining for decades, although the average number of guns per owner has skyrocketed.

Andrew Poe’s chapter is one of the first significant analyses of the personal production of 3D self-printed plastic guns. Although the technology is still relatively primitive and unreliable, one truism about technology is that it improves as costs decline. Poe draws out the prospect of how privately produced firearms, made without serial numbers, could fundamentally transform the relationship between citizens and the state with respect to the use of violence and the state’s traditional monopoly over the use of force. Poe’s analysis is both persuasive and disturbing.

Timothy W. Luke’s chapter on assault weapons parses one of the most important symbolically fraught firearms, the AR-15 assault rifle. With one exception, Luke’s narrative is an exceptionally skillful and insightful account that interweaves technological changes with symbolic and marketing considerations. Luke’s one disputable claim is his insistence that civilian versions of military assault rifles are not in fact assault rifles, a term he (and others) insist is inappropriate because they fire only in semiautomatic mode, whereas the military versions can fire either semi- or fully automatically. To support his claim he says that the civilian versions were intentionally named “Modern Sporting Rifles” and sold with low-capacity magazines. But the gun industry’s rebranding was just that—a marketing ploy. The absence of a fully auto fire mode for civilian weapons is just and only that. Whether civilian or military, assault weapons are still configured to lay down spray fire.

Weaponized drones represent a different instance in which technology allows for the detachment of the destructive device from those who control it, but where, unlike a cannon or mortar or gravity bomb, the explosive charge is guided directly to its target from a very far distance. Detachment, control, and precision have all made such weapons seductively appealing, as Heather Ashley Hayes notes. With the operators safely removed from harm, drone use has skyrocketed in the last decade, as have casualty figures, including of many innocents. Part of the “social life” of drones is their accompanying sound, which has had a terrifying effect on daily life in Pakistan and elsewhere.

The social life of bullets is the subject of Joanna Bourke’s chapter—specifically, a roiling controversy at the turn of the twentieth century over “dum-dum” bullets, which expanded on hitting their targets, magnifying their destructive capabilities. Oddly, the fierce debate over these bullets overshadowed the introduction of far more destructive weapons and devices. This fascinating historical account finds that the bullets were fetishized as independent actors.

Renowned criminologist Franklin E. Zimring analyzes police shootings of unarmed African Americans to address two key questions: why they face an unusually high risk of death at the hands of police and what might be done to reduce this death toll. Zimring offers five remedies.

I bet you did not know that concealed carrying of guns is now a “lifestyle.” The old gun culture that centered on hunting, sporting, and recreational gun uses has been eclipsed by a Gun Culture 2.0, claims David Yamane, in which armed citizenship focuses on self-defense, bringing together gun marketing and the ideology of personal self-defense.

Harel Shapira brings in the role of the body in human behavior to dissect the gun experience with respect to how people hold, shoot, and carry guns. Even loading a gun has become highly ritualized.

Both of these books seek to think outside of the box. That in itself is a worthy enterprise, especially for an issue as intractable as this one. Obert’s contribution in *The Six-Shooter State* is not quite as successful as his sometimes breathless analysis suggests; still its central analysis is important in understanding the interrelationship between public and private policing and what it reveals about state power when it collides with a fierce counter-belief that government power is better exercised when it is in private hands. *The Lives of Guns* is and will be important if it moves forward the new research and new thinking it touts, and sometimes achieves, about guns in America. Political science has come late to the study of gun policy, but these works show that it has much to offer. Just when you think there is really not much more to say, along comes writing like this.

Enchanted America: How Intuition and Reason Divide

Our Politics. By J. Eric Oliver and Thomas J. Wood. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018. 288p. \$90.00 cloth, \$30.00 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592719001701

— Jennifer Wolak, *University of Colorado*

Some are guided by reason in their decision making, whereas others rely on intuition. For J. Eric Oliver and Thomas J. Wood, these differences help explain fundamental divides within the U.S. electorate.

Oliver and Wood propose that some people are more likely to engage in magical thinking than others, believing that outcomes are guided by unobservable forces, even in the face of evidence that shows otherwise. Magical

thinkers are more likely to believe in the healing power of crystals and the existence of ghosts. They are often superstitious by nature and inclined to rely on folk wisdom. The authors describe those scoring high for this trait as Intuitionists, guided by emotional thinking and prone to using overly simplified heuristics in difficult domains. When faced with the uncertainties and anxieties of the modern world, they lean on intuitive judgments, visceral reactions, symbols, and metaphors. Those scoring low for this trait are cast as Rationalists, fact-based deliberative sorts who dispassionately use evidence to inform their judgments.

To differentiate Intuitionists from Rationalists, the authors rely on surveys. They create an Intuitionism scale that blends together feelings of trait anxiety and neuroticism in daily life (such as locking doors and shredding bills), apprehensions about the future (including assessments of the likelihood of wars or recessions), and belief in superstitions. Those high on the scale are more likely to believe in angels, karma, and reincarnation while doubting scientific evidence and the wisdom of experts. Higher levels of education and income are tied to lower levels of magical thinking, whereas women, religious conservatives, and ideological conservatives are more likely to score high on the measure. Those with the greatest economic insecurities report some of the highest levels of magical thinking, perhaps reflecting the importance of trait anxiety in the measure's composition.

In terms of political attitudes, those who rely more on their intuitions respond more strongly to symbolic issue frames, express more support for populism, and were more likely to favor Donald Trump in the 2016 primary election season. Although not distinctive in their levels of ethnocentrism, Intuitionists follow different patterns of reasoning about groups, overestimating the size of minority groups in the population and reporting more hostile views of immigrants. Beyond the ideological divides of politics, Intuitionists also diverge in their health attitudes, favoring alternative medicine while disliking gluten and vaccines.

Enchanted America is an intriguing and powerful narrative in that it challenges existing models of public opinion formation. In contrast to past accounts that considered variations in the information people bring to a decision, the authors show that people also vary in their fundamental decision to consider diagnostic information at all. Some seem to actively dismiss evidence-based reasoning in favor of trusting their instincts and making gut-level choices. Although we know that political decisions can have both physiological and unconscious origins, this scholarship is unique in highlighting that people may actively choose to eschew deliberative thinking in favor of relying on their own best personal judgments. In this way, the importance of information and evidence in politics lies not just in its availability and accessibility but also in people's willingness to rely on it.

In highlighting the power of intuition in political decision making, this research helps explain things that are difficult to explain well using existing theories. Why are some people more willing than others to believe in conspiracy theories and absorb misinformation? What drives people to reject the advice of experts and seek the views of outsiders? Oliver and Wood's theory of magical thinking offers perhaps the most compelling answer yet for why we see these differences in how people approach evidence and facts.

Their argument also helps explain why citizens on both sides of the ideological divide sometimes struggle to understand each other and where their opponents are coming from. Liberals and conservatives may not only value different policy approaches but may also reason about political dilemmas in fundamentally different ways. If one side leans on common-sense judgments while perceiving opponents as bound up with esoteric facts and data, it can be harder to find common ground.

Given the wide-ranging consequences of intuitionism demonstrated by the authors, an important next step for this research will be in investigating its origins and development. As they acknowledge, surveys are limited in sorting out matters of endogeneity and in pinpointing what leads people to rely on magical thinking. The authors suggest that people with lower stocks of education and resources may turn to folk wisdom as a way to make sense of a complicated, uncertain world; this reliance may be reinforced by factors such as personality, religious socialization, and media messages. It would be interesting to determine the relative contributions of superstitious thinking and neuroticism in cultivating a reliance on intuition. To the degree to which it is a trait people choose to adopt, then it will be important to investigate what intuition and folk wisdom offer to those who choose to rely on it. If greater magical thinking instead follows from situational pressures and information environments, then we should study how socialization affects people's cognitive style.

Oliver and Wood tend to present intuitionism and rationalism as opposing ends of a spectrum, where rational deliberation is framed as the ideal and intuition is characterized as a flaw of reasoning and a shortcoming of political decision making. This fits with cases where magical thinking results in conspiracy beliefs and rejection of scientific evidence. It is less compelling in instances where folk wisdom and intuitive thinking function as precursors of policy priorities or candidate choices.

Even if magical thinking raises normative worries about the quality of people's judgment, a reliance on intuition alone does not. After all, intuitive thinking based on accumulated experience can result in better outcomes than decisions made through careful consideration of the evidence. Even the politically sophisticated will often choose to satisfice over optimize, given the practical and cognitive challenges of meeting the standards of careful

deliberation. How should the perils of magical thinking be balanced against the virtues of inference and intuition? Even if careful deliberative decision making is desirable, it is often an unrealistic standard for cognitive misers. What then are the best ways to encourage higher-quality intuitive reasoning while discouraging magical thinking?

With excellent storytelling and great graphs, the book is an engaging narrative describing how people reason about politics. Its findings are provocative and challenge our conventional wisdom about decision making. It should be of interest both to those who study how people construct their opinions in politics and to those who want to better understand the roots of ideological divides in contemporary politics.

Reconstructing the National Bank Controversy: Politics and Law in the Early American Republic. By Eric Lomazoff. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018. 256p. \$90.00 cloth, \$30.00 paper.

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— Keith E. Whittington, *Princeton University*

It is difficult to find something new to say about a topic that has attracted the attention of generations of scholars. The history of the Bank of the United States is certainly such a topic. The struggle between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison over whether Congress had the constitutional authority to incorporate a national bank and whether such a bank would be a good idea has been a staple of political histories of the early republic. John Marshall's judicial opinion confirming Congress's constitutional authority to charter a bank and repelling state efforts to obstruct that bank is firmly entrenched in the constitutional canon. Andrew Jackson's quest to kill the "Monster Bank" over the objections of Daniel Webster and Henry Clay is a central episode in the history of U.S. political parties. Surely we know the story of the Bank.

It is therefore all the more impressive that Eric Lomazoff has found something new to say about it. Its history is more complicated than the standard narratives would suggest, and appreciating those complexities tells us something interesting about how constitutional politics works. The standard narrative may well survive Lomazoff's efforts at revisionism, but our understanding of these events is richer for them.

Lomazoff advances his revisionist project by looking beyond the traditional players in these narratives. If we limit ourselves to reading such familiar figures as Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, we will still see the familiar story. If we canvass the arguments of less familiar, though hardly unimportant, figures like Fisher Ames, James Jackson, and Edmund Randolph, we see that the points that were made were more varied and the competing camps more confused than is generally

recognized. The historical record is messy. The history books are much neater.

The book begins with the 1791 debates surrounding Hamilton's initial proposal for a national bank. The crux of the constitutional debate revolved around the "necessary and proper" clause and whether incorporation of a national bank was an appropriate means for advancing the principal powers entrusted to Congress in the text of the Constitution. In reviewing the arguments of the various opponents of a national bank, Lomazoff identifies not a single agreed-on standard for evaluating whether the necessary and proper clause had been satisfied, but rather several rival views. Moreover, the critics often treated those different considerations as operating concurrently rather than alternatively. By contrast, the proponents of the Bank were far more united on a single, liberal standard for assessing the constitutionality of the proposal.

The Bank was established with a 20-year charter. A great deal changed over the course of those two decades, and those changes had consequences for the Bank's political and constitutional fortunes. Unusually for a book principally concerned with constitutional argumentation, Lomazoff devotes substantial attention to broader political and economic developments. He does not treat constitutional ideas and arguments as occupying a rarified plane of existence, but rather sees them as intimately connected to the changing conditions of the country. On the one hand, the rise of state banks suggested to many of the Jeffersonians that the constitutional arguments offered on behalf of the Bank in 1791 had become even less persuasive. At the same time, however, the Bank had taken on a new importance as a regulator of the money supply and a tool for managing the behavior of the state banks. The War of 1812 further exposed the complications and limitations of a banking system that revolved around a host of state-chartered institutions.

As a consequence, the Bank debates of 1811 and 1816 did not simply repeat the arguments of 1791. Entirely new constitutional arguments were developed to account for the value of the Bank of the United States in the postwar environment. The moderate and radical wings of the Jeffersonian coalition shared important ideological common ground, and their constitutional arguments took account both of their shared concerns and their continued divisions over how best to proceed. The Bank was revived not simply because enough Jeffersonians had become convinced that Hamilton had been right all along or because the constitutionality of the Bank was taken as settled, but because a new constitutional logic could be deployed that explained why the Bank of the United States was an appropriate institution for the changed circumstances of the nation.

The centerpiece of the "compromise of 1816" in this account is an argument about the utility of a national bank for effectuating the congressional power to coin money and regulate the value thereof. If this is the key point on which mainstream Jeffersonians were able to agree in the