1945, Byron Price, a special advisor to Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lucius D. Clay, was urging that "[o]ur propaganda needs to be given an increasingly positive character, in contrast to the long-continued attempt to impress the Germans of their collective guilt, which from now on will do more harm than good" (p. 36).

Chapters 3 and 4 show how the American Information and Control Division's initial "blind spot" with respect to the fine arts was gradually overcome through a series of overt and covert initiatives to "reorient" German culture away from "extreme cultural nationalism and antimodernism" and toward what Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt, a German-born American who served during the occupation as an art intelligence coordination officer, saw as the inherently more democratic and antiauthoritarian tendencies of modernism (pp. 84–85). Of course, it is understandable that American military authorities of that era would find it difficult to grasp the opportunities for propaganda present in a society in which all classes professed so profound a reverence for *Kultur*. Together with Captain Edith Appleton Standen, the director of the Wiesbaden art-collecting point of the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section of OMGUS, Lehmann-Haupt nonetheless succeeded in making the fine arts an important part of the "American cultural propaganda agenda" (p. 87) by persuading his superiors, as one of his memos puts it, of the use to be made of the "authority and prestige which all manifestations of cultural life enjoy in the German community" (p. 84).

These chapters include some of the most fascinating material in Goldstein's book. Although, as she writes, the "resurgence of modern art in Germany after 1945 is often depicted as a grassroots phenomenon," it was in fact "a small group of American cultural officers [who] created the context for this revival" (p. 90). This was achieved by the success of these government officials in soliciting private funding to sponsor cultural associations, prizes, exhibits, and publications that supported "political and personal links between German artists and the democratic West" in ways that, as the author points out, "provided a model of intellectual warfare and cultural control that later became—greatly developed and lavishly funded—the modus operandi of the CIA in the cultural field" (p. 90).

Here too, as with the effort to make ordinary Germans feel responsible for their leaders' atrocities, there were unintended consequences. But these related not to unexpected or unmanageable German reactions, but rather to cultural politics in America. In the sphere of the fine arts, American propaganda efforts conflicted with members of the U.S. Congress who were inclined to view modern art not as democratic but, very much in tune with their reactionary German counterparts, as "decadent," "Communistic," and certainly anti-American. Anticipating such opposition is what drove the use of private funding for the effort to begin with, but that was not always successful in avoiding congressional scrutiny and opposition. Such conflicts are front and center in the final chapter, on "Iconoclasm and Censorship," which through close case studies analyzes the double bind of a military occupation that aims to engender a freer, more tolerant society.

Goldstein is very much alive to the implications and provocations of what her research puts on display, but however much historical and political analysis one reads, it is still hard to shake the idea that in the case of the American military occupations of Germany and Japan, the successes were little short of miraculous. The idea that they could form the basis of "models" to be applied elsewhere seems to have led to endless disappointments. Perhaps the problem lies in the very idea of a model. This book suggests that the successes of the occupation stemmed from its ability to improvise, to take seriously the observations of special people with unique insights into a concrete situation, and, trusting them, to change its ways to achieve its aims. Obviously, the American occupiers of Germany after World War II felt that the stakes could not be higher. One wonders whether our failures (so far, at least) in Iraq and Afghanistan have something to do with the perception that the stakes are not so absolute, that there are scripts to be followed, and that one's career depends, not on success, but on one's efforts to implement the assigned model.

Nietzsche's Noble Aims: Affirming Life, Contesting Modernity. By Paul E. Kirkland. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009. 306p. $75.00.
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— C. Heike Schotten, *University of Massachusetts Boston*

In his book, Paul E. Kirkland responds to those who claim that Nietzsche's philosophy offers only a critical or deconstructive project. Instead, he asserts that Nietzsche has his own affirmative project of overcoming modernity and inaugurating a new nobility. Nietzsche aims to realize this project through a variety of rhetorical tactics and believes it will come about only *after* an era of great wars and tyrannies that, according to the author, Nietzsche predicts but does not necessarily endorse.

The centerpiece of Kirkland's interpretation is *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and particularly the eternal recurrence. The heart of this lengthy study, eternal recurrence is presented as the epitome of Nietzsche's affirmative teaching, the foundation for a new, life-affirming ethics, and the basis for the development of a "politics of contest" (Chapter 8). This politics of contest is the necessary corrective to a democratic age that values egalitarianism, certainty, and security above all that is elevated or noble. And, on Kirkland's reading, Nietzschean nobility prizes self-overcoming, affirmation of life, courage to confront one's own limitations as well as those of time and knowledge, and laughter

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at the necessarily inadequate and incomplete projects that human beings attempt to realize in the world.

There is beauty and insight in Kirkland's study, particularly in the careful examination of *Zarathustra* and its passages regarding eternal recurrence. Kirkland offers a graceful analysis of Nietzsche's understanding of friendship as enmity as the corrective to vengefulness (pp. 116–17), which becomes the basis of his insightful reading of Zarathustra's confrontation with the spirit of gravity as a kind of exemplary conflict that all life affirmers must undertake. This confrontation also symbolizes Zarathustra's (and Nietzsche's) challenge to modernity. Kirkland astutely notes that "[t]he spirit of gravity is at once the spirit of modernity, its reductionist science, its leveling drives, its universal standards for morality, and difficulty as such" (p. 157). Admirably, however, there is no fawning reverence of Zarathustra in this book: Kirkland aptly notes moments when Zarathustra stumbles and acknowledges the necessarily incomplete nature of this text. The author deftly shows from within Nietzsche's own terms what is to be admired in Zarathustra and what this character has yet to learn.

Other arguments in the study are less persuasive, however, particularly the concluding claims that laughter leads life-affirming philosophers back to human affairs (Chapter 9) and that Nietzsche uses a comedic art of writing to induce the self-overcoming of modernity (Chapter 10). The first seems more a wish than an argument. While it *may* be the case that "awareness" of the "comedy of human efforts need not refute the value of effort," but rather "*could* call attention to the need for ever renewed effort to foster conditions for human nobility" (pp. 241–42, emphasis added), why *should* it do so? What necessity compels political action as the by-product of noble laughter? The second claim is weakened by a lack of examination of comedy itself, necessary in order to assess whether Nietzsche's style is comedic. Kirkland cites examples, such as the hyperbole of *Ecce Homo* or Nietzsche's declaration of his discipleship of Dionysus. That these examples are comic is not obvious, however, and there is a substantial literature on both Nietzsche's rhetorical posturing in *Ecce Homo* and his relationship with Dionysus—even more his relationship to comedy—that might dispute Kirkland's quick characterizations but is largely unexamined in this discussion. Even if Nietzsche *is* being comedic in these moments, it is nevertheless difficult to accept Kirkland's claim that Nietzsche's comedic writing is "a rhetorical method for provoking his readers to their own self-examination" (p. 265). Even explicitly political satire that pokes fun at its audience rarely moves members to self-reflection, much less self-overcoming.

There are methodological ambiguities with the study as well. It is unclear why Kirkland focuses on the texts he does or what he believes the overall relationships among Nietzsche's texts to be (the *Antichrist[ian],* despite being listed in the bibliography, is not cited; the *Gay Science* is rarely mentioned—a noteworthy omission given the concluding emphasis on laughter and comedy). Similarly, Kirkland is attentive to Nietzsche's use of masks and his character Zarathustra to convey his philosophical teachings. But it would have been helpful if there had been an interpretive principle offered by which we might discern when Nietzsche is employing masks, which ones he is using, or at what purposes they might aim.

The relative silence on methodology may be symptomatic of the book's seeming Straussian orientation, which tends to avoid making explicit its own approach or presuppositions but is discernible by the familiar narrative wherein philosophers use deception to communicate appropriate lessons to more and less deserving audiences, the less deserving of whom must be lied to in order to produce desirable political outcomes. Kirkland's book deploys a version of this narrative with regard to Nietzsche and also privileges the Platonic Socrates as the exemplary philosopher, Plato as the relevant context for philosophical inquiry and Straussian readers as the relevant interlocutors. While there is nothing wrong with a study taking a particular methodological position or making certain assumptions, it is better to make these explicit and justify them. This is especially the case when these presuppositions seem at odds with Nietzsche's philosophy, as when Kirkland takes for granted the distinction between human and animal (pp. 166–67) or the self-evident baseness of bodily needs (pp. 232–33). Sometimes a single sentence will provide the grist for a very large mill of speculative philosophical association, little of which seems anchored in the text (see, e.g., the discussions of nature, p. 196, and Thucydides, pp. 201–2). The study would have benefited from stronger substantiation of claims that many readers of Nietzsche might find controversial (e.g., Nietzsche advances a state-of-nature theory of human history [pp. 182–83]; modern democracy is the most complete expression of *ressentiment* [p. 186]).

These omissions are significant because they undercut important points. For example, Kirkland overlooks Nietzsche's explicit contempt for Shakespeare (*Beyond Good and Evil,* §224) in his discussion of Shakespearean tragedy and comedy in Chapter 9. In analyzing Zarathustra's courtship of Life (personified as a woman), Kirkland might have taken into consideration the bulk of this scene—including Zarathustra's whip brandishing at her—before privileging its sentimental conclusion (pp. 171–72). And he correctly notes the psychological character of will to power but neglects the radical deconstruction of subjectivity that results from this claim, a critique that might undermine his conscious and purposive presentation of Nietzsche's activity and that of the new nobility.

In the end, *Nietzsche's Noble Aims* is certainly important as a contribution to the field of political readings of Nietzsche, and Nietzsche studies will benefit from the proliferation of such interpretations located explicitly in political

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theory. I think that Kirkland's contribution would have been strengthened had its methodology been more transparent; such a justification would have provided a more robust framework to support his ambitious interpretation of Nietzsche.

The Playing Fields of Eton: Equality and Excellence in Modern Meritocracy. By Mika LaVaque-Manty. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009. 248p. $60.00.
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— Andrei S. Markovits and Lars Rensmann, *University of Michigan*

This is a thought-provoking book in which the whole comprises less than the sum of its parts. We do not mean this as a slight because the parts are true gems. Mika LaVaque-Manty commences his work by introducing the reader to controversies among Enlightenment philosophers and reformers about the role of physical culture in educating children. Notions of intrinsic human dignity and autonomy—which are physical themselves—became salient in the Enlightenment. Immanuel Kant, for instance, viewed physical exercise, that is, "gymnastics in the strict sense," as a moral duty. We also learn that Kant, concerned with raising children to become self-directed adults, rejected leading strings, walking carts, and other artificial tools; he thought they would undermine physical self-cultivation. However, while many thinkers agreed on equality of opportunity in terms of a physical "baseline autonomy," plenty disagreed about the implications for moral autonomy and social mobility.

Chapter 2 delineates how modern claims to equality merge uneasily, and often in unpredicted ways, with ideals of autonomy and excellence. Here, LaVaque-Manty turns to the stubborn persistence of dueling—"dueling for equality," as he calls it—within the bourgeoisie. We learn how even Max Weber was ready to duel in defense of his wife's "good name" after she had been publicly attacked for organizing a feminist conference. The peculiar "moral economy" of dueling, so LaVaque-Manty argues, hinged on the defense of a person's full equality and dignity within broader social strata. Duels among bourgeois men articulated claims to their honor and autonomy that challenged the social order by expanding such prized values from the aristocracy to all (male) citizens. Duels are modern by dint of their quest for equality and independence. More important still, they create a "space for extralegal politics," where individuals exercise their autonomy and establish their personal dignity.

The second part of the book features themes that are central to our own work. Here, the author turns to a world in which the progenitors of professional sports, in upper-class England and beyond, modernized wild games into, well, sports. Chapter 3 deals with their rise in the nineteenth century, which was obsessed with physical culture. The author reconstructs disputes about "proper" physical prowess mirrored in athletes—Victorians, for instance, viewed the human body as a window to the soul—just as he uncovers the controversies surrounding the emerging ideal of the modern professional in offices and on the playing fields. Yet, especially to the aristocracy, the professional constituted a threatening figure because he [*sic*] represented social mobility and the struggle for a political "change in social values about respect-worthiness" (p. 103).

Amateurism, then, was an upper-class invention to exclude members of the lower social order from elite-defined games. But as Chapter 4 suggests, the working class had its own reason to be concerned about the professionalization of sports. Many socialists viewed sports as a capitalist leisure industry driven by competition—a tool for social control and a way to distract workers from egalitarian pursuits. However, this suspicion did not prevent the creation of working-class sports organizations that turned leisure activities into a political struggle for dignity and "made emancipation *physical*" (p. 115). Thus, sports emerged as a venue to disprove the alleged superiority of the ruling class by defeating it on the field.

The book's third part starts with a discussion of the contemporary politics of disability sports. LaVaque-Manty asks under which terms there can be a right to meaningful competition, given "that there are differences that make a difference in terms of excellence" (p. 133). Might "separate but equal" principles be the solution? He suggests that questions about the rules and classifications of competition cannot be settled by anything other than contingent reasons. Rules are, first and foremost, a matter of consensual agreement among participants.

Nothing, in our view, surpasses the book's final chapter featuring "the political theory of doping." In it, LaVaque-Manty discusses performance-enhancing pharmaceuticals, an integral part of twentieth-century sports. The role of pharmaceuticals in athletic contests once again illustrates deep tensions in our modern thinking about autonomy, fairness, and equality of opportunity. The boundaries of "artificial" remain context dependent but never arbitrary. The use of drugs presents a problem in a world where fairness constitutes the most salient norm of sports. Thus, we are much less bothered by doping's many adverse effects than we are by its alleged violation of our sense of fairness.

LaVaque-Manty's study engages diverse philosophical and societal debates about physical culture and sports. In so doing, it shows not only how these seemingly peripheral controversies reflect the emergence of modern political values of equality, autonomy, and excellence. The study also demonstrates how sports furnish a crucial arena in which we resolve tensions between these ever-contested ideals outside "official" political institutions. *The Playing Fields of Eton* offers a multitude of wondrous details and fresh, sometimes unsettling insights. Above all, the author makes political theorizing intriguing—and relevant. The

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