

for the twenty thousand representatives of the Polish state as well? Beria's words provide the answer: the Stalinists, who only shortly before had killed hundreds of thousands of their citizens in the mass operations of the Great Terror, saw them as enemies who could not be reformed and hence had to die. That the POWs did all they could to make a nuisance of themselves, insisting on their rights as prisoners of war and arrogantly confronting their interrogators with self-confident Polish nationalism, only proved the point.

Weber's book provides little new information on the killing operations themselves, or their pre-history. Meanwhile, the chapter on Katyn at the Nuremberg trials is essential reading for any student of the early Cold War. Against the advice of the western Allies, the Soviets insisted on adding Katyn to the list of war-crimes prosecuted. Despite the continued good will of the other parties, this attempt to once and for all wash Stalinist hands of Polish blood turned into a major tactical blunder. When the defense found witnesses who disproved parts of the Soviet version, Stalin's legal team tried to prevent their appearance. This blatant attempt to turn Nuremberg into a show trial was too much for the western judges. The result was a major embarrassment for the Stalinists, and Katyn continued to linger in the polemical force field of the Cold War until the Soviets finally owed up to this past in 1990, a history Weber sketches in the final quarter of the book.

Overall, then, this is a useful book for anybody interested in the politics of political memory, the Nuremberg war crimes trials, and the early Cold War. Readers who want to inform themselves about the Katyn crimes are better served with Cienciala's standard edited volume.

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***Dealing with Dictators: The United States, Hungary, and East Central Europe, 1942–1989.*** By László Borhi. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2006. ix, 548 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. \$67.99, hard bound.

doi: 10.1017/slr.2017.294

László Borhi's thorough study of U.S. relations with Hungary and east central Europe builds on the works of Charles Gati, Stephen Kertesz, and other scholars of the early Cold War, with extensive documentation from US, Hungarian, and other European archives.

As D-Day approached in the summer of 1944, the western allies encouraged Hungary and Romania to defect from Adolf Hitler's orbit, hoping to divert German forces to the Balkans. Both countries wanted to curry favor with the west in part to bargain for Transylvania. Breaking with Hitler was fraught with danger, however, for as the Italian example in 1943 showed, German occupation would follow, with terrible consequences for the Hungarian people, especially Hungarian Jews. There was no hope for the western allies to liberate the Balkans. At the Moscow Conference in October 1944, Winston Churchill gave Iosif Stalin the green light to control the region, and the Red Army would enable him to do that.

Borhi argues that Stalin intended to impose Soviet-friendly communist dictatorships in eastern Europe from the start. That was true in strategically-important Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, but the Soviets were willing to play a waiting game in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where they allowed free elections, fully expecting popular support for the communists. Stalin differentiated between his neighbors; it was not the case that "almost miraculously, Finland was released from Moscow's grasp" (84). Finland was simply not vital to Soviet security.

Borhi deemphasizes western actions in Stalin's decision to give the Hungarian and Czechoslovak communists the go ahead to take power in 1947 and 1948, but Churchill's warning about an "Iron Curtain" descending on eastern Europe, Harry Truman's adoption of a containment policy, and the Marshall Plan (including aid to the western zones of Germany) accelerated the Kremlin's timetable.

Borhi is on solid ground in his critique of US policy in the mid-1950s. Although in 1952 Dwight Eisenhower had run on a commitment to liberate the Soviet satellites, Borhi reveals that the Kremlin knew that the United States would take no military action to support the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Radio Free Europe (RFE) broadcasts promising support—which was not to come—were not coordinated with the State or Defense Departments.

The lack of coordination and ineffectiveness of US policy in 1956 continued for the next several decades. Washington had a few weak cards to play: most-favored-nation status and increased trade, the return of the Crown of St. Stephen, and loans. Borhi argues persuasively that trade and cultural exchanges were more effective in undermining communist rule than diplomatic isolation and an economic embargo, which only hurt the Hungarian people.

In the 1970s, Romania, Poland, and Hungary became Washington's favored Warsaw Pact countries, Romania for its deviation from the Kremlin's foreign policy line, Poland and Hungary for their economic reforms and relative cultural openness. In the 1980s, the brutality of the Nicolae Ceausescu regime and the suppression of Polish Solidarity were met with sanctions from Washington, while Hungarian leader János Kádár was rewarded with MFN status and the return of the Crown of St. Stephen. Hungary allowed the opening of an American library in Budapest, and Radio Free Europe eschewed propaganda in favor of playing popular rock and roll and other western programming that kept Hungarians longing for the amenities on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

Borhi contends that US engagement policy had an important impact on exposing the sclerosis of the Soviet bloc dictatorships. Relations between Washington and Budapest normalized, something Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and even Ronald Reagan promoted. However, Borhi is critical of realist US policymakers who accepted a Europe of two blocs as the lesser of two evils, for fear of nationalist conflicts.

What brought down communist rule in 1989? Borhi acknowledges that Mikhail Gorbachev's renunciation to use force to prop up the communist regimes was decisive, although Gorbachev wanted to maintain the Soviet sphere of influence. Borhi emphasizes the efforts of the Hungarians themselves to create a multi-party system. George H.W. Bush has been largely praised for his cautious policies toward the revolutions of 1989, not wanting to provoke the Soviets toward armed intervention. Borhi is less enthusiastic about Bush's lack of a bold policy to back the Hungarian reformers.

While one can quibble about some of Borhi's interpretations, and the lack of Soviet documents that would provide evidence of the Kremlin's policies, this invaluable reference work belongs on the library shelf of any Cold War scholar.

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***In the Name of the Great Work.*** Ed. Doubravka Olšaková. New York: Berghahn Books, 2016. x, 311 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Index. Tables. \$120.00, hard bound. doi: 10.1017/slr.2017.295

The harsh policies that the Bolsheviks imposed on the Soviet Union for *raison d'état* were, as a rule, much less defensible when applied to the other countries of eastern