thus increasing public goods provision, or does it motivate them instead to undermine each other, thus reducing provision? Because the results are based on using the *total* number of party workers, we cannot answer this question. Second, the level of political competition is frequently significant in the results on public goods provision and the number of party workers selected. Do parties select slum leaders with similar qualities in highly and less competitive slums? Or do party loyalty and political skills, rather than service effectiveness, influence a party's choice of workers in highly politically competitive slums? If so, this could also explain why high party worker density does not translate into higher provision of public goods in more politically competitive slums.

In addition, Auerbach argues persuasively against selecting major metropoles as cases but does not explain how representative Jaipur and Bhopal are of second-tier Indian cities. This makes it harder to judge the scope of these findings even within India, particularly because both the theory and evidence are based on the same two cities. Finally, the timing of the surveys, completed in two rounds in 2012 and 2015, is both a challenge and an opportunity. Both states held state elections in 2014. In Rajasthan, in which Jaipur is located, the BJP government lost to the Indian National Congress. In Madhya Pradesh, the state in which Bhopal is located, the BJP won its *third* consecutive term. The influence of state elections is dealt with by including a 2015-year dummy variable in the analysis, whose effect turns out to be statistically and substantively significant in most specifications. The author's arguments about effective brokerage by party workers rely on the ability of parties in and out of power to access officials on behalf of constituents. Are such access and influence comparable in states where the same party is winning consecutive elections and in another with persistent turnover in the recent past? An opportunity to examine this dynamic is alas wasted, because there is no further attempt to explain why the 2015 dummy variable was so significant in so many of the analyses.

Despite these quibbles, this book is a valuable addition to an important emerging literature on the politics of public goods provision in marginalized communities, political brokerage, clientelism, and Indian politics. The empirical results identify an intriguing phenomenon: political representation only yields benefits in the most politically secure slums, not the most competitive ones. This poses some interesting challenges to research on clientelism, welfare, and policy outcomes, because it shows that swing voters are not the ones gaining valuable benefits. The combination of ethnographic and survey methods nicely demonstrates the theoretical and empirical leverage provided by using such mixed-methods research designs. And, as effective research does, it raises new, interesting questions for future scholarship to tackle.

From Pews to Politics: Religious Sermons and Political Participation in Africa. By Gwyneth H. McClendon and Rachel Beatty Riedl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 286p. $39.99 cloth.
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From Pews to Politics exemplifies comparative politics scholarship at its best. Through a rare combination of conceptual acuity, methodological dexterity, and conscientious contextual grounding, the authors develop powerful insights into an old question: To what extent do religious *ideas* influence the content, mode, and degree of individuals' political engagement? In other words, do religious teachings exert an independent influence on individual behavior, as Weber suggested in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, or does the content of religious teaching reflect rather than drive individual or group-level affinities, as in Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*? This question is important, as Gwyneth H. McClendon and Rachel Beatty Riedl remind us, because we "live in a time when religion—in all of its forms, practices, experiences and content—is highly salient to most people in the world" (p. 231). Yet, this question is also vexing. Studying the *causal* effects of religious ideas is difficult because individuals may be predisposed to opt into particular religious traditions.

To address these challenges, McClendon and Riedl combine localized descriptive research with experiments, survey data analysis, focus groups, analysis of an original newspaper database, and brief case studies. They also wisely delimit the scope of their analysis to one of several component parts of the lived experience of religion, namely *exposure to religious content delivered through sermons.* This is distinct from other mechanisms through which religion may influence individual attitudes and behaviors, such as social networks, opportunities for skill-building, elite-level advocacy, or social service provision. Sermons, in particular, merit close attention because they convey "metaphysical instructions" to their listeners. By answering "deep questions about the causes of problems of this world, the possibilities for change, and the nature of human agency," sermons plausibly inform citizens' evaluations of their political context *and* their capacity to influence it (p. 5). Although sermons are not the only way in which religious content is conveyed, they are indeed central to the diffusion of religious ideas in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.

This book offers a valuable template for research on the influence of sermons across diverse contexts but focuses empirically on variation in Christian religious content in sub-Saharan Africa. This allows the authors to advance descriptive understanding of Pentecostalism and other

Christian traditions in the region. This is a major contribution in its own right, given the dearth of reliable data and systematic research on Christianity and African politics (Elizabeth Sperber and Erin Hern, "Pentecostal Identity and Citizen Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: New Evidence from Zambia," *Politics and Religion* 11[4], 2018). McClendon and Riedl's empirical focus is also substantively important: the percentage of sub-Saharan Africans who identified as Christian more than doubled between 1950 and 2010 (Luis Lugo and Alan Cooperman, *Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Pew Research Center, 2010). Independent and Pentecostal churches have grown especially quickly in some sub-Saharan states and it is now common for citizens to encounter diverse religious messages on television, via street preachers, and on social media. Kenya, where the authors focus their data collection, is characterized by religious pluralism and relatively fluid religious affiliation among Christians, who are in the majority.

In this context, the authors began by recording and analyzing the content of sermons delivered at randomly selected Mainline Protestant, Pentecostal, and Catholic churches in Nairobi. Evidence generated by this stage of research was critical because it was the first systematic evidence to substantiate the view that the region's Pentecostal churches expound a relatively coherent set of ideas. This was not obvious *ex ante*. Pentecostal churches, after all, lack hierarchical bodies to promote uniformity and vary widely in the degree and type of training that pastors may or may not have. Similarly, before this work, we lacked systematically collected data to determine how similar or different the messaging of Mainline Protestant churches is from that of Catholic churches. McClendon and Riedl find that in Nairobi, churches from both denominations propounded extremely similar messages in sermons, which is consistent with the fact that they tend to cooperate on high-profile political and social matters across African contexts.

Specifically, McClendon and Riedl document uniformity on two important dimensions of Pentecostal sermons, on the one hand, and Mainline Protestant and Catholic sermons, on the other. Whereas Pentecostal sermons emphasized the power of individuals to make change in the world and located the sources of earthly problems *within* the individual, Mainline and Catholic sermons voiced skepticism about individuals' ability to make change and more frequently located the sources of earthly problems in institutions and relationships *outside* of the individual. It follows that Pentecostals urged followers to enact change by maintaining strong faith, leading through their individual example, and working to ensure that national leaders embraced born-again Christianity. Conversely, Mainline Protestant and Catholic sermons emphasized the need to oppose greed and the abuse of power, especially in government institutions. Although the sermons heard in Kenya rarely mentioned *explicitly* political topics (e.g., candidates, parties, or policies), the authors show that variation in the presumed degree of individual agency (high for Pentecostals, low for Mainliners) and the disparate attribution of earthly problems to internal or external sources nevertheless affected individuals' political attitudes and behaviors.

Building on this descriptive research, the authors deployed excerpts of local Pentecostal and Catholic/Mainline sermons as realistic treatments in a series of experimental studies in Nairobi. As expected, individuals randomly exposed to an audio recording of the Pentecostal message were more likely to approach political life as what the authors term "empowered players of the game." They exhibited higher levels of self-efficacy and engagement in a text-message campaign and were less likely to criticize the government or challenge the status quo in their text messages. Additionally, when asked to put themselves in the role of politicians who make decisions about spending, Pentecostals—especially those exposed to the Pentecostal message—were significantly more likely to give generously to citizens, thereby "leading by example." In focus groups, Pentecostals also emphasized internal transformation and intrinsic sources of good governance.

Evidence from experiments with Catholics and Mainline Protestants was also generally consistent with the authors' categorization of these congregants as "reluctant reformers." Exposure to the Mainline/Catholic sermon message corresponded with slightly lower overall levels of self-efficacy, lower participation in the text-message campaign, and a higher proclivity to voice criticism of government institutions. When asked to behave as politicians or citizens in a spending game, exposure to the Mainline/Catholic message raised participants' expectations of government officials and increased their willingness to invest in structural constraints on leaders (sanctions). This is consistent with Mainliners' emphasis on structural and extrinsic incentives for good governance in focus groups and their real-world investment in legislative advocacy, protest, and public criticism of government. Additionally, the authors find that participants in the experiments were more strongly affected by messages with which they were *already* familiar. In other words, a Pentecostal exposed to a Pentecostal sermon responded more than did an Anglican exposed to a Pentecostal sermon.

Analysis of cross-country survey data offers further support for the conceptual archetypes of individual Pentecostals as "empowered players of the game" and Mainline Protestants and Catholics as "reluctant reformers." The authors also studied the duration of effects of exposure to religious sermons by exploiting variation in the day of the week on which existing cross-country surveys were conducted. This clever empirical strategy suggests that the influence of sermons wanes within days of Sunday services, but that individual participation in midweek religious services (e.g., bible study) effectively recharges it.

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In the final empirical chapter, the authors switch levels of analysis to explore whether evidence of *group-level* behavior reflects their conceptual categorization of Pentecostals as "empowered players of the game" and Mainline Protestants and Catholics as "reluctant reformers." To do so, they coded a sample of newspaper articles from anglophone African states and noted whether the article portrayed Pentecostals, Mainline Protestants, or Catholics as empowered players, reluctant reformers, or both. This analysis, along with brief case studies of church–state relations in Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia, is offered as evidence that despite their organizational differences and variation in church–state relations over time, Catholics and Mainline Protestants consistently acted at the national level as "reluctant reformers," while Pentecostals consistently acted as "empowered players."

This last contention is the most likely to spark debate. What does it mean to categorize all Catholic and Mainline Protestant political engagement in Uganda, Kenya, and Zambia since the 1980s as "reluctant reform," despite variation in the degree to which Catholic and Mainline churches facilitated third-wave democratization in certain times and places (Monica D. Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy S. Shah, *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics*, 2011)? Others may question how "reluctance," which McClendon and Riedl conceptualize at the *individual level* in terms of self-efficacy, relates to competing explanations for variation in churches' political engagement at the institutional level. For instance, scholars have explained variation in the roles played by different churches in national politics by focusing on changes in Catholic social doctrine, religious competition, or the relationship between religious and national identities rather than individuals' self-efficacy (c.f., Anna Grzymała-Busse, *Nations Under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy*, 2015). Do such ideational and institutional theories challenge McClendon and Riedl's concept of "reluctant reformer" or complement it? Scholars are also likely to challenge the idea (prevalent as it may be) that Pentecostalism has a single origin in the United States (p. 46). Instead, African historians trace a parallel development of Pentecostal roots in early African Christian revival movements (Ogbu Kalu, *African Pentecostalism: An Introduction*, 2008).

Moving forward, scholars might ask how the existence of Charismatic members of the Catholic and Mainline Protestant churches relate to the conceptual categories that McClendon and Riedl establish. According to the World Christian Database (https://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/, 2015), nearly one in three Catholics is Charismatic in Ghana and South Africa, and one in four is Charismatic in Kenya and Nigeria. Scholars should carry forward insights from McClendon and Riedl's study of African Pentecostals, non-Charismatic Catholics and non-Charismatic Protestants to study Charismatic Catholics and Protestants as well as Evangelicals in greater detail.

State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein. By Lisa Blaydes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. 376p. $35.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.
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Iraq has been left out of consideration of mainstream comparative politics for too long. One of the main reasons for this estrangement was Iraq's inaccessibility and inhospitality to sustained social science research. In the 1980s and 1990s, scholars struggled even to gain access to the increasingly repressive regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th party. Consequently, scholarship on Iraq had almost no impact on the development of important theories like rentier political economics, ethnic conflict, and authoritarian regime durability. With the downfall of Saddam in 2003, documents from the government and ruling party became accessible, with much of them eventually being stored at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Scholars like Dina Khoury, Amatzia Baram, Joseph Sassoon, Samuel Helfont, and Aaron Faust used these documents to conduct a historical autopsy of the opaque Ba'th regime. Like scholars who flocked to the East German or Polish archives at the end of the Cold War, they focused on filling in the gaps of knowledge about what had happened behind Saddam's veil of repression. This research tended to be ideographic in scope, and few scholars ventured to use the data to place Iraq in comparative perspective or develop more generalizable theories.

Lisa Blaydes's *State of Repression* is an important step in reopening the dialogue between scholarship on Iraq and the nomothetic social sciences. She seeks to build a theory of how systems of political repression and rewards affect expressions of political identity. Blaydes's key contention is that people's choices about how to express their commitment to different political identities, whether a broad sense of Iraqi patriotism or more narrowly construed ethno-sectarian affiliation, were often a response to how the regime itself behaved. When the regime was able to allocate oil wealth broadly and effectively across the country, as it did in the 1970s, many Iraqis were willing to acquiesce to its demands for singular loyalty. The regime's ability to both reward and monitor the population for dissent, however, steadily degraded through the turmoil of the Iran–Iraq War, the Persian Gulf War, and the post-1991 sanctions era. Coercion became more flagrant and indiscriminant as the regime struggled to identify and recruit loyal supporters. Many Iraqis, in turn, embraced ethno-sectarian identities as a way of registering resistance against a state that failed to fulfill its own socioeconomic promises. This argument is a rejoinder to the still prevalent assumption that Iraq's tripartite ethno-sectarian cleavages—pitting Sunnis versus Shi'is versus Kurds—are innate, immutable, and bound for violence.